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Introduction: individuals and institutions in 
medieval scholasticism∗
Antonia Fitzpatrick and John Sabapathy
This volume has three purposes. It gathers together a wide range of current 
approaches analysing the relationship between individuals, institutions 
and medieval scholasticism; it sets them in a broad historiographical 
frame; and through these it suggests an agenda for future work in relation 
to these subjects. It does that by bringing together a range of important 
perspectives, including many not well known within Anglophone circles. 
This introduction sets a number of them out at length. An afterword by 
David d’Avray offers suggestions for agendas to be extended. The editors 
offer suggestions themselves below. 
A miniature portrait in a landscape: Richard Southern
A very helpful way of opening out the issues and problems in which we are 
interested can be provided by considering the work of one of the greatest 
medieval historians of the twentieth century, partly because his distinctive 
interpretations remain of great interest, partly because he exemplified a 
number of wider currents. Sir Richard Southern (1912–2001) began and 
ended his intellectual life writing about scholasticism, both in relation to 
specific individuals’ thinking and in relation to wider patterns of thought 
and the social structures underlying them.1 In particular, Southern’s work 
helpfully reflects a wider tendency to separate phenomena which in this 
volume we wish to connect. These are: work on the substance of individuals’ 
thought (e.g., Southern’s work on Anselm or Grosseteste’s thought); work 
* Our thanks to David d’Avray for comments on a earlier draft of this.
1 See the last quarter of R. W. Southern, The Making of the Middle Ages (London, 1953), 
St. Anselm and His Biographer (Cambridge, 1963); and the unfinished trilogy on Scholastic 
Humanism and the Unification of Europe (2 vols, Oxford, 1995–2001). For Southern see A. 
Murray, ‘Richard William Southern’, Proc. Brit. Academy, cxx (2003), 413–42; A. Boureau, 
‘Richard Southern: a landscape for a portrait’, Past and Present, clxv (1999), 218–29; and R. 
Bartlett’s introduction to History and Historians: Selected Papers of R. W. Southern, ed. R. J. 
Bartlett (Oxford, 2004), pp. 1–10. 
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on wider intellectual practices and also schools and intellectual groupings 
(e.g., his work on ‘scholastic humanism’; his argument that there was no 
school of Chartres); and, finally, work on the administrative organization 
which structured, enabled and/or constrained this thought (e.g., his work 
on ecclesiastical government; his argument that Grosseteste’s writings 
are incompatible with an Oxford/Paris formation and therefore prove an 
English provincial education). All these we sketch below. 
Southern’s writings, then, present a nuanced picture of how he thought 
individuals and institutions interacted in medieval scholasticism and can 
provide the point of departure for our wider consideration of the recent 
historiography. It is a mark of their interest, weight and force that sixteen 
years after his death they remain one of the great syntheses with which 
it is worth engaging. Southern alternated between the close-up and the 
panorama. On the one hand, there are the portraits of the ecclesiastics 
and thinkers Anselm of Aosta/Bec/Canterbury (c.1033–1109) and Robert 
Grosseteste (c.1170–1253). On the other, there are the much larger landscapes 
in which such writers thrived: first, Western Society and the Church in the 
Middle Ages (1970) and the unfinished project on scholastic humanism. 
It is these latter which are most ‘institutional’ –  but they are such only 
in some respects and, in part, negatively so. Western Society was the book 
Southern said he enjoyed writing least. Not coincidentally, it is also the 
most conventionally ‘institutional’, dealing with the development of 
ecclesiastical organization between c.700 and c.1520 (it was a volume in the 
‘Penguin History of the Christian Church’, definitionally ‘Institutional’). 
There is discussion of ‘thought’ here, but it is diffused through the whole 
or sneaks in through individual pen portraits (of Archbishop Eudes 
Rigaud or Grosseteste). ‘Administering’ and ‘thinking’ appear as oil and 
water in consequence. The two volumes of Scholastic Humanism and the 
Unification of Europe establish a more comfortable ‘institutional’ register. 
If Western Society is institutional largely in an (ecclesiastical) organizational 
sense, Scholastic Humanism is institutional in the sense of describing the 
intellectual practices its protagonists developed. It is these that are orientated 
towards exploring and asserting the fundamental dignity of human nature, 
its right ordering and its enrichment through the cultivation of human 
and divine friendship. The overwhelming focus is on the intellectual 
disciplines developed for these purposes: institutions-qua-practices. Here is 
the canonist Gratian’s ‘integration of doctrine and law’; the exegete Anselm 
of Laon’s move ‘from glosses to sententiae’; the subsequent ‘stumbling’ ‘from 
sentences to system’; the ‘great achiever’ Peter Lombard’s re-organizing of 
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theological commentary.2 Institutions-qua-organizations are here, but 
somewhat negatively. Some inhibit thought, others do not exist, a select 
few enable. The school of Laon’s inability to expand, given its finite hill-
top location, is described; the existence of any ‘school of Chartres’ is given 
a final savaging (a long-running debate between Southern, Peter Dronke 
and others); the practical problems with cathedral schools are described; 
the need for curriculum organization at Paris is analysed. A core narrative is 
the institutional clearing of the ways which led to the eventual ascendancy 
of Paris, an ascendancy Southern sadly never fully described since it would 
have formed a pivot in the never-completed third volume. That absence 
inadvertently contributes to the absence of institutions-qua-organizations, 
since chronologically this volume would have contained Southern’s account 
of how universities regulated themselves and were regulated from Robert 
of Courson’s 1215 rules, Gregory IX’s 1231 bull Parens scientiarum, to the 
1277 condemnations of various Aristotelian teachings in the arts faculty.3 
It is fair to say, however, that (a) comments about such organizational 
underpinnings could already have been made for twelfth-century Bologna 
in earlier volumes; and (b) their absence may point partly towards Southern’s 
thematic, disciplinary and geographical preferences: namely, intellectual 
practices, theology and Paris. Nevertheless, it is clear that volume three 
would have stressed the organizational institutionalization which produced 
the dominance of Paris, even if only to argue for its negative intellectual 
effects. A core of that criticism is clear from Robert Grosseteste, in which a key 
argument is that Grosseteste’s ‘provincial’ English education accounts for 
his innovative work across multiple fields, work which could not have been 
well countenanced by the disciplinary silos of Paris (or Oxford). Parisian 
hegemony entailed intellectual conservatism, in Southern’s account. If that 
critique relates to scholastic organizational institutionalization, our great 
loss is that we lack Southern’s full case for it as well as his case for the failure 
of his scholastic system as a set of institutionalized intellectual practices.
We stress ‘his’ because that narrative was sharp and particular. It had 
three stages: innovation, application, then disintegration.4 From c.1080 to 
1160 was the first period of heroism, ‘the essential period of innovation’, 
when ‘the scholastic method of absorbing, elaborating, Christianizing 
and systematizing the whole intellectual deposit of the Greco-Roman 
past to produce a complete body of doctrine about both the natural and 
2 The quotations are taken from subheadings in the books.
3 I. P. Wei, Intellectual Culture in Medieval Paris: Theologians and the University, c.1100–
1330 (Cambridge, 2012), ch. 3.
4 It would also have included a final, post-medieval ‘renewal’ of scholasticism.
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the supernatural worlds took place’.5 Scholastic theology then entered a 
‘placid phase in which it put on weight and grew in importance … without 
making any spectacular new advance or asking any new fundamental 
questions’.6 This period up to variously 1215 or 1250 saw ‘the theoretical 
work of scholars in the schools [turned] to practical use in government’.7 
Thereafter Southern’s history of scholastic humanism was one of ‘increasing 
difficulties encountered, especially from the middle of the thirteenth century 
onwards, by those who aimed to make the system complete in substance 
and operation’.8 Central to these difficulties was scholars’ compulsion for 
both completeness and order, since ‘systematization requires selection, 
selection requires omission, and omission impairs completeness’.9 Implicit 
anyway in even early scholastic sophistication was a tendency towards over-
elaboration, impenetrable private languages and the picking at ostensibly 
innocuous threads which would ultimately unravel the whole.10 This was so, 
furthermore, before the Aristotelian and Arabic textual influx of the later 
twelfth and thirteenth centuries which ‘opened up many new problems 
on which no generally agreed solutions appeared to be attainable’.11 Even 
at the very apex of their ‘comprehensive serenity’ – Southern suggested – 
it is not clear that the scholars’ confidence in their enterprise was well-
founded.12 This characterization has not carried universal assent by any 
means.  One might look to Alain Boureau for an alternative, much less 
negative account of the later chronology; or to John Marenbon for both a 
critique of Southern’s idea of ‘scholastic humanism’ per se and of his unitary 
model of scholasticism.13 
This is not the moment to seek to resolve such issues. Scholasticism itself 
can, of course, be defined in different ways, as much to do with how a group 
validates itself as the holders of knowledge as with the intellectual practices 
5 Southern, Scholastic Humanism, i. 6.
6 Southern, Scholastic Humanism, ii. 145. 
7 Southern, Scholastic Humanism, ii. 152. A synecdoche for what would have been 
Southern’s later judgement on the happiness of the marriage between learning and 
government in the 13th century can be found in his Robert Grosseteste: the Growth of an 
English Mind in Medieval Europe (2nd edn, Oxford, 1992), pp. 270–81, 285–91.
8 As volume 3 was previewed on the hardback cover of Scholastic Humanism, ii.
9 Scholastic Humanism, ii. 54. 
10 Respectively: Scholastic Humanism, ii. 23, 130, 118.
11 R. W. Southern, ‘The changing role of universities in medieval Europe’, Hist. Research, 
lx (1987), 133–46, at p. 138.
12 Southern, Scholastic Humanism, ii. 47, on the biblical Glossa ordinaria.
13 A. Boureau, La Raison scolastique (4 vols, Paris, 2006–16); J. Marenbon, ‘Humanism, 




they then carry out.14 We find the following definition by Riccardo Quinto 
helpful, which focuses on scholasticism as a set of intellectual practices. 
Scholasticism following Quinto’s ‘ideal type’ is a ‘certain way of reading 
texts’. This ‘way’ [modo], Quinto suggested, comprised the following: (1) an 
‘objective’ engagement with texts ‘independent of the subjective conditions 
of the commentator’, that is, not primarily concerned with a ‘subjective’ 
personal, spiritual engagement – as in monastic texts; (2) texts are subject to 
an analytical reading, with ‘individual statements’ compatibility established 
though dialectical means’; (3) the text’s value comes wholly from its truth-
value and not from its ‘own’ interest or purpose – to that degree it produces 
knowledge (scientia), ‘an ensemble of propositions guaranteed by their 
conformity to an authoritative text, yet integrated in a new ensemble in 
which their legitimacy and reciprocal connection shines in an even clearer 
way’.15 We wonder about the first proposition insofar as it seems there are 
scholastic texts (e.g., Bonaventure’s Journey into the Mind of God) which are 
both ‘scholastic’ and meditative, but we nevertheless find this ‘ideal type’ 
dynamically useful. (Isabel Iribarren’s chapter on Jean Gerson’s poem the 
Josephina in this volume also raises important questions about this facet of 
the ideal type.) We would stress two further aspects.16 First, scholasticism’s 
modo was conspicuously world-facing as well as revealed-truth-reconciling. 
Scholastic thinking was not cloistered in an ivory tower. On the contrary, 
its influence was a function of its utility and applicability well outside 
the schools.17 This volume, then, pointedly emphasizes the extension of 
scholasticism’s institutional role far beyond academic ‘disputed questions’. 
Second, and correlated, the range of subject matter and fields of action 
addressed by scholasticism was accordingly vast and certainly not restricted 
to theology or philosophy. The chapters which follow deliberately reflect 
this. Without aiming to be comprehensive, our chapters show the place 
of scholastic ‘trouble-shooting’ in law and inquisition, for instance, just as 
much as in theology; in poetry as well as history; and in targeting problems 
ranging from the concrete and particular to the abstract and general. In 
what follows we now review important relevant historiographical trends 
14 C. König-Pralong, Le bon usage des savoirs (Paris, 2011), pp. 290–4. 
15 Summarizing R. Quinto, Scholastica. Storia di un concetto (Subsidia Mediaevalia 
Patavina, ii, Padua, 2001), pp. 416–17. See further D. L. d’Avray, Medieval Religious 
Rationalities: a Weberian Analysis (Cambridge, 2010), pp. 70–6. Translations in this chapter 
are by the authors unless otherwise specified.
16 See also Emily Corran’s comments on Quinto in her chapter in this volume at pp. 220, 
233–4; and David d’Avray’s comments in his afterword at pp. 271–2.
17 D’Avray’s comments on preaching in the afterword to this volume at p. 276 may also 
be thought of in this context. 
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and then return to those areas marked out above –  namely individuals, 
schools and, finally, institutions as both practices and organizations.
Perspectives and premises
What is one interested in?
This book is interested in the back-and-forth relationship between individual 
thinkers and the various institutional contexts in which their thought was 
produced and by which it may have been inflected. It is obvious that the 
parameters of one’s interests and axioms radically predetermine and alter 
the history one writes. In the history of philosophy alone, for example, 
there are a variety of possible approaches.18 
A particularly insightful way of encapsulating this plurality was suggested 
by David d’Avray over thirty years ago. He suggested that, among the subjects 
grouped under ‘the history of ideas and attitudes’, one could differentiate 
between history which was principally interested in (1) the history of original 
ideas; (2) ideology and social development; (3) ‘ordinary’ beliefs.19 This 
schema remains very helpful – though one might want to make explicit that 
(1) also contains the history of philosophy as a set of disciplinary interests.20 
Of course, historians have sometimes interested themselves in more than 
one in the same instance. However, part of our point in using Southern as a 
point of departure is that more often than one might expect these interests 
have been canalized in a rather artificial way. We may, say, be interested 
in Dominican thought, but what we want to do with that thought may 
vary. We may be mostly interested in how theological ideas played out in 
identity formation for a group; why Dominican organizational life seemed 
so much less painful than the Franciscans’; how to isolate those aspects 
of inquisitorial procedure which are intellectually ‘Dominican’ in order to 
differentiate what, within inquisitorial depositions, may be ‘Dominican’ 
and what may be ‘irreducibly’ heretical. Three contributors to this volume 
have addressed each of these respective questions (Fitzpatrick, Melville, 
Biller), but it is an obvious truth that the complexity of Dominican life as 
18 C. König-Pralong, ‘L’histoire de la philosophie médiévale depuis 1950: méthodes, 
textes, débats’, Annales, lxiv (2009), 143–69; É. Anheim, A. Lilti and S. van Damme, ‘Quelle 
Histoire de la philosophie?’, Annales, lxiv (2009), 5–11.
19 D. L. d’Avray, The Preaching of the Friars: Sermons Diffused from Paris Before 1300 
(Oxford, 1985), pp. 258–9.
20 Given its most ‘institutional’ form in Anglophone historiography in The Cambridge 
History of Later Medieval Philosophy: from the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration 
of Scholasticism, 1100–1600, ed. N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny, J. Pinborg, with E. Stump 
(Cambridge, 1982); and in a slightly different way in its successor volume The Cambridge 
History of Medieval Philosophy, ed. R. Pasnau with C. van Dyke (2 vols, Cambridge, 2010).
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it was experienced by medieval Dominicans intertwined all these facets of 
institutional and intellectual life and more. 
These are not either/or alternatives: all are important. Accordingly, 
we have not sought to even out differences of approach so much as 
to showcase what each offers. This volume seeks to think further about 
these interconnections, the reciprocal relationship between individual and 
institution and the thinking the latter produced. As Nathalie Gorochov said 
apropos the University of Paris, ‘no text without context then, but equally 
[scholastic] works themselves are liable to reflect the institutional, political, 
social, and religious stakes which galvanize the history of the university’.21
The history of medieval thought on whose terms?
The moment for undertaking such an exercise seems propitious across a 
range of historiographies which are different both in geographical origin 
and historiographical style. We have already alluded to the obvious fact that 
the sorts of ambition one has for an intellectual history very significantly 
alter the resulting account. Peter Biller has recently argued that it is worth 
thinking again about Antonio Gramsci as a mediator in connecting 
intellectuals with their various contexts.22 Biller suggests there was a road 
not taken after the 1970s with respect to constructing stronger analytical 
models which put intellectuals in a better-rooted, sociological context; and 
the present seems a good time to review this.23 Gramsci certainly furnished 
some of the moving parts which drive the engine of what is still one of 
the most stimulating essays on the subject of ‘intellectuals in the middle 
ages’: Jacques Le Goff’s book of 1957, revised in 1985.24 That argument 
– elegantly compressed by Alain Boureau and compatible with Southern’s 
– was a three-act tragedy of individuals devoured by the institution which 
also empowered them, the university: 
21 N. Gorochov, Naissance de l’université: les Écoles de Paris d’Innocent III à Thomas d’Aquin 
(v. 1200–v. 1245) (Paris, 2012), p. 23.
22 P. Biller, ‘Intellectuals and the masses: oxen and she-asses in the medieval Church’, 
in The Oxford Handbook of Medieval Christianity, ed. J. H. Arnold (Oxford, 2014), pp. 
323–39, at pp. 335–6. See also J. L. Nelson, ‘Organic intellectuals in the Dark Ages?’, History 
Workshop Jour., lxvi (2008), 1–17 (on Gramsci).
23 There is plainly work which does this (e.g., R. I. Moore’s), but it seems to us there 
remains room for further differentiation of intellectuals with respect to different forms of 
power. 
24 J. Le Goff, Les Intellectuels au Moyen Âge (Paris, 1957). For Gramsci’s further influence 
here see G. Tabacco, ‘Gli intellettuali del medioevo nel giuoco delle istituzioni e dalle 
preponderanze sociali’, in Storia d’Italia, Intelletuali e potere, ed. R. Romano and C. Vivanti 
(Annali, iv, Turin, 1981), pp. 7–46.
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[T]he twelfth century, full of promise and disinterested enthusiasm, sees the 
birth of the hero of the intellect; the thirteenth century sees a twist in the 
plot: the intellectual falls into the trap of the institution of the university, 
encountering the constraints of authority, which he does not always resist. The 
‘internal contradictions’ of the university intellectual harden, at the end of the 
century, into the ‘double truth’, philosophical and theological. The play, in 
the fourteenth century, ends badly: internal conflicts produce patent divorces, 
between faith and reason, between knowing and teaching, between the critical 
spirit and careerist flattery.25 
The immediate point is this: Le Goff’s (and Biller’s) sociological history of 
intellectuals is only one possible frame which could be chosen for something 
which contributed to ‘a history of medieval thought’. The degree to which 
Le Goff privileged the university as the relevant space in which such an 
intellectual history played itself out is made clear by the vigorous ‘counter’-
thesis and paradox of Alain de Libera in 1991: intellectuals as intellectuals could 
only freely and properly develop once university activities were extended 
outside the university, since there intellectual activities and identities could 
flourish independently of that institutionalized setting. Condemnations 
such as Étienne Tempier’s 1277 censure of various Aristotelian positions 
being taught in the Paris arts faculty acted as a goad to thought. Censure 
ultimately played a useful role; and the leaking of intellectual activity 
outside universities ultimately produced ‘the intellectual’.26 (One notes 
that here universities are still given a very privileged space in terms of the 
sheer possibility of thinking at all in these middle ages.) ‘Intellectuals’ as 
a category – argued de Libera – were therefore closely connected with the 
deprofessionalization of philosophy.
Such a critique indeed takes many of Le Goff’s starting premises for 
granted.27 However, historians of philosophy might critique the ‘ideas in 
context’ of Les Intellectuels au Moyen Âge for being long on context and 
personalities and short on ideas.28 Historians of philosophy might be more 
interested in the ideas than their authors.29 The history of philosophy, 
however, can be written with different accents. The history of philosophy 
25 A. Boureau, ‘Intellectuals in the middle ages, 1957–1995’, in The Work of Jacques Le Goff 
and the Challenges of Medieval History, ed. M. Rubin (Woodbridge, 1997), pp. 145–55, at p. 
147. For a variant stressing earlier ‘colour’ and plasticity, see F. Rexroth, Fröhliche Scholastik. 
Die Wissenschaftsrevolution des Mittelalters (Munich, 2018).
26 A. de Libera, Penser au Moyen Âge (Paris, 1991), pp. 12–13, 349–51. For the role of 
censure and self-policing in shaping Parisian thought between 1200 and 1250, see Gorochov, 
Naissance de l’université.
27 Pointed out by Boureau, ‘Intellectuals in the middle ages’, pp. 150–1.
28 See de Libera, Penser au Moyen Âge, p. 75. 
29 König-Pralong, ‘L’histoire de la philosophie médiévale’.
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stresses a continuous history of philosophical interests as validated by 
contemporary philosophers (ethics, metaphysics, philosophy of language 
etc.). It may also seek to show the ongoing resonance of medieval philosophical 
formulations as a resource for contemporary philosophy. This, however, 
may require taking it some considerable distance from its medieval setting-
in-life (Sitz im Leben). The history of philosophy might be denatured by 
such an enterprise. Thus John Marenbon (another contributor here), while 
sympathetic to and practitioner of such methods, has nevertheless argued 
that the re-tooling of medieval philosophical formulations so as to make 
them fit for modern philosophical use may cause significant problems from 
a historian’s perspective. Damage may be done to the history of philosophy. 
One may give a precision to a medieval argument which was lacking, 
unnecessary, in its medieval formulation. Restating medieval formulations 
using the symbols of modern propositional logic produces a ‘deformation 
of the historical truth’. Finally, applying the interpretative principle of 
charity to such thought, whereby the most coherent and least problematic 
interpretation is always preferred, is ‘not a good method to arrive at a fair 
understanding of that which a past philosopher actually thought’.30 
Elsewhere, Marenbon has helpfully suggested one might study 
‘antiquated philosophy’ for at least six reasons which sometimes intertwine 
(this intersects with and extends d’Avray’s model above). In summary, 
these are: (1) because its philosophical content may help the progress of 
contemporary philosophers; (2) because, as history, intellectual history is as 
interesting as the next sort of history; (3) this, however, requires a division 
of labour in which the history of philosophy provides an ‘internal history’ 
for philosophers while the history of ideas offers a more ‘external’ history 
of wider interest; (4) really great philosophers perennially merit study as 
exemplars of thinking philosophically, though arguably few medieval 
philosophers would make the canon; (5) like great works of literature, 
anyone interested in understanding the heights of human culture should 
read its great philosophical works (again the question of what counts is 
begged); (6) reading antiquated philosophy challenges what we might 
conceive of as valid philosophy precisely because it operated differently 
from what we hold philosophy to be.31
30 J. Marenbon, Le temps, l’éternité et la prescience de Boèce à Thomas d’Aquin (Paris, 2005), 
ch. 6. The quotations are from pp. 164, 168.
31 Summarizing J. Marenbon, ‘Why study medieval philosophy?’, in Warum noch 
Philosophie? Historische, systematische und gesellschaftliche Positionen, ed. M. van Ackeren, T. 
Kobusch and J. Müller (Berlin/New York, 2011), pp. 65–78, at pp. 66–72.
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The ‘return’ of institutions and organizations
If it is to introduce the historiographical context of the present volume 
as it relates to intellectuals, this introduction should do something similar 
with respect to ‘institutions’, which have been less fashionably the focus 
of post-war historical study, be those institutions constitutional, legal and 
ecclesiastical, administrative or economic. Such institutions saw a waning 
of an influence which had waxed strongest in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries and whose dominance itself largely evoked movements 
such as the Annales ‘school’. Southern himself acknowledged that Scholastic 
Humanism was in part a reaction against older institutional models.32
Southern’s rather negative approach to the role institutions played in 
constraining individual thought is best exemplified in his arguments about 
Grosseteste’s intellectual formation. Grosseteste was an extraordinarily 
wide-ranging thinker across a range of different intellectual, linguistic, 
scientific, mathematical, philosophical and theological traditions. In what 
institutional matrix should he be placed? A long-standing tradition suggested 
a Parisian and an Oxford one. Southern argued for a provincial English one. 
To look in Paris’s direction was to see Grosseteste ‘as a precursor of Albert 
the Great [d. 1280]; and I [Southern] look on him as an enlargement of 
Adelard of Bath’, the equally skilled interdisciplinary English intellectual 
of an earlier generation (d. c.1150).33 This remains a somewhat controversial 
interpretation and Southern restated it forcefully in the book’s second 
edition. Southern’s arguments are detailed and specific but his conclusion 
is this: 
We can say that Grosseteste’s pre-1225 works were scientific; that, with the 
possible exception of his Commentaries on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics and 
Physics, which probably belong to the years after 1220, they show no sign of 
having been written in or for the schools; that several seem to be written to 
clear his own mind. These works also show a progression from the calendar to 
astronomy and astrology, and then to the study of the great texts on scientific 
method (Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics) and the origin of motion in the universe 
(Aristotle’s Physics). So the evidence of his writing from 1200 to 1225 suggests 
the development of a scientist in the tradition of Adelard of Bath turning into 
a philosopher of science … Such evidence as we have, therefore, both about his 
physical whereabouts and about his writings, places him in the line of English 
scientists working in relatively humble administrative position in some kind of 
32 Southern’s ‘author response’ to D. L. d’Avray, ‘Review of Scholastic Humanism and 
the Unification of Europe. Volume I: Foundations’, Reviews in History, xiii (1996) <http://
www.history.ac.uk/reviews/review/13> [accessed 13 June 2016]. Cf. Gorochov’s reflections in 
Naissance de l’université, pp. 15–22.
33 Southern, Robert Grosseteste, p. lvi. 
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association with the diocesan administration of Hereford, which was also an 
outstanding centre of scientific study at the time when Grosseteste went there.34
In other words, one apparently marginal institutional setting (Hereford) 
enabled an interdisciplinary creativity which would have been quite 
impossible within the ostensibly obvious places for such study (Paris, 
Oxford). Grosseteste’s work before 1220 ‘showed no clear signs of a scholastic 
background and give no indication of theological study or training’.35
In this case, the institutional margins are where this important and 
innovative work can happen, not the centre. This is no rule, however, 
demonstrating the iron inflexibility of university syllabuses, a black mark 
against scholasticism’s institutions; it is simply what happened in this 
case. Indeed arguments have been made that Grosseteste could have had 
a Parisian intellectual formation.36 This would be interesting not because 
Southern would then be wrong, but because of how he would be wrong. 
Southern’s axiomatic argument was that Grosseteste’s interdisciplinary 
freewheeling was incompatible with a highly regulated, scholastic milieu 
(Paris). If Grosseteste can be shown to have had Parisian formation, it 
makes Southern’s underlying argument about institutional formation 
highly overdetermined.37 
Southern’s reaction against an over-privileging of institutions can be 
usefully connected with more recent approaches which stress the variability 
of what particular institutional spaces enable or constrain. Étienne Anheim, 
for instance, has called for better ‘topographies of institutions’.38 He 
argues that not all positions in an institutional space are equivalent and 
they change over time. The intellectual pope Clement VI (1342–52) can 
prove a decisive figure in reconfiguring papal authority at the centre of the 
papacy because he is at the centre of the papacy.39 This sounds obvious, but 
it need not be. The history of the western Church suggests that after the 
Gregorian reforms ‘the closer one is to the centre the greater one’s capacity 
to transgress or innovate becomes … – Franciscanism takes off when Pope 
34 Southern, Robert Grosseteste, pp. lix–lx. 
35 Southern, Robert Grosseteste, p. xxviii.
36 N. Schulman, ‘Husband, father, bishop? Grosseteste in Paris’, Speculum, lxxii (1997), 
330–46.
37 John Marenbon’s article in this volume is an especially subtle exploration of the limits 
and promise of ‘institutional’ explanations in this spirit.
38 É. Anheim, ‘Le pape et les artistes au milieu du XIVe siècle. Réflexions sur les notions 
d’actueur et d’institution’, Circé, i (2012) <http://www.revue-circe.uvsq.fr/le-pape-et-
les-artistes-au-milieu-du-xive-siecle-reflexions-sur-les-notions-dacteur-et-dinstitution/> 
[accessed 11 July 2019].
39 É. Anheim, Clément VI au travail. Lire, écrire, prêcher au XIVe siècle (Paris, 2014), p. 352. 
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Innocent III (1198–1216) decides to protect it, and one could suggest that 
Boniface VIII (1295–1303) was the best placed, paradoxically, to doubt the 
Christian faith’.40 Anheim suggested that the situation with respect to the 
court is the opposite: ‘peripheral positions in relation to the court, where 
the dependence [on the institution] is relative, as for Petrarch [at Avignon], 
are the topographical positions with the strongest innovative capacity’:
Not all institutions, each in relation to the other, give the same space to actors’ 
practices [i.e., scope for action]; furthermore, at the heart of each institution 
not all the positions for the actors give the same possibilities in terms of the 
game [i.e., the rules of the game]. To produce a repertoire of these internal and 
external differences would be to imagine in general a topography of institutions, 
taking into account the fact that the relationship between actor and institution 
is not fixed. This would help to historicize these two notions where generalities 
sometimes risk enclosing the historian in proofs which are all too predictable.41 
What institutions do is neither constant nor a given: they both enable and 
constrain, but how they do so always requires analysis and attention to time, 
place and individuals. The complexity of the dialectic between individual 
and institution may be vertiginous. One forceful example is the Avignonese 
papal penitenciary Opicino de Canistris (1296–c.1354), whose idiosyncratic 
psychosexual Mediterranean maps and registers, Sylvain Piron has argued, 
are an inverted response to the institutions which shaped him. Like Kafka’s 
‘K’, he is the ‘unhappy bureaucrat who cannot stop himself from loving 
the institution which destroys him’.42 Opicino, for all his idiosyncrasies – 
because of all his idiosyncrasies – is in some sense a symptom of his own 
institutions.43
An inverse pendant to Opicino’s exceptional idiosyncrasy, stressing 
intellectual anonymity, is Ulla Kypta’s recent account of the agency of 
countless nameless, literate and numerate clerks of the English royal 
exchequer in the twelfth century.44 This is, in fact, as ‘intellectual’ an 
40 Anheim, ‘Pape et les artistes’, developing an idea of Jean Coste. 
41 Anheim, ‘Pape et les artistes’.
42 S. Piron, Dialectique du monstre. Enquête sur Opicino de Canistris (Brussels, 2015), p. 
174. 
43 Cf. K. Achams’s statement: ‘We are always already in institutions’ (Wir sind immer 
schon in Institutionen), cited in G. Melville, ‘Institutionen als geschichtswissenschaftliches 
Thema’, in Institutionen und Geschichte. Theoretische Aspekte und mittelalterliche Befunde, ed. 
G. Melville (Norm und Struktur, i, Cologne, 1992), pp. 1–24, at p. 17.
44 U. Kypta, Die Autonomie der Routine. Wie im 12. Jahrhundert das englische Schatzamt 
entstand (Historische Semantik, xxi, Göttingen, 2014). What follows draws on J. Sabapathy, 
‘Review, Ulla Kypta, Die Autonomie der Routine. Wie im 12. Jahrhundert das englische 
Schatzamt entstand’, German Hist. Institute London Bull., xxxviii.1 (2016), 40–6.
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institution as more recognizable ones and Kypta’s argument is as follows: it 
is fundamentally mistaken to think of kings and high-level administrators 
as the guiding hands and minds behind the innovative administrative 
development of the exchequer as a government department. They played no 
such role. Rather, agency belongs anonymously to the humble clerks who, 
through their many, small, repeated actions and modifications, created the 
exchequer-as-department, the unintended longer-term consequence of 
those same actions and their development of the technical language needed 
to articulate it to one another. This is the autonomy of exchequer routine, 
which develops its own agency à la genetic mutations which are at once 
random and preserved as a function of their fit within their environmental 
context. The resulting interpretation is effectively one about a kind of 
‘automatic government’: unconscious, impersonal, anonymous. The 
institution is the (anonymous) practice. However, between Opicino and 
the anonymous exchequer clerk, who was the more ‘institutionalized’, who 
the more ‘individualized’? Are idiosyncratic ‘one-offs’ more ‘individual’ by 
definition than ‘orthodox’ contributors to institutional practices? Might a 
‘conservative’ institutional enforcer such as Étienne Tempier not be both?45 
In recent decades European historians have found new ways to return to 
those older, important concerns, all the better for the collective time spent 
away from them.46 One might point to the Dresden-based ‘Forschungsstelle 
für Vergleichende Ordensgeschichte’ (FOVOG, Research Network for the 
Comparative History of Religious Orders), led by Gert Melville (another 
contributor), which has focused comparatively on the rationality and 
constitutional logics of a wide range of religious orders. The project ‘Power 
and Institutions in Medieval Islam and Christendom’ (PIMIC) focused 
on medieval institutional similarities and differences between western and 
Islamic countries.47 FOVOG has focused on recognizably ‘hard’ institutional 
45 F.-X. Putallaz, Insolente liberté. Controverses et condamnations au XIIIe siècle (Paris, 1995), 
pp. 58–64, 82–91. For the intellectual coherence of Tempier’s 1277 condemnations, see S. 
Piron, ‘Le plan de l’évêque. Pour une critique interne de la condamnation du 7 mars 1277’, 
Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales, lxxviii (2011), 383–415.
46 J. Sabapathy, Officers and Accountability in Medieval England 1170–1300 (Oxford, 
2014), with wider historiographical comment on the ‘new administrative history’ at pp. 
10–19. Important reflections on institutions and intellectuals include É. Anheim, ‘L’histoire 
intellectuelle du moyen âge, entre pratiques sociales et débats doctrinaux. Revue critique de 
la collection ‘Vestigia’ (Éditions du Cerf )’, Médiévales, xxxvii (1999), 151–63; and É. Anheim 
and S. Piron, ‘Le travail intellectuel au moyen âge’, Revue de Synthèse, cxxix (2008), 481–84, 
part of a special issue which we have found very helpful.
47 One product was: Diverging Paths? The Shapes of Power and Institutions in Medieval 
Christendom and Islam, ed. J. Hudson and A. Rodríguez (The Medieval Mediterranean, ci, 
Leiden/Boston, 2014).
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forms – religious orders; PIMIC on ‘structures or processes performed by 
social regularities, which do not simply flow from an addition of individual 
behaviours, but rather as the outcome of power struggles among multiple 
actors who shape institutions as arenas of social conflict and dispute’.48 
Kypta’s work on the exchequer comes out of a distinctive German tradition 
of historical semantics and conceptual history (Begriffsgeschichte).49 Art 
historians have analysed the institutional ‘content of the form’, examining 
the connections between corporate identity, memory and bureaucracy in 
images in charters, as well as in cartularies and charters themselves.50 Such 
work takes diplomatic (the history of formal texts and their rules) into new 
fields, building importantly on Michael Clanchy’s seminal contribution to 
the history of literacy and the written word.51 Many fields remain (we still 
need an intellectual history of registers and cartularies, for instance).52 
An especially vivid proof of the importance of these issues is that one 
of the most controversial medieval disputes of recent years has focused 
on institutionalization. The issue is heresy; and the core of the dispute is 
whether Cistercian and Dominican, as well as other, ‘secular’, theologians 
articulated so compelling a set of intellectual grids for perceiving heresy 
that inquisitors internalized them and projected them from the schools 
onto the world, reality notwithstanding, from the late twelfth century on. 
‘Cathars’, by this account, were the institutionalized tromp l’oeil produced 
by intellectual inquisitors. Whether or not one accepts these arguments, the 
issue concerns intellectuals’ creation of institutions which change reality.53 
Institutionalization plainly matters. We have, so far, briefly introduced 
intellectuals and institutions, key categories in this book. We turn now to 
unpacking the ‘question’ of individuals before thinking about how these 
elements can be understood to interlock and interact.
48 As was defined on the project website <http://pimic.eu/what/>. This is no longer live. 
For one successor development see the St Andrews Institute of Legal and Constitutional 
Research <https://ilcr.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk> [accessed 11 July 2019].
49 Kypta, Autonomie der Routine. 
50 J. Berenbeim, The Art of Documentation: Documents and Visual Culture in Medieval 
England (Toronto, 2015).
51 M. T. Clanchy, From Memory to Written Record: England, 1066–1307 (3rd edn, Chichester, 
2013 [1979]).
52 A valuable recent contribution is L’art médiéval du registre: Chancelleries royales et 
princières, ed. O. Guyotjeannin (Paris, 2018).






The history of ‘individuals’ and individualism in western liberal 
historiography has been extraordinarily shaped by somewhat uncritical 
contemporary valuations of ‘the individual’ and individualism, whether 
that historiography belongs to the 1860s or the 2010s.54 This is, perhaps, 
as unsurprising as it has become unhelpful –  but its contradictions are 
interesting. On the one hand, the roll-call of named medieval intellectuals 
includes a clutch who might even today muster a trace of popular recognition 
(just about): Augustine, Abelard, Aquinas, Dante, Ockham, Petrarch. These 
are unmistakably significant figures. On the other hand, there is a forceful 
argument that our ‘standard’ accounts of medieval thought are almost fatally 
reliant on a wildly distorted, partial picture of what the most important 
intellectual texts of the period were. A misplaced, ‘literary’ privileging of 
authorship means we seek to write a personalized history of this thought 
when, in fact, we must learn to write a history of influential texts about 
whose authors we often know nothing personal. The ‘death of the author’ is 
resurrected. In some cases much editing of manuscripts remains to be done. 
We have lists of works without authors and lists of authors without works, 
to paraphrase Alain de Libera.55 Texts are often individual and impersonal. 
Further, this is not something we must rectify, ‘not an accident or external 
catastrophe but the very essence of the matter’: the anonymous manner 
of copying manuscripts was a fundamental feature of such thinking and 
needs to be built into our accounts. (Recall Kypta above.) ‘To understand 
the history of thought as an anonymous history, such is, in our view, the 
first task of the medievalist’, de Libera argued.56 Yet – to join this with his 
other argument –  as ‘thought’ escaped from the universities it produced 
that egoist, the intellectual. The resulting paradox, according to de Libera, 
is that ‘the middle ages of the “intellectuals” was marked simultaneously by 
the invention of egoism and the effacement of the ego’.57 
The point can be exemplified through Peter Abelard (c.1079–1142), 
intellectually famous for his contribution to dialectic, individually famous 
54 For the 1860s see, of course, J. Burckhardt’s The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy, 
trans. S. G. C. Middlemore (London, 1990), on which see below; for the 2010s see, e.g., 
L. Siedentop, Inventing the Individual: the Origins of Western Liberalism (London, 2014). 
One exception to this general rule is J. Seigel, The Idea of the Self: Thought and Experience in 
Western Europe since the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge, 2005). 
55 de Libera, Penser au Moyen Âge, pp. 65–8.
56 de Libera, Penser au Moyen Âge, p. 67.
57 de Libera, Penser au Moyen Âge, p. 356.
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for seducing his pupil Heloise and the castration and flight which followed. 
Abelard is arguably a curious amalgam of excess and absence with respect 
to his individualism. Institutions play a non-accidental role. His History of 
My Calamities has been described as dramatizing a ‘conflict between the 
individual and the surrounding world, the institutions of the church to 
which the individual belongs’.58 The History is indeed a sequence of battles 
against intellectual antagonists (William of Champeaux, Anselm of Laon, 
Bernard of Clairvaux), nothing if not individualistic. Something of this 
mutability or volatility was sensed at the time. Bernard of Clairvaux said 
Abelard was ‘a man dissimilar from himself ’.59 Nonetheless, Aron Gurevich 
suggested, behind these antagonisms, Abelard’s ‘personality remains hidden 
behind a mask, or rather, behind several different masks, following on from 
another, which the philosopher saw fit to don’.60 One of Abelard’s teachers, 
Roscelin, said he did not know what to call Abelard since he was neither a 
cleric, a layman or a monk. Indeed, Abelard’s modern biographer Michael 
Clanchy persuasively constructed his life according to the sequence of roles 
Abelard assumed (master, logician, knight, lover, man, monk, theologian, 
heretic).61 To Roscelin’s retort Clanchy suggested the riposte that Abelard 
‘fitted none of these [Roscelin’s] roles because they were too restrictive’.62 
More positively, Caroline Walker Bynum said (at least of the History) that 
it ‘is really the story of the rise and fall of a type: “the philosopher”’.63 
Gurevich offered a more sociological solution: ‘[B]ecause of his new social 
status, which he tried to create for himself, [Abelard] was unable to integrate 
himself into any group’. Abelard exemplified a new type of individual, ‘the 
autonomous individual’.64
Nevertheless, in Gurevich’s account one cannot help but feel he is 
disappointed that Abelard did not do better at fully expressing himself 
beyond his masks. Did institutions, therefore, enable or inhibit Abelard? 
Historians of individualism sometimes seem unsure whether individuals’ 
58 A. Gurevich, The Origins of European Individualism, trans. K. Judelson (Oxford, 1995), 
p. 130.
59 Discussed in Gurevich, Origins of European Individualism, p. 143; M. T. Clanchy, 
Abelard: a Medieval Life (Oxford, 1997), pp. 18, 339–40.
60 Gurevich, Origins of European Individualism, p. 142. 
61 Clanchy, Abelard; see also J. Marenbon, The Philosophy of Peter Abelard (Cambridge, 
1997), p. 36.
62 Clanchy, Abelard, p. 332.
63 C. W. Bynum, ‘Did the twelfth century discover the individual?’, Jour. Eccles. Hist., 
xxxi (1980), 1–17. See also C. Morris, The Discovery of the Individual 1050–1200 (Toronto, 
1972), with which Bynum partly disagreed. Morris responded in ‘Individualism in twelfth-
century religion: some further reflections’, Jour. Eccles. Hist., xxxi (1980), 195–206.
64 Gurevich, Origins of European Individualism, p. 144.
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institutional contexts are the grit which produces the pearl or simply a stone 
inside the shoe. Much of the time interpretative problems arise precisely 
because of this idea of ‘free’ individuation, excessively idealized apart from 
a specific social context.65 Indeed, this, ultimately, is the problem with 
Gurevich’s wider history of the origins of European individualism (whence 
his account of Abelard). Gurevich was torn between historically relativistic 
and specific ways of expressing individualism (for him, e.g., the Icelandic 
Sagas) and a teleological, developmental model through which individuals are 
increasingly, absolutely, expressing themselves (where Abelard disappoints). 
By this yardstick, the middle ages are ultimately found wanting: ‘The 
system of values substantiated by medieval Christianity did not encourage 
men and women to proclaim and assert their individualities’. Gurevich’s 
assumption of how free such an assertion can ever be appears as remarkably 
unproblematized as his argument that medieval Christianity provided so 
necessary and restrictive an armature.66 In so far as Gurevich’s middle ages 
had individual high points, Augustine figures as the overwhelming peak, 
with Petrarch at the other end.67 Yet if even (!) Abelard somehow failed 
fully to discover his personality; if, between Augustine (d. 430) and Petrarch 
(d. 1376!!) the landscape of European individualism appears uninhabited, 
perhaps we are looking at a question mal posée? As many historians have 
pointed out, this way of thinking about discovering personality and a 
particular way of being individual imposes a highly static expectation of 
what ways of being individual ‘count’.
The mirage of the complete individual
One can critique the older argument which elevated the individual in other 
ways. Important and still influential presumptions were set out in Jacob 
Burckhardt’s hymn to the renaissance individual in The Civilization of the 
Renaissance in Italy (1860). Burckhardt’s deeply sociological account offered 
an explanation of why Italian city-states allegedly produced the individual. 
The argument can be compressed as follows: particularly in despotic city-
states but also in republics, the cult of the individual extended well beyond 
leaders who used it as a means of gripping power more tightly. Fostered 
by competition for favour and patronage, the renaissance state accordingly 
provided both space and stimulus for individual self-cultivation. This 
65 See Bynum, ‘Did the twelfth century discover the individual?’.
66 The point about reductive and essentializing characterizations of what Christianity 
inherently represses or enables is also made by J.-C. Schmitt, ‘La “découverte de l’individu”: 
une fiction historiographique’, in J.-C. Schmitt, Le corps, les rites, les rêves, le temps. Essais 
d’anthropologie médiévale (Paris, 2001), pp. 241–62, at p. 246. 
67 Gurevich, Origins of European Individualism, p. 150.
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individuation was not necessarily political since its articulation spread into 
private spheres, but in republics the effect was the same since competition 
for power and its subsequent exercise also provided a platform for 
individualism and self-differentiation.68 By contrast, in the middle ages 
both inward and outward aspects of self-consciousness were ‘dreaming or 
half-awake’ beneath a veil:
woven of faith, illusion and childish prepossession, through which the world 
and history were seen clad in strange hues. Man was conscious of himself only 
as a member of a race, people, party, family or corporation – only through some 
general category. But at the close of the thirteenth century Italy began to swarm 
with individuality; the ban laid upon human personality was dissolved; and a 
thousand figures meet us each in its own special shape and dress.69
In this negative stress on restrictive categories and groupings which inhibit 
the full articulation of individuality one sees the interpretation which had 
left its clear trace elements in Gurevich’s account and many others. One way 
of identifying what goes wrong here is to suggest that the historiographical 
ideal of what the individual ought to look like has not progressed very 
far beyond the model of nineteenth-century realist fiction, capable of 
dramatizing the relationship between inner and outer worlds. 
If, by contrast, Virginia Woolf ’s The Waves is a modernist literary account 
of consciousness, perhaps it is then interesting to ask what a modernist 
historiographical equivalent might look like. In many ways the dominance 
of traditional biography as the mode of studying the individual probably 
contributes to the conservatism analysed here. A modernist stress on 
permeability and flux is, of course, very much more in sympathy with 
modern brain science but also with more recent approaches to understanding 
specific forms of identity, such as gender.70 Piron’s reading of Opicino de 
Canistris, stressing his multiple, interpenetrating identities, might then 
be seen as a much more responsive development of such approaches (and 
contrasting with Gurevich, who also wrote on Opicino).71 
68 This is to compress Burckhardt, Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy, pp. 98–119. See 
also Schmitt, ‘“Découverte de l’individu”’, pp. 242–4.
69 Burckhardt, Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy, p. 98.
70 Contrast the reading of the ‘Montaillou’ deposition material of J. Fournier (e.g., on 
Arnaud de Verniolles) in J. H. Arnold, Inquisition and Power: Catharism and the Confessing 
Subject in Medieval Languedoc (Philadelphia, Pa., 2001), ch. 5; and E. Le Roy Ladurie, 
Montaillou. Village occitan, de 1294 à 1324 (Paris, 1975). 
71 Piron, Dialectique du monstre.
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Beyond false oppositions 
A second critique of the ‘old’ elevation of individuals was made by Caroline 
Walker Bynum – discussing twelfth-century religious and spiritual groups – 
and is worth revisiting. (Southern’s individualistic scholastic humanism, we 
should note, is one of the interpretations she critiqued for their privileging 
of internal mental space over external group.) Bynum’s argument had 
several key turns.
First, it is worth stressing Bynum’s focus on religious groups as a basis for 
individuals’ sense of selfhood. In modern, secularizing accounts religion 
often figures as a feature which must be sublimated before a more or less 
explicitly ‘full’ individualism can be achieved.72 This can be seen in the 
tendency (encouraged by Burckhardt) to align ‘secular’ with ‘renaissance’ in 
analyses of intellectual development.73 Yet, as Étienne Anheim has pointed 
out in relation to the impeccable renaissance and anti-scholastic figure of 
Petrarch, he could only articulate his individuality ‘on condition of having 
the humility to accept the Other (God, death) in himself ’. Petrarch’s 
version of self-expression is not a Cartesian cogito ergo sum but credo ergo 
sum. As Anheim suggested, one could write an equally true, parallel history 
of self-knowledge and the philosophy of conscience to the conventional, 
secularizing one which took full account of the role of religion.74
Second, a ‘Burckhardt-style’ opposition between group and individual is 
unhelpful. Medieval ‘individualism’ did not go hand-in-hand with declining 
group identity. On the contrary, the proliferation of reflections about the 
former was sharply aligned with the proliferation in number and form of the 
latter: ‘[I]t was characterized by the one because it was characterized by the 
other’.75 The individual understands him-her-self as such through a group’s 
72 L. Dumont, Essais sur l’individualisme. Une perspective anthropologique sur l’ideologie 
moderne (Paris, 1983), stresses the modern form and its medieval origins. See also D. 
Iogna-Prat, ‘Introduction générale: la question de l’individu à l’épreuve du Moyen Âge’, 
in L’individu au Moyen Âge. Individuation et individualisation avant la modernité, ed. B.-M. 
Bedos-Rezak and D. Iogna-Prat (Paris, 2005), pp. 7–32.
73 E.g., R. G. Witt, The Two Latin Cultures and the Foundation of Renaissance Humanism 
in Medieval Italy (Cambridge, 2012).
74 É. Anheim, ‘Une lecture de Pétrarque. Individu, écriture, et dévotion’, in Bedos-Rezak 
and Iogna-Prat, L’individu au Moyen Âge, pp. 187–209, at pp. 206–7.
75 Bynum, ‘Did the twelfth century discover the individual?’, p. 3. See also Schmitt, 
‘“Découverte de l’individu”’, p. 255. Bynum was partly responding to Morris, Discovery of 
the Individual. Morris’s response in ‘Individualism in twelfth-century religion’ (esp. pp. 199–
205) generally accepted the importance of thinking about groups. Cf. Rexroth, Fröhliche 
Scholastik, for stress on group relations and their instrumental affinities in transforming 
early scholasticism.
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projection and validation of this.76 Further, the articulation of individualism 
was very frequently connected directly to fulfilment of a model and/or 
fulfilment of a type (‘fulfilment’, not ‘conformity’, since the question of 
how to fulfil the type was to be contested, as with the Franciscans on whom 
more below). A central insight of Bynum was that these models and types 
provided the means to articulate individuality with increasing granularity. 
Corporate and individual identity do not need to be opposed in this way. 
Institutionalization in different ways was how the groups gave shape to 
individuals.77 The medieval use and importance of models and types (those 
‘enemies’ of individual character!) can, in fact, provide an answer to what 
a modernist historiographical analogue of Woolf ’s The Waves might look 
like. It might, that is, look something like Jacques Le Goff’s Saint Louis 
(1996), a book which deconstructed the notion of the individual apart 
from the typological models (king, warrior, etc.) in relation to which he 
validated himself. This is a book, after all, which (in)famously asked: ‘Saint 
Louis – did he really exist?’ How, that is, can he be said to exist for us as a 
historical individual apart from the grids and characters through which he 
was expressed in the medieval sources? 
Exemplarity was central to Louis (as with the advice he gave to his 
children). Exemplarity-through-typology is also central to two of the 
greatest individualistic works of medieval literature: Dante’s Commedia 
(the categorization of damned to redeemed; the sorting by moral qualities; 
the mirroring of this by fitting contrapasso punishment); and Chaucer’s 
Canterbury Tales (the exploration and testing of character/vocational types; 
the exploration of their personae and their fallibilities). In terms of lived life, 
however, perhaps no more powerful or problematic model of exemplarity is 
available than Francis of Assisi. The whole purpose of Francis’s order was to 
exemplify the apostolic life and imitatio Christi, an exemplification which 
Francis’s stigmatization took to extremes. Francis was a man whose concern 
with being a model, being an example, being a pattern, is stressed again and 
again in texts close to his earliest entourage, such as the Writings of Brother 
Leo. It is present in Francis’s Testament, the unexploded bomb he left behind 
which would go on to blow up in the faces of a series of friars and popes in 
the later thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. The Testament, the rule-that-
was-not-a-Rule, would blow up so repeatedly precisely because it provided 
the nexus for conflict between Francis’s own exemplary manifestation and 
definition of what being a Franciscan meant in practice on the one hand 
76 Iogna-Prat, ‘La question de l’individu à l’épreuve du Moyen Âge’.




and what the Rule’s institutionalized version seemed to say on the other. 
The chapters by Sylvain Piron and Gert Melville look at the problem of 
religious orders (specifically mendicant ones) from these quite distinct 
angles. The Franciscans’ problem with their own institutionalization can, 
then, be reconnected to the problem which Bynum raised in her article but 
which, like Southern’s, remains unanswered:
No period was ever busier creating structures for its own piety than the 
twelfth century. My analysis therefore suggests that in order to understand 
the relationship between twelfth-century religion and the fifteenth-century 
‘Renaissance’ we need to ask more clearly than we have so far not only how 
twelfth-century attitudes lead into the self-awareness often associated with later 
periods but also how and why the twelfth-century equilibrium between self and 
community, interior and exterior, falters in the later Middle Ages.78
There are presumptions here one might want to question. Is the twelfth-
century’s equilibrium quite as clear as assumed here? Are later disequilibria 
quite as apparent as assumed? However, even if one wished to qualify 
the axioms, the fundamental grounds of Bynum’s question still demand 
answers. It is hoped that our focus on precisely this period – from the later 
twelfth century (Corran, Melville, Sabapathy) into the thirteenth (Corran, 
Sabapathy, Biller, Dufal, Fitzpatrick, Piron), fourteenth (Dufal, Kempshall, 
Linde) and fifteenth centuries (Iribarren, Marenbon) – will help to do so. 
Indeed, it is precisely this period’s proliferation of thought and practice 
regarding individuals and institutions which provides the rationale for our 
chronological focus. The chapters in this volume are intended to take us 
beyond unnecessary oppositions in general as well as taking forward a range 
of more detailed questions and problems. 
‘Schools’ and beyond
Richard Southern was keenly aware of the role of intellectual ‘schools’ in 
his own life. In his sensitive memoir of his friend Beryl Smalley Southern 
wrote that ‘she wanted to be remembered as a member of a group’.79 The 
importance of filiation extended to Southern’s own work. Michael Clanchy 
recalls talking to him near the end of his life about the origins of Scholastic 
Humanism. Of Southern’s two great teachers, Vivian Galbraith and Maurice 
Powicke, Clanchy suggested to Southern that Powicke must have been 
78 Bynum, ‘Did the twelfth century discover the individual?, p. 16. 
79 R. W. Southern, ‘Beryl Smalley (1905–1984)’, Proc. Brit. Academy, lxxii (1986), 455–71, 
including the photo of that group; repr. in Bartlett, History and Historians, pp. 235–9, at p. 
238.
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more influential on the project, given his own interest in scholasticism, as 
in his work on the theologian and archbishop Stephen Langton. Southern, 
however, was vehement in saying that it was all down not to Powicke but 
Galbraith, whom he praised elsewhere for unravelling ‘the significance 
of documents of modest size’ and throwing ‘light on the thoughts, 
circumstances, and difficulties in which they had their origin’.80 In fact, it 
is hard to see a better ‘model’ for Southern’s work on ‘scholastic humanism’ 
in its connecting of intellectual and ‘real world’ concerns than Powicke’s 
Stephen Langton, but Southern’s disavowal is nonetheless notable. Positive 
or negative, intellectual filiation – and its (mis)remembrance – mattered. 
Problems with schools
The genealogical master-pupil relationship provides one way of framing 
intellectual filiation for the period from the twelfth to the fifteenth centuries, 
but the question of what, if anything, constituted a medieval intellectual 
school is complex. Answers could range from a more or less loose network 
of shared interests, such as Peter the Chanter’s ‘biblical-moral’ Parisian 
tendency, to a Dominican studium in which a particular set of intellectual 
positions are sometimes assumed as a corollary of that membership. 
Within twentieth-century historical, and historical-theological, continental 
scholarship on scholasticism there was also a distinctive investigative 
thread which effectively confined itself to an ideological plane, searching 
for thirteenth-century intellectual schools as defined by individuals’ 
common subscription to discrete sets of doctrine. Much work was framed 
by researchers’ own beliefs; and while we would not want to be reductive 
about that, equally it seems foolish to ignore it. 
Southern took no part in this doctrinal approach to intellectual schools. 
We have already seen that he approached the medieval institutionalization 
of thought from a different angle. He also thought that ‘as a general 
rule, medieval historians do well to avoid words ending in “-ism”’,81 the 
exception being his own ‘scholastic humanism’. This continental tradition 
nevertheless left deep marks on historiography. The key questions here 
were taxonomic: what were the branches of intellectual affiliation and 
influence one should induce? How determinative were differences shaped 
by readings in Aristotle, Avicenna, Platonic texts, or Augustine, for that 
80 Personal information from Michael Clanchy and R. W. Southern, ‘Vivian Hunter 
Galbraith (1889–1976)’, Proc. Brit. Academy, lxiv (1978), 397–425; repr. in Bartlett, History 
and Historians, pp. 168–92, at p. 191. See also R. I. Moore, ‘Southern and the sinews of 
power’ <http://rimoore.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/R.W.-Southern.pdf> [accessed 11 
July 2019]. 
81 R. W. Southern, Medieval Humanism and Other Studies (Oxford, 1970), p. 29. 
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matter? In the decades following the classic studies by Karl Werner and 
Franz Ehrle in the late 1880s – which first divided Aquinas’s ‘Aristotelianism’ 
from Franciscan ‘Augustinianism’ –  there was much debate over where 
exactly the intellectual fault lines between these apparent, great, ideological 
tectonic plates should be drawn. The resulting historiographical confusion 
sprung from an attempt to codify individuals’ thought according to a 
vast taxonomy of ‘-isms’. One automatically associates this tendency with 
Etienne Gilson, but equally indicative is the work of Maurice de Wulf, for 
instance, who argued for a complex five-fold taxonomy within thirteenth-
century thought: Augustinianism vs. Thomism vs. Scotism vs. Averroism 
(all as mutually divergent sub-species of Aristotelianism) vs. Neoplatonism 
(as a separate current of thought altogether). Such complexity tells its own 
story, perhaps to the long-term detriment of medieval intellectual history.
Nevertheless, school labels ending in ‘-ism’ have proved surprising 
durable as shorthand terms in historical writing on scholasticism, even 
though the general approach to medieval thought to which they used to be 
tethered has somewhat fallen out of fashion. If doctrinally focused schemata 
bear critiquing from several angles, then two problems are particularly 
important for us. First, these schemata assume that doctrinally defined 
intellectual schools established themselves only in the thirteenth century. 
Like Bynum’s question about the balance between individual and group, 
this is a chronological issue and raises the question ‘So what?’ in either 
case. Fernand Van Steenberghen’s solution, while implicitly critiquing De 
Wulf and Gilson for failing to give a convincing explanation for diachronic 
change, exemplified his targets’ tendency to privilege a doctrinally focused 
approach. According to van Steenberghen, the twelfth century’s characteristic 
philosophy was too pluralistic, literary and subjective to admit of systematic 
differentiation into schools.82 It was only from c.1250, when a new Aristotle 
stripped of Arabic and Neoplatonic interpolations became available and 
could underpin a rigorous, constraining, objective and shared approach to 
philosophy, that schools attuned to doctrinal difference could emerge. To 
complicate matters further, historians of fourteenth- and fifteenth-century 
thought have kicked against the entire bulk of this writing on the thirteenth 
century to argue that doctrinally defined schools can be detected only from 
the late fourteenth century (the clash of philosophical and theological 
‘ways’, ‘nominalists’ vs. ‘realists’, etc.), if at all.83 
82 F. Van Steenberghen, La Philosophie au XIIIe siècle (2nd edn, Louvain, 1991), pp. 169–
76, 405–11.
83 This paragraph and the last compress S. P. Marrone, The Light of Thy Countenance: 
Science and Knowledge of God in the Thirteenth Century (Studies in the History of Christian 
Thought, 2 vols, Leiden, 2001), i. 1–10. 
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The second problem lies at a deeper level and goes to the heart of some 
of the questions addressed by this volume. When talking of intellectual 
schools in the middle ages (as in any period) we run the risk of reification 
in thinking of schools as intellectual communities defined by total mutual 
agreement on doctrine. The artificial imposition of uniformity upon the 
original and creative thinking of individuals simply does not stand up 
against a close, hard look at the evidence. The diffuseness of the so-called 
contemporary ‘Cambridge School’ of intellectual history illustrates the 
difficulty of such labels today, let alone the ‘Annales School’.84 This lies at 
the heart of the critique of Southern’s ‘scholastic humanism’ by Marenbon, 
for whom it offers too monochromatic a view of very colourful twelfth- 
and thirteenth-century scholastic worlds.85 To agree with Marenbon’s 
rejection of Southern’s formulation would entail abandoning any general 
co-ordinating ‘word ending in “-ism”’ (saving scholasticism) for these 
groups and thinkers. That may be no bad thing, especially if one thinks the 
designation ‘scholastic humanism’ is indeed fallacious. It would produce a 
much more multi-polar set of configurations (again, good so far as they are 
true). It does, however, leave unresolved the problem of how to describe 
their undeniable structure, influence and effects accurately and adequately. 
The suggestion is not  that evacuating ‘intellectual schools’ of all 
explanatory power whatsoever provides a satisfactory solution to either 
problem. Sensitivity to one’s own and others’ membership of an intellectual 
group evidently could shape scholars’ self-identification and political 
outlook. This is most readily explored by looking at recent analysis of 
Parisian intellectual groupings, on which much recent work has focused. 
For instance, William Courtenay’s study of the seals of Parisian theology 
masters between 1190 and 1308 analyses master William of Bardenay’s 
1211 seal bearing the slogan ‘ex impossibili quidlibet’, a logical position 
identifying him as a member of the ‘Parvipontani’, that is to say, as a pupil 
of Adam of Balsham (or Petit Pont) or of one of his disciples.86 This is 
84 For reflection by members of the ‘Cambridge School’, see Rethinking the Foundations 
of Modern Political Thought, ed. A. Brett, J. Tully and H. Hamilton-Bleakley (Cambridge, 
2006); for Annales see, e.g., S. Clark, ‘The Annales school’, in The Return of Grand Theory in 
the Human Sciences, ed. Q. Skinner (Cambridge, 1990 [1985]), pp. 177–98.
85 Marenbon, ‘Humanism, scholasticism and the school of Chartres’. Rexroth’s Fröhliche 
Scholastik is an interesting recent interpretation stressing a more colourful, flexible, ‘joyful’ 
scholasticism between c.1070 and 1250, in contrast to the straitjacketing ‘conservative 
revolution’ which made a golden cage for university scholasticism (Rexroth, Fröhliche 
Scholastik, pp. 20, 320–50).
86 W. J. Courtenay, ‘Magisterial authority, philosophical identity, and the growth of 




both an intellectual position and a group affiliation: the inscription refers 
to the logical position that from an impossible premise any conclusion may 
follow. Mews and Zahora, meanwhile, have drawn attention to two early 
fourteenth-century anonymous treatises on the last things, of mendicant 
origin and probably produced in the French royal court, which evince a 
meticulous attempt to synthesize Bonaventure’s and Aquinas’s approaches to 
the intellect, will and grace, in order to overcome mendicant factionalism87 
– hardly worthwhile if ‘school’ divisions had no concrete importance in 
informing individuals’ actions beyond the studia. 
We think the solution to these problems lies instead in a re-framing of 
intellectual schools, grounded in questioning the ways in which the politics 
of group identification, and institutions more generally, did, or did not, 
constrain, enable and inflect the substantive thinking of individuals, rather 
than in attempting to track doctrine primarily and per se. Two relatively 
recent major studies deserve particular attention for suggesting just such 
an agenda for further work on medieval intellectual schools, namely Steven 
Marrone’s The Light of Thy Countenance: Science and the Knowledge of God in 
the Thirteenth Century (2001); and Russell Friedman’s Intellectual Traditions 
at the Medieval University: the Use of Philosophical Psychology in Trinitarian 
Theology among Franciscans and Dominicans (2013). Both Marrone and 
Friedman reconstruct intellectual schools as traditions of thought which 
were shaped first and foremost by the politics of group identification rather 
than rigid adherence to distinct sets of doctrinal details and which kept their 
integrity in spite, or perhaps because, of the creativity of the individuals 
within them. 
Tracing thirteenth-century theologians’ various metaphysical and 
epistemic interpretations of the notion of ‘divine illumination’ derived from 
Augustine, Marrone argued for an ‘Augustinian school’, which is primarily 
politically rather than doctrinally defined. According to Marrone’s model, 
which he evidently intends to be applicable more generally, one’s particular 
political affiliation or group identification would in practice restrict the 
range of stances one could take for or against a particular theoretical 
position just enough to result in an ‘intellectual consanguinity’ between 
thinkers over the decades, although within ‘an especially elastic set of 
formal boundaries or constraints’. Such affiliations, Marrone argued, would 
have been perceptible to contemporaries, whether evoked and expressed 
‘in a tendency to call upon a common fund of models and metaphors for 
87 C. J. Mews and T. Zahora, ‘Remembering the last things and regulating behaviour 
in the early fourteenth century: from the De consideratione novissimorum to the Speculum 
morale’, Speculum, xc (2015), 960–94. See also B. Kent, Virtues of the Will: the Transformation 
of Ethics in the Late Thirteenth Century (Washington, D.C., 1995). 
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analysis’ consciously or unconsciously by scholars themselves.88 In this way, 
theologians almost a century apart and as divergent in the fine-grained 
detail of their thought as Robert Grosseteste and John Duns Scotus emerge 
equally as members of Marrone’s ‘Augustininan school’. 
Where Marrone focused mostly but not exclusively on Franciscans, 
Friedman examined the oppositional politics of the Dominican and 
Franciscan orders (c.1250–c.1350). Friedman conceived of intellectual 
traditions in a way which is broadly compatible with Marrone, but goes 
much further in drawing out the implications of such an approach. The cut 
and thrust of scholastic debate at precise moments of intense opposition 
between the orders could shape the content of individuals’ arguments in 
quite an exact way. Franciscan and Dominican mutual opposition thus 
worked as a motor, pushing philosophical and theological debate along for 
scholars both within and outwith the two orders themselves. The history 
of scholastic theology in this hundred-year period, it emerges, cannot be 
understood without taking into account ways in which the thinking of 
individuals at the cutting edge of debate was inflected by the politics of 
these rival intellectual traditions and the internal politics of these orders:
By tradition I want to denote that a general approach to certain philosophical 
and theological problems was handed down from one scholarly generation to 
the next, and solutions to these problems were developed and discussed on 
the basis of a shared approach. These approaches were general enough to leave 
room for internal development and disagreement within each of the traditions, 
but they were also developed in conscious opposition to the other tradition 
… they developed together inasmuch as their mutual criticism was a motive 
force in the way that debate evolved. Criticism by one tradition of the other 
was neither ignored or flatly denied; rather it frequently elicited a change of 
some kind in the original position with the purpose of countering the critique. 
In this sense we can say that the mutual criticism of the two traditions led to 
improvements in the original position, with each step laying the groundwork 
for a new round of criticism.89
Taking Marrone and Friedman together, then, membership of an 
intellectual school or tradition would consist not in the mere recapitulation 
of the thinking of one’s intellectual antecedents, but in the use made of it, 
specifically its positioning to reaffirm one intellectual identity within one 
tradition precisely in opposition to another tradition. Fitzpatrick’s chapter 
88 Marrone, Light of Thy Countenance, ii. 571–2. 
89 R. L. Friedman, Intellectual Traditions at the Medieval University: the Use of Philosophical 
Psychology in Trinitarian Theology among the Franciscans and Dominicans, 1230–1350 (Leiden, 
2013), pp. 21–2. 
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in the present volume is a case study of the effect of these oppositional 
dynamics in thirteenth-century theological discussions of the central 
philosophical problem of the composition of human nature. Hence, 
Dominicans in the 1280s came up with interpretations of the theory which 
diverged quite far in their detail from Aquinas’s own, precisely to counter 
Franciscans’ inaccurate caricature of his thought.
While Marrone and Friedman offer models for intellectual schools which 
are both doctrinally sensitive and politically astute, they both still propose 
a certain hardening of intellectual lines c.1250 at the universities of Paris 
and Oxford. Recent work by Constant Mews strikes at this assumption, 
questioning whether the acceptance of a full Aristotelian curriculum at 
the faculty of arts in 1255 in itself had any radical effect at all on patterns 
of intellectual affiliation. Mews’s argument, in short, is this: the twin 
tendencies in historical writing on scholasticism – to treat Aquinas as the 
quintessence of scholastic thinking; and to place an implicit emphasis upon 
the basic curricular unity of Paris in the mid thirteenth century – stem 
ultimately from the papal encyclical of Aeterni patris (1879) and have been 
seriously distorting of both scholasticism’s institutional and its intellectual 
history. Mews does concede, along lines suggested by Van Steenberghen, 
that the various ‘Logico-Theological Schools’ (nominales, reales, Porretiani, 
Meludinenses and Montani, as well as the Parvipontani mentioned above) 
appearing in Parisian records from c.1150 well into the thirteenth century 
were probably relatively unsystematically defined, or ‘as slippery as 
“deconstructionists” and “post-modernists” today’.90 Up to 1255 there was 
a low degree of uniformity in the study of arts and theology.91 The point, 
however, is that Parisian intellectual pluralism lasted beyond Courson’s 
decree of 1215, and even beyond 1255, precisely as a function of complex 
institutional politics. 
The university of Paris was not a single, centralized institution and at 
no point did its scholars actually study one uniform, coherent curriculum. 
Rather, the university’s intellectual life was characterized by ‘the competition 
between different communities of learning’, struggling ‘to define a vision of 
synthesis’, of their own, underpinned by their own curriculum and serving 
90 C. J. Mews, ‘Communities of learning and the dream of synthesis: the schools and 
colleges of thirteenth-century Paris’, in Communities of Learning: Networks and the Shaping 
of Identity in Europe, 1150–1500, ed. J. N. Crossley and C. J. Mews (Turnhout, 2011), pp. 
109–35, at p. 112. See also Y. Iwakuma and S. Ebbesen, ‘Logico-theological schools from the 
second half of the 12th century: a list of sources’, Vivarium, xxx (1992), 173–210. 
91 S. E. Young, Scholarly Community at the Early University of Paris: Theologians, Education 
and Society 1215–1248 (Cambridge, 2014) makes this point and affirms the significance of 
master–pupil intellectual filiation in the theology faculty. 
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as a symbol of their group’s identity.92 Here, Mews is indebted to Boureau’s 
use of Brian Stock’s notion of a ‘textual community’ as defined by a group’s 
interpretation of a particular text.93 Yet, crucially, Paris’s rival ‘communities 
of learning’ were shaped just as much by parameters of place and loyalties 
associated with precise political networks as they were by their selection of 
their own specific range of texts for study. 
After 1255 it is not the competition between the mendicants as such 
but rather the competition between the secular college of the Sorbonne 
(1257) and the College of the Treasurer (1266) which best exemplifies the 
complex political dynamics in which Mews is interested. The former was 
established for students of theology of any nation and no religious order, 
under the authority of the bishop of Paris and with close connections to 
the royal court.94 The latter was regional, established for poor students from 
Rouen for the study of both arts and theology, enabling Norman students 
to study theology free of the bishop’s supervision. However, for Mews the 
‘Averroist Crisis’ of 1272 to 1275 in the faculty of arts is best explained by the 
politics surrounding Siger of Brabant’s bid for the rectorship of the faculty 
rather than by his supposed ‘heterodox Aristotelianism’ and commitment 
to Averroes’ belief in humans sharing a single external intellect.95 
Marrone, Friedman and Mews all emphasize the primacy of ‘political’ 
factors in delineating communities of learning and intellectual frameworks 
of endorsement and critique in the late thirteenth century. Even so, there 
would still appear to have been a particular quality of thought among the 
mendicants which demanded self-definition and counter-definition with 
respect to doctrinal minutiae, such as was not produced by other clusters of 
interests within faculties. If, therefore, it is the opposition of the Franciscan 
and Dominican religious orders which provides the crucial stimulus to this 
92 Mews, ‘Communities of learning’, p. 135. Cf. Alasdair MacIntyre on modern intellectual 
disagreements and affiliations: ‘It is always important not to confuse the consequences 
of intellectual positions with those of institutional arrangements. What appears to be an 
impasse resulting from theoretical commitments of those involved in debate may sometimes, 
in part at least, be one brought about by institutional arrangements and social habits’ (A. 
MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry: Encyclopaedia, Genealogy, and Tradition 
(London, 1990), p. 6). 
93 B. Stock, The Implications of Literacy: Written Language and Models of Interpretation in 
the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries (Princeton, N.J., 1983); A. Boureau, L’Empire du livre. 
Pour une histoire du savoir scolastique (1200–1380) (La Raison scolastique, ii, Paris, 2007). 
94 On the Sorbonne’s group identity see J. Sabapathy ‘Regulating community and society 
at the Sorbonne in the late thirteenth century’, in Legalism: Justice and Community, ed. 
F. Pirie and J. Scheele (Oxford, 2014), pp. 151–76; and D. Gabriel, La ‘Maison des pauvres 
maîtres’ de Robert de Sorbon. Les débuts de la Sorbonne (1254–1274) (Paris, 2014).
95 Mews, ‘Communities of learning’, passim.
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quality of thought, then what is it about religious orders that produces 
this result? The institutional similarities between the Franciscan and 
Dominicans, and their resulting (and ever increasing) direct competition 
for benefactions, chairs and recruits, might go some way towards explaining 
the dynamics involved, along with contingent facts about the way in which 
regent masterships develop, so that the mendicants appear to gain a de 
facto monopoly c.1250. Whichever way one looks at it, the formation of 
theological traditions and intellectual schools in Paris after c.1250 appears as 
a function of organizational development. 
Other ways of grouping: constellations and networks 
Schools in themselves are an important but limited analytical prism through 
which to tell the whole story of patterns of learning and thought in the period 
which our essays address. Shaped by contextual factors other than curricula 
and extending beyond the theology faculties of the major universities, 
there were complex regional and temporal patterns of intellectual debate, 
influence, approbation and disapprobation. Thus, Blaise Dufal’s chapter in 
this volume argues that the self-conscious use of Augustine as an authority, 
in particular in commentaries on De civitate Dei, could extend beyond the 
mere exigencies of positioning oneself in live academic debate and become 
a means of self-identification in relation to a range of institutions from 
religious order to kingdom. 
This wider insight that ideas can never be properly understood apart 
from the places, spaces and located networks in which they emerge has been 
well-taken.96 The idea of Konstellationsforschung (constellation research) in 
German historiography, meanwhile, has developed a more granular set of 
axes for thinking about the networks linking individuals both in terms of 
external organizational links, affiliations, social groups, shared publishers, 
patrons and the like. The metaphor of constellation does not imply fixity 
but stresses fluidity and development over time.97 From other quite different 
disciplinary perspectives have come deep mappings of the sociologies of 
particular intellectual cadres – such as Pierre Bourdieu’s account of the fields 
structuring Parisian homo academicus at the time of the student rebellions 
in 1968.98 Another sociologist, Randall Collins, has sought to map literally 
96 E.g., Lieux de savoir, ed. C. Jacob (2 vols, Paris, 2007–11), i: Espaces et communautés 
(Paris, 2007); ii: Les mains de l’intellect (Paris, 2011). For a medieval application with this 
model partly in mind, see C. J. Mews, ‘Communautés de savoirs. Écoles et collèges à Paris 
au xiiie siècle’, Revue de synthèse, cxxix, 6th ser., iv (2008), 485–507.
97 M. Mulsow, ‘Qu’est-ce qu’une constellation philosophique? Propositions pour une 
analyse des réseaux intellectuels’, Annales, lxiv (2009), 81–109, at pp. 84–8.
98 P. Bourdieu, Homo Academicus, trans. P. Collier (Cambridge, 1988). In so far as it is 
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the sociology of all philosophy, stressing the ‘interaction rituals’ between 
individuals whose friction produces new thought.99 However, it is hard for 
historians to see how, for example, this produces new insights into Franciscan 
and Dominican rivalries between 1200 and 1335.100 There are obvious limits 
to how far one can reconstruct past networks anyway.101 Nevertheless, it 
is perfectly possible to point towards rich studies of medieval intellectual 
networks and patterns in the development of ideas which do not burnish 
especial methodological credentials.102 This is not to imply that there are no 
useful heuristics through which our understanding of intellectual groupings 
in our period can be deepened. We analyse below some which seem especially 
helpful (some have influenced contributors here). These comprise: Alasdair 
MacIntyre’s ‘traditions’; Weberian ‘conviction rationalities’ and d’Avray’s 
extension of them; and Niklas Luhmann’s ‘systems thinking’. 
Traditions
Collins’s Sociology of Philosophy includes, but is not especially galvanized by, 
consideration of medieval thought. By contrast, the philosopher Alasdair 
MacIntyre has for decades placed medieval philosophy –  specifically 
Aquinas’s – at the heart of his project to re-describe the terms on which 
viable (modern) ethical thought might be constructed. Our interest here, 
however, is not so much in the accuracy of MacIntyre’s account of that 
medieval thought as in the model he develops to account for its integrity 
– the idea of ‘tradition’.103 For MacIntyre a:
sociological, Bourdieu’s analysis is less personal and more structural than the historical 
reconstitution of particular intellectual constellations Mulsow has in mind. 
99 R. Collins, The Sociology of Philosophies: a Global Theory of Intellectual Change 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1998), sketches the approach and key terms at pp. 1–53, esp. at pp. 20–4, 
28–9, 35–6.
100 For Collins’s map of Franciscan/Dominican rivalries, see Sociology of Philosophies, p. 
470. Cf. Mulsow’s comments on Collins’s Sociology of Philosophies in Mulsow, ‘Qu’est-ce 
qu’une constellation philosophique?’, pp. 90–3.
101 Mulsow, ‘Qu’est-ce qu’une constellation philosophique?’, pp. 98–9.
102 E.g., J. Marenbon, From the Circle of Alcuin to the School of Auxerre (Cambridge, 1981); 
D. E. Luscombe, The School of Peter Abelard (Cambridge Studies in Medieval Life and 
Thought, n.s., xiv, Cambridge, 1969); M. S. Kempshall, The Common Good in Late Medieval 
Political Thought (Oxford, 1999), E. Coccia and S. Piron, ‘Poésie, sciences et politique. Une 
génération d’intellectuels italiens (1290–1330)’, Revue de synthèse, cxxix, 6th ser., iv (2008), 
549–86.
103 For a critique, see J. Coleman, ‘MacIntyre and Aquinas’, in After MacIntyre: Critical 




living tradition then is an historically extended, socially embodied argument, 
and an argument precisely in part about the goods which constitute that 
tradition. Within a tradition the pursuit of goods extends through generations, 
sometimes through many generations … Once again the narrative phenomenon 
of embedding is crucial: the history of a practice in our time is generally and 
characteristically embedded in and made intelligible in terms of the larger 
and longer history of the tradition through which the practice in its present 
form was conveyed to us; the history of each of our own lives is generally and 
characteristically embedded in and made intelligible in terms of the larger and 
longer histories of a number of traditions.104 
Traditions here are construed very much as practices or ‘crafts’ within a 
magisterial context: that is, an apprentice is instructed in the terms of a craft 
by a master. The rationality and excellence of the craft (furniture making, 
philosophy) is internal to the craft and also directed out to its worldly 
purpose (telos). This emphatically Aristotelian model is also emphatically 
based in a group (a ‘moral community’) and placed in time (the tradition 
develops itself under the impetus of successive generations):105 ‘The craft is 
justified by its history so far, which has made it what it is in that specific time, 
place, and set of historical circumstances, such rationality is inseparable 
from the tradition through which it was achieved’.106 The rationality of the 
tradition, that is, is relativistic within the overall arc of the tradition but also 
an objective achievement at any single point in time. Matthew Kempshall’s 
chapter in this volume explores this in relation to the very discipline of 
history itself, arguing that as historiographically sophisticated a thinker as 
the Dominican Nicholas Trevet produced surprisingly annalistic histories, 
not because of any inherent limitation in his analytical abilities but rather as 
a function of an epistemological tradition which drew sharp barriers around 
what he thought history was competent to explain.
MacIntyre counterpointed traditions against ‘encyclopaedic’ and 
‘genealogical’ modes of enquiry. The latter two, he argued, give poor 
accounts of how knowledge is both social and develops over time. For the 
former, the ‘external’, social aspects of its intellectual content are in fact 
part and parcel of its intellectual standing.107 By contrast, the encyclopaedist 
104 A. MacIntyre, After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory (2nd edn, London, 1985), p. 222. 
J. Porter argued he does not define the term, but this seems a de facto definition (J. Porter, 
‘Tradition in the recent work of Alasdair MacIntyre’, in Alasdair MacIntyre, ed. M. C. 
Murphy (Contemporary Philosophy in Focus, Cambridge, 2003), pp. 38–69, at p. 38). 
105 These ideas are developed in MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, pp. 59–
66.
106 MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, pp. 65, 116. 
107 MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, p. 117.
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wishes to elevate thinking for him-her-self and to assert that knowledge 
rests on generally accepted (commensurable) grounds in a way which no 
longer seems credible. The genealogist, meanwhile, wishes to unearth the 
disreputable descent of all intellectual knowledge since knowledge is always 
compromised by the ulterior wilfulness it masks (as Nietzsche argued in The 
Genealogy of Morals).108 Yet how can the genealogist sustain any sequence 
of unmaskings over time which are not equally open to having their own 
disreputable genealogies unearthed (and hence their case undermined)? 
If they avoid this implosion, how can they do so without implying an 
unacknowledged tradition of truthfulness to give sense and continuity 
to their claims as a whole, thus undermining the premises of their entire 
genealogical model?109 Traditions, then, are MacIntyre’s alternative model, 
offering an approach with which historians can think in many ways, 
especially medieval historians. His central medieval exemplification is 
Aquinas, whom he takes to exemplify the thirteenth-century reconciliation 
of two apparently immiscible and contradictory traditions, an indigenous 
Augustinian one and a recently interpolated Aristotelian one.110 
Whether one wishes to amend or reconstruct MacIntyre’s account of 
this conflict, his three characteristic models of enquiry raise interesting 
questions. First, Southern, we have seen, stressed the unitary ambitions of 
what he called scholastic humanism, the desire for a complete ‘system’ of 
knowledge. That sounds more similar to MacIntyre’s encyclopaedic enquiry 
than his tradition-based one, yet for MacIntyre it is scholastic practices which 
pre-eminently exemplify the open-ended, moral-community learning 
of tradition. MacIntyre is insistent that Aquinas’s method of intellectual 
progression was inherently provisional: ‘[W]hen Aquinas has reached his 
conclusion, the method always leaves open the possibility of a return to that 
question with some new argument’.111
One might wonder whether Southern (b. 1912) was back-projecting a 
nineteenth-century encyclopaedic model onto his scholastic humanists. 
MacIntyre’s quintessential exemplification of encyclopaedic knowledge 
is, after all, the ninth edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica (1873–88). 
108 F. Nietzsche, ‘On the Genealogy of Morality’ and Other Writings, ed. K. Ansell-Pearson, 
trans. C. Diethe (Cambridge, 1994).
109 For these arguments, see MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, pp. 32–57. 
B. Williams, Truth and Truthfulness: an Essay in Genealogy (Princeton, N.J., 2002) is a very 
sophisticated genealogist’s case.
110 MacIntyre’s successive accounts of this conflict and the reconciliation of it are found 
in After Virtue, pp. 165–80; A. MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (London, 1988), 
pp. 164–208, but also chs. VII–IX; and Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, pp. 82–126.
111 MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, pp. 124–5.
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However, second, one might wonder whether MacIntyre’s account of 
encyclopaedism is sufficient in the first place. There was, after all, a massive 
medieval tradition of encyclopaedism, well before either this Victorian one 
or, indeed, Diderot and D’Alembert’s. It is hard not to see how Vincent 
of Beauvais’s (d. c.1264) still-unedited encyclopaedia, the Speculum maius, 
could not be considered an encyclopaedia which was also part of a tradition in 
MacIntyre’s terms.112 Genealogy, third, may unmask intellectual affiliations 
less straightforwardly as well. In scholastic thought more than anywhere else 
one might expect to unearth unedifying intellectual genealogies in which 
institutional affiliation pre-determines intellectual/credal positions. Yet, 
pace Mews, as several chapters here show (notably Linde’s and Fitzpatrick’s) 
the positions taken might be quite different from what one would expect 
given institutional affiliations. That is to say: MacIntyre’s three versions of 
moral enquiry are particularly instructive for specialists on scholasticism to 
think about even – perhaps especially – when they appear not to work or 
call their own categories of analysis into question. Whether that has any 
bearing back on MacIntyre’s own ethical thought may be a question more 
for philosophers than historians. 
Conviction rationalities and thought styles
MacIntyre’s account is philosophical and historical, but not especially 
sociological. In fact, it describes a semi-permeable style of thinking similar 
to the account of ‘conviction rationalities’ which David d’Avray has 
developed from Max Weber.113 Like Macintyre’s traditions, conviction (or 
value) rationalities are socially embedded modes of reasoning with internal 
standards of rational justification, but, unlike Macintyre’s traditions, 
conviction rationalities encompass any world-view or system of conviction. 
As an ‘ideal type’ of rationality, systems of conviction have two principal 
112 See Vincent de Beauvais et le Grand Miroir du monde, ed. M. Paulmier-Foucart and 
M.-C. Duchenne (Turnhout, 2004); and Atelier Vincent de Beauvais <https://ateliervdb.
hypotheses.org> [accessed 11 July 2019]. See, more widely, Die Enzyklopädie im Wandel 
vom Hochmittelalter bis zur frühen Neuzeit. Akten des Kolloquiums des Projekts D im 
Sonderforschungsbereich 231 (29.11.–1.12.1996), ed. C. Meier-Staubach (Munich, 2002); B. 
Ribémont, Littérature et encyclopédies du Moyen Âge (Orléans, 2002); B. Ribémont, La 
‘Renaissance’ du XIIe siècle et l’encyclopédisme (Paris, 2002); and the SourcEncyMe project 
<http://sourcencyme.irht.cnrs.fr> [acccessed 11 July 2019].
113 D. L. d’Avray, Rationalities in History: a Weberian Essay in Comparison (Cambridge, 
2010); and Medieval Religious Rationalities: a Weberian Analysis (Cambridge, 2010). The first 
volume develops the analytical model which the second volume applies. D’Avray noted 
the similarity of MacIntyre’s traditions with his conviction rationalities in Rationalities in 
History, p. 100.
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features.114 First, there is interconnectedness. The individual values or 
convictions which comprise the system form a logically interlocking web, a 
unique Gestalt. Individual components can take the form of ‘is’-, as well as 
‘ought’-convictions when the former are phenomenologically very similar 
to the latter (to use one of d’Avray’s own examples, the conviction ‘there is 
a God’ is phenomenologically similar to the belief ‘polygamy is wrong’). 
Each individual conviction is thus rendered rational in the context of the 
system; and the interconnectedness of values strengthens the structure as a 
whole. Different value systems may overlap, but cannot be simultaneously 
correct. What it is crucial to note is that they can all be rational by their 
own internal standards. 
Second, there is concreteness. Social practices, emotional experience 
and strong mental images bear out, reinforce and justify values and 
beliefs, functioning as ‘concrete’ arguments which enter into and cement 
the overall structure of the system. Medieval Christianity provides an 
excellent example of how value rationalities work. As d’Avray explains, one 
could illustrate ad infinitum the thickly and precisely interconnected and 
interdependent nature of various doctrinal convictions (the Trinity, Christ’s 
suffering humanity, the resurrection) and the institutions, rituals and other 
practices and experiences in which they were embodied and which gave 
them force (the liturgy; the mass; prayer; interaction with images of Christ’s 
passion; confession; penance; and the apostolic penitentiary; and so on).115 
Conviction rationalities have considerable explanatory as well as 
illustrative power. When systems of values compete, individuals rarely 
abandon their convictions when confronted with logical counter-arguments 
they cannot easily answer. The model just outlined explains why it may be 
rational for individuals to hold onto their values in this way, even when 
they basically understand one another’s positions and share a great deal of 
overlap in their general world-view.116 
The example of competing Franciscan and Dominican intellectual 
traditions illustrates this point. We have met the work of Russell Friedman, 
which explains the resilience of these traditions as a matter of the politics 
of group identification. This leaves fairly open the question of any deeper 
intellectual conviction. It is true that, even following the mendicant 
legislation of the 1280s which sought to direct their scholars’ output either 
for or against Aquinas, it was possible for Franciscans and Dominicans 
114 Following d’Avray, Medieval Religious Rationalities, pp. 21–3. 
115 d’ Avray, Medieval Religious Rationalities, ch. 2: ‘Medieval values: structures’. 
116 A philosophical presentation is G. A. Cohen, ‘Paradoxes of conviction’, in G. A. 
Cohen, If You’re an Egalitarian, How Come You’re so Rich? (Cambridge, Mass., 2001), pp. 
7–19, discussed by d’Avray in Rationalities in History, pp. 66, 73. 
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either to dissent from the ‘party line’ on any one issue or range of issues, 
or just to appear less than fully convinced of it.117 Still, there is enough of a 
pattern discernible in the later middle ages of Franciscans and Dominicans 
consistently failing to convince one another on a whole variety of issues 
to suggest that competing systems of intellectual conviction were in play 
and that these systems, even if internally flexible, remained fundamentally 
resistant to attack by one another over time.118 
The tenacity of convictions can be explained in part by their 
interconnectedness: one axiom cannot be easily extricated from the set; 
rather, several, perhaps all, stand or fall together.119 This applies in the 
case of the mendicants. Scholastic theology was a purposefully holistic 
mode of thinking; and the basic theses about which Franciscans and 
Dominicans argued were embedded in thick webs of interlocking positions 
on fundamental metaphysical issues about which the two traditions also 
disagreed. Although positions within each tradition could be developed, 
it would have had hugely disruptive consequences for a scholar’s entire 
metaphysical apparatus suddenly to change his mind with respect to any 
individual major thesis. There was little motivation, then, to be convinced 
by objections from the other tradition targeted against any one basic 
metaphysical position. Rather, the support provided for any disputed 
thesis by the supposed truth of several related theses would have reduced 
the perceived likelihood that the individual thesis under attack was false; 
while thoroughly debating all the relevant theses at once would have been 
impracticable: according to the internal standards of the tradition it was 
rational to be unconvinced by individual objections. 
Furthermore, the intellectual convictions associated with their 
tradition would have derived psychological support from mendicant 
scholars’ concrete, everyday experiences as members of their order: self-
identification as Franciscan or Dominican; material dependence on the 
order; the interrelated sentiments of loyalty towards order, minister general 
and schoolmaster; and so on. In light of this it becomes less difficult to 
117 E.g., I. Iribarren, Durandus of St. Pourçain: a Dominican Theologian in the Shadow of 
Aquinas (Oxford, 2005). On the Franciscan Richard de Mediavilla, see S. Piron, ‘Franciscan 
quodlibeta in southern studia and at Paris, 1280–1300’, in Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle 
Ages: the Thirteenth Century, ed. C. Schabel (Leiden, 2006), pp. 403–38, at pp. 417–18. 
118 Alongside Friedman, Intellectual Traditions, see B. Gaspar, ‘The immaculate conception, 
1100–1700: para-magisterial powers and their politics’ (unpublished University College 
London PhD thesis, 2012) on Franciscan and Dominican disputes over the immaculate 
conception; and A. Fitzpatrick on the issue of the unicity versus plurality of forms in 
Franciscan and Dominican thought (A. Fitzpatrick, ‘Mendicant order politics and the status 
of Christ’s shed blood’, Hist. Research, lxxxv (2012), 210–27).
119 See d’Avray, Rationalities in History, pp. 70–7. 
36
Individuals and Institutions in Medieval Scholasticism
understand why Franciscans and Dominicans appeared prone to argue so 
fiercely about the orthodoxy of abstract metaphysical details as well as the 
more concrete issue of the correct definition of apostolic poverty. 
Systems thinking
A final powerful, universally applicable set of tools for thinking about the 
dynamics involved in the patterning of social action is Niklas Luhmann’s 
systems theory. Of particular relevance here is Luhmann’s theory of social 
systems, which offers a way of understanding how individuals can change 
wider institutions. A basic introduction to the central ideas is as follows.120 
The function of all social systems, which are all systems of communication 
(including action as a form of communication), is to reduce complexity, 
fulfilling humans’ need to orientate themselves in the world in a suitably 
planned and structured way. A taxonomy of social systems takes in not just 
social organizations but time-limited interactions and conversations (teacher-
pupil; doctor-patient; students in a classroom; partners in a household) and 
whole societies (comprehensive social systems which contain functionally 
differentiated sub-systems).121 Any social system defines itself with reference 
to what is outside it, namely its environment, which, from the perspective of 
the system, is unstructured and exceedingly complex. The system stabilizes 
expectations regarding the range of communications or actions which can 
take place within it through channelling communication between social 
actors. This channelling maintains the boundaries between communication 
system and uncontrolled environment. Pietro Pomponazzi, working within 
the arts faculties of Paris and Bologna universities, is accordingly enabled 
to present what appears to be a highly sceptical Aristotelian account of 
the mortality of the soul. As John Marenbon shows in his chapter in this 
volume, however, one risks seriously misunderstanding Pomponazzi’s wider 
position by extracting from within one social system of communication 
arguments which are not intended to be viable within other social systems 
of communication. Marenbon does not frame his account in Luhmann’s 
terms, but the usefulness of the framework is demonstrated precisely by the 
fact that Pomponazzi’s position can be explicated by it. 
To view social systems as static and/or closed would be to miss the 
fundamental point about the relationship between system and environment. 
120 Useful studies are: N. Luhmann, Social Systems, trans. J. Bednarz Jr., with D. Baecker 
(Stanford, Calif., 1995); N. Luhmann, ‘Differentiation of Society’, Canadian Jour. Sociology, 
ii (1977), 29–53; R. Muench, Sociological Theory (3 vols, Chicago, Ill., 1994), iii: Development 
since the 1960s, pp. 273–95. 
121 Luhmann, Social Systems, p. 2 for a diagram of the taxonomy of systems. 
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The continuing, stabilizing operations of a system involve constant reference 
to the system itself and to that extent entail continual reference to what lies 
outside it. The environments relative to systems are continually changing; 
and changes in the external environment of a system (which includes 
other sub-systems to which it will be necessary to react, for instance) will 
introduce changes into that system. This is where individual agents come 
in. Insofar as they subsist between individual agents, systems have a life 
of their own, but changes and adaptations in social systems are driven by 
the individuals who connect with and make use of them, who continually 
recreate the boundary between system and environment by actively 
selecting and/or rejecting new operations as pertaining to the system. John 
Sabapathy’s interpretation of the master of theology Robert of Courson (d. 
1219) can be seen in this light. His focus is the internal logic of Courson’s 
attitude to the pastoral problems which he addressed in his Summa. This 
was systematic –  but not really in Southern’s sense of a complete and 
formalistically consistent set of answers. Rather, what unites Courson’s 
solutions seems to be a pragmatic, relativistic system which asked what 
was spiritually damaging for particular communities in specific contexts. 
Courson’s systematic logic seems keyed to a relative sense of what would 
damage community X specifically. It can itself be seen as the articulation of 
a particular idea of a ‘social system’ in the period. The particular tradition 
stemmed from the ‘school’ of Peter the Chanter itself and seemed rather 
short-lived – perhaps as a consequence of the difficulty of extending such 
an approach on any scale. As such, it exemplifies the need to grasp the 
sometimes quite rapid ways in which particular social systems, and ways of 
institutionalizing them, wax and wane. Cornelia Linde’s chapter offers an 
analogous example over one hundred years later when she argues that the 
Dominican Robert Holcot’s (d. c.1349) writings regarding the 1215 Fourth 
Lateran Council’s rule on confession were strongly influenced not only by 
the glosses of Aquinas and Albertus Magnus on this rule, but also by the 
need to respond to contemporary Parisian intellectual debates and practical 
social concerns. The social system continued to draw on its ‘rule base’ while 
remaining responsive to contemporary context. 
Groups may generate their social systems in quite distinct ways using 
quite distinct tools, however. In his work on the Dominicans (and in his 
chapter here) Gert Melville has explored how monastic rules interact with 
other means of creating social groups. In an early essay Melville suggested 
three striking hypotheses in relation to institutions-as-organizations which 
still reward reflection. They will, first, seek to perfect themselves through 
an increasingly precise and detailed set of procedural and proscriptive rules, 
a process which may very well be self-destructive through hypertrophy or 
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impossible demand setting. Second, the principle of guaranteeing institutional 
stability provides grounds against change, thus external changes can threaten 
the organization’s arrangement, either its functions or its meaning. As a result, 
it may develop a new role and become a new organization. Internal change 
within an organization may, third, also seek to re-stabilize it by either seeking 
to return to an earlier state or an adjustment to present needs.122 All this will 
need to be legitimized in relation to the organization’s own history and values. 
For religious orders, how this plays out will depend on whether the originating 
norms came from a founding text or the words of a charismatic leader.123 Even 
in the latter case, however, there will need to be some written routinization 
of that charisma (in Weberian terms) for the institution to endure beyond 
the first generation. The balance between rules and a charismatic legacy can 
produce very different outcomes for religious orders. ‘Rules’ may be usefully 
differentiated between a rule itself (the articulation of a binding message 
for right-living), customs (self-ratifying descriptions of established practice 
glossing the rule) and statutes (in principal consensual documents generated 
by a community for engineering its self-regulation to a greater degree).124 The 
Dominicans are a key example for Melville of religious order as institutional 
system – both in terms of the practices and organization. The case exemplifies 
his approach. What is striking about the Dominicans, he argues, is their ‘total 
fixation’ on their preaching purpose. The Paris-educated Dominican master 
general Humbert of Romans’s commentary on the order’s Constitutiones 
illustrates this. Other values were subordinated to securing its preaching 
purpose through dispensations or re-orientated to strengthen it. Hence 
fasting could be dispensed with if it was hindering preaching; and poverty 
was endorsed because a poor preacher was likely to get a better reception 
than a rich one. The relative relation of religious values, authoritative 
regulations and charismatic totem-founder played out in a very different way 
for the Franciscans, whose later thirteenth century was riddled with disputes 
precisely about their founding values, rules and the meaning of their founder. 
Whether, however, the Franciscans as an institution were any less successful 
in the long run for all that remains an interesting question. In his chapter 
Sylvain Piron offers a very different – almost antithetical – approach to that 
of the Dominican Humbert of Romans by analysing the Franciscan Peter 
John Olivi. For Olivi it is not the Franciscans’ Regula bullata which is central 
122 Melville, ‘Institutionen als geschichtswissenschaftliches Thema’, pp. 18–20.
123 G. Melville, Die Welt der mittelalterlichen Klöster. Geschichte und Lebensformen (Munich, 
2012), pp. 294–6; trans. now by J. Mixson as The World of Medieval Monasticism: its History 
and Forms of Life (Collegeville, Penn., 2016), pp. 343–5.
124 Melville, Welt der mittelalterlichen Klöster, pp. 290–4, summarizing his earlier work (= 
Melville, World of Medieval Monasticism, pp. 338–42). 
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to being a Franciscan but the individual Franciscan’s vow – a vow constantly 
and perpetually renewed in action and which simply cannot be settled by a 
prescriptive stipulation. Melville’s chapter in this volume offers a further way 
of reading how the founders of religious orders made use of themselves as 
symbols to construct a more enduring legal authority for their organizations. 
Both chapters show a plurality of ways through which institutions may 
express their social systems.
Institutions and institutionalization
These reflections on traditions, rationalities and systems-thinking have 
already led us into a consideration of institutions. To be sure, these 
‘institutions’ do not look like the traditional objects of institutional history. 
That is the point. ‘Institutional history’ from its heyday up to the first half 
of the twentieth century generally concerned itself with organizations and 
their rules, often within a more or less Whiggish teleological framework 
(parliamentary developments were perhaps the British acme of this 
historiography). Today the landscape is refreshingly altered, both because 
historians have re-evaluated their hierarchy of historical ‘objects’ and 
because they have revised how to think about institutions, notably under 
the influence of philosophy, sociology and anthropology.
The historian Jacques Revel rightly argued that institutionalization can be 
treated as a spectrum. At one end lies the institution as the ‘juridical-political 
reality’ of traditional institutional history; at the other lie institutions at their 
most diffuse:  ‘every form of social organization which links values, norms, 
models of relation and conduct, roles’. Here ‘every social form that presents 
some regularity can be subject to an institutional analysis’. In the middle 
of the spectrum Revel places ‘every organization functioning in any regular 
way within a society, according to explicit and implicit rules, and where one 
assumes that it responds to a particular collective demand’ (family, school, 
hospital, etc.).125 Revel thus argued for an ‘open definition of the institution 
that is plastic and relational. It [the institution] formalizes an ensemble of 
conventions which are the regularized forms of exchange [formes réglées de 
l’échange] (whence constraint and conflict play a role). At the same time 
one needs to understand the relationship which actors sustain with them as 
being based in practice’.126
125 J. Revel, ‘L’Institution et le social’, in J. Revel, Un Parcours critique. Douze exercices 
d’histoire totale (Paris, 2006), pp. 85–110, at p. 86. For a parallel analysis, see Melville, 
‘Institutionen als geschichtswissenschaftliches Thema’.
126 Revel, ‘Institution et le social’, p. 106.
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As mentioned above, we are principally interested in the relationship 
between the softer and harder forms, between institutions-as-practices 
and institutions-as-organizations and the role of individuals within this. 
Institutions-as-organizations are simply the hardest form humans ever give to 
the social practices they most want to protect and mark off – but they must 
always contain institutions-as-practices: these are their content. The metaphor 
of slugs and snails may show what we mean: the snail’s extruded shell is the 
structure of traditional institutional analysis, but still requires the organism 
within to give it life. The shell has to be understood as an expression, an 
outgrowth, of those practices. Likewise, while the shell per se structures and 
protects the organism, it is neither impregnable nor a sufficient explanation 
for that life. Slugs, after all, lack shells. One has to go further. A good 
illustration of this is Dominique Iogna-Prat’s analysis of the medieval Church, 
the quintessential medieval institution marrying both hard and soft forms as a 
‘total institution’.127 On the one hand, we naturally today think of the Church 
as its buildings and human hierarchies. Iogna-Prat argued, however, that it 
was only between c.800 and c.1040 (esp. 800–880) that there occurred, within 
medieval thinking, a basic conflation of churches (ecclesiae) with an idea of The 
Church (Ecclesia) itself, when Ecclesia as a body could stand for the whole of 
rightly ordered European society by definition, becoming both ‘container and 
content’.128 From 1050 to 1200 further micro-institutionalizations occurred 
whereby the Church itself became a person and clearly thought-through 
answers were offered to how Christians were contained in their churches.129 
This happened above all, he argued, through the re-ordering of sacramental 
practices which were increasingly rendered valid by their attachment to 
physical churches.130 Both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ institutionalization occurred but 
they had a history which was not at all inevitable. 
127 The phrase partly originates in M. Mauss, ‘Essai sur le don forme et raison de 
l’échange dans les sociétés archaïquès’, L’Année Sociologique, n.s., i (1923–4), 30–186, at p. 
179. It was developed further by Erving Goffman (Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of 
Mental Patients and Other Inmates (New York, 1961); see also Blaise Dufal’s comments in 
‘The fathers of scholasticism’ in this volume). Dominique Iogna-Prat borrows the phrase 
from Anita Guerreau-Jalabert (D. Iogna-Prat, La Maison Dieu. Une histoire monumentale 
de l’Église au Moyen Âge (v. 800–v. 1200) (Paris, 2006), p. 265). See A. Guerreau-Jalabert, 
‘L’ecclesia médiévale, une institution totale’, in Les tendances actuelles de l’histoire du Moyen 
Âge en France et en Allemagne. Actes des colloques de Sèvres (1997) et Göttingen (1998), ed. J.-C. 
Schmitt and O. G. Oexle (Paris, 2002), pp. 219–26. For religious orders as total institutions, 
see G. Melville, ‘L’institutionalité médiévale dans sa pluridimensionalité’, in Schmitt and 
Oexle, Les tendances actuelles de l’histoire du Moyen Âge, pp. 243–64.
128 Iogna-Prat, Maison Dieu, passim, esp. pp. 107–8, 155, 309–14, 613–15. 
129 Iogna-Prat, Maison Dieu, pp. 314, 323 and ch. 6. 
130 Iogna-Prat, Maison Dieu, chs. 8–9. 
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As noted, much work on medieval intellectual thought and 
‘institutionalization’ has invariably and intelligibly denoted the formal 
organizational structures within which that thought was produced: 
universities and their faculties above all, but also monastic schools, 
mendicant studia and their attendant organizational structures. As is clear, 
here we wish to expand, differentiate and integrate ‘institutionalization’ in 
order to accommodate both organizational forms (universities; faculties; 
colleges; studia; legal courts) and intellectual practices (dialectic; syllogistic 
reasoning; quodlibets; disputed questions; commentaries; summae; as well 
as disciplinary forms). It was the latter which gave intellectual substance 
and raisons d’être to the former. It was the former which provided a 
protected, constraining environment for the latter’s development. Even in 
cases in which intellectual practices developed at arm’s length or free from 
such organizational-institutional influence, they developed in ways deeply 
inflected by them (as with the notable generations of lay, multi-disciplinary, 
politically active Italian scholars of the late thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries).131 Understanding their differences and the relationships between 
these two different senses of ‘institutional’ seems to us only to increase our 
understanding of both.132 
One of the aims of this book is to encourage historians to think harder 
about how these forms shape one other. It is encouraging that important 
recent works in English, French and German are convergent in doing so.133 
Still, it remains a gross, but generally valid, observation that much work on 
scholasticism has tended to stress either the content (the thought) or the form 
(the organizational setting in which it was produced) and sometimes the 
practice (particular intellectual techniques, such as the disputed question), 
but seldom how one informed the others. We have already argued that this 
can be illustrated in relation to Southern’s work. Other great historians of 
scholasticism illustrate the same division of labour. Palémon Glorieux wrote 
on the ‘hard’ institution of the Sorbonne and on the ‘soft’ institution of 
quodlibets, and on the ideas of an individual, Jean Gerson, but the levels of 
131 E.g., de Libera, Penser au Moyen Âge; Coccia and Piron, ‘Poésie, sciences et politique’.
132 Interesting analyses of medieval social and religious life in a parallel vein are being 
developed by I. Forrest, ‘The transformation of visitation in thirteenth-century England’, 
Past and Present, cci (2013), 3–38; ‘Power and the people in thirteenth-century England’, 
Thirteenth Century England, xv (2015), 17–33; Trustworthy Men: how Inequality and Faith 
Made the Medieval Church (Princeton, N.J., 2018).
133 Respectively, Wei, Intellectual Culture in Medieval Paris; Gorochov, Naissance de 
l’université; and, most recently – as this volume was being edited – Rexroth, Fröhliche 
Scholastik. A mould-breaking work of cross-thinking remains A. Murray, Reason and Society 
in the Middle Ages (Oxford, 1978).
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analysis tended to separation not integration.134 By focusing on the figure 
of Gerson, Isabel Iribarren demonstrates, in fact, how deeply in Gerson’s 
own thought intellectual practices meshed with institutional ones through 
her close reading of his epic poem the Josephina, composed during and at 
the council of Constance as both a devotional text and a political work of 
reform. It is necessary now, therefore, to turn to ways of explaining how 
institutions work.
Articulating institutions 
Many analysts of institutionalization risk dizzying heights of abstraction, 
so it is helpful to start with John Searle’s approach, which does not.135 A 
philosopher, his is an ordinary language tradition via J. L. Austin, not a 
sociological or anthropological one, although he engages with some of 
this material.136 Searle argues that the fundamental logic underlying all 
human institutions can be clearly stated. He begins with language as the 
foundation of institutionalization. ‘Innocent III is a man’, describes a 
reality (what Searle calls ‘word-to-world fit ↓’) – we describe a world with 
words. ‘Let us go on crusade’ describes a reality Innocent III hopes to 
achieve through his words (what Searle calls a ‘world-to-word fit ↑’) – he 
wants to change the world to match the word. Institutions are different: 
they point in both directions. With institutions we collectively agree to 
grant certain functions to certain practices in certain contexts. By allowing 
this we actually create these powers. Our words change our world. This 
can be put as ‘X counts as Y in context C’. ‘The Albigensian Crusade is 
a crusade’ is a nice medieval example (because the standing of non-Holy 
Land crusades were argued about). To use one of Searle’s, ‘playing chess is 
constituted in part by acting in accord with the rules [of chess]’.137 These 
sets of constitutive rules are fundamental in his explanation: the functions 
to which we put X (the chess piece) only exist within the constitutive terms 
134 E.g., P. Glorieux, Aux origines de la Sorbonne (2 vols, Paris, 1965–6); P. Glorieux, La 
littérature quodlibétique (2 vols, Paris, 1925–35); J. Gerson, Oeuvres complètes, ed. P. Glorieux, 
(10 vols, Paris, 1960–73).
135 Particularly useful are J. R. Searle, Intentionality: an Essay in the Philosophy of Mind 
(Cambridge, 1983), pp. 141–59; The Structure of Social Reality (London, 1995); ‘What is 
an institution?’, Jour. Institutional Economics, i (2005), 1–22; Making the Social World: the 
Structure of Human Civilization (Oxford, 2010). For discussion of Searle, see Searle, Making 
the Social World, pp. xi–xii; the whole issue of the journal Anthropological Theory, vi (1) 
(2006); Tracés, xvii (2009), the issue entitled Que faire des institutions?, esp. the interview at 
pp. 243–58. We sketch here only those parts most relevant for historical analysis.
136 J. R. Searle, ‘Lukes and “substantive social scientific work”’, Anthropological Theory, vi 
(2006), 122–5.
137 Searle, Structure of Social Reality, p. 28.
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of those rules (what counts as a crusade or chess).138 Hence Searle defines 
an institution as ‘a system of constitutive rules, and such a system creates 
the possibility of institutional facts’.139 What seems especially powerful in 
Searle’s account is the role which social assertion plays (‘X counts as Y’) 
within a particular context (‘in context C’). As noted, these sorts of speech 
act combine both word-to-world fit ↓ and world-to-word fit ↑: ‘[T]hese 
are cases where we change reality to match the propositional content of the 
speech act and thus achieve world-to-word direction of fit. But, and this is 
the amazing part, we succeed in so doing because we represent the reality 
as being so changed’. Such ‘declarations’ (Searle’s name for such speech 
acts) ‘change the world by declaring that a state of affairs exists and thus 
bringing that state of affairs into existence’: ‘this is a church’, ‘this is a valid 
marriage’, ‘this is a quodlibet’, ‘this is a religious order’s rule’ are all examples 
of this.140 Searle further states: ‘The phenomena in question are what they 
are in virtue of being represented as what they are’.141 Searle nicely captures 
the circular, problematic social nature of this through a quotation from 
Marx: ‘One man is king only because other men stand in the relation of 
subjects to him. They, on the other hand, imagine that they are subjects 
because he is king’.142 Explaining the ostensibly circular logic through which 
concrete historical institutions are formed, persist, mutate and die is one of 
the historian’s great tasks (we suggest). It is, indeed, as the historian John 
Bossy put it, a ‘social miracle’.143 Further (says Searle), all these institutions 
entail obligations, duties or powers – reasons for doing things which do not 
depend on our desires. Indeed, Searle suggests, their owning such powers is 
how to tell whether a phenomenon is actually institutional: it should carry 
those consequences socially for it to count as such.144 Emily Corran’s chapter 
138 For functions and the status we assign them, see Searle, Making the Social World, pp. 
58–60, 94–5; Structure of Social Reality, pp. 13–23.
139 Searle, Making the Social World, p. 10; Structure of Social Reality, pp. 54–5.
140 Searle, Making the Social World, pp. 11–12 (the examples are ours); this can only be done 
with language, according to Searle (pp. 68–9). On the deontology internal to language for 
which Searle argued, see Making the Social World, pp. 80–6. It was a criticism of Austin’s 
approach to speech acts that it did not attend to their social context (P. Bourdieu, Le sens 
pratique (Paris, 1980), p. 54).
141 Searle, Making the Social World, p. 85. For parallel lines of medieval thought which had 
implications for phenomena such as the sacraments, see I. Rosier-Catach, La parole efficace. 
Signe, rituel, sacré (Paris, 2004).
142 K. Marx, Capital: a Critique of Political Economy, trans. B. Fowkes (3 vols, London, 
1976), i. 149 n. (the section on the commodity and the relative form of value); quoted by 
Searle, Making the Social World, p. 107.
143 J. Bossy, Christianity in the West, 1400–1700 (Oxford, 1985), pp. 57–75; see also J. Bossy, 
‘The mass as a social institution 1200–1700’, Past and Present, c (1983), 29–61.
144 These are known as ‘deontic’ powers in the jargon (Searle, Making the Social World, 
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in this volume offers an exemplary instance in the way the institution of 
private confession produced sophisticated and practical moral thought 
in trying to systematize and rationalize the issues arising from concrete 
pastoral problems. 
For a historian there are several attractions to Searle’s approach. First, and 
fundamentally, it makes very clear just how basic institutions are to social 
life and how important its histories should be. Second, and analytically, 
it recognizes the role of both power and group consent or acceptance of 
the institutions. Being able to represent ‘X as Y’ is a fact of power and 
communication (not of truth) and one which is contingent on others 
accepting (willingly or not) that it is such. It also enables a group to have a 
church, or a crusade, or a quodlibet, all of which do jobs within the societies 
which have them.145 However, because the status of these things as churches, 
crusades, or quodlibets is constructed through social acceptance, that status 
can be gradually acquired, lost, contested, ignored or become redundant 
(like MacIntyre’s traditions). The institutions do make claims on us – but 
those claims are not necessarily efficacious; they depend on our recognition 
of them and the possibilities they offer.146 Explaining the process of how 
this happens – and stops happening – is the business of historians; being 
clearer about what is going on institutionally makes clearer what the general 
shape of this historical task is.147 Peter Biller’s chapter in this volume is an 
exemplary case study of how theological, legal and medical thinking from 
Paris and Montpellier was transmitted and instrumentalized by Rolando of 
Cremona into the Dominican studium at Toulouse, where it seems to have 
played a key role in the early institutionalization of inquisitorial practices 
against heretics. This occurred through the sorts of ‘declarations’ Searle 
analyses, although how such processes begin is something theory struggles 
to clarify.
Establishing institutions: habits, practices, games
Is this only relevant for those institutional objects which are at the ‘hardest’ 
end of Revel’s spectrum? Not really, since the ‘received’ norms of institutions 
pp. 91–2, 105–6). On desire-independent reasons, see Searle, Making the Social World, pp. 
123–32.
145 Searle, Making the Social World, pp. 105–6, 118–19, 123–32.
146 Searle, Making the Social World, pp. 140–1; Searle, Construction of Social Reality, pp. 
117–19.
147 In Making the Social World Searle does go on to explain certain ‘big’ institutions like the 
state (pp. 160–98), but as he becomes more concrete his examples – to a historian – seem 
to include more value judgements (from a modern, secular, liberal, democratic perspective) 
and therefore become less historically useful, generally speaking. 
45
Introduction
should be statable at a push (‘Abelard does not behave as an early twelfth-
century teacher ought because …’).148 How does this explain, however, how 
a group acquires or follows rules when they do not do so consciously? One 
answer is Ludwig Wittgenstein’s language games (Sprachspiele). Another is 
anthropologist-sociologist Pierre Bourdieu’s habitus (see below). Yet another 
is Searle’s own idea of the ‘background’.149 Although it has been the least 
influential on historians it is also the clearest one with which to start. 
Abelard had a background understanding of how to cope with his world 
and apply his intentions in it: what, in the twelfth century, a city was; what a 
school was; what private tutoring was; what marriage was; what humiliation 
was, etc. Like us, he had a background ‘of all those abilities, capacities, 
dispositions, ways of doing things, and general know-how that enable us 
to carry out our intentions and apply our intentional states generally’.150 
Rule-following at this level, Searle suggests, is an unhelpful way of thinking 
about what is going on: ‘[W]e should not say that the man who is at home 
in his society … is at home because he has mastered the rules of the society, 
but rather that the man has developed a set of capacities and abilities that 
render him at home in the society; and he has developed those abilities 
because those are the rules of his society’.151 This looks like a problem but it 
is precisely what makes institutions so invaluable socially. They enable order 
and reduce effort. (This is also why it is enormously easy to take them for 
granted.) The mathematician Alfred North Whitehead’s arguments about 
mathematical notation seem exactly applicable to institutions: 
It is a profoundly erroneous truism ... that we should cultivate the habit of 
thinking of what we are doing. The precise opposite is the case. Civilization 
advances by extending the number of important operations which we can 
perform without thinking about them. Operations of thought are like cavalry 
charges in a battle – they are strictly limited in number, they require fresh 
horses, and must only be made at decisive moments.152
148 Searle, Making the Social World, pp. 158 and 167.
149 Searle argued that he, Bourdieu and Wittgenstein mean the same thing (Construction 
of Social Reality, p. 132). Wittgenstein himself talks about the background (Hintergrund) 
but Searle means something much wider in their affinity. For the Hintergrund, see L. 
Wittgenstein, Über Gewissheit/On Certainty, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, 
trans. D. P. and G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford, 1974 [1969]), §§  94, 461; Philosophische 
Untersuchungen/Philosophical Investigations, ed. P. M. S. Hacker and J. Schulte, trans. G. E. 
M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker and J. Schulte (4th edn, Chichester, 2009), §§ 102, 422.
150 Searle, Making the Social World, pp. 31, 155–60; Searle, Construction of Social Reality, pp. 
127–47.
151 Searle, Construction of Social Reality, pp. 143–7. 
152 A. N. Whitehead, An Introduction to Mathematics (Oxford, 1948 [1911]), pp. 41–2; in the 
same vein but a different discipline, see M. Douglas, How Institutions Think (Syracuse, N.Y., 
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This runs in tandem, too, with Luhmann’s thinking, which stresses the role 
of social systems in reducing the white noise of human life into some sort 
of bounded, manageable order. 
Searle’s stress on intuited background understanding meshes very well 
with the ideas of Pierre Bourdieu, especially the latter’s ideas of practice and 
habitus. Bourdieu’s habitus operates at the same level as Searle’s background 
and, while more sociologically concrete, can be analytically diffuse. It is 
the internal logic produced and shared within a given social group, a reflex 
logic which springs from and reproduces the social structures which have 
produced it and in turn produces a set of social practices whose logic it 
structures (e.g., marriage, inheritance, kin relations). For its adherents this 
shared subjective logic produces an ostensible objectivity in the norms and 
practices they apply. It is a shared subjective grid through which the world 
is objectively and practically ordered.153 To seek to represent the resulting 
social practices theoretically is to misunderstand their essentially practical, 
concrete nature for those enacting them. The practice is the only theory one 
needs. Hence the religion of medieval knights was a practical, corporal one 
of ritual practices – and such logic is best ‘seized in the act’.154 
The example of the medieval knights is one Bourdieu himself borrowed 
from historians; and, in fact, he ostensibly derived his central idea of 
habitus from Erwin Panofsky’s argument that there was a deep underlying 
concordance behind the logic of both gothic architecture and scholastic 
thought and that this derived from the shared habitus of those who 
thought this architecture and reason.155 Habitus itself was a technical, but 
straightforward, term of scholastic art, defined by Aquinas as ‘principally 
bringing order to an act’.156 Panofsky applied this. Scholastic thought 
sought clarification; gothic architecture, transparency. Scholastic thought 
1986), pp. 76–7 on energy-saving.
153 Bourdieu, Sens pratique, pp. 87–109; and in relation to Béarnaise inheritance practices, 
p. 270.
154 Bourdieu, Sens pratique, pp. 152–65, quotation at p. 155. The example of the knights 
is borrowed by Bourdieu from G. Duby, Temps des cathedrals (Paris, 1976), p. 155 n. There 
are useful comments on ritual at pp. 161–4. The stress on practice is entirely consonant 
with Searle’s. Practices are also important in MacIntyre’s thinking but they enact particular 
virtues for him: MacIntyre After Virtue, pp. 187–91, 275–7. Cf. also Wittgenstein, Über 
Gewissheit, § 601; Philosophische Untersuchungen, §§ 150–5.
155 E. Panofsky, Architecture gothique et pensée scolastique, trans. and afterword P. Bourdieu 
(Paris, 1967), pp. 142, 151–67 (Bourdieu’s gloss). On Panofsky’s thesis today, see P. Binski, 
Gothic Wonder: Art, Artifice and the Decorated Style 1290–1350 (New Haven, Conn., 2014), 
passim and particularly pp. 43–4, 50, 142, 278.
156 Aquinas, Summa theologiae, Ia IIae, q. 4, a. 3c., cited by Panofsky, Architecture gothique, 
p. 83, although in a slightly different form. Panofsky did not invest the term with the same 
explanatory power as Bourdieu (Panofsky’s original English was ‘mental habitudes’).
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sought definitional differentiation and distinction; gothic architecture 
spatial differentiation of form. Scholastic thought sought the reconciliation 
of received authorities; gothic architecture sought that of authoritative 
buildings and motifs.157 It is this underlying logic which led thinkers and 
architects to say of their institutions, ‘this counts as a summa’, ‘this counts 
as a church’ (‘X counts as Y in context C’). While striking and evocative, 
Panofsky’s parallelisms risk oversimplification. 
A powerful and still useful way of thinking about how this happens comes 
from Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein might say there was a match here between 
the pattern of the ‘language game’ (Sprachspiel) played by scholastics and 
gothic architects. He, too, famously thought about these issues with a 
medieval (or late antique) example: Augustine’s account of how children 
acquire language from the Confessions, which Wittgenstein found far too 
narrow. Wittgenstein suggested that languages are communicative, social 
games of plural types whose tacit rules can be extraordinarily complicated 
yet navigable. ‘The limits of my language’, he had argued, ‘mean the limits 
of my world’: the games construct the world’s meaning for its participants.158 
Language games only makes sense within their own terms and as an 
ensemble rather than a linear series: the elements of the game hang together. 
Language, like institutions, builds a cumulative, enveloping world:159 
Not only rules, but also examples are needed for establishing a practice [Praxis]. 
Our rules leave loop-holes open, and the practice has to speak for itself. We 
do not learn the practice of making empirical judgments by learning rules: we 
are taught judgments and their connexion with other judgments. A totality of 
judgments is made plausible to us. When we first begin to believe anything, 
what we believe is not a single proposition. It is a whole system of propositions. 
(Light gradually dawns over the whole.) It is not single axioms that strike me 
as obvious, it is a system in which consequences and premises give one another 
mutual support.160
157 Panofsky, Architecture gothique, pp. 83–7, 102, 117–21.
158 Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, § 5.6.
159 Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen. Specifying these general features in 
the work is almost pointless but see §§  25–32, 150–5. A critique of the transposition of 
such terms to topics such as religion or science is G. Graham, Wittgenstein and Natural 
Religion (Oxford, 2014), ch. 3, esp. pp. 35–42. Graham’s critique of this over-interpretation 
seems more justified in relation to the uses made of Lebensform [form of life] compared to 
Sprachspiele. However, since, following Bernard Williams, Wittgenstein’s use of ‘language 
game’ was ‘notoriously generous’, it does seem to permit the application of Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy to historical/empirical material (B. Williams, ‘Wittgenstein and idealism’, in B. 
Williams, Moral Luck (Cambridge, 1981), pp. 144–63, at pp. 154 and 155–6).
160 Wittgenstein, Über Gewissheit, §§  139–142; discussed by d’Avray in Rationalities in 
History, p. 175 n. 19
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The coherence of Wittgenstein’s language-game institutions comes from 
how they hang together and we are entirely justified in scaling them up 
into institutional registers (just as Searle does).161 Anthropologists argue that 
social institutions work in precisely this way, too. Mary Douglas suggested 
that the reliability of social institutions arose from strong connections 
between groups’ ideas of their world and those institutions themselves: 
‘for a convention [say a form of worship] to turn into a legitimate social 
institution [say a church] it needs a parallel cognitive convention to sustain 
it [say, ‘this idea of right worship confirms and conforms to this idea of 
a church]’.162 Returning to Panofsky, his account of gothic architecture 
and scholastic thought suggested that the homology between two quite 
distinct traditions can derive from a hidden water table they both share. 
The logic of one language game (scholastic thought) informed another one 
(gothic architecture) in that society. This is, in practice, a version of what 
David d’Avray has elsewhere called the ‘weak Zeitgeist principle’: without 
projecting a singular spirit of the age one can perfectly respectably examine 
actual structural similarities between historical phenomena.163
***
161 Wittgenstein says so: Philosophische Untersuchungen, § 7.
162 Douglas, How Institutions Think, p. 46. The square brackets are the editors’; see above 
the discussion of Iogna-Prat’s Maison Dieu. 
163 Since this very useful idea of d’Avray has been insufficiently noted, it is worth quoting 
(it refers to E. H. Gombrich’s 1967 lecture ‘In search of cultural history’): ‘Taken in this 
strong sense, the Zeitgeist is a sort of central principle to which the various aspects of a 
period’s culture all lead back – an essence, as it were, in which art, religion, customs, politics, 
etc. all really participate. If one is not a conscious or unconscious Hegelian there seems 
no reason why this should be the case, and Gombrich suggested that cultural historians 
would do better to look for cultural “syndromes”, such as the association at a particular 
time of anti-realistic painting with Catholicism. Since there is no intrinsic relation between 
the style and the religion this is quite different from the search for essential structural 
similarities between apparently diverse phenomena … Gombrich remarked that to criticize 
the Zeitgeist principle proper is not “to deny that such structural likenesses between various 
aspects of a period may be found to be interesting”; and by the “weak Zeitgeist principle” I 
mean no more than this. There is no “iron law of such isomorphism” (that is, of structural 
similarity), and of course “ages” do not have “essences”. So far as periods are concerned, 
almost everyone now believes in a plurality of forms. When a structural similarity emerges 
empirically, however, it need not be ignored, and there is indeed a sort of “isomorphism” 
between the relation of secularity to eschatology in the sermons and in the political world 




Panofsky’s analysis brought together institutions ‘hard’ (church) and ‘soft’ 
(scholastic textual practices) – two very different ends of the institutional 
spectrum. Thus it fits entirely with our argument in this introduction 
and the volume as a whole that institutional history should occupy itself 
with the full range of the institutional spectrum. Without re-summarizing 
ourselves, what we have sought to do here is to offer an introduction to 
major, useful ideas about how institutionalization, individualization and 
intellectual grouping happen. Some are individually familiar to historians, 
but showing how they can connect with one another helps to strengthen the 
historian’s analytical arsenal. The chapters which now follow illustrate the 
explanatory benefits of thinking about the relationship between individuals 
and institutions more widely.
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1. The fathers of scholasticism: authorities as totems∗
Blaise Dufal
Individual thinkers and institutions of meaning
As a social institution, medieval scholasticism was a historical moment of 
moyenne durée in the longue durée of medieval societies, lasting from the 
beginning of the twelfth century to the end of the fourteenth century. As 
a place of activity, medieval scholasticism was located in Latin western 
Europe, in the schools, in the universities and in the monasteries. As 
knowledge, it was defined in the thirteenth century as a scientia within 
the Aristotelian philosophical principles applied to Christian culture. As a 
method, medieval scholasticism originated with Anselm of Canterbury and 
his attempt systematically to ally the Augustinian sentence ‘faith seeking 
understanding’ (fides quaerens intellectum) with the logical method of ‘by 
reason alone’ (sola ratione).1 Anselm also introduced the positive conviction 
that knowledge could be a way of salvation for humankind. This conviction 
found its role in the institution of medieval scholasticism, the ‘empire of the 
book’,2 as an institution for the production of meaning over which it had 
the official monopoly in western medieval societies. Medieval scholasticism 
was the major apparatus of the process of veridiction – determining the 
truth – as a social and cultural activity, an institution which organized the 
production, circulation and consumption of the truth. It was an arm of the 
Church, an institution of faith, of adhesion to belief, an institution focused 
on the will-to-truth which was also a self-fulfilling prophecy (in that the 
knowledge produced by its truthful procedures would be true).3 However, 
more than any complete institution, medieval scholasticism was itself a long 
and complex process of institutionalization.4
*  I thank John Sabapathy for his important help in the writing of this paper.
1 In general, M. Grabmann, Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode (2 vols, Freiburg, 
1909–10). Translations are by the author unless otherwise specified.
2 A. Boureau, L’empire du livre. Pour une histoire du savoir scolastique (1200–1350) (La 
Raison scolastique, ii, Paris, 2007).
3 G. Leclerc, ‘Histoire de la vérité et généalogie de l’autorité’, Cahiers Internationaux de 
sociologie, cxi (2001), 205–31, esp. p. 221 on self-fulfilling prophecies.
4 See V. Tournay, Sociologie des institutions (Paris, 2011).
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Applying the idea from canon law that formally defined an institution 
(institutio) as an act of recognition of a religious community by an 
ecclesiastical superior shows us medieval scholasticism as a grouping of 
institutions:5 the universities founded by papal acts of recognition which gave 
them their specific missions and privileges.6 Here, as in Catholic monastic 
moral conduct, individualism is reprehensible. The community of monks – 
the model for university communities – was founded on the renunciation 
of individual character. Following John Cassian and Benedict of Nursia, 
Bernard of Clairvaux defined an institution as the rules which organized a 
community, ‘a rule accepted by everyone’.7 Adopting this formula from the 
‘last Father of the Western Church’,8 we can say that medieval scholasticism 
was a social structure defined by rules of social relationships (juridical 
statues, legal exceptions, internal rules); rules of teaching (graduations, 
teaching programmes, reading lists); and rules of thinking and writing 
(censure, controversies). Medieval scholasticism was a discipline (disciplina) 
in the monastic ascetic conception and in its scholarly application. This 
discipline was the way to guarantee the regulation of the controversies and 
dogmatic order. These rules assured the proper functioning of scholasticism 
and guaranteed the legitimacy of knowledge. The scholastic world, then, 
was an institution governed by an idea of establishing truth, the necessity 
of providing sense in a Christian world and the requirement to boost the 
Church’s doctrinal foundations. Thus, while the medieval scholastic world 
was not a ‘total institution’ in some modern senses,9 it was an institution 
5 Y. Thomas, Los artificios de las istituciones. Estudios de derecho romano (Buenos Aires, 
1999); E. Coccia, ‘“Qu’est-ce que la vérité?” (Jean 18,38). Le christianisme ancien et 
l’institution de la vérité’, in Aux origines des cultures juridiques européennes. Yan Thomas entre 
droit et sciences socialesi, ed. P. Napoli (Rome, 2013), pp. 207–30; R. Chéno, ‘La pertinence 
ecclésiologique de la théorie de l’institution de Maurice Hauriou’, Revue sciences religieuses, 
lxxxii (2008), 225–43.
6 For Paris, see I. P. Wei, Intellectual Culture in Medieval Paris: Theologians and the 
University, c.1100–1330 (Cambridge, 2012), ch. 3.
7 Bernard of Clairvaux, Liber de Praecepto et Dispensatione (PL, clxxxii), col. 861 (cap. 
I, ‘An monasticae Regulae instituta praecepta sint, an consilia duntaxat’). See also letters 7 
and 221 in the same volume. Commentary in J. Dubois, ‘Ce qu’étaient pour saint Bernard 
la Regula et l’Institutio dans les monastères de son temps’, Bull. Société Nat. des Antiquaires 
de France (1980 for 1977), 162–5; E. Coccia, ‘Regula et vita. Il diritto monastico e la regola 
francescana’, Medioevo e Rinascimento, xx (2006), 97–147. 
8 J. Mabillon, ‘Préface’, in Bernard of Clairvaux, Liber de Praecepto, cols. 25–6; O. 
Rousseau, ‘S. Bernard. Le “dernier des Pères”’, Analecta Sacri Ordinis Cisterciensis, ix (1953), 
300–8.
9 E. Goffman, Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates 
(New York, 1961); Erving Goffman et les institutions totales, ed. C. Amourous and A. Blanc 
(Paris, 2001); M. Foucault, Surveiller et punir. Naissance de la prison (Paris, 1975). 
55
The fathers of scholasticism: authorities as totems
for producing a total interpretation of reality, an institution of totalized 
meaning with much variety within and many extensions into other cultural 
systems.10 Bernard of Clairvaux’s conceptualization of institutions finds 
echoes in contemporary sociological definitions of institutions as collective 
beliefs and behaviours.11 For him, institutions were ways to act and think 
used by individuals. However, if the monastic model played an important 
role in the construction of the university and medieval scholarly self-
representations, the scholastic institution was in practice more open and 
inclusive, more plastic and dynamic. The scholastic institution stretched 
the tension of an institutional formulation originally designed to produce 
conformity; and its extension to include the individuality of scholars created 
an ambiguous paradox.12
In a parallel way the historiography of medieval scholasticism has been 
torn between a focus on some of the most important figures of western 
thought, such as Thomas Aquinas, and an insistence on the collective aspect 
of academic and religious groups, especially between the universities and the 
mendicants. The dialectical movement of this historical analysis between 
individuals as writers and institutions as producers of archives properly 
reflects, in this case, the paradigmatic image of the tension which structured 
the world of medieval scholasticism. The historiographical narration of 
medieval scholasticism tends constantly to try to articulate these twinned 
dimensions.13 It also reflects the internal tension within a strong institution 
which produced and expressed strong personalities. Medieval scholasticism 
was a world dominated by a habitus of humility and dogmatic normativity, 
two strong forms of domination in which individuals could find collective 
justifications for their own activities. The medieval scholastics were 
obsessed with the notion of individual and of person – it was placed in 
the centre of their investigation – but in connection with the question 
of individuals’ community – the central place of their reflection.14 The 
specificity of scholastics as individuals, and as social actors, was to produce 
highly developed theories of their own activity and of their own institution. 
10 See A. de Libera, Penser au Moyen Âge (Paris, 1991).
11 ‘One can … call institutions all the beliefs and all the patterns of conduct established 
by a collectivity. Sociology can thus be defined as the science of institutions, of their genesis 
and of their functioning’, cited in E. Durkheim, Les règles de la méthode sociologique (Paris, 
1871), pp. xxii–xxiii.
12 Y. Thomas, ‘Les artifices de la vérité en droit commun médiéval’, L’Homme, clxxv–
clxxvi (2005), 113–30.
13 See the comments on the work of Southern and Glorieux in the introduction to this 
volume.
14 A. Boureau, De vagues individus. La condition humaine dans la pensée scolastique (Paris, 
2008).
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In a way the institution often remained the unspoken but ubiquitous 
moule (mould) within which the theories of their activity were articulated.15 
In this context, examining the distinctive individuals used by scholastic 
thinkers as models for thinking about their own particular identities is both 
a paradoxical and a fitting activity.
Reconciliation and fathers in the twelfth century
The Church Fathers were models who offered a way to articulate the 
individual in the Christian community and unite authoritative groups of 
intellectuals. In medieval societies based on a globalizing conception of 
kinship,16 especially spiritual kinship,17 the figures of the Church Fathers 
were at the centre of the practices of communication by different social 
agencies from the twelfth century on. In spiritual kinship, they guaranteed 
the institution of charity, the link which unifies the Church. Scholasticism 
became an institution at a symbolic level by establishing a universal heredity 
from these (past) thinkers through the (present) textual memorialization of 
them. Building on patristic thought – for example, through commentaries, 
that ‘idiom of scholastic thought’18 – was a way to articulate the individual 
thinker and the institution as a past and as a present through intertextuality. 
If medieval divine kinship could be understood as an anti-genealogical 
kinship19 – it was the place where everything was amassed and where the 
difference between filiation and alliance was abolished – all the scholastics’ 
work on patristic texts was a way of reintroducing genealogy and history 
into this kinship. Thus, scholasticism raised itself by cutting the patristic 
knot and unrolling the exegetical string. The rise of medieval scholasticism 
was a dialectical movement both identifying with, and distinguishing itself 
from, the models of the Church Fathers. 
During the twelfth century the theologians and philosophers of the 
medieval schools began to have the same attitude towards patristic texts 
as toward biblical texts. This was the result of a long, prior process of 
incorporating patristic explanations (expositiones) onto the biblical sacred 
page (sacra pagina) itself. For Lanfranc (c.1020–89), the Church Fathers 
15 E. Marmursztejn, L’autorité des maîtres. Scolastique, normes et société au XIIIe siècle (Paris, 
2007).
16 A. Guerreau-Jalabert, ‘Sur les structures de parenté dans l’Europe médiévale’, Annales, 
xxxvi (1981), 1028–49.
17 D. Boquet, L’ordre de l’affect au Moyen Âge. Autour de l’anthropologie affective d’Aelred de 
Rievaulx (Caen, 2005).
18 As Alexander Murray said at Oxford during the original conference for this volume.
19 See P. Legendre, Leçons IV, suite. Le dossier occidental de la parenté. Textes juridiques 
indésirables sur la généalogie (Paris, 1988).
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were under the ‘stronghold of authority’ (arx auctoritatis).20 They became a 
specific sort of authority. Later debates around the work of Rupert of Deutz 
(c.1075–1129/1130) were also focused on the intellectual and religious status 
of the Church Fathers – especially Augustine in De omnipotentia Dei – and 
Rupert was one of the first to make a clear distinction between apostolic 
authority and that of the Church Fathers.21 Nevertheless, by the beginning 
of the twelfth century patristic writings had gained a quasi-scriptural 
status. In the work of Hugh of St Victor (d. 1141) the Church Fathers were 
associated with the apostles and the evangelical texts.22 Patristic writings 
gained an increasingly quasi-juridical status equivalent to the founding texts 
of Christianity itself. From now on this group of exegetes became the point 
of reference for intellectual production, the source of intellectual legitimacy 
and the model for scholastics. That influence is seen in criticism of it, such 
as that by the canonist Stephen of Tournai at the end of the twelfth century, 
when he complained about contemporary masters who produced ‘little 
books’ (summulae) ‘as if the works of the holy fathers were insufficient’.23
The question of patristic authority was at the centre of some of the 
most important controversies of the twelfth century, especially around 
Peter Abelard (1079–1142).24 His Sic et non was an enormous collection of 
patristic contradictions and a methodical attempt to overcome them.25 In 
his preface Abelard summarized the way to reconcile the different religious 
and intellectual authorities,26 providing a way to synthesize the evolution 
of the doctrinal issues inspected by the theologians and canonists from 
the beginning of the twelfth century.27 Following the school of Laon,28 
20 Lanfranc of Bec, Liber de corpore et sanguine Domini (PL, cl), col. 408; see also cols. 
428–9, 435. 
21 Rupert of Deutz, Expositio in Apocalypsim (PL, clxix), cols. 10–17. 
22 Hugh of St Victor, De scripturis et scriptoribus sacris (PL, clxxv), col. 15 (c. 6).
23 ‘quasi non suffecerint sanctorum opuscula patrum’, Epistola Stephani Tornacensis 
episcopi, ad Romanum quemdam Pontificem (Chartularium universitatis Parisiensis, ed. H. 
Denifle and E. Chatelain (4 vols, Paris, 1889–99), i. 47–8 (no. 48)).
24 B. Pranger, ‘Sic et non: patristic authority between refusal and acceptance: Anselm of 
Canterbury, Peter Abelard and Bernard of Clairvaux’, in The Reception of the Church Fathers 
in the West from the Carolingians to the Maurists, ed. I. Backus (2 vols, Leiden, 2001), i. 
165–93, at p. 169.
25 D. E. Luscombe, The School of Peter Abelard: the Influence of Abelard’s Thought in the 
Early Scholastic Period (Cambridge, 1969), pp. 214–22.
26 Peter Abailard [sic], Sic et non: a Critical Edition, ed. B. B. Boyer and R. McKeon 
(Chicago, Ill., 1976), p. 96.
27 J. Jolivet, ‘Le traitement des autorités contraires selon le Sic et non d’Abélard’, in J. 
Jolivet, Aspects de la pensée médiévale: Abélard. Doctrines du langage (Paris, 1987), pp. 79–92.
28 E. Bertola, ‘I precedenti storici del metodo del Sic et non di Abelardo’, Rivista di 
filosofia neo-scolastica, liii (1961), 266–76; N. M. Häring, ‘The interaction between canon law 
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Abelard built his scholastic method as a dialectical way of reconciling 
biblical and patristic writings. Medieval scholasticism was based on the 
effort of integrating the diverse excerpts and different authorities which 
were, moreover, historically and geographically remote from medieval 
European societies. With similar goals but different methods, the school of 
St Victor in Paris developed a conception based on the principle of reason 
as the handmaid of faith (ratio ancilla fidei).29 For Richard of St Victor 
(d. 1173) the most important intellectual test was the ability to confront 
patristic authority itself.30 Patristic authority became the invaluable test of 
scholastic authority by its proponents’ willingness to conform to the high 
threshold of its reasoning.31 For scholastic thinkers this validated; it did not 
restrict. Based on attempts to resolve the dissonances and discrepancies of 
a millennium of Latin Christian writing, early scholasticism evolved out 
of institutions of concord producing dialectical harmonies following the 
model of canonists’ work.32 In a way we can say that scholastic thought 
was this effort of reconciliation itself. The two works which effectively 
founded medieval scholasticism were Gratian’s legal Decretum (by 1140), 
whose original title was the Concordia, and the theological Sentences of 
Peter Lombard (c.1100–60) with an analogous goal. Medieval scholasticism 
appeared thereafter as an institution for the resolution of conflicts: religious, 
dogmatic, doctrinal and intellectual.33
The distinction of a major group of four principal Fathers of the Latin 
Church (Augustine of Hippo, Ambrose of Milan, Jerome of Stridon and 
Pope Gregory I) appeared only in the second half of the twelfth century 
in the Latin world.34 These choices were the result of a long process in 
which the intellectual value of their writings had been important but 
and sacramental theology in the twelfth century’, in Proceedings of the Fourth International 
Congress of Medieval Canon Law, ed. S. G. Kuttner (Monumenta Iuris Canonici, series 
C, Subsidia, xv, Vatican City, 1976), pp. 483–93; G. Makdisi, ‘The scholastic method in 
medieval education: an inquiry into its origins in law and theology’, Speculum, xlix (1974), 
640–61.
29 E. Michaud, Guillaume de Champeaux et les écoles de Paris au XIIe siècle (Paris, 1867).
30 Richard of St Victor, ‘Prologue’, in In visionem Ezechiel (PL, lcvi), cols. 527–34.
31 A. Boureau, ‘L’usage des textes patristiques dans les controverses scolastiques’, Revue des 
Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques, xci (2007), 39–49, at p. 43.
32 S. G. Kuttner, Harmony from Dissonance: an Interpretation of Medieval Canon Law, ed. 
R. M. Kollar (Latrobe, Pa., 1960); S. G. Kuttner, ‘On auctoritas in the writing of medieval 
canonists: the vocabulary of Gratian’, in S. G. Kuttner, La Notion d’Autorité au Moyen Age. 
Islam, Byzance, Occident (Paris, 1982), pp. 69–81; C. Munier, Les sources patristiques du droit 
de l’Église du VIIIe au XIIIe siècle (Mulhouse, 1957).
33 Marmursztejn, L’autorité des maîtres, p. 17.
34 On Ambrose’s multiple afterlives, see P. Boucheron, La trace et l’aura. Vies posthumes 
d’Ambroise de Milan (IVe–XVIe siècle) (Paris, 2019).
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not superordinate. The model of the Church Fathers became Augustine 
of Hippo (354–430), who wrote his own biography. The importance of 
those Confessions in medieval Latin societies was extraordinary, especially 
in the twelfth century.35 Rupert of Deutz built a compilation of excerpts 
from it and Ivo of Chartres (c.1040–1115/16) tried to fill the gaps in the 
Augustinian biography. The Gregorian reforms had emphasized the place 
of the lives of the Fathers (Vitae patrum) and these became very important 
for preaching, a trend which assured the place of Jerome as a Father by 
virtue of his embodiment of Christian language, time and memory.36 
Medieval scholastic thinkers were part of the ecclesiastical movement which 
built up this group of Church Fathers and in return their codification of 
them ensured the collective affirmation of the scholastics as an institution 
themselves. The movement opened the possibility for theologians and 
philosophers to find models for their own social activity. In the case of 
Hugh of St Victor, the Fathers provided a model for defining different 
intellectual attitudes and the place of each scholastic thinker in the history 
of Christian intellectualism.37 The Church Fathers became the benchmark 
system of medieval scholasticism. 
The institution of a specific past in the thirteenth century
The Church Fathers and the symbols of the primitive Church became the 
official Christian past for many thirteenth-century groups more generally, 
as well as for the founders of the scholastic movement. The Fathers 
articulated the past for the present of scholasticism, the latter defined by 
its temporal distance from it.38 Medieval scholasticism affirmed itself by 
creating a past through a group of thinkers and textual compilations which 
provided a mirror for its own historical identity. The medieval scholastics 
upheld the Fathers as a common culture and identified commonalities of 
collective models of behaviour. The Fathers worked as a referential past 
which scholasticism interpreted and vivified to assert its own powers of 
interpretation. As a novel institution, scholasticism needed a past; and to 
35 P. Courcelle, Les Confessions de saint Augustin dans la tradition littéraire: antécédents et 
postérité (Paris, 1963).
36 J. Lössl, ‘Hieronymus – ein Kirchenvater?’, in Väter der Kirche. Ekklesiales Denken von 
den Anfängen bis in die Neuzeit. Festgabe für Hermann Josef Sieben SJ zum 70. Geburtstag, ed. 
J. Arnold et al. (Paderborn-Munich, 2004), pp. 431–64.
37 D. Poirel, ‘“Alter Augustinus – Der zweite Augustinus”. Hugo von Sankt Viktor und 
die Väter der Kirche’, in Arnold et al., Väter der Kirche, pp. 643–68.
38 See Lévi-Strauss’s dictum that ‘a myth is always related to a past event’ (C. Lévi-Strauss, 
‘La structure des mythes’, in C. Lévi-Strauss, Anthropologie structurale (2 vols, Paris, 1956–
73), i. 227–55, at p. 231.
60
Individuals and Institutions in Medieval Scholasticism
have permanent links to and foundations in that past. The intellectual and 
spiritual mobilization of the Church Fathers afforded a link to the primitive 
Church which avoided the possibility of rupture, as unmasked in earlier 
Christian anthropology. Thus, scholasticism’s interaction with the Fathers 
could be defined as a process of making them sociably ‘memorable’  –  a 
‘knowledge for the present’.39 
At the beginning of the thirteenth century the translation into vernacular 
languages, especially French, of the Lives of the Fathers spread patristic 
images to all medieval Latin societies.40 This vernacularizing movement 
was reinforced by a strong interest in Greek patristics throughout the 
thirteenth century, supported by the Dominican and Franciscan orders.41 
The building of a strong, specific conception of the Latin Church tradition 
was also a weapon in the struggle against the Greek Church, an attempt 
to marginalize this Church which defined itself as the first Church of 
the Fathers. The Latin Church and its scholastic theologians therefore 
tried to affirm a similar anteriority for their institution of knowledge. In 
the thirteenth century the explosion of iconographic representations of 
the Church Fathers went alongside a declining representation of earlier 
‘ancestors’: Abraham, for example.42 Augustine of Hippo and Abraham 
had the same function of double kinship, maternal and paternal, which 
characterized the paternity of the Christian divinity. The stronger affinity 
between the Fathers and the scholars is, however, self-evident. The iconic 
status of the four Church Fathers also diversified. The locating of the 
Church Fathers in the paradisal court and in the Church militant evolved 
considerably. This movement was reinforced by the diffusion from the 
late thirteenth century of the Dominican Jacobus da Voragine’s (c.1230–
98) collection of saints’ lives, the Golden Legend (Legenda aurea), which 
reinforced the Fathers’ liturgical recognition and distinction.43 In 1298 
39 M. Détienne, L’invention de la mythologie (Paris, 1981), p. 79.
40 Wauchier de Denain, L’histoire des moines d’Égypte suivie de la Vie de Saint Paul le 
Simple, ed. M. Szkilnik (Geneva, 1993); E. Schwan, ‘La vie des anciens pères’, Romania, xiii 
(1884), 233–63.
41 N. Lewis, ‘Robert Grosseteste and the Church Fathers’, in Backus, Reception of the 
Church Fathers, i. 197–229; G. Bardy, ‘Sur les sources patristiques grecques de saint Thomas 
dans la Iere partie de la Somme théologique’, Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques, xii 
(1923), 493–502. 
42 J. Baschet, Le Sein du Père. Abraham et la paternité dans l’Occident médiéval (Le temps 
des images, Paris, 2000), pp. 308–9.
43 B. Fleith, ‘The Patristic sources of the Legenda aurea. A research report’, in Backus, 
Reception of the Church Fathers, i. 231–87; A. Boureau, ‘Vitae Fratrum, Vitae Patrum. L’ordre 
dominicain et le modèle des Pères du désert au XIIIe siècle’, Mélanges de l’École française de 
Rome, xcix (1987), 79–100.
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a decretal of pope Boniface VIII instituted the feast of the four Church 
Fathers. This ecclesiastical decision had important liturgical consequences. 
The feast of each became a double celebration, meaning that the antiphon 
(sung response) was doubled between each psalm during celebrations of the 
office. The four Fathers were now officially distinguished in the Christian 
community’s liturgical celebration of itself. They became the mirror of 
the four evangelists. This papal decision registered the ongoing evolution 
of cultural, religious and intellectual practices which became, from that 
time onwards, a canonical command throughout Christendom. This feast 
symbolized the link between past and present:  it was a social and ritual 
construction which also promoted an institutional pattern for the future of 
scholastic individuals.
Scholastic thinkers increasingly differentiated between grades of past 
and present exegetical authority. At the beginning of the thirteenth century 
Alexander of Hales (d. 1245) developed, in his Gloss on the Sentences (Glossa 
super Sententias (1227)), a distinction between the authority of the Church 
Fathers and the authority of the French Victorine school, particularly of 
Anselm of Laon, who inherited some attributions of patristic authority as 
a specified father of contemporary scholasticism.44 Philip the Chancellor’s 
Summa de bono (1225–8) distinguished three forms of intellectual authority: 
the Fathers, the pagan philosophers and contemporary Latin thinkers.45 
This conception stressed the differences between the world of scholasticism 
and the world of the classical Christian Fathers. The scholasticism of 
the thirteenth century was conscious of being very different in time and 
place to that of the early Church. In the middle of the thirteenth century 
scholastic thinkers, therefore, produced both an important, self-conscious 
movement with regard to the historicity of knowledge, and historical self-
reflection on the ecclesiastical institutionalizing process. Thomas Aquinas, 
who gave an important place to doxography in his work, considered the 
first five ecumenical councils as historical sources and textual context for 
the patristic canon.46 Scholasticism was moving to become dominant over, 
and independent of, patristic thought by enclosing its textual corpus and 
base within a discrete historical period. Aquinas developed a very high 
degree of attention to the diversity of texts he could use and the diversity 
of the knowledge to which he had access. He often quoted the patristic 
44 A. Horwoski, La Visio Dei come forma della conoscenza umana in Alessandro di Hales 
(Rome, 2005), p. 16; H. P. Weber, Sünde und Gnade bei Alexander von Hales. Ein Beitrag zur 
Entwicklung der theologischen Anthropologie im Mittelalter (Innsbruck, 2003).
45 Philip the Chancellor, Summa de bono, ed. N. Wicki (Bern, 1985).
46 L. J. Elders, ‘Thomas Aquinas and the Fathers of the Church’, in Backus, Reception of 
the Church Fathers, i. 337–66, at p. 344.
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authority before the biblical text in his demonstrations. His enterprise to 
reconcile Aristotle and Plato with the Fathers, especially Augustine, became 
the model for a medieval intellectualism in which biblical exegesis would 
orbit away from the centre of intellectual gravity. 
Throughout the thirteenth century we see an explosion of patristic 
compilations which continued the trend initiated in the twelfth century. 
Those compilations, such as the Liber florum, or Liber florigenus, were very 
important for scholarly learning and scholastic works, becoming the major 
point of access to patristic writings.47 These compilations certainly reinforced 
the authority of patristic thought. In compilations and encyclopaedias 
the Church Fathers began to be treated as original sources (originalia, 
documenta).48 Early encyclopaedias, such as Vincent of Beauvais’s Speculum 
maius (1240s–50s), were also important secondary sources for scholastic 
knowledge of the Fathers. In the encyclopaedias, begun and developed in 
the thirteenth century, they became sources of knowledge, but without 
specific differentiation in their level of authority as distinct from other 
sources. During the thirteenth century, then, patristic texts were often used 
outside the frame of theology as a discipline, with its focus on preaching 
and liturgical debate.49 The trend of specialization in scholastic production 
also impacted on the representations of the Church Fathers. It is striking, 
however, that by the end of the thirteenth century – at precisely the point 
they are singled out liturgically –  we also see a disintegration of their 
actual theological distinctiveness. The omnipresence of the Church Fathers 
in scholastic texts, especially Augustine of Hippo, also marked a sort of 
dissolution. They began to be nowhere by being everywhere. The diluting 
of the individuality of patristic writings was one of the logical consequences 
of the scholastic ‘washing machine’. The scholastic institution became too 
powerful and spun the Church Fathers to the side for its own development. 
The dialectic between the dissolution of the individuality of the Fathers’ 
writings and the consolidation of their descendants’ authority became a far 
more general phenomenon in many later medieval intellectual contexts. 
47 E. Dekkers, ‘Quelques notes sur des florilèges augustiniens anciens et médiévaux’, 
Augustiniana, xl (1990), 27–44, at pp. 36–7; T. Falmagne, ‘Le liber Florigerus: recherches 
sur l’attribution d’un florilège augustinien’, Revue d’études augustiniennes et patristiques, xlv 
(1999), 139–81, at p. 160.
48 R. H. Rouse, ‘La diffusion en Occident au XIIIe siècle des outils de travail facilitant 
l’accès aux textes autoritatifs’, Revue des études islamiques, xliv (1976), 115–47, at pp. 142–3.
49 Boureau, ‘Usage des textes patristiques’.
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Collective identities through patristics in the fourteenth century
As a past for a world, as the memory of an institution, the Fathers needed 
to be studied with the building of specific tools of knowledge as well. 
Scholastic work on the patristic corpus in the second part of the thirteenth 
century evolved to become more intensive, with new forms of critical 
textual approach. At the beginning of the fourteenth century, medieval 
theologians were involved in very deep, extensive work around the writings 
of the Church Fathers, fashioning new sorts of tools for it. In 1306 the 
theologian Thomas of Ireland wrote the Manipulus florum, which contained 
thousands of references to patristic sources.50 His works, and those produced 
by the Dominican Robert Holcot (c.1290–1349), the Franciscan Walter of 
Bruges (c.1225–1307) and many others, tried to order the ocean of patristic 
writings and were characterized by an erudite approach, especially in the 
construction of tables (tabulae), which proved very useful for the scholars.51 
It was an attempt at classification and indexing and a mark of the evolution 
of the scholastic analysis in complete autonomy from the older structures of 
knowledge.52 Simply put, the scholastic writers re-composed patristic texts 
according to their own interest and their own methods. Popes, notably John 
XXII, supported and sometimes provided impetus to this movement, as 
well as discouraging misunderstanding and misuse of patristic sources.53 
In the middle of the fourteenth century Bartolomeo of Urbino composed 
the Milleloquium veritatis Augustini, dedicated to Pope Clement VI, and 
perhaps the Milleloquium Sancti Ambrosii.54 These big compendia, and 
the Vidarium Gregorianum55 and the Hieronymianus of Jacques Fouquier, 
were organized alphabetically. The scholastics of the first part of the 
fourteenth century built textual monuments for the Church Fathers. Those 
monuments celebrated their authority but also relegated them to the status 
of intellectual tools and references. 
50 R. H. Rouse and M. A. Rouse, Preachers, Florilegia and Sermons: Studies on the 
Manipulus Florum of Thomas of Ireland (Toronto, 1979), pp. 311–407; R. H. Rouse, ‘The list 
of authorities appended to the Manipulus florum’, Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du 
Moyen Âge, xxxii (1965), 243–50.
51 Walter of Bruges, Tabula originalium, in Répertoire des maîtres en théologie de Paris, ed. 
P. Glorieux (2 vols, Paris, 1933–4), ii. 84–6.
52 J. de Ghellinck, ‘Une édition ou une collection médiévale des Opera omnia de saint 
Augustin’, Liber Floridus. Mittellateinische Studien Paul Lehman gewidmet, ed. B. Bischoff 
and S. Brechter (St Ottilien, 1950), pp. 63–82.
53 F. Ehrle, Historia bibliothecae romanorum pontificum tum bonifatianae tum avenionis 
(Rome, 1890), i. 151–4, 180–1.
54 Paris, BNF, MS. lat. 2120, offered to Pope Clément VI; Rome, Biblioteca Apostolica 
Vaticana, MS. Urb. Lat. 81 and MS. Vat. Lat. 518.
55 J. Fouquier, Vidarium Gregorianum (Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine, MS. 687). 
64
Individuals and Institutions in Medieval Scholasticism
These different, somewhat countervailing, currents can be interestingly 
explored in attitudes towards one Church Father, dogmatically the most 
important but also the most global figure to mix the figures of pastor and 
theologian: St Augustine. The uses made of Augustine were multiple. During 
the first four decades of the fourteenth century a few scholastics from the 
mendicant orders composed commentaries on Augustine’s monumental 
City of God (413–26), written as a riposte to learned pagan criticism of 
Christianity after the Goths’ sack of Rome in 410. These commentaries 
showed a variety of different views and representations of Augustine.56 For 
these commentators The City of God provided an opportunity to define 
their conceptions of Augustine and develop their own conception of what 
the scholastic thinker should be, drawing on his model and the common 
patristic references and distinctions. For the Dominican Nicolas Trevet 
(c.1258–1335), Augustine’s City of God became an ‘old’ text whose cultural 
references needed explanation, something which Trevet provided in his 
commentary on pagan religion and classical literature by focusing on the first 
ten books of the City of God. For the Dominican Thomas Waleys (c.1287–
1349) and the Franciscan John Ridevall (d. after 1340), the Augustinian 
text needed to be used for preaching as well as explanation.57 For these 
scholastic writers the patristic text did not need theological explanation; 
and they accordingly developed a conception of scholastic thought which 
encompassed erudite knowledge about all the texts from the past. The 
Franciscan theologian François of Meyronnes (c.1280–1328), by contrast, 
tried to organize the theological aspects of The City of God and composed 
a text which put in order the religious and doctrinal developments of 
Augustine’s thought. He proposed a ‘scholastization’ of Augustine’s text 
to make it comprehensible for students and young monks. The Carmelite 
John Baconthorpe (c.1290–1348) used scholastic logic and Aristotelian tools 
to establish the superiority of the theology of Augustine. He defended the 
conception of scholasticism’s focus on theology and tried to avoid what 
he saw as excesses in philosophical trends. These commentaries expressed 
the intellectual and cultural concerns of contemporary commentators and 
illustrate how, by the fourteenth century, the Church Fathers and their texts 
had become polysemous figures. All wanted to defend Augustine’s text but 
not in the same way or with the same goals; and in so doing they proposed 
various conceptions of Augustine – and of patristic figures more widely. 
Thus, for example, employing the four Aristotelian causes (material, formal, 
56 B. Dufal, ‘Repenser l’autorité du Père Saint Augustin et le De civitate Dei au XIVe siecle’ 
(unpublished University of Paris PhD thesis, 2014). 
57 B. Smalley, English Friars and Antiquity in the Early Fourteenth Century (Oxford, 1960).
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efficient, final), Trevet divided the four exegetical meanings of scripture 
across each of the four Church Fathers (the division became current in 
the fourteenth century). Jerome represented the historical level of meaning; 
Gregory the allegorical; Ambrose the tropological/moral; and Augustine 
the anagogical/mystical level of meaning. The Church Fathers each 
embodied one technique of exegesis and represented different traditions 
of interpretation. This typological schematization nicely exemplifies the 
scholastic subordination of these superordinate patristic figures within their 
descendants’ intellectual frameworks.
These different appropriations of St Augustine testify to a diffraction of the 
scholastic world, a world which by the beginning of the fourteenth century 
appeared as an institution co-ordinated by the constellation of authorities. 
Thus scholasticism, a written world inked by speculative distinctions and 
a social world built by classification struggles, was dividing into multiple 
communities and identities. From the fourteenth century specific schools 
and groups of thinkers appeared which distinguished themselves with 
reference to specific contemporary authorities (Averroes, Thomas Aquinas, 
Duns Scotus). This competition over identification was further stressed by 
the question of Aristotle’s place, still seen as a pagan Father, but perhaps 
also a scholastic Father in the manner of Augustine.58 The Church Fathers 
became demultiplicate bodies: they were limbs of the Church and the 
scholastic institution and they were specific figureheads for certain 
groups. Their texts, as specific bodies for specific questions, functioned as 
ambiguous masks for these different groups. The various appropriations 
and mobilizations of patristic figures in the fourteenth century were a 
de facto way of inscribing new forms of dispositive authority and of re-
composing the system of scholastic self-representation. In this connection, 
the patristic author, as a source of authority, became an individual because 
of his existence as a historical figure. He moved from saintly to human.59 
Through St Augustine, groups which affirmed their own identity found a 
way to attach that specificity to a normative intellectual pedigree, something 
which contemporary institutionalization required. For the mendicant 
orders, Augustine’s writings in particular became a forge on which to make 
– individually and collectively – proofs for their own institutions and a way 
to be a part of the glorious history of the Church. The Augustinian orders 
themselves also had an enormous impact on the cultural production of this 
58 C. König-Pralong, Avènement de l’aristotélisme en terre chrétienne. L’essence et la matière 
entre Thomas d’Aquin et Guillaume d’Ockham (Études de philosophie médiévale, Paris, 
2005).
59 A. J. Minnis, Medieval Theory of Authorship: Scholastic Literary Attitudes in the Later 
Middle Ages (2nd rev. edn, Philadelphia, Pa., 2012).
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patristic figuration, likewise the Carmelite order.60 The important diffusion 
of De origine et progressu ordinis fratrum eremitarum Sancti Augustini 
et vero ac proprio titulo eiusdem (1334) by Henry of Friemar throughout 
the fourteenth century showed the polysemy and ambiguity of medieval 
conceptions of the Fathers.61 Its success nursed new evolutions in patristic 
attitudes at the end of the fourteenth century. The mendicant orders, to 
reinforce themselves, built patristic figures who mixed ascetic behaviours 
and intellectual aptitudes. Doing so brought them back as religious and 
devotional figures in the second part of the fourteenth century, qualifying 
their earlier dominance as primarily scholastic intellectual figures.
The Church Fathers as ‘totems’ of medieval scholasticism
As a world of coexistence between naturalist and analogist anthropology, 
Latin medieval societies participated in some totemic representations. 
Anthropologically, western medieval societies were characterized by a mix 
between a naturalist ontology and an analogic ontology, following Descola’s 
typology.62 Briefly, Descola has suggested that it is useful to think about 
societies in terms of the four ways of relating themselves to the world 
which, he argues, they adopt, adapt and mix to different degrees: animistic 
(perceiving continuities between humans and other living systems/
creatures); totemistic (perceiving particular shared attributes between 
humans and other particular species); analogistic (perceiving multiple 
parallels and correspondences across created substances); and naturalistic 
(perceiving the world and its entities as belonging to a single generalizable 
order of material logic but where internal worlds are separate, in contrast 
60 D. Blume and D. Hanssen, ‘Agostino pater e praeceptor du un nuovo religioso 
(considerazioni sulla propaganda illustrata degli eremiti agostiniani)’, in Arte et spiritualità 
degli Ordini Mendicanti. Gli Agostiniani et il cappello di S. Nicola a Tolentino (Tolentino, 
1992), pp. 77–92; S. Dale, ‘I veri figli di Agostino e gli affreschi della chiesa di Sant’Agostino 
a Gubbio’, in Arte et spiritualità degli Ordini Mendicanti, pp. 151–64.
61 R. Arbesman, ‘Henry de Friemar’s treatise on the origin and development of the order 
of the hermits friars and its true and real title’, Augustiniana, vi (1956), 37–145; P. Courcelle, 
‘Les romans de propagande développés par les ermites de saint Augustin’, in P. Courcelle, Les 
Confessions de saint Augustin dans la tradition littéraire. Antécédents et Postérité (Paris, 1963), 
pp. 324–7.
62 P. Descola, Par-delà nature et culture  (Paris, 2005); F. Coste, ‘Philippe Descola en 
Brocéliande’, in Faire l’anthropologie historique du Moyen Âge, ed. E. Brilli, P.-O. Dittmar 
and B. Dufal (= Atelier du Centre de Rechercher Historique, vii (2010)) <https://journals.
openedition.org/acrh/1911> [accessed 15 Feb. 2019]; P.-O. Dittmar, L’invention de la bestialité. 
Une anthropologie du rapport homme-animal dans les années 1300 (Paris, 2010). An accessible 
English summary by Descola of his typology is ‘Modes of being and forms of predication’, 
HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory, iv (2014), 271–80 <https://www.haujournal.org/index.
php/hau/article/view/hau4.1.012> [accessed 15 Feb. 2019].
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to animism). The scholastic world dealt with the principle of Christian 
transcendence and earthly material embodiment with a discursive structure 
dominated by analogical principles. The ambiguity of the ontological 
background of medieval societies was fixed by the gravity of the Church 
Fathers as institutional embodiments of an individual figure, abstracting 
the individual into a general understanding of their personae (following 
the classical theatrical term for a dramatic character). The Church Fathers 
accordingly became mythological figures, the products of culture63 and 
collective representation,64 at a moment when scholastics became aware 
of the temporal difference between antiquity and their modernity.65 The 
Church Fathers represented the past of the scholastic world, but this 
past needed to be managed if the present was to remain self-sufficient 
and not be overwhelmed by it. The Fathers needed to be connected, but 
not too connected, to their contemporary successors. On the one hand, 
these mythologized figures were formulated to function in a genealogy of 
scholasticism which connected medieval societies to the early and classical 
Christian world. On the other hand, too great a distancing from them 
would have risked a break between the Church’s legitimating late antique 
roots and the ecclesiastical institution of the thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries which claimed those roots as its warrant. The Church Fathers 
were given a double structure, historic and a-historic: they belonged to 
the inscribed word but also to the living language.66 They were a way for 
scholastics to build a continuity between two worlds which had become 
different. Scholastic interpretations of the Church Fathers could be seen as 
different versions of a mythological story.67 They appeared in the scholastic 
texts as names, where they were put forward as emblems.68 These emblems 
were social characteristics for groups and for individuals, embodying and 
operating as tutelary authorities.69 These ‘totems’ gave the name of the 
63 Pensée mythique et représentations sociales, ed. D. Jodelet and E. Paredes (Paris, 2010).
64 According to R. Barthes, ‘[m]yth, closely related to what Durkheimian sociology 
calls a collective representation, can be heard to speak in the formulations of newspapers, 
advertising, mass-market goods, is that which is determined socially, a reflection. This 
reflection however, conforming to the celebrated image of Marx, is inverted – myth consists 
in overturning culture into nature, or at least, the cultural, ideological, historical into the 
natural’ (R. Barthes, Mythologies (Paris, 1957), pp. 181–2).
65 According to Lévi-Strauss , ‘[a] myth is always related to a past event’ (Lévi-Strauss, ‘La 
structure des mythes’, p. 231).
66 F. Saussure, Cours de linguistique générale (Paris, 1995).
67 Lévi-Strauss, ‘La structure des mythes’, p. 240.
68 A. Boureau, L’aigle. Chronique politique d’un emblème (Paris, 1985).
69 According to E. Durkheim, ‘[t]he use of emblems, necessary for a society to become 
conscious of itself, is no less indispensable in assuring the continuity of that conscience’ (E. 
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social groups; fixed the identity; named and appointed their purpose; and 
guaranteed the harmony of their society.70 Monastic orders, as brotherhoods 
and similar to clans,71 also built their identities on the paternal reference to 
a spiritual father, again operating as institutionalizing totems.72 As a specific 
cult, the Church Fathers supported a more general cult of the late antique 
patristic past which instituted and reinforced the identifies of medieval 
intellectual groupings and of the Church itself.73
The Church Fathers, as paradigmatic, instrumental figures, provided a 
way to think both of the collective past and the present world; and a way 
to conceive the genealogies between individuals and scholastic culture. 
As figures of mediation between individuals and institutions, the Church 
Fathers worked as totemic forms for the medieval scholastic world,74 in 
a process of institutionalization which aimed to organize and control the 
links between individuals and social models.75 In a dialectical process of 
self-recognition, medieval intellectuals defined themselves relative to 
these ‘ideal types’. Scholastic thinkers built their own Fathers as a way to 
describe themselves and to recognize their relative intellectual ancestors. 
The Patristic Fathers worked as social models, exemplary figures, cultural 
prototypes, ideal types, for their scholastics sons. Those very polysemous 
‘ideal types’ played a decisive part in the construction of scholasticism as an 
institution. Between individuals and institution, the Church Fathers were 
Durkheim, Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse. Le système totémique en Australie (2nd 
rev. edn, Paris, 1925), p. 331).
70 Barthes writes: ‘Myth correctly has a double function: it designates and it notifies, it 
creates understanding and imposes it’ (Barthes, Mythologies, p. 202).
71 Durkheim writes: ‘The clan is moreover, a society which can, less than any other, 
dispense with emblems and symbols, since there is hardly another so lacking in coherence. 
The clan cannot define itself through its chief, since even if all central authority is not 
absent, it is at least uncertain and unstable. It cannot, furthermore, define itself through 
the territory which it occupies, since the population, being nomadic, is not tightly tied to a 
specific locality … The unity of the group then is only apprehensible thanks to the collective 
name which all its members bear and the emblem, also equally collective, which reproduces 
the thing designated by this name’ (Durkheim, Formes élémentaires, pp. 333–4).
72 D. Donadieu-Rigaut, Penser en images les ordres religieux (XIIe–XVe siècles) (Paris, 2005), 
p. 2.
73 According to Durkheim, ‘[t]he different cults specific to each clan merge and 
complement one another by forming an interdependent whole [un tout solidaire]’ 
(Durkheim, Formes élémentaires, pp. 423–4).
74 Descola asserts that ‘[t]he Lévi-Straussian principle of conceiving of discontinuities 
in the natural world [as a means of explaining discontinuities in humans’ social world] is 
inoperable here and one has to turn therefore towards mythical ontogenesis [i.e., the way 
humans stage their narrative of mythical development] in order to understand the reasons 
for totemic rearrangements’ (Descola, Par-delà nature et culture, p. 228).
75 M. Weber, Économie et société (2 vols, Paris, 1995), i: Les catégories de la sociologie, p. 94.
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social figures, cultural intermediaries and subtle intellectual mediators who 
allowed the building of representations of individual intellectuals linked to 
a collective identity. In order to objectify and stabilize itself, scholasticism as 
an institution needed the Church Fathers to circumscribe the social habitus 
which embodied its own social standards, to put a limit on the hubris of 
theologians and philosophers.76 The referential system of scholasticism 
needed permanently to reconcile its internal tensions and external social 
injunctions. The resolution of this conflict between individuals and 
scholasticism lay in the institutional reconfiguration of patristic authors as 
common cultural references which each Christian thinker could appropriate. 
As they were figures of intellectual and religious authority in the medieval 
world, talking and writing about the Fathers was an important contribution 
to the strengthening of scholasticism as a set of institutions. Commentaries 
on their works and the different uses of their authority were ways for 
scholastics to distinguish themselves and connect internal groupings, 
expressed by specific conceptions of what they were reading, writing and 
arguing. The uses of these figures showed, in fact, how an institution was 
not a common way to realize common purposes but a common way to 
realize different ends.77 The Church Fathers represented the possibility of 
plural expressions in a unified context which included the possibility of 
individual self-affirmation. Together, these different intellectual attitudes 
produced a large pantheon; and the patristic tradition was employed as a 
founding agency for scholasticism as an institution which gathered together 
all the symbolic structures for each group and intellectual individuality.78 
They represented kinship as a shared fatherhood, a conception of the 
generational transmission of sacred knowledge; and they embodied love 
and charity (caritas) as the spiritual link which unified the Church and 
sought to protect it from the dangers of misinterpretation. 
76 P. Bourdieu, ‘Les rites comme actes d’institution’, Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, 
xliii (1982), 58–63.
77 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass., 1971), ch. 2.
78 M. Douglas, How Institutions Think (Syracuse, N.Y., 1986); M. Calvez, ‘L’analyse 
culturelle de Mary Douglas: une contribution à la sociologie des institutions’, SociologieS 
(2006) <http://journals.openedition.org/sociologies/522> [accessed 15 Feb. 2019].
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2. The unicity of substantial form in the Correctoria 
corruptorii fratris Thomae of Richard Knapwell, 
Robert Orford and John of Paris
Antonia Fitzpatrick
The Dominican general chapter of June 1286 demanded that each and every 
individual friar (omnes et singuli) familiarize himself with, promote and 
defend the teachings of Thomas Aquinas.1 This was a response to certain 
events of 30 April that year. The archbishop of Canterbury, John Peckham, a 
Franciscan, had condemned as heretical Aquinas’s theory of human nature, 
according to which there is one and only one substantial form in a human 
being: the rational soul.2 The condemnation followed – without being the 
inevitable conclusion of – the thirteenth century’s most acrimonious and 
significant scholastic debate.3 Was there one substantial form alone in a 
human being, as Aquinas’s (mostly Dominican) defenders argued;4 or was 
there more than one, or a plurality of forms,5 as his (mostly Franciscan) 
1 Acta capitulorum generalium Ordinis Praedicatorum, ed. B. M. Reichert (9 vols, Rome, 
1898–1904), i. 235. 
2 Registrum epistolarum fratris Johannis Peckham archiepiscopi cantuariensis, ed. C. T. 
Martin (RS, 3 vols, 1882–5), iii. 922–3. 
3 See A. Boureau, Théologie, science et censure au XIIIe siècle (Paris, 1999); and R. Zavalloni, 
Richard de Mediavilla et la controverse sur la pluralité des formes (Louvain, 1951). In English 
see: A. Fitzpatrick, Thomas Aquinas on Bodily Identity (Oxford, 2017), pp. 5–11, 175–80; J. F. 
Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines: a Study in Late Thirteenth-century 
Philosophy (Washington, D.C., 1981), pp. 314–47. For the later history of the debate: R. 
Pasnau, Metaphysical Themes 1274–1671 (Oxford, 2011), pp. 574–605. 
4 The Augustinian Giles of Rome, additionally, was an important defender of the theory 
of the unicity of form. See his De gradibus formarum/Contra gradus et pluralitatem formarum 
(Venice, 1500). 
5 The secular Henry of Ghent, an early critic of Aquinas’s thought, proposed a duality 
(not plurality) of forms in humans. See esp. his Opera omnia, ed. R. Macken et al. (multiple 
vols, Leuven, 1979–), v–viii (Quodlibets, I.4, II.2, III.6 and IV.13). For commentary: Boureau, 
Théologie, science et censure, pp. 118–34; Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of 
Fontaines, pp. 329–35. 
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critics maintained?6 The deep philosophical and theological importance of 
this question will become clear shortly. At the centre of the conflict was 
another Franciscan’s contentious ‘corrective’ to Aquinas’s thought, William 
de la Mare’s Correctorium fratris Thomae (Paris, c. March 1277),7 mandatory 
reading for Franciscans studying Aquinas’s Summa theologiae following their 
own general chapter of 1282.8 For their part, Dominican leaders encouraged 
a deepening connection between Aquinas’s theology and Dominican group 
identity before 1286, even if early legislative measures emphasized discipline 
over doctrine: in 1278 and 1279 general chapters empowered visitators, 
provincial and conventual priors to punish any friar bringing scandal to the 
order by openly criticizing Aquinas’s writings.9 There were five Dominican 
responses to William de la Mare, each a Correctorium corruptorii fratris 
Thomae. Three of these will be discussed here. 
The Correctoria corruptorii, self-evidently, hold out an opportunity for 
a case study in the formation of individuals’ thinking in relation to the 
institution of which they were a part. Yet it would hardly be worth returning 
to these texts and to the debate over the unicity of form, mapped out so 
well by others, were there not the possibility of revealing something new, 
or at least underappreciated. It is not the argument of this chapter that the 
Correctoria corruptorii of Richard Knapwell (Quare, Oxford, c. 1278), Robert 
Orford (Sciendum, Oxford, 1282–3) and John of Paris (Circa, Paris, 1283–4)10 
yield a straightforward study in the homogenization and institutionalization 
of Dominican thought on the basis of Aquinas’s philosophy. The last study 
6 For one version of the doctrinal case against the unicity of form argument, see the 
1278 apologia by John Peckham’s predecessor as archbishop of Canterbury, the Dominican 
Robert Kilwardby, edited in F. Ehrle, ‘Der Augustinismus und der Aristotelismus in der 
Scholastik gegen Ende des 13. Jahrhunderts’, Archiv für Literatur- und Kirchengeschichte des 
Mittelalters, v (1889), 603–35, at pp. 614–32; and A. Birkenmajer, Vermischte Untersuchungen 
zur Geschichte der mittelalterlichen Philosophie (Münster, 1922), pp. 60–4. This apologia was 
one of the targets in July 1278 of the Dominican Giles of Lessines’ De unitate formae, ed. 
M. de Wulf (Louvain, 1902). For commentary, see Boureau, Théologie, science et censure, pp. 
36–8, 63–70, 76, 80–1; Fitzpatrick, Thomas Aquinas on Bodily Identity, pp. 8–9 and n. 24. All 
translations are by the author.
7 For this dating: Boureau, Théologie, science et censure, p. 75. 
8 ‘Definitiones Capituli Generalis Argentinae, Celebrati anno 1282’, ed. P. Geroldus 
Fussenegger, Archivum Franciscanum historicum, xxvi (1933), 127–40, at p. 139.
9 Reichert, Acta capitulorum generalium, i. 199, 204. 
10 Each is named after the first word of its incipit. For an overview of the 5 Correctoria 
corruptorii, see M. D. Jordan, ‘The controversy of the Correctoria and the limits of 
metaphysics’, Speculum, lvii (1982), 292–314, esp. pp. 292–8 and n. 3, with bibliography 
detailing the previous 70 years of research on these texts, notably works by Hödl, Mandonnet, 
Ehrle, Glorieux, Creytens and Pelzer. Jordan’s dating of the Correctoria is challenged by 
Boureau, Théologie, science et censure, p. 79. Here this chapter follows Boureau. 
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devoted to the cast of characters and the range of issues with which this 
chapter is concerned, Frederick J. Roensch’s Early Thomistic School (1964) – 
also published as The Unicity of Substantial Form and its Implications in the 
Early Thomistic School – presented things in exactly that way. Noting that 
‘the doctrine of unicity of substantial form … constituted the most basic 
yardstick by which to judge the character of any early Thomist’, Roensch 
intended to show that our three Dominicans were ‘true and loyal Thomists’ 
who ‘not only defended St. Thomas, but understood his teaching in 
exactly the same way as he did himself ’.11 Here Roensch missed something 
significant. Read closely, the Correctoria instead provide a case study in 
individual thinking deeply marked by the politics of group opposition – in 
this case, the institutional rivalry between the two major mendicant orders. 
It emerges, furthermore, that this partisan process of critical re-evaluation 
could have a radically disintegrative effect, generating wildly divergent 
renderings of Aquinas’s theory of the composition of a human being. 
Admittedly, one does not have to look far to find discussions of 
‘Thomism’ which suggest less stringent criteria for membership of a 
‘Thomistic school’ than Roensch’s study of 1964. Still, an assumption often 
encountered is that this supposed intellectual school or ‘-ism’, grounded 
in Aquinas’s writings, has possessed, from the thirteenth century until 
now, an unchanging essence of ‘basic doctrines … commonly recognized 
as characteristic’, even if the ‘problems and polemics of their day’ have 
influenced the range of questions which different Thomists, as individuals 
or generations, have asked of Aquinas’s works and the answers they have 
looked to defend.12 It may appear obvious, then, that Roensch’s concept 
of an ‘Early Thomistic School’ should have failed to capture the real 
diversity of the earliest Dominican interpretations of Aquinas: we might 
immediately suppose that individuals should have found themselves 
at least slightly adapting, rather than merely replicating, what Aquinas 
said, in order to keep pace with the development of debate.13 What is too 
infrequently recognized, however, and what it is crucial to understand, 
is that Aquinas’s ‘basic doctrines’, as set out over the range of his works, 
could themselves appear fundamentally underdetermined, especially 
11 F. J. Roensch, The Unicity of Substantial Form and its Implications in the Early Thomistic 
School (Dubuque, Iowa, 1964), pp. ix, 19. 
12 Quotations from J. A. Weisheipl, ‘Thomism’, in New Catholic Encyclopedia (18 vols, 
New York, 1967–88), xiv. 126–35, at pp. 126–7 (20 ‘basic doctrines’ are listed at pp. 127–8). 
13 On the impossibility of reconciling the evolution of scholastic debate with the notion 
of intellectual schools defined by doctrine, see S. P. Marrone, The Light of Thy Countenance: 
Science and Knowledge of God in the Thirteenth Century (Studies in the History of Christian 
Thought, 2 vols, Boston, Mass., 2001), i. 13–15. 
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when subjected to the pressure of questions which Aquinas himself (d. 
1274) did not (or could not) foresee.14 
This was just the case with the theory of the unicity of substantial form 
in humans. In some aspects, it was clear and uncompromising. In others, 
especially the theory’s implications for the continuity of the body after death 
(or the composition of the corpse), Aquinas’s thinking appeared muddled. 
Many different views could consequently follow. As we shall see, it was no 
accident that William de la Mare chose to focus his critique of the unicity of 
form upon the issue of post-mortem bodily continuity, or that discussion of 
the theory’s alleged consequences in this area could provide ample material 
for an increasingly complex and heated scholastic debate. It followed, too, 
that, while the Dominican authors of the Correctoria wrote on Aquinas’s 
behalf, countering de la Mare ‘secundum Thomam’ [according to Thomas], 
the act of constructing an effective defence of Aquinas on the subject of 
the composition of a human being was a case of setting out creatively and 
originally what Aquinas must have intended or would have said. Finally, and 
most importantly, it could follow that these Dominicans’ readings of the 
‘basic doctrine’ of the unicity of form, profoundly shaped by the need to 
find a reply to a distorting Franciscan caricature of Aquinas’s thought on 
human nature, were just as likely (if not more) to replicate critical aspects 
of de la Mare’s misrepresentation as they were to attempt to rectify them.15 
The political-intellectual dynamics in play can be explained much 
more readily with reference to what Russell Friedman has identified as 
rival Franciscan and Dominican intellectual ‘traditions’ at the medieval 
university16 than by the language of ‘-isms’ or ‘schools’. First, however, we 
need to return to the issue at stake. Scholastic theologians held that the two 
most basic components of composite things were matter and substantial 
form. A substantial form was a form which determined something’s nature 
– as a human, an animal, or a body, for instance. The question of the unicity 
or plurality of substantial forms in a human, then, was fundamental: 
a theologian’s answer would determine, inter alia, his account of how a 
14 An emphatic appreciation of this point may be the key to understanding Aquinas’s 
reception more broadly. Cf. H. de Lubac: ‘[C]e grand docteur … apparaît plutôt comme 
un auteur de transition, et l’ambivalence de sa pensée en équilibre instable, rançon de sa 
richesse même, explique qu’on ait pu dans la suite l’interpréter en des senses si opposés’ (H. 
de Lubac, Surnaturel: Études historiques (Paris, 1946), pp. 435–6).
15 Here this discussion respectfully parts ways with elements of I. Iribarren’s crucial article 
‘Responsio secundum Thomam and the Search for an Early Thomist School’, Vivarium, xxxix 
(2001), 255–96, at pp. 281, 295. 
16 R. L. Friedman, Intellectual Traditions at the Medieval University: the Use of Philosophical 
Psychology in Trinitarian Theology among the Franciscans and Dominicans, 1250–1350 (2 vols, 
Leiden, 2013). 
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single being could arise from the union of matter and soul; his theory of 
embryogenesis;17 his understanding of which of a human’s components were 
essential to a person’s continuing identity over his or her lifetime;18 and – as 
just indicated – his judgement of what continued, and what perished, at the 
moment of death.
Aquinas’s account of human nature was innovative.19 One substantial 
form alone, the rational or human soul, was to be the source of all a human’s 
defining characteristics and to give to it the totality of its existence (esse). 
‘In one individual, there is only one substantial form [forma substantialis]’, 
Aquinas says, and ‘through this substantial form, which is the human soul 
[anima humana], this individual is not only human, but an animal, one 
thing, a body, a substance, and a being [ens]’.20 
This intervention was neither random nor arbitrary. Like the majority 
of the most significant philosophical theories developed by medieval 
universities’ most important thinkers,21 the theory of the unicity of 
substantial form in humans was motivated by theological considerations. 
Aquinas had the doctrine of the bodily resurrection in mind. If the soul were 
a human’s only substantial form, then the union between soul and matter 
in each human would be intimate and essential. It would make sense to say, 
as the Fourth Lateran Council’s declaration of faith proposed, that, at the 
resurrection, each person’s soul would be reunited to a body recovered from 
their own matter, so that the whole person, sinning flesh included, could 
be judged justly.22 Additionally, the theory (like the Council’s doctrinal 
pronouncement), was distinctively shaped by Catholic polemic with dualist 
17 Studies include F. Amerini, Aquinas on the Beginning and End of Human Life, trans. M. 
Henninger (Cambridge, Mass., 2013); and M. A. Hewson, Giles of Rome and the Medieval 
Theory of Conception (London, 1975). 
18 An indispensable study of medieval debates on personal identity over time, relating 
them to analogous discussions in modern philosophy and science fiction, is C. W. Bynum, 
‘Material continuity, personal survival and the resurrection of the body: a scholastic 
discussion in its medieval and modern contexts’, in C. W. Bynum, Fragmentation and 
Redemption: Essays on Gender and the Human Body in Medieval Religion (New York, 1991), 
pp. 239–97 and 393–417.
19 S. de Boer, The Science of the Soul: the Commentary Tradition on Aristotle’s De anima, c. 
1260–c. 1360 (Leuven, 2013), p. 40. 
20 Thomas Aquinas, Opera omnia, ed. Leonine (multiple vols, ongoing, Rome and 
Paris 1882–), xxiv. 2. 40 (Quaestio disputata de spiritualibus creaturis, 3c). This and other 
translations are the author’s own. 
21 J. Marenbon, Later Medieval Philosophy (1150–1350) (London and New York, 1987), p. 
190. 
22 All were to rise in the ‘bodies which they now wear’ (Qui omnes cum suis propriis 
corporibus resurgent, quae nunc gestant) (Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, ed. N. P. Tanner 
S.J. (2 vols, Washington, D.C., 1990), i. Nicaea I to Lateran V, pp. 230–230*).
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heresy.23 Aquinas thought that if there were another substantial form in 
a human being intervening between the soul and matter, for instance a 
corporeal substantial form which gave definition and existence to the body 
independently of the soul, then the union of a human soul to any particular 
body would be merely incidental. Body and soul would be substances 
arranged next to one another, like a woman and the clothes she wears, but not 
complementary components of one naturally unified thing. Reincarnation 
would become conceivable, a heretical opinion which Aquinas understood 
to have been taught ‘continuously down to today [usque hodie]’, from Plato 
to Origen to, now, certain ‘Manichees [Manichaei]’.24 Indeed, for Aquinas, 
soul and body are more than just complementary components of the 
human being. They overlap: the soul, as the body’s substantial form, is an 
intrinsic component of the body. Strictly, for Aquinas matter (the body’s 
other component) and soul, not body and soul, come together to compose 
the human being.25 
The Correctorium fratris Thomae is dominated by a critique of the theory 
of the unicity of form.26 Of the 117 theses de la Mare selects for ‘correction’, 
at least twenty-one are related to the theory, even if the central claim ‘that 
in a human being there is one substantial form alone’ is attacked only in 
article 31.27 Tying together all de la Mare’s criticisms of the theory is a basic 
assertion: Aquinas places such great emphasis on the essential unity of 
body and soul, the Franciscan argues, that his theory effectively denies the 
autonomy of the body, or of the material part of human nature, relative to 
the soul. If the soul were the body’s only substantial form, what was the 
body just in itself? As de la Mare makes clear, several points of Catholic 
doctrine, not least transubstantiation, the incarnation and the contraction 
of original sin, appear to require a strong account of the body’s autonomy. 
23 For historiographical debate, see Cathars in Question, ed. A. Sennis (York, 2016), 
including an important discussion by D. d’Avray, ‘The Cathars from non-Catholic sources’, 
pp. 177–84.
24 Aquinas, Opera omnia, xiii. 520 (Summa contra Gentiles, II.83). 
25 For further discussion, see Fitzpatrick, Thomas Aquinas on Bodily Identity, pp. 84–5, 
89–91.
26 For biography and bibliography, see J. Marenbon, ‘Mare, William de la [William de 
Mara] (fl. 1272–1279)’, ODNB <https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/18025> [accessed 26 Aug. 
2018]. 
27 De la Mare’s text is transmitted as incorporated into Knapwell’s reply, Quare, and 
edited accordingly: Le Correctorium Corruptorii ‘Quare’, ed. P. Glorieux (Kain, 1927). Article 
48 of Quare bears the same heading as article 31, but adds no new arguments from de la 
Mare, containing simply Knapwell’s extended defence of the unicity of form. The number 
of theses targeted is thus not actually 118, as is often claimed, but 117. Articles 8, 10, 11, 12, 
27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 52, 85, 86, 88, 90, 98, 100, 102, 107, 113, 114 and 115 also relate to Aquinas’s 
thought on the union of body and soul. 
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The theological issue he places in primary position (which would also 
provide the focus of Peckham’s condemnation of Aquinas’s theory in 1286), 
however, is the continuity and identity of Christ’s corpse during the three 
days of His death:
[I]f however there had not been some substantial form other than the intellective 
soul belonging to the body of Christ, then after the soul was separated prime 
matter [prima materia] alone remained, or another substantial form was 
introduced. From this it follows that it was not the same body in number 
[idem corpus numero] dead on the crossbar and buried in the sepulchre. For if 
matter alone remained, it was not a body; nor, therefore, was it the same body 
in number, for prime matter is not a body … But if … some other substantial 
form … was introduced, it follows from this … that the body of Christ living 
and dead was not the same in number; for where there is a different substantial 
form there is another body. In the three days [in triduo], therefore, it would not 
have been the body that He assumed.28 
That the hypostatic union between Christ’s divinity and each component of 
His human nature, His body and His soul, once forged, could not be dissolved, 
was taken as an article of faith. This implied that the corpse in the tomb 
(somehow, its death notwithstanding) had remained ‘the same in number’ 
(the selfsame individual thing) as Christ’s living body.29 William de la Mare’s 
point is that, assuming the unicity of form, there is no bodily continuity. For 
when it comes to the composition of the corpse (‘body’ with soul removed), 
there are only two options. If all that crosses over from living body to corpse 
is mere prime matter, then the corpse is no body at all: scholastic theologians 
understood prime matter, posited as the ultimate substratum of all cases of 
natural change, to be completely raw and featureless, such that it was not a 
‘this’, nor ‘this much’, nor ‘this way’, nor otherwise determined in any manner 
whatsoever.30 If, however, we decide that the matter in the corpse must have a 
substantial form, this must be a new form altogether.31 Then, although we do 
have a body, it is a different body entirely. 
28 William de la Mare, Correctorium fratris Thomae, pp. 129–30 (a. 31).
29 See discussion in J.-L. Solère, ‘Was the eye in the tomb? On the metaphysical and 
historical interest of some strange quodlibetal questions’, in Theological Quodlibeta in the 
Middle Ages: the Thirteenth Century, ed. C. Schabel (Brill’s Companions to the Christian 
Tradition, Leiden, 2006), pp. 526–58, esp. at p. 530. 
30 ‘Materia prima nec est quid, nec est quantum, nec quale, nec aliquid aliorum quibus 
ens est determinatum’ (Les ‘Auctoritates Aristotelis’: un florilège médiéval, ed. J. Hamesse 
(Louvain, 1974), p. 128).
31 This possible consequence of the theory of the unicity of substantial form for Christ’s 
corpse was identified earlier, by Henry of Ghent in his Opera omnia, v. 14–17 (Quodlibet I.4c 
(dated 1276)). 
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For de la Mare, therefore, the faith demands a plurality of substantial 
forms in a human being, especially an additional bodily form giving 
the body existence independently of the soul and remaining after the 
soul’s separation. The human being’s essential unity, meanwhile, can be 
maintained if this subsidiary bodily form is understood to be intrinsically 
incomplete, bestowing an incomplete act of existence, in such a way that 
it is in potency to and perfected by the soul (esse … est incompletum et in 
potentia ad esse completum).32
With what conceptual resources could Aquinas’s Dominican defenders 
respond to William de la Mare? Though it has not been very well understood, 
Aquinas did develop an account of the body’s autonomy relative to the soul. 
If we take seriously his concern for the correct understanding of the bodily 
resurrection, a point of doctrine which clearly implies that the material 
part of human nature makes its own contribution to the person, then this 
should come as no surprise. Aquinas specifies, for instance, that the human 
essence (‘what it is to be’ human) comprises not only form, or the soul, 
but matter too.33 Furthermore, Aquinas pointedly explains that the matter 
which enters into human nature is not mere prime matter, ‘common to all 
things’, but a differentiated material arrangement which is the intrinsically 
appropriate subject for a rational soul. He calls this the ‘proper matter’ 
(materia propria) of the human being.34 Finally, although he holds that the 
soul is the body’s only substantial form, Aquinas does not think that the 
soul is a shape or a physical structure. For Aquinas, there is another form 
in a body which gives it its physical structure and proportions, spreading 
out its organic parts into particular positions relative to one another and 
marking out and particularizing its matter. Importantly, this bodily form is 
not a substantial form, but an ‘accidental’ form, or a property of the bodily 
substance, meaning that it depends, for its existence, on the continued 
union between matter and soul. Aquinas calls this structuring accidental 
form ‘dimensive quantity’ (quantitas dimensiva).35 
32 William de la Mare, Correctorium fratris Thomae, p. 133 (a. 31).
33 Aquinas, Opera omnia, iv. 330 (Summa theologiae, I, q. 29, a. 2, ad 3). For further 
discussion, see Fitzpatrick, Thomas Aquinas on Bodily Identity, pp. 83–91. 
34 Thomas Aquinas, In Metaphysicam Aristotelis commentaria, ed. M.-R. Cathala (Turin, 
1935), p. 503 (VIII. lect. 4, § 1735), beginning ‘Quia vero, licet materia prima sit communis 
omnibus, tamen materiae propriae sunt diversae diversorum’. For further discussion, see 
Fitzpatrick, Thomas Aquinas on Bodily Identity, pp. 88–91.
35 Aquinas, Opera omnia, xii. 183 (Summa theologiae, III, q. 76, a. 3, ad 2), beginning: 
‘determinata distantia partium in corpore organico’; and v. 207 (Summa theologiae, I, q. 75, 
a. 7c), beginning: ‘nec poterit dici materia haec alia ab illa’. Constraints of space prevent 
further discussion of the pivotal role which dimensive quantity has to play in Aquinas’s 
account of the human body’s composition, individuality and identity over time. For a full 
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Aquinas’s statements on the subject of post-mortem bodily continuity, 
however, could be deeply ambiguous and were never brought together in 
one place, let alone in a discussion of Christ’s corpse. Aquinas asks whether 
Christ’s body was the same in number living and dead at Summa theologiae, 
III, q. 50, a. 5, answering simply as follows: 
[A] body that ceases to be alive does not remain totally the same ... The 
dead body of any other human being does not remain united to any abiding 
hypostasis, as Christ’s dead body did. And therefore the dead body of any other 
human is not the same absolutely [simpliciter], but only relatively [secundum 
quid], because it is the same according to its matter [secundum materiam], but 
not according to form. But the body of Christ remains the same absolutely, 
because of the identity of the supposit [propter identitatem suppositi].36 
Here, Aquinas confirms there is physical continuity across bodily death, 
including Christ’s. This continuity is not on the level of substantial form, or 
else the body would not have died at all, but rather on the level of matter. 
Aquinas does not actually say a new form is introduced into Christ’s corpse, 
nor does he explain what continuity ‘according to matter’ really means. 
Instead, at the crux of his argument is the corpse’s continued union to the 
same ultimate metaphysical subject, namely the divine hypostasis, supposit 
(suppositum), or person of Christ. The (presupposed) continuing hypostatic 
union of the divinity to the components of Christ’s human nature guarantees 
the absolute identity of living body and corpse in this unique case. 
Elsewhere, it is true, Aquinas suggests that a new substantial form 
is introduced into a dead body, albeit an imperfect form, as here in his 
commentary on Aristotle’s De generatione et corruptione, I.3: 
[F]or it is not that, with the soul separated, the body of the animal is resolved 
immediately into the elements; but this happens through several intermediate 
corruptions, as several imperfect forms succeed one another in matter 
[succedentibus … formis imperfectis], like the form of the dead body [forma 
corporis mortui], and afterwards the form of the decomposed body.37 
Again, how should the material continuity Aquinas posits between living 
body and corpse be construed? Aquinas nowhere suggests that all that 
persists is prime matter. Moreover, his general insistence on the importance 
of proper matter (‘the proper matters of different things are different’38) 
dovetails with his deep commitment to the Aristotelian idea of material 
account, see Fitzpatrick, Thomas Aquinas on Bodily Identity, esp. pp. 96–103, 118–27, 135–41. 
36 Aquinas, see, Opera omnia, xi. 484 (Summa theologiae, III, q. 50, a. 5c and ad 1). 
37 Thomas Aquinas, Opera omnia, iii. 292 (In De gen. et corr., I, lect. 8, § 3(60)).
38 Aquinas, In Metaphysicam, VIII. lect. 4, § 1735 (Latin text above, n. 34). 
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causation (that in order for a certain form to manifest itself, certain material 
conditions must necessarily be present39). This makes it a priori unlikely that 
Aquinas would have conceded that the substratum persisting in Christ’s 
dead body was mere prime matter, as opposed to, say, the proper matter 
of a corpse. Aquinas even says that in the generation and corruption of 
substances material resolution never proceeds as ‘far down’ as prime matter: 
prime matter is rather peripheral to Aquinas’s account of substantial 
change.40 
One model for post-mortem bodily continuity could be found in 
Aquinas’s commentary on Metaphysics VII.16, in which Aristotle stated that 
the material parts of substances were not substances in their own right, but 
in a state of potentiality. Aquinas explains: 
When those things which are posited as parts are separated from one another 
with the dissolution of the whole, then they are beings in act [entia in actu], 
not as parts, but as matter existing under the privation of the form of the whole 
[forma totius]. This is evident of earth and fire and air, which, when they are 
parts of the mixed body, are not existents in act, but are in potency … but when 
they are separated, then they are things existing in act, and not parts ... one 
might suppose that the parts of animated things, especially … are … so as to be 
in a state of potency close to act [potentia propinqua actui] … because animated 
bodies are organic bodies possessing parts that are formally distinct [distinctas 
secundum formam]; hence those most of all are close to act … nonetheless they 
are all in potency when the whole is one and continuous by nature.41 
Perhaps this applied to a human being. One could say that the living body’s 
complex material constituents, falling on the side of matter and potentiality 
when in composition with the soul (corresponding here to the ‘form of 
the whole’), were so ‘close to act’ that they could take on an actuality or 
existence of their own once the human being corrupted (or died) at the 
soul’s separation.
If his commentary on Metaphysics VII.16 contains obscurities (what 
exactly is the relationship between the body’s material constituents which 
39 Aristotle, Metaphysics, VIII.4, 1044a 15–30; Aristotle, Physics, II.9, 200a24–b4. For 
commentary, see Fitzpatrick, Thomas Aquinas on Bodily Identity, pp. 31–8. 
40 Aquinas, Opera omnia, xii. 165 (Summa theologiae, III, q. 75, a. 3c): ‘praeiacens autem 
materia in quam corpora mixta resolvi possunt, sunt quatuor elementa, non enim potest 
fieri resolutio in materiam primam, ita quod sine forma existat, quia materia sine forma esse 
non potest’. For further discussion, see Fitzpatrick, Thomas Aquinas on Bodily Identity, pp. 
108–12, 156–8. This chapter disagrees with the discussion in R. Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on 
Human Nature: a Philosophical Study of Summa Theologiae 1a 75–89 (Cambridge, 2002), in 
particular that ‘Aquinas’s theory of matter is eliminative’ (p. 131). 
41 Aquinas, In Metaphysicam, pp. 472–3 (VII., lect. 16, §§ 1633–1634, 1636). 
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are ‘close to act’ and any new substantial form?), then other passages in 
which Aquinas discusses post-mortem material continuity appear positively 
inconsistent. Analysing the general resurrection, Aquinas claims that traces 
of a body’s structural form, its dimensive quantity, can remain to mark 
out its matter even after death. ‘The matter which was subject to the soul 
remains’, he says, ‘under the same dimensions from that which it had 
it when it was individual matter’.42 How could this be possible? Unlike 
Averroes, by whom this argument is inspired,43 Aquinas consistently holds, 
elsewhere at least, that a substance is ontologically prior to its accidents:44 if 
the human body corrupts at death, its accidents should go too. 
Let us now turn to our Dominican Correctoria. Of the five responses 
to de la Mare, only three deal directly with article 31 of the Correctorium 
fratris Thomae.45 The earliest, and least conceptually developed, is Richard 
Knapwell’s Quare:46 
[B]rother Thomas responds in the final part of the Summa, saying that the 
body of Christ dead and living is the same in number absolutely [idem numero 
simpliciter] ... and this is because of the unity of the supposit of the divine person 
… in which it subsisted. But it was not the same ... totally [totaliter], for then 
it would not have changed [mutatum], nor … died, which it is heretical to say. 
And although the body changed through death, it does not follow that in death 
Christ assumed a new nature [novam naturam], both because the substantial 
form induced in death is not assumable in itself [per se assumptibilis], and 
because such a nature, a mutable and mortal one, was assumed in the beginning 
of His incarnation, at length to be changed through death and repaired through 
the glory of resurrection.47
Much here recalls Aquinas’s Summa theologiae, III.50.5. Of course, Knapwell 
says, there is a sense in which Christ’s corpse cannot have been totally the 
same as his living body: to claim otherwise would be to deny Christ’s true 
42 Aquinas, Opera omnia, xv. 252 (Summa contra Gentiles, IV.81). For commentary, see 
Fitzpatrick, Thomas Aquinas on Bodily Identity, pp. 159–65. 
43 Fitzpatrick, Thomas Aquinas on Bodily Identity, pp. 69–78. 
44 E.g., Thomas Aquinas, In quattuor libros Sententiarum (Thomas Aquinas, Opera omnia, 
ed. R Busa (7 vols, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 1980), i. I.8.5.2c), Summa theologiae, I, q. 76, a. 
6c. Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII.1, 1028a21–b2. 
45 The remaining two are William of Macclesfield’s Quaestione (c.1284) (Le correctorium 
corruptorii ‘Quaestione’: texte anonyme du ms. Merton 276, ed. J.-P. Müller (Rome, 1954)); and 
Ramberto dei Primadizzi of Bologna’s Apologeticum veritatis (1286–8) (Apologeticum veritatis 
contra corruptorium, ed. J.-P. Müller (Vatican, 1943)). 
46 For biography and bibliography, see S. Tugwell, ‘Knapwell [Clapwell], Richard (fl. 
1284–1286)’, ODNB <https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/5434> [accessed 26 Aug. 2018]. 
47 Richard Knapwell, Quare, in Le Correctorium Corruptorii ‘Quare’, ed. P. Glorieux (Kain, 
1927), p. 135 (a. 31). 
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death and tantamount to heresy.48 However, for Knapwell, as for Aquinas, 
the absolute identity of the body, grounded on the hypostatic union, 
overrides any natural substantial mutation in the body’s composition. 
Note that Knapwell is ready to concede de la Mare’s point that a new 
substantial form must have been introduced into Christ’s corpse on the 
grounds that the Franciscan’s objections are thereby neutralized. The 
new form does not imply a new nature was absorbed into the hypostatic 
union: the form is not assumed in its own right by the divinity; rather, the 
divinity originally assumed a mortal human nature, destined always to be 
transformed in death. Here, however, the analysis stops. Knapwell appears 
to assume concrete material continuity between living body and corpse (the 
entombed body is evidently the very same one which is to be resurrected), 
but he sidesteps the question of what this physical continuity consists in, be 
it prime matter or anything else. 
In Circa, John of Paris,49 like Richard Knapwell, grants that a new 
substantial form was introduced into Christ’s corpse and denies this altered 
the hypostatic union: Christ voluntarily assumed a mortal body, death and 
all that followed from the separation of matter and soul.50 John emphasizes, 
as ‘the response of brother Thomas’, that ‘numerical identity is the identity 
of the supposit’:51 the unbroken hypostatic union guarantees the absolute 
identity of Christ’s body living and dead. What is striking, however, is 
quite how much further than Knapwell John of Paris is willing to go in 
conceding de la Mare’s interpretation of Aquinas. Crucially, John clarifies 
that, taking the hypostatic union out of the equation, the body in the tomb 
was a totally new, individual body: not only did it have a new substantial 
form, but all that remained on a material level was prime matter. Glossing 
Psalm XV: 10 (‘nor will you give your holy one to see corruption’), John 
says: ‘The body of Christ did not suffer complete dissolution ... not because 
in death it was not resolved into prime matter, but because the forms of the 
simple elements did not succeed the rational soul immediately, but rather 
the form of a mixed body [forma mixti corporis], which was never corrupted 
further’.52 This picture of bodily corruption as involving a succession of ever 
lower forms is recognizable from Aquinas’s commentary on De generatione 
et corruptione I.3. In John of Paris’s hands, however, every other significant 
48 Cf. Aquinas’s Quodlibets III.2.2c and IV.5c. 
49 For biography and bibliography, see R. L. Friedman, ‘John of Paris’, in A Companion to 
Philosophy in the Middle Ages, ed. J. J. E. Gracia and T. B. Noone (Oxford, 2003), pp. 382–3. 
50 John of Paris, Le Correctorium Corruptorii ‘Circa’, ed. J.-P. Müller (Rome, 1941), p. 172 
(a. 30 (31)). 
51 John of Paris, Circa, p. 170 (a. 30 (31)). 
52 John of Paris, Circa, p. 173 (a. 30 (31)).
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aspect of Aquinas’s thought on the composition of the corpse (notably, as 
we have said, his concern for concrete material continuity) has fallen away 
sharply. Why? It cannot be discounted out of hand that pure intellectual 
impulse was responsible. Yet, read closely, Circa’s argument indicates a 
more complex and interesting possibility. Not only, in John’s view, could 
much of the Franciscan reading of Aquinas be safely conceded: it could 
also be positively instrumentalized to reinforce the unicist position, while 
simultaneously undermining the pluralist line. 
First, John of Paris is happy to allow radical discontinuity between 
living body and corpse, at least in part because he is able to argue that even 
pluralists have to fall back on the corpse’s union with the divinity in order to 
preserve bodily identity. The corporeal form which pluralists say remained 
in the corpse could hardly have remained in a generic way, John says. That 
form would have to establish the body in an entirely new species,53 yielding 
nothing short of a new individual body: 
And it should not seem unfitting to the adversary that a new individual 
body [novum singulare corporis] and a new corporeity [nova corporeitas] were 
substantified [substantificata] in the divine supposit … because they necessarily 
have to concede this, if they posit in Christ both a form of corporeity and a form 
of life, and that, with soul separated from body, the same corporeity remains as 
before ... That there should remain an individual of a subaltern genus, without 
a species ... is against reason in every way. Therefore it is necessary that this 
remaining corporeity gave the body of Christ … an act of existence [esse] of a 
new species … And so the adversary ought … to concede that there was not 
the same species [or form] of the body in the body of Christ living and dead, 
but one and then another.54
Here, the pluralist position on bodily continuity is made to appear just as 
feeble as de la Mare’s construal of Aquinas’s position: in either case there was 
in effect a new form, and hence a new body, in the tomb. 
Second, John of Paris evidently saw a particular theological advantage 
in taking up a reading of unicity theory which thoroughly diminished 
any meaningful autonomy of the material part of human nature relative 
to the soul. If everything essential to human nature, including everything 
essential to the body, ‘radically remained [radicaliter remansit]’ within the 
immortal soul as the one and only substantial form (and especially as the 
body’s substantial form), then, when it came to explaining how the bodily 
53 This represents a significant hardening of the position found in Aquinas’s commentary 
on De generatione et corruptione, I.3, where it was permitted that formae imperfectae could 
succeed the soul in matter. 
54 John of Paris, Circa, pp. 172–3 (a. 30 (31)).
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resurrection could happen, the knotty problem of post-mortem material 
continuity could be circumvented entirely: 
[Christ] did not abandon the corporeity assumed in the incarnation, because 
this always remained in its root [in radice], namely in the separated soul, from 
which the divinity was not separated. It this sense, the Psalm [XV: 9] says: My 
flesh shall rest in hope, because the same flesh radically remained in the separated 
soul where it waited to be resurrected.55 
John intends this not merely as an innovative solution to a theological 
problem, but as an anti-Franciscan attack on pluralist theory. As we know, 
the Dominican thinks he has been able to deduce that the pluralists’ 
corporeal form effectively falls out of existence at Christ’s death. How, then, 
could the very same form return at his resurrection?56 Pluralist theory, John 
suggests, has heretical implications. In construing the theory of the unicity 
of form in this particular way, however, he ends up undermining one of the 
exact points of doctrine Aquinas intended the theory to preserve: the bodily 
resurrection literally understood.57 
Robert Orford’s58 encounter with de la Mare’s arguments pushed him to 
test the limits of the theory of the unicity of form in a completely different 
way. In article 31 of Sciendum, looking to bolster bodily autonomy relative 
to the soul, Orford alters Aquinas’s metaphysical framework so significantly 
that he threatens the human being’s intrinsic unity. Orford begins by 
clarifying his terms: regarding everything composed of matter and form, 
we must consider ‘what it is’ (quod est), namely a composite of matter and 
form; and ‘that by which it is’ (quo est), or that which gives it its existence, 
namely form.59 So far, so straightforward. Then, however, Orford appears to 
advance a pluralist account of human composition: 
55 John of Paris, Circa, p. 172 (a. 30 (31)), editor’s emphasis, my insertions. 
56 In their discussions of resurrection, scholastic theologians of the late 13th century 
tended to assume that continuity was necessary for identity, taking it as axiomatic that 
‘Quorum substantia deperit, non redeunt eodem numero, sed specie’ (Hamesse, ‘Auctoritates 
Aristotelis’, p. 171). Cf. Aristotle, De generatione et corruptione, II.11, 338b14–18. 
57 Pace Bynum, who traces this theory of ‘form as identity’ back to Aquinas himself 
(‘Material continuity, personal survival’, pp. 258–60). John of Paris was criticized for 
denying a literal understanding of the resurrection when his Sentences commentary was 
censured in 1295. His apologia is edited in P. Glorieux, ‘Un mémoire justificatif de Bernard 
de Trilia’, Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques, xvii (1928), 407–15, at p. 411.
58 For biography and bibliography, see S. F. Gaine, ‘Orford, Robert [Robert of Orford] (fl. 
c.1280–c.1293)’, ODNB <https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/20827> [accessed 26 Aug. 2018].
59 ‘in omni re composita ex materia et forma est duo considerare, scilicet quod est et quo 
est. Quod est, est ipsum suppositum subsistens compositum ex utroque; quo est, est forma’ 
(Robert Orford, Correctorium corruptorii ‘Sciendum’, ed. P. Glorieux (Paris, 1956), pp. 137–8 
(a. 31)). 
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But to give an absolute act of existence [esse simpliciter], namely substantial 
existence [esse substantiale], happens in two ways, either partially, or totally. 
Now, for there to be several forms in a thing which give partial substantial 
existence is not unfitting, more precisely it is necessary ... and according as the 
form of the whole [forma totius] is more noble, a greater plurality of partial 
forms [pluralitas formarum partialium] is required … because ... according as 
it is more powerful in its operations, it requires a greater diversity in the parts 
[of the body].60
Recognizing the danger, Orford tries to distance himself from pluralist 
theory, explaining that none of the ‘partial’ substantial forms necessary in a 
complex organism like a human actually give existence in their own right: 
rather, they passively participate in the act of existence communicated by 
the soul as ‘form of the whole [forma totius]’.61 This ‘total’ act of existence, 
meanwhile, is the metaphysical glue binding soul to body: 
These [partial forms] … do not give an act of existence impeding the form of 
the whole, but they participate in the form of the whole [participant formam 
totius] ... If we should speak of ... the form that gives total substantial being [esse 
substantiale totale], thus it is impossible for there to be several forms in a single 
thing ... such a substance would be not one whole but several ... From a single 
form, as from the rational soul, which contains in itself whatever the inferior 
forms, like the vegetative and the sensitive soul, contain, a human being is 
human and an animal and living and a body.62
Note, in particular, that although the rational soul gives existence to the 
body, it virtually contains only two ‘inferior forms’: the sensitive and 
the vegetative souls. The ‘partial substantial forms’ composing the body, 
in contrast, appear to be essentially distinct from the soul, even if they 
participate in the act of existence which the soul communicates. Orford 
even says that body and soul ‘differ according to their essence’, although 
they ‘come together [conveniunt] in a single act of existence’.63 
This is a startling interpretation of Aquinas’s theory of the unicity of 
form. For Aquinas, the soul did enter into what the body essentially was, as 
its only nature-determining form. That was rather the point. For Orford, 
60 Orford, Sciendum, p. 138 (a. 31). 
61 Cf. the Franciscan pluralist Peter John Olivi, who posited a theory of ‘formal parts’ 
(partes formales), each actively communicating a grade of being (gradum essendi) (not per 
se but qua parts of a whole), from which, collectively, a ‘total form’ (forma totalis) ‘arose’ 
(consurgit) (Petrus Iohannis Olivi Quaestiones in secundum librum sententiarum, ed. B. Jansen 
(3 vols, Ad Claras Aquas, 1922–6), ii. 36 (II.50 ad 1)). 
62 Orford, Sciendum, pp. 138–9 (a. 31). 
63 Orford, Sciendum, pp. 132–3 (a. 29). 
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the body has its own (albeit partial) form and the soul does not enter into 
what it is at all. Even the Franciscan de la Mare argued that the soul entered 
into the body’s essence, intrinsically perfecting it. As Orford sees it, however, 
there is none of this essential overlap between body and soul: a single act 
of existence, again, is all that connects the two. Yet now, of course, Orford 
can argue that what the body of Christ is (quod est) survives in its entirety 
across his death: 
[T]he body of Christ can be understood in two ways: with regard either to what 
it is [quod est] or that by which it is [quo est]. That by which it is, according as 
the soul makes the human being, is the form of the whole; and the body loses 
this form when the soul, through death, is separated ... But if we should speak 
of the body of Christ as regards that which it is [quantum ad id quod est], it is a 
body composed of matter and the form corresponding to it, and thus it remains 
the same in number living and dead.64 
In contrast to Richard Knapwell and John of Paris, Orford can also avoid 
conceding de la Mare’s suggestion that there must have been a new substantial 
form introduced into Christ’s corpse, accurately noting that ‘Thomas can 
never be found to have said this about the body of Christ’.65 Instead, citing 
Aristotle’s Metaphysics, VII.16, Orford explains that the body’s form (or 
‘partial forms’ or, here, ‘form(s) of the parts’), although falling on the side 
of potency while in the composite, take on an act of existence of their own 
upon the soul’s separation, emerging thereby as a new form of the whole: 
[W]ith the form of the whole removed, the form of the part [forma partis] … 
becomes the form of the whole ... for the form of the part, with the form of 
the whole remaining, was in potency that it be the form of the whole ... hence 
just as when a worm [anguilla] is divided no new form is introduced, but souls 
which were in a state of potency close to act [potentia propinqua actui] advance 
into act [vadunt in actum], the same is to be understood of the forms of the 
parts which are similarly in a state of potency close to act, according to the 
Philosopher in Metaphysics VII.66 
Along with some of the language in which this account of post-mortem 
bodily continuity is couched – the departure of the soul as removal of 
the form of the whole; the material parts of the body subsisting in a state 
of potency close to act – the analogy of the divided worm, whose latent 
forms (here souls) spring forth into act, also recalls Aquinas’s commentary 
on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, VII.16.67 Again, it is Orford’s insistence on an 
64 Orford, Sciendum, p. 139 (a. 31). 
65 Orford, Sciendum, p. 141 (a. 31), my emphasis.
66 Orford, Sciendum, p. 142 (a. 31).
67 Aquinas, In Metaphysicam, VII. lect. 16, § 1635.
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essentially distinct corporeal form (or forms) which significantly distances 
his thought from Aquinas’s. 
Orford’s divergence from Aquinas (and Richard Knapwell and John of 
Paris), is exposed again in how he handles the question of the hypostatic 
union. Having just shown that the body of Christ was the same in number 
across death as regards what it is [quod est], Orford adds that ‘besides this 
identity, there is the identity of the supposit [suppositum], which gives a 
greater unity [maior unitas]’.68 What was the crux of the argument for the 
other Dominicans is plainly an afterthought here. If Orford’s claim is that 
Christ’s living body and corpse were the same in number anyway, then 
what possible greater identity can be guaranteed by the hypostatic union? 
Orford’s reference to the divine supposit makes sense as an indication of 
intellectual allegiance to his Dominican brothers, a marker of what Stephen 
Marrone would call ‘intellectual consanguinity’,69 but not as a necessary 
stage in his argument. 
What happened next?70 Richard Knapwell made another, more decisive, 
intervention with his Quaestio disputata de unitate formae (1285), now as 
regent master in theology at Oxford. He picked up John of Paris’s anti-
pluralist argument with regard to the resurrection, developing it with the 
help of the Averroan theory of a quantitative structure in matter to which 
Aquinas had been so attracted. The pluralists’ corporeal form would eventually 
disintegrate as the corpse decayed, Knapwell argued: only if matter had its 
own ‘nature of dimensive quantity’ (natura quantitatis dimensivae) could the 
material belonging to each individual body be marked out between their 
death and the general resurrection.71 This line of argument aggravated the 
Franciscans Roger Marston, also regent in theology at Oxford,72 and John 
Peckham at Canterbury: Knapwell’s Quaestio disputata was the proximate 
target of the condemnation of 1286, whose terms made particular reference 
to ‘dimensions’ and ‘quantity’ in the matter of dead bodies.73 
Knapwell, eventually, came the closest of our three Dominicans to 
capturing what Aquinas was trying to say about postmortem bodily 
68 Orford, Sciendum, p. 141 (a. 31).
69 Marrone, The Light of Thy Countenance, ii. 571. 
70 Some Dominicans’ thought on these issues can be found in in A. Fitzpatrick, ‘Dominican 
theology at the early fourteenth-century universities: bodily identity in the quodlibets of 
Nicholas Trivet, Hervaeus Natalis, and John of Naples’, in King’s Hall, Cambridge and the 
Fourteenth-Century Universities: New Perspectives, ed. J. Marenbon (forthcoming). 
71 Richard Knapwell, Quaestio disputata de unitate formae, ed. F. E. Kelley (Paris, 1982), 
pp. 67–8 (responsio section). For commentary, see Fitzpatrick, Thomas Aquinas on Bodily 
Identity, pp. 178–9. 
72 R. Marston, Quodlibeta Quatuor, ed. G. Etzkorn and I. Brady (Grottaferrata, 1994), p. 
427 (IV.27 ad 1). 
73 John Peckham, Registrum, iii. 922–3, cf. also 866.
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continuity, but that is not the point this chapter wishes to make.74 Neither 
is the point simply that William de la Mare distorted Aquinas’s thought, 
nor that, in responding to the Franciscan, Aquinas’s earliest Dominican 
defenders distorted it too – even in ways which were mutually incompatible. 
The purpose of examining the Correctoria so closely has been to show just 
how deliberate, and just how precisely and inextricably embedded within 
the institutional context of inter-order rivalry, were Richard Knapwell’s, 
John of Paris’s and Robert Orford’s very distinct readings of Aquinas. 
Russell Friedman has identified the competition between Franciscan and 
Dominican ‘intellectual traditions’ as a, even the, principal factor which not 
simply drove scholastic debate forward in a general way but also shaped quite 
specifically the way in which debate surrounding critical concepts and ideas 
developed. Those oppositional dynamics apply here. Our three Dominicans 
‘neither ignored nor flatly denied’ de la Mare’s critique.75 Rather, in order to 
respond effectively, they conceded and incorporated parts of that critique, 
either neutralizing it or proceeding to show how unicist theory remained 
superior. Plainly, these individuals were intellectuals wholeheartedly 
committed to their institutions and deeply motivated by the politics of 
group opposition, even though they were certainly not a ‘school’, and barely 
even ‘Thomistic’, in the exact way Roensch would have liked them to be. 
74 See, further, Fitzpatrick, Thomas Aquinas on Bodily Identity, pp. 159–65, 178–9.
75 Friedman, Intellectual Traditions at the Medieval University, i. 22.
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3. Italian universities, arts masters and interpreting 
Pomponazzi’s De immortalitate animae
John Marenbon
This study of Pietro Pomponazzi in relation to the institutions which shaped 
his work is intended to contribute to the wider discussion of the historiography 
of institutions and individuals in medieval scholasticism opened up by the 
editors in their substantial, thought-provoking introduction. It concentrates 
on the most famous and interpretatively controversial feature of Pomponazzi’s 
thought, the position he takes on the immortality of the human soul in 
his De immortalitate animae. The first section gives a neutral summary of 
the argument of Pomponazzi’s treatise and the different interpretations 
which have been proposed. The second section looks at how considering 
Pomponazzi’s institutional background as an arts master in the north Italian 
universities helps to solve the interpretative problem. However, Pomponazzi 
was far from a simple representative of a type: the third section will consider 
some of the ways in which he defied institutional norms and how they relate 
to interpreting his views about the soul.1 
De immortalitate animae: the argument and its interpretation
De immortalitate sets out to answer two questions put to Pomponazzi by 
his one-time pupil, the Dominican Girolamo Natale of Ragusa.2 What does 
1 The very inclusion in a book about medieval scholasticism of Pomponazzi, who did 
his most important work in the early 16th century, points to an interesting problem. The 
methods and practices characteristic of medieval scholasticism flourished from c.1050 to 
c.1700, a period which only partially coincides with what most historians identify as the 
middle ages. Related problems of chronology and the relation between ‘medieval’ and 
‘renaissance’ philosophy are discussed in J. Marenbon, ‘When was medieval philosophy?’ 
(inaugural lecture, University of Cambridge, 2011) <https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/
handle/1810/240658?show=full> [accessed 24 Oct. 2019]; ‘Latin philosophy, 1350–1550’, in 
The Oxford Handbook of Medieval Philosophy, ed. J. Marenbon (Oxford and New York, 
2012), pp. 222–44; ‘When did medieval philosophy begin?’, in Ingenio facilis. Per Giovanni 
Orlandi (1938–2007), ed. P. Chiesa, A. M. Fagnoni and R. E. Gugliemetti (Florence, 2017), 
pp. 149–62.
2 P. Pomponazzi, Traité de l’immortalitate de l’âme/ Tractatus de immortalitate animae, ed. 
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Pomponazzi think about the immortality of the human soul ‘putting all 
revelation and miracles aside, and without going beyond the boundaries of 
nature [pure infra naturales limites]’; and what does he think about Aristotle’s 
view of this matter? Starting (chapter 1) from the generally accepted 
view that the nature of human beings is ambiguous (anceps), in between 
mortality and immortality, and from the logical truth that nothing can be 
mortal and immortal at the same time, Pomponazzi spells out (chapter 2) 
six possibilities. Either (A) humans have two different natures, by one of 
which they are mortal, by the other of which they are immortal; or (B) 
they are at once mortal and immortal by one and the same nature. In the 
first case, either (Ai) each human has his/her own mortal and his/her own 
immortal nature; or (Aii) there is one immortal nature for all humans, but 
each has his/her own mortal natures; or (Aiii) vice versa, there is one mortal 
nature for all, but an immortal nature for each. In the second case, since 
it would be contradictory for anything to be mortal without qualification 
and immortal without qualification, the one nature by which each human 
is both mortal and immortal must be either (Bi) immortal without 
qualification (simpliciter) and mortal with qualification (secundum quid); or 
(Bii) mortal without qualification and immortal with qualification; or (Biii) 
both mortal and immortal with qualification. (Aiii) and (Biii) are both 
merely theoretically possible positions, held by no one. The four remaining 
positions, however, correspond to the main views held in Pomponazzi’s day 
about the immortality of the human soul. 
(Ai) is the Platonic view, as expounded by Ficino (not mentioned by 
name, but clearly in Pomponazzi’s mind). It is recounted and dismissed 
briefly (chapters 5–6). (Aii) is the view of Averroes, who held that there is 
one immortal, incorporeal intellect shared by all humans, whose individual 
souls are themselves mortal. Many of Pomponazzi’s contemporaries in the 
Italian universities subscribed to this interpretation as the correct reading 
of Aristotle.3 Here, however, he begins by declaring (chapter 4) that he 
has nothing himself to add to Aquinas’s exposition of the falsity of this 
opinion which ‘leaves nothing intact, nor any reply that might be made on 
Averroes’s behalf unrefuted’.4 Pomponazzi confines himself, therefore, to an 
extended discussion of how Averroes is not merely wrong, but unfaithful to 
Aristotle’s text. 
T. Gontier (Paris, 2012), p. 5 (Proem 5). Gontier’s long introduction is one of the best recent 
studies of the treatise, as is that in Pietro Pomponazzi. Trattato sull’immortalità dell’anima, 
trans. V. Perrone Compagni (Florence, 1999). 
3 See G. di Napoli, L’immortalità dell’anima nel Rinascimento (Turin, 1963), pp. 179–226.
4 Pomponazzi, De immortalitate animae, p. 21 (4.24).
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(Bi) is Aquinas’s view. It is expounded in chapter 7; and Pomponazzi 
begins chapter 8 by declaring he has no doubt about the truth of this 
position ‘since Holy Scripture, which should be preferred to any human 
reasoning or experience, since it has been given by God, endorses this 
position’.5 However, he continues, reiterating his description in the preface 
of the scope of his discussion, he does think that it is questionable whether 
the position, as Aquinas thought, is in accordance with Aristotle’s texts and 
whether it can be rationally established or, rather, makes presuppositions 
based on revelation or belief. There follows a long sequence of arguments 
against both the fidelity to Aristotle and the rational coherence of Aquinas’s 
view. (Bii) is Pomponazzi’s own view: it can be called ‘mortalism’ because 
according to it the human soul is unqualifiedly mortal and immortal only 
with qualification. Since this view is the mirror-opposite of Aquinas’s, it is 
not surprising that Pomponazzi’s arguments against Aquinas and his defence 
of his own position against possible objections follow the same lines.
Despite the intricacy of this discussion, Pomponazzi’s central point, 
to which he returns again and again, is straightforward. For Aristotle, 
intellection itself is an incorporeal action and Pomponazzi follows him and 
the whole medieval tradition in regarding it as such. However, in De anima 
Aristotle adds that the human soul does not engage in intellection without 
having imaginative images (phantasmata).6 In Aristotelian psychology, 
imaginative images belong to the corporeal sensible soul: to its inner 
senses, which are situated in specific parts of the brain. Aristotle himself, 
in a phrase often quoted by Pomponazzi, comments that ‘if intellection 
[intelligere] either is imagination [phantasia] or is not without imagination, 
then it cannot be separated’ (that is, from the body).7 Pomponazzi puts the 
position in terms of subject and object. The human intellect does not require 
the body as a subject: that is to say, it does not need anything bodily in 
order to function as such; but it does require something bodily as an object, 
because it cannot in fact function without forming some corporeal image 
(idolum).8 As a result the human soul is without qualification inseparable 
and so mortal, even though – because it participates in the incorporeal 
action of intellection – it is immortal with qualification.
After four chapters (9–12) setting out this position and defending it from 
counter-arguments, Pomponazzi moves, in chapter 13, to objections of a 
different sort. These objections are not based on attacking the coherence 
of Pomponazzi’s theory of the soul, or its fidelity to Aristotle, but on the 
5 Pomponazzi, De immortalitate animae, p. 57 (8.94).
6 Aristotle, De anima, III, 431a16–17; 432a8–9.
7 Aristotle, De anima, I, 403a8–10.
8 Pomponazzi, De immortalitate animae, pp. 89–91 (9.150). 
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unacceptability of mortalism in general and its consequences. They include, 
among others, the arguments that, if humans are mortal, then self-sacrifice 
for a friend or the common good will be irrational; that, since the good 
and evil are frequently not fittingly rewarded or punished in their earthly 
lives, God either does not govern the universe or is wicked; and that all the 
religious laws (leges) say the soul is immortal and those who have denied 
its immortality were impious and wicked. Pomponazzi’s replies (chapter 
14) are even bolder than his earlier arguments. The essential reward for 
virtuous actions, he contends, is simply that of being virtuous; and the 
prospect of other ‘accidental’ rewards, even heavenly ones, reduces the 
essential reward gained by acting well. From this perspective, not only are 
God’s goodness and justice vindicated simply by virtuous people being 
virtuous – the implication is also that the pagan mortalist is able to be more 
virtuous than any Christian. Pomponazzi is able to assemble a list of great 
and worthy figures who, it seems, were mortalists, among them Homer, 
Simonides, Galen, Hippocrates, Pliny, Seneca, al-Farabi and Ibn Gabirol.9 
As for the point that all the laws support human immortality, Pomponazzi 
remarks that ‘since there are just three laws – that of Christ, or Moses and 
of Mohammed – either they are all false, and so everyone is mistaken, or at 
least two of them are false, and so the greater part of the world is mistaken’.10 
He then goes on to suggest that, in any case, many of those who have taught 
there is an afterlife have done so not because they thought it was true, but 
so as to produce good conduct. Only a very few people, he argues, will act 
well for the sake of virtue alone; and for most the threat of punishment in 
an afterlife is the only way to restrain their wickedness.11
Yet, in the final chapter, Pomponazzi declares that the immortality of the 
soul is ‘a neutral problem’, like that of the eternity of the world. Problems 
were considered to be neutral when no proof could be found for either of 
their contradictory sides. This was exactly how Aquinas thought about the 
eternity of the world, but not, of course, about the immortality of the soul. 
Pomponazzi goes to say both that on such a question, on which many are 
in doubt, only God can be certain; and yet that we cannot afford not to be 
certain about such a matter, since this uncertainty means we do not know 
our end or goal and so cannot decide how to act: ‘If the soul is immortal we 
should despise earthly things and seek eternal ones; but if it is mortal, we 
should follow the opposite path’.12 
9 Pomponazzi, De immortalitate animae, pp. 203–5 (14.308).
10 Pomponazzi, De immortalitate animae, p. 185 (14.279). 
11 Pomponazzi, De immortalitate animae, pp. 185–7 (14.280–1).
12 Pomponazzi, De immortalitate animae, p. 211 (15.317).
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However, we need not remain in doubt. The question is resolved, 
Pomponazzi declares, by the statements of revelation in the Old and New 
Testaments; and there are overwhelming reasons, because of the way in 
which the revelation has been made, to accept its truth. Pomponazzi does 
not go into these reasons himself, but he refers readers to the expositions 
by both Aquinas and Scotus.13 The immortality of the soul is, indeed, an 
article of faith and, as such, it should be proved through arguments proper 
to matters of faith, that is to say, through revelation and the Bible.14
Clearly, the De immortalitate poses an interpretative problem. Given the 
length and power of the arguments for mortalism, to which no replies are 
developed, and the absence of arguments left unrefuted for immortalism, 
it is hard to see how the preceding chapters bear out the view, announced 
in chapter 15, that the immortality of the soul is a neutral problem. Some 
interpreters, therefore, hold that Pomponazzi really thought that the soul 
was mortal; and that chapter 15 and the other places where he professes his 
personal adherence to the Church’s teaching are dissimulations, included in 
order to allow the book to be published and save its author from trial as a 
heretic. Others accept the sincerity of these professions.
These differences over how to interpret Pomponazzi arose from the 
very beginning.15 Some of his opponents, such as Ambrogio Fiandino and 
Bartolomeo Spina, treated him as unqualifiedly denying the immortality 
of the soul or as writing in such a way as to undermine people’s faith.16 In 
Venice Pomponazzi was declared a heretic and it was ordered that copies 
of De immortalitate should be burned;17 and in Rome the master of the 
apostolic palace, Silvestro Mazzolini, applauded this decision, considering 
13  Pomponazzi, De immortalitate animae, p. 213 (15.318). He refers to Aquinas’s Summa 
contra Gentiles, Prologue, p. 6; and to Scotus’s Ordinatio, Prologue, pt. 2, q. unica (a very 
long and detailed discussion).
14 Pomponazzi, De immortalitate animae, p. 213 (15.319). 
15 On the controversy provoked by De immortalitate, which produced many books and 
lasted beyond Pomponazzi’s own life, see E. Gilson, ‘Autour de Pomponazzi. Problématique 
de l’immortalité de l’âme en Italie au début du XVIe siècle’, Archives d’histoire doctrinale 
et littéraire du Moyen Âge, xxxvi (1961), 163–279, at pp. 196–277; di Napoli, L’Immortalità 
dell’anima, pp. 277–338; and M. L. Pine, Pietro Pomponazzi: Radical Philosopher of the 
Renaissance (Padua, 1986), pp. 124–234.
16 On Ambrogio, see Gilson, ‘Autour de Pomponazzi’, pp. 230–6; di Napoli, L’Immortalità 
dell’anima, pp. 300–1; Pine, Pietro Pomponazzi, pp. 133–4 (and in the following, synthetic, 
discussion); on Spina, see Gilson, ‘Autour de Pomponazzi’, pp. 196–206; di Napoli, 
L’Immortalità dell’anima, pp. 302–9; Pine, Pietro Pomponazzi, pp. 134–5 (and in the 
following, synthetic, discussion).
17 See P. Pomponazzi, Apologia, in Pietro Pomponazzi. Tutti i trattati peripatetici, ed. F. 
P. Raimondi and J. M. García Valverde (Milan, 2013), pp. 1107–537, at pp. 1492–4 (III, 2). 
References to the Apologia are to this edition. 
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that Pomponazzi’s book weakened and destroyed the faith in the minds of 
the young.18 However, his most considered opponents, Gasparo Contarini, 
a one-time pupil, Venetian diplomat and future cardinal, and Agostino 
Nifo, a colleague and rival, accepted that Pomponazzi was discussing just 
what could be established by arguments based on natural reason, although 
they differed from his conclusions; while the Dominican Chrysostom Javelli 
publicly affirmed Pomponazzi’s religious sincerity.19 Pietro Bembo appears 
to have stopped a papal call for a retraction in its tracks and declared he 
found nothing heretical in the treatise.20
Later reactions are similarly divided. In the seventeenth century De 
immortalitate was frequently cited, though rarely directly, by ‘atheists’ 
– those who questioned aspects of Christian doctrine, including post-
mortem survival.21 However, in his Dictionnaire historique et critique Bayle 
fully accepted that Pomponazzi wished simply to say that rational proof of 
the soul’s immortality is impossible; and Bayle’s discussion was influential 
in many circles.22 Recent scholars, too, are split. Giovanni di Napoli and, 
more stridently, Martin Pine and Burkhard Mojsisch see Pomponazzi as 
dissimulating a disbelief in personal immortality.23 However, the opposite view, 
put polemically by Kristeller half a century ago, is shared, with more nuance, 
by most of the leading scholars today.24 All, however, would agree that the 
problem is not, as some earlier historians thought, one of deciding whether 
or not Pomponazzi is a herald of modernity; but rather one of reconstructing 
the framework within which he worked and thought so that the elusive, and 
probably complex, intention behind his text can be identified. How far does 
investigating Pomponazzi’s institutional background help towards this aim?
18 See Pietro Pomponazzi. Apologia, trans. V. Perrone Compagni (Florence, 2011), p. 
254, n. 17, quoting from Mazzolini’s own De strigmagarum demonumque mirandis (1521). 
Pomponazzi himself gives a completely different account, in which Mazzolini laughs and 
says he approves of the book (Apologia, p. 1494 (III, 2)).
19 See Gilson, ‘Autour de Pomponazzi’, p. 265; on Javelli, see below, p. 100.
20 Pomponazzi, Apologia, p. 1494 (III, 2); cf. B. Nardi, Studi su Pietro Pomponazzi 
(Florence, 1965), pp. 25–7.
21 See Gontier’s comments in De immortalitate, introduction, pp. lxi–lxii.
22 See P. Bayle, Dictionnaire historique et critique (4 vols, Amsterdam, 1740), iii. 777–83; 
cf. M. Longo, ‘L’immagine di Pomponazzi nella “prima Aufklärung”’, in Pietro Pomponazzi. 
Tradizione e dissenso, ed. M. Sgarbi (Florence, 2010), pp. 407–34.
23 di Napoli, L’Immortalità dell’anima, pp. 274–5; Pine, Pietro Pomponazzi, passim; Pietro 
Pomponazzi. Abhandlung über die Unsterblichkeit der Seele, trans. B. Mojsisch (Philosophische 
Bibliothek, ccccxxxiv, Hamburg, 1990), pp. ix–xiv.
24 P. O. Kristeller, ‘The myth of renaissance atheism and the French tradition of free 
thought’, Jour. Hist. Philosophy, vi (1968), 233–43; cf. the introduction to Gontier’s edition 
of De immortalitate and, though her view does not fit neatly into either alternative, Perrone 
Compagni, Trattato, pp. lxxxv–xcvi.
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Pomponazzi the institutional insider
Pomponazzi is more clearly and closely tied to a particular sort of institution 
than most thinkers. No philosopher of the long middle ages was more a 
creature of the university system, a true academic insider. Born in Mantua 
in 1462, he studied at Padua university, one of the two most prestigious in 
Italy. When his studies were finished in 1487, he became a teacher there, 
staying – except for a three-year break at the court in Ferrara at the very end 
of the century – until 1509, when the university was closed due to Padua’s 
rebellion and the Venetian reconquest. Then, from 1511 until his death in 
1525, Pomponazzi taught at Bologna, the other leading Italian university.25 
Pomponazzi did not merely work within the system: he used the celebrity 
he gained to play the system to his own advantage, in a way that some of 
today’s academic superstars would be happy if they could emulate. When 
the temporary closure of the universities at Padua and then Ferrara left 
Pomponazzi without a job, Bologna took the opportunity to poach him. At 
first he had to take a cut in salary, though he was still paid more than twice 
as much as the professorial average, but then, in the face of counter-bids 
from Pisa, by 1518 the university had to pay him three times the original 
sum in order to retain him.26
Pomponazzi’s writings are mostly closely linked to his university 
teaching. Many of them are, indeed, not properly speaking his writings at 
all, but reportationes of his lectures on exactly the texts which a professor 
of arts would have been expected to teach – especially Aristotle’s physical 
works, with a particular concentration on the De anima.27 These reports can 
represent only a fraction of his teaching activity over more than thirty years. 
The works he printed in his lifetime were almost all gathered together in the 
Tractatus acutissimi, utillimi et mere peripatetici, published in the year of his 
death.28 They include treatises on the interpretation of Aristotelian physics 
by the fourteenth-century Oxford thinkers so influential in the Italian 
universities; and one on Nutrition and Growth, closely linked to Aristotle’s 
discussions of these themes; along with the De immortalitate animae and 
the treatises – the Apologia and the Defensorium – which Pomponazzi wrote 
in response to its critics. These three texts are almost as closely linked with 
25 There is a good account of Pomponazzi’s career in Pine, Pietro Pomponazzi, pp. 39–52. 
26 See P. F. Grendler, The Universities of the Italian Renaissance (Baltimore, Md., 2002), pp. 
15–16.
27 These are listed in Gontier’s edition of De immortalitate, pp. lxxvii–lxxviii.
28 P. Pomponazzi, Tractatus acutissimi, utillimi et mere peripatetici (Venice, 1525). The 
works in this collection have been republished, closely based on the text here, but collated 
with the first editions, with Italian translation, notes and introductions in Raimondi and 
García, Pietro Pomponazzi.
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Pomponazzi’s teaching as the rest of the volume, since De immortalitate, first 
published in 1516, is based on the lectures he had been giving on De anima 
from the turn of the century. There are, finally, two further important works, 
which Pomponazzi wrote in his last years and circulated in manuscript but 
chose not to have printed in his lifetime: De incantationibus and De fato, de 
libero arbitrio et de praedestinatione.
The institution to which Pomponazzi belonged so thoroughly was part 
of a very special sort of medieval university: the arts faculty in its particular, 
fourteenth- to seventeenth-century Italian variant, as illustrated by its 
two outstanding examples, Padua and Bologna.29 Both universities were 
outstanding centres for medicine and law. Arts were considered part of the 
preparation for the doctorate in medicine, although it was possible to take a 
doctorate just in arts, or in arts as well as medicine; and a very few students, 
including Pomponazzi himself, took a degree in arts and then, some 
years later, in medicine. However, Pomponazzi never taught medicine: he 
remained throughout his career an arts professor.
The arts course he and others taught diverged in some important ways 
from that of the northern universities. Like theirs, it was built around 
Aristotle’s texts, but the arts masters did not usually lecture on either the 
Ethics or the Metaphysics, two of the central texts of the arts curriculum 
in Oxford, Paris and elsewhere. Ethics was given little attention and was 
usually taught in a limited number of lectures by specialists who carried 
little prestige. Metaphysics was usually taught, if at all, by the theologians.
It is in regard to the theologians and their position that there is the 
most striking difference of all between the Italian university model and 
that found north of the Alps. It was not until the fourteenth and early 
fifteenth centuries that theology faculties began to be established in the 
Italian universities: for instance, at Padua in 1363 and Bologna the next 
year. However, theology (and metaphysics, which was considered to be 
tied to it) was only very partially integrated into the university’s own 
curriculum. The teaching was generally done in the existing studia of the 
various mendicant and monastic orders, but there were a few university 
posts. By Pomponazzi’s time there were at Padua a professor of Thomist 
theology and one of Scotist theology; and similarly two professors of 
metaphysics, one in via S. Thomae and one in via Scoti. As these job-
titles indicate, metaphysics was closely tied to theology and completely 
apart from the courses followed by medical students. Bologna, however, 
was among the Italian universities which did little to bring theology and 
29 On Padua, Bologna and other Italian universities, see Grendler, Universities of the 
Italian Renaissance.
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metaphysics into its ambit and for most of Pomponazzi’s period there was 
just one post, in metaphysics.30
The shape of medieval Latin thinking from the thirteenth century 
onwards was determined in its outlines by the institutional structure of 
the universities, especially the division into arts and higher faculties, just 
as that structure, and that division, were moulded by the thinking of the 
time. In Paris and Oxford the existence of an arts faculty fostered a form 
of thinking based on reason and developed through a line-by-line reading 
of the works of the man who was judged its best exponent, the ancient 
pagan, Aristotle. However, the prestige of the theology faculties there, and 
the close ecclesiastical supervision of the universities, placed limits on how 
far the arts masters were able to develop their own lines of thought when 
they threatened to go against Christian doctrine. The situation of the arts 
faculties in Italy might be expected to foster the same form of thinking, but 
in a version biased towards naturalistic explanation (because of the students’ 
usual intended career and the absence of ethics and metaphysics) and far 
less restricted by doctrinal scruples (because of the light Church and heavy 
civic supervision and the absence of influential theologians). 
So, indeed, it happened – but with a twist which is of great importance 
for understanding Pomponazzi’s position and the aims behind De 
immortalitate. Arts masters in the thirteenth-century university of Paris 
did indeed conceive themselves as dedicated expositors of Aristotelian 
philosophy, which they believed to provide the best understanding of the 
world based on natural reason. Their wish to work untrammelled within 
this sphere of rational, Aristotle-based enquiry, expressed most vividly in 
the work of Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia, had received two 
rebuffs in the 1270s. Most famously, there were the 1277 Condemnations, 
in which 219 propositions, some of them linked to the positions of Siger, 
Boethius or their colleagues, were condemned; and in which, in his preface, 
Bishop Étienne Tempier criticized those who said that some things ‘are true 
according to philosophy, but not according to faith, as if there were two 
contrary truths’.31 Earlier, in 1272, a statute, perhaps written at their request, 
had forbidden the Paris arts masters from making purely theological 
questions the subject of their disputations and required them to refute any 
30 Grendler, Universities of the Italian Renaissance, p. 382.
31 Section 5 of the prefatory letter, in La condemnation Parisienne de 1277. Nouvelle edition 
du texte Latin, ed. D. Piché (Paris, 1999), p. 74. A brief account of the condemnations 
and recent controversy among historians over them is given in J. Marenbon, Pagans and 
Philosophers: the Problem of Paganism from Augustine to Leibniz (Princeton, N.J., 2015), pp. 
149–54.
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views they discussed which might seem to negate Christian doctrine.32 This 
statute formed the basis of the oath for arts masters instituted in Paris in 
1279, but the requirement about statements contrary to Christianity was 
both widened and qualified, since arts masters had to swear that, if they had 
to determine any question touching on ‘faith and philosophy’, they would 
determine it ‘on behalf of faith’ (pro fide) and refute the arguments against 
the faith ‘in so far as it seems to you they should be refuted’ (secundum quod 
vobis dissolvende videbuntur).33
Although some historians underline the constraining effect of these 
measures, especially the 1277 Condemnations, on intellectual freedom, it 
was usually possible for arts masters to follow through their interpretations 
of Aristotelian texts, even when they went directly against Christian 
doctrine, simply by declaring that such philosophical doctrines were false 
and mentioning, however briefly, the teaching of the faith. They adopted, 
in effect, a type of limited relativism, accepting that the doctrine of the 
faith was true, but vigorously pursuing their own philosophical discussions 
and drawing their conclusions, sometimes opposed to Christian doctrine.34 
They were content to keep the two spheres apart in practice and not to 
press enquiry into their relations. Indeed, the success of this pragmatically 
relativist approach depended on its not being theorized. The freedom it 
offered was particularly evident in Italy, for the reasons already mentioned, 
and in the later fifteenth century the standard interpretation by arts 
masters there of Aristotle’s views on the soul was, as mentioned above, 
that of Averroes: a clearly anti-Christian position, since it did not allow for 
individual immortality.
However, such liberty provoked a counter-reaction, which provides 
the immediate context for De immortalitate. First, in 1489, the bishop of 
Padua banned public disputations on the unity of the intellect, even if the 
disputants condemned Averroes’ wickedness. He did not, however, forbid 
masters from following Averroes’ interpretation of Aristotle’s teaching on 
the intellect in their lectures.35 Then, in 1513, the Fifth Lateran Council went 
32 Chartularium universitatis Parisiensis, ed. H. Denifle and E. Chatelain (4 vols, Paris, 
1889–99), i. 499–500 (no. 441); cf. F.-X. Putallaz and R. Imbach, Profession: Philosophe. Siger 
de Brabant (Paris, 1997), pp. 128–34; L. Bianchi, Censure et liberté intellectuelle a l’université 
de Paris (XIIIe–XIVe siècles) (Paris, 1999), pp. 165–201; L. Bianchi, Pour une histoire de la 
‘double vérité’ (Paris, 2008), pp. 98–100.
33 Denifle and Chatelain, Chartularium, i. 587 (no. 501); cf. Bianchi, Histoire de la ‘double 
vérité’, pp. 101–2.
34 See Marenbon, Pagans, pp. 153–5; and, for an emphasis on the constraining effects of 
the condemnations, Bianchi, Histoire de la ‘double vérité’.
35 See di Napoli, L’immortalità dell’anima, pp. 185–6; Grendler, Universities of the Italian 
Renaissance, pp. 283–5.
99
Italian universities, arts masters and interpreting Pomponazzi’s De immortalitate animae
further.36 The bull Apostolici regiminis ordered all engaged in philosophy, 
in universities or otherwise teaching publicly, when lecturing on ‘the 
principles or conclusions of the philosophers, where they are known to 
have deviated from the right faith’ to use all their efforts ‘to make clear to 
their hearers the truth of the Christian religion, and teach it by persuading 
so far as they can, and with the greatest care to rule out and to reject these 
sorts of the arguments of the philosophers with all their ability, since they 
all can be refuted’.37 The view that the soul is mortal, or not individually 
immortal, is explicitly mentioned as an example of such arguments.38 The 
bull’s injunction to refute anti-Christian arguments seems to be modelled 
on the 1279 arts masters’ oath, which had been adopted in the later middle 
ages in, for example, Heidelberg and Vienna, though not, it seems, in Italy.39 
Underlying it is a return to Aquinas, a powerful influence at this time. 
Aquinas holds that reason and Christian doctrine, both gifts from God, 
must be in harmony. Since human reason is limited, there may be questions 
in which neither side can be proven by it and on these neutral questions 
faith will give the answer; but reason can never prove what is contrary to 
Christian doctrine. The Lateran Council wished to insist on Aquinas’s anti-
relativist position to put aside the untheorized, de facto relativism of the 
arts masters. Since reason is unitary, their philosophical accounts must be 
mistaken when they contradict Christian doctrine and so, the bull insists, 
the arts masters themselves should explain how.
Apostolici regiminis posed a direct challenge to the intellectual freedom arts 
masters had enjoyed until then, especially in Italy. By publishing, just three 
years later, De immortalitate, a work which apparently directly contravenes 
Apostolici regiminis, Pomponazzi launched a counter-challenge on their 
behalf. Of all those colleagues who shared a similar institutional position, he 
was best placed to take such a bold step because he had powerful ex-pupils, 
such as the papal secretary Pietro Bembo, who could, and did, defend him. 
36 The bull is printed in J. D. Mansi, Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio (54 
vols in 59, Graz 1960–1, repr. of 1902–27 edn), xxxii. 842–3. On its interpretation, see E. 
Constant, ‘A reinterpretation of the Fifth Lateran Council decree Apostolici regiminis (1513)’, 
Sixteenth Century Jour., xxxiii (2002), 353–79.
37 ‘mandamus, ut cum philosophorum principia aut conclusiones, in quibus a recta 
fide deviare noscuntur, auditoribus suis legerint, seu explanaverint, quale hoc de animae 
mortalitate aut unitate, et mundi aeternitate, ac alia huiusmodi, teneantur eisdem veritatem 
religionis christianae omni conatu manifestam facere, et persuadendo pro posse docere, 
ac omni studio huiusmodi philosophorum argumenta, cum omnia solubilia existant, pro 
viribus excludere atque resolvere’ (Mansi, Collectio, xxxii. 842DE).
38 Earlier the bull also inveighs against those who hold that the soul ‘is mortal or one for 
all humans’ is true ‘at least according to philosophy’ (Mansi, Collectio, xxxii. 842B). 
39 See Bianchi, Histoire de la ‘double vérité’, pp. 111–12, 118–20, 125–7.
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De immortalitate, then, can be seen – at least in one aspect – as a defence 
of the traditional intellectual freedom of the arts masters to develop their 
philosophical ideas, so long as they also acknowledge the truth of Christian 
doctrine. This reading throws light on the purpose of the passages, such 
as chapter 15, in which, according to some interpreters, Pomponazzi 
is dissimulating. Hence far from being sops to orthodoxy, included to 
avoid censorship or persecution, they are central to Pomponazzi’s strategy 
in opposing the new restrictions imposed by the Lateran Council. The 
apparatus of contrasting the conclusions of philosophical reasoning 
with Christian doctrine, which is accepted as the truth, was the essential 
framework for the arts masters’ qualified, pragmatic relativism, which gave 
them intellectual freedom and was now under threat. 
Pomponazzi had to find a very delicate balance in which he simultaneously 
went against the spirit of Apostolici regiminis, so as to reassert the arts 
masters’ traditional independence, but respected the letter of the new 
regulations sufficiently to avoid having his text condemned. A special 
difficulty was posed for him by the new requirement to provide refutations 
of the arguments for the position contrary to Christian doctrine, since the 
body of the treatise suggests he thought that, within natural reason, it is 
the view that the soul is mortal which emerges triumphant. Pomponazzi 
does not provide these refutations. Even when, for the publication of the 
Defensorium, his reply to Nifo’s criticisms, the Church authorities insisted 
on there being refutations of his arguments for mortalism, Pomponazzi 
satisfied them by having the Dominican theologian Chrysostomus Javelli 
supply these counter-arguments in his place.40 Pomponazzi did, however, 
make a concession to this new demand by declaring that the immortality 
of the soul is a ‘neutral’ problem, since the normal implication of this 
description is that the arguments on both sides are not conclusive and so, 
in principle, the arguments he makes for mortality could be refuted. Given 
the way he has argued for mortalism, this remark, at least, may appear to be 
dissimulation, but a closer look at the whole passage (see the next section) 
suggests that in fact he may have been able to make it in good faith.
In any case, Pomponazzi seems to have done enough to convince the 
Church authorities that he was not openly opposing them. He was not 
punished; and his career flourished even more after 1516 than before, even 
though in his works replying to the critics of De immortalitate he did not 
40 A. Cappiello, ‘Le Solutiones di Crisostomo Javelli al Defensorium di Pietro Pomponazzi. 
Edizione critica del testo latino’, Noctua, iii (2016), 74–149; cf. A. Cappiello, ‘Una verità 
senza stonature. Le Solutiones di Crisostomo Javelli al Defensorium di Pietro Pomponazzi’, 
Medioevo e Rinascimento, xxix (n.s. xxvi) (2015), 151–80. Javelli does not, in effect, attempt to 
refute Pomponazzi’s arguments from within the sphere of natural reasoning.
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significantly alter his position about mortalism. Historians disagree about 
the general effects of Apostolici regiminis over the coming decades, but it 
is clear that to a large extent arts masters in Italy continued as before to 
develop their arguments without stopping to show why they were wrong 
when they contradicted the faith.41 They were most probably beneficiaries 
of Pomponazzi’s stand, which helped to qualify or even neutralize the bull 
from the very start.
Pomponazzi the individual
The picture of Pomponazzi as a figure moulded by his institution and 
fighting for the values associated with it and his position there, and of De 
immortalitate as countering a threat to these values, captures an important 
aspect of the truth. However, it is not the whole truth. There are many 
elements in the treatise not explained by it, just as this description covers 
only one aspect of Pomponazzi. Pomponazzi was far too powerful, complex 
and enigmatic a thinker to be a mere product and representative of his 
institution. Although he was an eminently successful academic insider, 
Pomponazzi’s career had some unusual features: for instance, he chose 
to lecture, shortly after his arrival at Bologna, on book XII of Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics, a text usually left to the theologians (who would be friars or 
monks); and to add, between 1514 and 1521, to his prestigious, well-paid 
lectureship there a part-time, very poorly paid post in moral philosophy – 
he clearly had a strong interest in this subject, side-lined in the universities 
where he worked.42 
Arts courses were based on Aristotle, usually studied with the help of the 
commentator, that is to say Averroes, whose interpretations had statutory 
authority in the universities where Pomponazzi worked. Although, in fact, 
arts masters often arrived at novel positions, they rarely did so in explicit 
contradiction of their authorities. Pomponazzi, by contrast, was willing 
to reject, often contemptuously, the views of any authority. Even at the 
start of his career, when he believed that Averroes’ theory of one intellect 
for all humans was the correct interpretation of Aristotle, he rejected it 
entirely – and, clearly, his opposition had nothing to do with ecclesiastical 
pressure, given the alternative views he developed.43 Even in the case of the 
newly available translations of Greek works, he was quick to turn against 
their doctrines. Michael of Ephesus’s commentary is introduced with 
41 Grendler stresses the arts masters’ freedom (Universities of the Italian Renaissance, pp. 
293–7); Bianchi qualifies this impression (Histoire de la ‘double vérité’, pp. 134–44).
42 Grendler, Universities of the Italian Renaissance, pp. 398–402.
43 See A. Poppi, Saggi sul pensiero inedito di Pietro Pomponazzi (Rome, 1970), pp. 27–92. 
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considerable fanfare in the lectures on De partibus, but soon Pomponazzi 
marks his disagreement with it and then stops using it. Even Aristotle was 
not spared. In lectures on the Meteora given late in his life, he remarked: ‘I 
should prefer to be in the state of Socrates, who reached the position which 
he expressed by saying, “I know one thing: that I know nothing”, than that 
of Aristotle who, I believe, pretended that he knew many things of which 
he was in fact ignorant’.44
Although up to the time of De immortalitate, and to an extent in that 
work too, Pomponazzi’s writings were closely linked to his university 
teaching, in the years from its publication in 1516 to his death in 1525 much 
of his work was independent of the university curriculum, since he was 
specially occupied in producing his two long defences against critics of his 
views on immortality; and two treatises in which he developed his own 
interests quite independently of the curriculum, De incantationibus, on 
miracles, and his work on fate and predestination. This treatise, the longest 
of all Pomponazzi’s writings, is a most unusual work to have been produced 
by an arts master. It was the very raison d’être of arts masters’ profession, in 
Italy as everywhere, that they were not theologians: their questions and their 
authorities were philosophical, not theological. Nonetheless, in books 3–5 
of De fato (200 pages in the modern edition) he devotes himself completely 
to discussing human freedom and predestination from the point of view of 
Christian doctrine.
These details about Pomponazzi’s interests and other writings cast aspects 
of De immortalitate in a new light. The lengthy discussion on ethics is 
clearly not there just to reinforce a point about the freedom of arts masters, 
but to contribute to an area of thought Pomponazzi considered centrally 
important.45 Perhaps, too, as both his interest in theology and his scepticism 
about the certainty of Aristotelian science indicate, his methodological 
stance embraced, but went beyond, the traditional independence of the 
arts masters. 
To follow up this suggestion, the central paragraph in chapter 15 on the 
immortality of the soul as a neutral problem needs to be examined carefully. 
After saying that, in the light of what he has said, the immortality of the 
soul seems to be a neutral problem (neutrum problema), Pomponazzi goes 
on:
44 Quoted in Pietro Pomponazzi. Expositio super primo et secundo De partibus animalium, 
ed. S. Perfetto (Istituto nazionale di studi sul rinascimento. Studi e testi, xliii, Florence, 
2004), p. xlii, n. 74.
45 See J. Marenbon, ‘Pomponazzi’s ethics and the philosophical tradition’, in Regards sur 
les traditions philosophiques (XIIe – XVIe siècles), ed. Z. Kaluza and D. Calma (Ancient and 
Medieval Philosophy, series 1, lvi, Leuven, 2017), pp. 309–22.
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Mihi namque videtur quod nullae rationes naturales adduci possunt cogentes 
animam esse immortalem, minusque probantes animam esse mortalem, sicut 
quam plures doctors tenentes eam immortalem declarant. Quare nolui ponere 
responsiones ad alteram partem, cum alii ponant, et praecipue divus Thomas 
luculenter, copiose et graviter. Quapropter dicemus, sicut Plato in primo De 
legibus, certificare de aliquo cum multi ambigunt solius est dei. Cum itaque tam 
illustres viri inter se ambigant, nisi per deum hoc certificari posse existimo.46
According to the widely used and only complete English translation, this 
means: 
For it seems to me that no natural reasons can be brought forth proving that 
the soul is immortal, and still less any proving that the soul is mortal, as very 
many scholars who hold it immortal declare. Wherefore I do not want to make 
answer to the other side, since others do so, St. Thomas in particular, clearly, 
fully, and weightily. Wherefore we shall say, as Plato said in the Laws I, that 
to be certain of anything, when many are in doubt, is for God alone. Since 
therefore such famous men disagree with each other, I think that this can be 
made certain only through God.47
The line of thought, as expressed in the translation, is puzzling. The first 
statement does, indeed, fit with the idea of immortality of the soul as a 
neutral problem by declaring that there are no proofs based on natural reason 
on either side, although the remark that none can be found for the soul’s 
mortality directly contradicts pages of argument in the preceding chapters. 
If the remark which follows is attached to what immediately precedes it, as 
would be expected, then it seems rather pointless, since it says that many 
scholars who hold that the soul is immortal believe there are no proofs 
that it is mortal. The next sentence deepens the puzzle. What is ‘the other 
side’, since the previous sentence has mentioned both sides (that the soul 
is immortal; that it is mortal)? Since the sentence begins with ‘Wherefore’ 
(Quare), it is supposed to follow on as a consequence, explained by the 
preceding remark, but it is not clear how it does; and the translator goes on 
to explain it, rather, by the following remark: that others, such as Aquinas, 
have given answers. The final two sentences state there is uncertainty over 
the immortality of the soul, but this was already established by saying it is 
a neutral problem: it is not clear what argumentative purpose the previous 
sentences have served or why the disagreement of ‘famous men’ has been 
brought into the discussion.
46 Pomponazzi, De immortalitate animae, p. 211 (15.316). 
47 Translation by W. H. Hay II, rev. by J. H. Randall, Jnr, in The Renaissance Philosophy of 
Man, ed. E. Cassirer, P. O. Kristeller and J. H. Randall (Chicago, Ill., 1948), pp. 280–381, at 
p. 377.
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The passage becomes less problematic if the first sentence is translated 
in the most obvious way for the Latin, although it produces a meaning 
which is unexpected. The phrase minusque probantes animam esse mortalem, 
as Perrone Compagni, alone among translators, has pointed out, should 
in the context be rendered ‘and showing that it is less arguable that the 
soul is mortal’ or ‘showing that there is no proof for the soul’s mortality’.48 
Pomponazzi does not, then, give a straightforward gloss on what it means 
for a problem to be neutral. Rather, completely in line with the preceding 
chapters, he insists on the mortalist position and says that, within natural 
reasoning, there are neither good arguments for the immortality of the soul, 
nor good arguments against its mortality. 
Pomponazzi’s comment about ‘very many scholars who hold it immortal’ 
now becomes far from a bland truism: he is pointing out that many 
thinkers, such as Scotus, who hold that in truth the soul is immortal, 
agree with him that natural reason cannot establish its immortality, either 
positively or negatively, by disproving the arguments for its mortality.49 
Understood in this way, the sentence does indeed offer a reason, as the 
word quare indicates, why Pomponazzi has not given replies to refute the 
arguments for ‘the other side’, that is, the view that the soul is mortal: he 
cannot find any. In the clause which follows, cum cannot have the sense 
of ‘because’ since the reason Pomponazzi has not chosen to reply to these 
arguments has already been given; rather, it must mean ‘although’. On 
the one hand, many learned people, Pomponazzi himself among them, 
cannot find any arguments based on natural reason either for the soul’s 
immortality or against its mortality. On the other hand, others, chiefly 
Aquinas – whose arguments for immortality had already been presented in 
chapter 7 – propose many arguments against its mortality; and Aquinas’s 
are lucid, full and weighty (note that Pomponazzi does not say they are 
cogent). Pomponazzi has, therefore, established that many, including 
‘famous men’ such as Aquinas and Scotus, disagree over whether the soul’s 
immortality can be shown by natural reason; and that, he contends, is a 
reason for mere humans to suspend judgement. By implication he seems 
also to give this disagreement as his reason for holding that the problem of 
48 Perrone, Pomponazzi. Trattato, p. lxxxviii, n. 174. As well as Hay, and the other 
translators she mentions, Gontier (De immortalitate, p. 210) and Raimondi (Pomponazzi. 
Tutti I trattati, p. 1099) favour the usual version; only di Napoli, L’Immortalità dell’anima, 
p. 256, gives the same, convincing rendering as she does.
49 See Scotus, In IV librum Sententiarum, I, q. 46, a. 2, resp. (as indicated in P. Compagni’s 
translation, Pomponazzi. Trattato, p. 114); cf. A. Poppi, ‘Consenso e dissenso del Pomponazzi 
con il ‘subtilissimus et religosissimus Ioannes Scotus’, in Sgarbi, Pietro Pomponazzi. 
Tradizione e dissenso, pp. 3–39, esp. pp. 11–21.
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immortality is neutral, although he himself thinks that there is no rational 
case for immortality. 
In the remaining paragraphs of chapter 15, and at much greater length in 
his Apologia, Pomponazzi defends the view that the immortality of the soul 
is a position which, although contrary to all the principles used in natural 
reasoning, can be vindicated by arguing on the basis of the articles of faith, 
which are not known through natural reason but are believed as a result 
of revelation.50 Within the sphere of natural reasoning, arguments for the 
soul’s immortality must be rejected and those for its mortality are cogent. 
Nonetheless, there is an overall doubt about the reliability of the results 
of natural reasoning which permits Pomponazzi rationally to juxtapose 
its mortalist conclusion with the immortalist conclusion reached by the 
different sort of argument which uses revealed premises; and then to choose 
to accept as true this conclusion, reached using revelation and endorsed by 
the Church.
There is every reason, in the light of his work as a whole, to take this as 
his own genuine, considered position. It is not a concession, made for the 
sake of appearance so as to avoid censorship and persecution, but a bold 
stance and an unusual one, shared neither by the Church leaders, under the 
sway of Thomism, nor his fellow arts masters, whose cause it nevertheless 
sustained, nor even by his favoured authority, Duns Scotus. As explained 
above, the arts masters had countered Aquinas’s anti-relativism, which the 
Lateran Council would reaffirm, by ignoring it in practice and not engaging 
with it theoretically. By contrast, Pomponazzi rejected it explicitly. The best 
natural reasoning, he holds, can and does come to conclusions contrary to 
Christian doctrine, such as that the human soul is mortal. Duns Scotus would 
have agreed that, at least in some cases, even the wisest philosophers cannot 
but be misled by their reasons.51 However, these philosophers were, for him, 
the pagan thinkers of antiquity, such as Aristotle: Scotus himself worked as 
a theologian, pursuing truth by using, where appropriate, premises from 
revelation. Except in the last three books of De fato, Pomponazzi worked 
always in the capacity of an arts master, not a theologian. He was content 
to argue within the sphere of natural reason, which he held to have its own 
coherence. He defended, as an arts master, what he thought to be the best 
conclusions of reason, even if they contradicted Christian doctrine, and 
would not accept that they could, even in principle, be rationally refuted. 
50 Pomponazzi, Apologia, pp. 1504–22 (III.iii.8–25).
51 Scotus thought that the philosophers could not but have been misled about the nature 
of God, whom they thought to cause necessarily, not contingently (Ordinatio I, Prologue, 
q. unica; cf. Marenbon, Pagans, pp. 155–7). With regard to the immortality of the soul, he 
merely thought that it could not be proved by natural reason.
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Yet he also accepted that this whole system of reasoning, considered from 
the outside, was not beyond question. He could, therefore, happily accept 
that there is another sphere of argument, sustained by the articles of faith, 
where certainty is to be found.
Conclusion
The view just suggested about Pomponazzi’s underlying aims and beliefs 
needs much more careful exploration than can be offered here, in the 
light not only of the methodological statements in the Apologia, but 
also of the comments and procedures in De incantationibus and De fato. 
However, it is very clear from the discussion above that explanations based 
on Pomponazzi’s institutional character, as the university insider, go only 
part of the way towards solving the interpretative puzzle posed by De 
immortalitate. Such a judgement might seem disappointing in relation to 
the aims of this collection as a whole – a return to the sort of old-fashioned 
history based on outstanding individuals and great minds, to which the 
focus on institutional contexts is supposed to provide an alternative. A 
more careful look, however, at the way the argument about Pomponazzi 
has unfolded here suggests a different, less negative conclusion. 
Reference to institutional norms plays as large a part in the third section 
of this essay, on Pomponazzi as an individual, as it does in the second, on 
Pomponazzi as the institutional insider. Pomponazzi’s unusual traits and 
novel views emerge only in the light of institutional practice. However, 
‘institutional’ needs to be taken in a wide sense, for while the tangible 
institutions of the universities of Padua and Bologna are of some importance, 
the main explanatory roles are played by the virtual institutions of being-
an-arts-master (in early sixteenth-century Italy, but with the weight of a 
history stretching back to thirteenth-century Paris) and, more widely, of 
Abrahamic Aristotelianism – the set of texts, aims, assumptions, methods 
and practices, both shared and disputed by Muslims, Jews and Christians, 
within which alone the complex argument of De immortalitate set out 
in part 1, and the interpretative choices explored in parts 2 and 3, can be 
understood. It is above all this and other such chronologically long and 
geographically broad virtual institutions which must be studied, both to 
reach a historically plausible, contextualized understanding of individual 
thinkers and their work; and, more ambitiously, to ensure a social history 
of philosophy is one day written.
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4. Individual and institution in scholastic 
historiography: Nicholas Trevet
Matthew Kempshall
Historical narrative narrates things that have been instituted by human beings 
in the past, but should not, for that reason, itself be counted among human 
institutions [humana instituta]. For what has already gone into the past and 
cannot be undone [nec infecta fieri possunt] must be considered part of the 
order of time [ordo temporum], whose creator and controller is God. There is 
a difference between narrating what has been done [facta] and teaching what 
should be done [facienda]. History narrates past events in a faithful and useful 
way [fideliter atque utiliter], whereas books of haruspices and similar literature 
set out to teach things to be done, or observed, with the boldness of admonition 
[monitoris audacia] rather than the trustworthiness of a witness [indicis fide].1
Augustine’s epitome of the relationship between the divine institution of 
history and the human narration of individual historical events presented 
scholastic readers with as many questions as answers. Understanding the 
cause of events and setting out the sequence of human actions presupposed 
different types of knowledge and different purposes in writing. The 
individual instance of Nicholas Trevet, and the structure and practice 
of the institutions to which he belonged, indicate the complexity of the 
relationship between historical causation and historiographical narrative 
which resulted.
Augustine – the divine and human institution of history
According to Augustine, narrating individual historical events should be 
closely tied to the divinely instituted ordo temporum. This approach was 
founded on the purpose which such narrative is designed to serve. History, 
in this sense, should be distinguished from aetiology: ‘It is history’, 
1 Augustine, De doctrina Christiana, ed. and trans. R. P. H. Green (Oxford, 1995), p. 107 
(ii.28.109). Translations offered in this essay are from the English editions specified in the 
footnotes, amended where necessary; otherwise, they are the author’s own.
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Augustine writes, ‘when deeds done, whether by God or by humans, are 
commemorated … it is aetiology when the causes of what is said or done 
are set out’.2 This is the conceptual demarcation which underpins his 
otherwise blunt statement that he will not try to narrate or commemorate 
the calamities of the second Punic War because, were he to do so, he would 
become nothing other than a writer of history.3 Analysing the causes of a 
particular event, on this reckoning, went beyond the writing of history. If 
the meaning of past events lay in the reasons why something happened, then 
the task of identifying them belonged, strictly speaking, not to the historian, 
but to prophets – individuals who proclaim God’s will in the future, but 
also in the past and the present. This did not mean that, for Augustine, 
narrating history was an otiose act. Writing down an individual’s res gestae, 
commemorating their deeds, could still serve a moral-didactic function: 
the subject-matter of history is useful (utilis) because it teaches or nurtures 
through examples (exempla) and hence constitutes the first of seven steps 
of spiritual understanding.4 However, this ethical utility clearly needed to 
stop short of the presumption of augury and divination. The result was 
an equivocal approach to history, two senses in which its record might 
be conceived: divine institution in the ordo temporum; human institution 
in the sense familiar from Quintilian and Lactantius (and subsequently 
Boethius, Cassiodorus, Cassian and Hrabanus Maurus), as a practice which 
is formative, exemplary and instructive.
One consequence of Augustine’s strictures in the middle ages was for 
writers of history to concentrate on chronography, recording the sequence 
of events within an overarching order of time. In formal terms, this meant 
annotating events to Easter tables, but this physical conjunction carried an 
interpretative significance, too. According to Augustine, humans experience 
time as a distension of the soul, an expression and consequence of their 
sin. Past, present and future, by contrast, exist simultaneously in God as 
a single point of ‘now’ (simul nunc). This differentiation between human 
and divine perception applies to the temporal succession of individual 
events, but also to the entirety of world history. As a result, only when 
the created universe is seen in its totality will the significance of the ordo 
temporum become clear.5 This is why prophets – humans who share, at least 
2 Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram imperfectus liber, ed. J. Zycha (CSEL, xxviii.1, Vienna, 
1894), p. 461 (ii); De utilitate credendi, ed. J. Zycha (CSEL, xxv, Vienna, 1891), p. 8 (iii.5).
3 Augustine, De civitate Dei, ed. B. Dombart and A. Kalb (CCSL, xlvii–xlviii, Turnhout, 
1955), p. 85 (iii.18).
4 Augustine, De vera religione, ed. K.-D. Daur (CCSL, xxxii, Turnhout, 1962), p. 218 
(xxvi.49).
5 Augustine, Epistulae, ed. A. Goldbacher (CSEL, xliv, Vienna, 1904), pp. 129–30 
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in part, God’s atemporal perspective – use the past tense to speak of events 
in the future. This is also why chroniclers left the providential significance 
of events open to interpretation by continuators – their historiography 
was a process, inherited from predecessors and passed on to successors. 
Such modesty was encapsulated in disclaimers. ‘I leave allegorical readings 
and interpretations appropriate to human conduct to be expanded by 
the learned’, wrote Orderic Vitalis, ‘setting myself the task of relating … 
straightforward history [simplex historia]’. Orderic’s aim was to record events 
whose significance might be revealed only in the future, or by those blessed 
with greater understanding and ability than his own.6 Likewise, William 
of Newburgh writes: ‘I am only a simple narrator [simplex narrator], not a 
prophetic interpreter [praesagus interpres]’.7
Such analytical restraint was particularly important for contemporary 
events. Again, this approach was indebted to Augustine, in this case to a 
division of the history of the world into six ages. On this reckoning, ‘sacred 
history’ was complete at the end of the fifth age, with the death, resurrection 
and ascension of Jesus Christ. Thereafter, the world had entered into old 
age (senectus mundi) and, as such, was characterized by exterior decay and 
interior renewal. Events in this sixth age are still governed by God, but 
they will not necessarily have the significance for the economy of salvation 
which can be traced for events in ages one through to five. God can, and 
will, continue to intervene directly in history, but such active providence 
will be even harder to unveil than in the past: ‘God’s ways are inscrutable 
and his judgements past searching out’ (Romans XI: 33). More prevalent 
in the sixth age, if not its defining characteristic, is permissive providence: 
God will allow events, and nature, to take their course.8
Augustine’s influence on medieval historiography concentrated attention 
on the constraints under which it operated: history was distinct from 
aetiology; chronography from prophecy; permissive providence from active 
providence. While humans could still learn from individual moral exempla 
and chart a natural order of events which was experienced in time, the 
providential order of those events might be unknown and, in the sixth age, 
unknowable. The resulting bifurcation of divine and human institution 
(cxxxviii.4–5); De Civitate Dei, p. 337 (xi.18). Cf. Bonaventure, Breviloquium, in Opera 
theologica selecta (5 vols, Ad Claras Aquas, Florence, 1934–64), v. 1–175, at pp. 8–9 (prol. 2.4).
6 Orderic Vitalis, Historia ecclesiastica, ed. and trans. M. Chibnall (6 vols, Oxford, 1969–
80), i. 132 (i. prol.); iv. 228 (viii.16).
7 William of Newburgh, Historia Rerum Anglicarum, ed. H. C. Hamilton (2 vols, 
London, 1856), ii. 14 (iv.6).
8 Augustine, De civitate Dei, p. 288 (x.14); pp. 865–6 (xxii.30); R. Markus, Saeculum: 
History and Society in the Theology of Augustine (Cambridge, 1970).
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clearly raised fundamental methodological questions for historical narration. 
These came into particularly sharp focus when Augustine’s conceptualization 
was read alongside Aristotle’s analysis of knowledge and art.
Aristotle – individual actions and particular experience
Aristotle’s account of intellectual induction from particulars carried clear 
consequences for the individual deeds and events which form the subject 
matter of human history. The idea that empirical narrative could never, 
by itself, form the basis for a truly scientific discipline was aired in the 
Nicomachean Ethics, when Aristotle crisply dismissed the claims of sophists 
to teach political science. The acquisition of political knowledge, he argued, 
requires systematic reflection on the underlying principles of laws, not 
just the collection of individual examples. Without an understanding of 
the goal of the political community or of different forms of government, 
true knowledge of politics is impossible.9 In the Ethics Aristotle’s primary 
target was law and lawyers, but the criticism was also levelled at history and 
historians. The Poetics, for example, compared history to poetry very much 
to the former’s disadvantage:
[T]he poet’s function is to say, not what was done [gesta], but the sort of 
thing that would happen; as a consequence, poetry is more philosophical and 
worthwhile than history, for poetry deals more with universal statements, 
history with particulars [particularia]. A universal statement sets out what sort 
of person would, probably or necessarily, say or do what sort of thing, and 
this is what poetry aims at, although it attaches proper names; a particular 
statement tells us what Alcibiades did or what happened to him.10 
Still more influential was Aristotle’s analysis of scientific knowledge in the 
Physics, Metaphysics and Posterior Analytics.
Since humans know something only when they know its causes and 
principles, ‘science’ requires, by definition, a knowledge of causes, and its 
principles had to be necessary and universal.11 Both science and art derive 
from experience, where experimentum is the accumulation in the memory of 
a plurality of individual things. Whereas experience retains knowledge only 
of those singular particulars, art makes a universal judgement about the 
9 Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, ed. R.-A. Gauthier (Aristoteles Latinus, xxvi.1–3, Leiden 
and Brussels, 1972–3), pp. 586–7 (x.14).
10 Aristotle, De arte poetica, ed. L. Minio-Paluello (Aristoteles Latinus, xxxiii, Brussels, 
1968), pp. 12–13 (ix).
11 Aristotle, Physica, ed. F. Bossier and J. Brams (Aristoteles Latinus, vii.1.2, Leiden, 1990), 
p. 7 (i.1); Analytica Posteriora, ed. L. Minio-Paluello and B. Dod (Aristoteles Latinus iv.1–4, 
Bruges and Paris, 1968), p. 294 (i.8).
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similarities found in the many things memory has stored. Experience may 
therefore know that something is (quia, quod), but art knows the cause and 
the reason why (causa, propter quid). Moreover, if art expresses a knowledge 
of causes, then, unlike experience, it can be taught, since teaching, too, 
requires a knowledge of causes.12 The object of scientific knowledge is 
demonstrable and necessary, proceeding sometimes through induction, 
sometimes through deductive syllogism; art may not be concerned with 
things which come into being by necessity or in accordance with nature, 
but it still denotes a capacity to make something in accordance with a true 
course of reasoning.13 Singular instances, individual events and empirical 
particulars all remain, in and of themselves, the subject of experience, not 
of knowledge. This is not to say Aristotle thought there was no value in 
those particulars. His approach in the Historia animalium, for example, was 
to accumulate material preparatory to its explanatory study; likewise in the 
Politics, where particular circumstances of individual human communities 
are analysed to produce more generally applicable ‘types’ of human 
association. Nonetheless, the intellectual apprehension of experiential 
material will depend on the category of knowledge being attempted and 
addressed. Peter of Abano’s exposition of Aristotle’s Problemata encapsulates 
the point when explaining why some types of knowledge create a disposition 
(habitus) and others do not. The difference lies in the distinction between the 
scientific knowledge produced by demonstration and the ordering of cause 
and effect and the more common application of the term to knowledge 
drawn from the practically limitless and disordered number of particulars: 
the latter proceeds from narrative (that is, history), precept (that is, laws) or 
experience (that is, custom).14
For scholastic writers, there were clear implications to reading Aristotle’s 
emphasis on causality as the object of knowledge alongside Augustine’s 
distinction between history and aetiology. Both propositions appeared 
in close proximity at the start of Aquinas’s Summa theologiae.15 Their 
consequences were spelled out by Vincent of Beauvais. A chronological 
account of res gestae from the beginning of the world to the present day, 
arranged according to the sequence of time (series temporum), will be a 
source of wonder (admiratio), refreshment (recreatio) and utility (utilitas). 
12 Aristotle, Metaphysica, ed. G. Vuillemin-Diem (Aristoteles Latinus, xxv.3.2, Leiden/New 
York/Cologne, 1995), pp. 14–16 (i.2).
13 Aristotle, Ethica, pp. 480–1 (vi.3–4).
14 [pseudo-]Aristotle, Problematum Aristotelis cum … expositione Petri Aponi (Venice, 
1505), fo. 248 (xxx.2) (hereafter Peter of Abano, Expositio Problematum).
15 Aquinas, Summa theologiae, ed. and trans. T. Gilby et al. (Blackfriars edn., 61 vols, 
London, 1964–80), Ia, q. 1. a. 2, ad 2, p. 12; Ia, q. 1, a. 10, ad 2, p. 38. 
112
Individuals and Institutions in Medieval Scholasticism
However, such material does not pertain to philosophy, because history 
narrates only singular deeds and, according to Aristotle, art cannot result 
from particulars.16 Its utility is determined by the nature of the audience. 
Aristotle’s Problemata, for example, asked why it is that people in general 
derive more pleasure from exempla and fables than from enthymemes and 
syllogisms. The answer is that the majority of people like to learn quickly, 
and they always learn more readily, by induction from what is familiar, from 
particulars accessible to their senses, than by deducing what is universal 
from demonstrative proofs. For Peter of Abano, this was why reading about 
the deeds of Trojans and Romans is more likely to keep people awake. It 
is also why people take greater pleasure from Roman history than res gestae 
which are either very old – his example is (Seneca’s) Hercules – or very 
recent – pope Boniface VIII.17
Put Aristotle and Augustine together, in other words, and it becomes 
clear why the subject of ‘history’ should have been absent from scholastic 
classificatory schemata of knowledge.18 Its material was taught as part of 
an initial training in grammar and served, at best, as a form of ethical 
instruction tailored to an audience of young, simple, uneducated or ignorant 
minds. This is why Giles of Rome opened his mirror for princes with a 
disclaimer that he would not proceed in a narrative manner.19 Giles never 
denies the didactic value of an exemplary method – a ruler ought to read 
about praiseworthy deeds (laudabilia gesta) and the history of his kingdom 
in order to learn how to rule correctly. For philosophers, however, Giles 
echoes the warning from the Ethics: to descend from general principles to 
particular eventualities is to practise unreflective sophistry.20
It has been a longstanding criticism of medieval historiography that it 
either was not interested in or deliberately ignored the analysis of causes, 
even though causation had been made central to the definition of history-
writing by a range of classical authorities. Tacitus stated his intention to 
describe ‘reasons and causes’, not ‘occurrences and events’; Virgil declared 
16 Vincent of Beauvais, Speculum maius (Douai, 1624), cols. 13 (prol. 16), 3 (prol. 3: de 
rebus gestis iuxta seriem temporum suorum ordinate dissererem), 12 (prol.15), 16 (prol. 20).
17 Peter of Abano, Expositio Problematum, fos. 166v–167 (xviii.3), fo. 169 (xviii.10). Cf. 
Aristotle, Rhetorica, ed. B. Schneider (Aristoteles Latinus, xxxi.1–2, Leiden, 1978), pp. 298–9 
(iii.10.2).
18 H.-W. Goetz, ‘Die Geschichte im Wissenschaftssystem des Mittelalters’, in Funktion 
und Formen mittelalterlicher Geschichtsschreibung. Eine Einführung, ed. F.-J. Schmale 
(Darmstadt, 1985), pp. 165–213.
19 Giles of Rome, De regimine principum (Venice, 1502), prol.
20 Giles of Rome, De regimine principum, ii.3.20; iii.2.15; G. Bruni, ‘The De Differentia 
Rhetoricae Ethicae et Politicae of Aegidius Romanus’, The New Scholasticism, vi (1932), 1–18, 
at p. 8.
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‘happy … the person who has been able to understand the causes of 
things’.21 Concentration on causation had consequences for classification 
into genre and, in particular, for the distinction between writing history 
and compiling annals. According to Aulus Gellius (in a text known, in 
part, to John of Salisbury and, in full, to the Oxford Franciscan lector John 
of Wales), history is an exposition or demonstration of ‘deeds done’, while 
annals provide a compilation of these res gestae, following the order of each 
year; history is therefore superior because, whereas annals set out what was 
done and in what year it was done, history also sets out the reason (ratio) and 
the deliberation or prudential calculation (consilium) behind it.22 It is not 
the general applicability of this distinction which is at issue here, so much 
as its affinity to a scholastic historiography which was rooted in Aristotle’s 
analysis of how knowledge and art derive from the experience of particulars. 
The historical writing of Nicholas Trevet provides a case in point.
Nicholas Trevet – consolation, tragedy and instruction
The outlines of Trevet’s career and the chronology of at least some of his 
writings are reasonably secure. He incepted in theology at Oxford around 
1302 and taught there until c.1307; a series of quodlibets and quaestiones 
survive, together with commentaries on Genesis and Exodus which were 
endorsed by the Dominican general chapter at Strasbourg in 1307. From 
c.1308 Trevet was in Paris, at the convent of Saint Jacques, returning to 
Oxford for a second spell as regent master in 1314 around the time he 
completed a commentary on the Psalms. From 1324 he was in London as 
the Dominican lector, until his death sometime after 1334.23 It was during 
this final period that Trevet wrote, from the early 1320s, his Annals and 
Chronicles, the first a record of the deeds of Angevin kings from 1135 to 
1307;24 the second an account of the first five ages of the world from the 
21 Tacitus, Histories, i.4, ed. C. D. Fisher (Oxford, 1910); Virgil, Georgics, ii.490, ed. F. A. 
Hirtzel (Oxford, 1900). Cf. Otto of Freising, Gesta Friderici, ed. G. Waitz (MGH SRG, xlvi, 
Hanover, 1884), p. 13 (i.4).
22 Aulus Gellius, Noctes Atticae, ed. P. K. Marshall (2 vols, Oxford, 1968), i. 211–12 (v.18). 
Cf. J. Swanson, John of Wales: a Study of the Works and Ideas of a Thirteenth-Century Friar 
(Cambridge, 1989), pp. 24–8. For the latter’s influence on the Oxford Dominican John of 
Westerfield, see B. Smalley, ‘Oxford University sermons 1290–1293’, in Medieval Learning 
and Literature: Essays Presented to Richard William Hunt, ed. J. Alexander and M. Gibson 
(Oxford, 1976), pp. 307–27, at pp. 322–4.
23 T. Käppeli, Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum Medii Aevi (4 vols, Rome, 1970–93), iii. 
187–96; iv. 213–15.
24 Trevet, Annales sex regum Angliae, ed. T. Hog (London, 1845). For bk. vi [1272–1307], see 
F. Mantello, ‘A critical edition of the Gesta Temporum Edwardi Regis Anglorum of Nicholas 
Trevet OP’ (unpublished University of Toronto PhD thesis, 1977), pp. 230–517.
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creation to the birth of Christ,25 a Latin text from which he subsequently 
produced an Anglo-Norman adaptation for Edward I’s daughter, Mary of 
Woodstock.26 What has always intrigued modern scholars is the series of 
texts Trevet produced alongside these directly exegetical, theological and 
historical works. In the first instance there was a commentary on Boethius’s 
Consolation of Philosophy, written around 1300;27 followed by a commentary 
on Seneca’s Declamations (specifically the Controversiae), written perhaps 
as early as 1306; then commentaries on Seneca’s Tragedies and the first and 
third decades of Livy’s Ab urbe condita,28 both of which were completed 
before 1318. At some point between c.1300 and c.1318 Trevet also produced 
an exposition of the poetic and historical contents of Augustine’s De civitate 
Dei. These were all works which took Trevet beyond the institutional axis 
of Oxford and Paris, in particular to the Dominican houses of northern 
Italy (Santa Caterina in Pisa, Santa Maria Novella in Florence) and, after 
1308, apparently to the papal court at Avignon, earning him the patronage 
of the Dominican cardinal Nicholas of Prato (who commissioned the 
commentary on Seneca’s Tragedies after reading Trevet on the Consolation 
and Declamations)29 and Pope John XXII (to whom Trevet dedicated a copy 
25 London, British Library, Royal MS. 13 B XVI, fos. 2–334.
26 A. Rutherford, ‘The Anglo-Norman chronicle of Nicholas Trevet’ (unpublished 
University of London PhD thesis, 1932). Cf. R. Dean, ‘Nicholas Trevet, historian’, in 
Alexander and Gibson, Medieval Learning and Literature, pp. 328–52; H. Pagan, ‘Trevet’s 
Les Cronicles: manuscripts, owners and readers’, in The Prose Brut and Other Late Medieval 
Chronicles: Books have their Histories. Essays in Honour of Lester M. Matheson, ed. J. Rajsic, 
E. Kooper and D. Hoche (Woodbridge, 2016), pp. 149–64.
27 R. Dean, ‘The dedication of Nicholas Trevet’s commentary on Boethius’, Studies in 
Philology, lxiii (1966), 593–603; L. Nauta, ‘The Consolation – the Latin commentary tradition 
800–1700’, in The Cambridge Companion to Boethius, ed. J. Marenbon (Cambridge, 2009), 
pp. 255–78, at pp. 263–6; L. Nauta, ‘The scholastic context of the Boethius commentary 
by Nicholas Trevet’, in Boethius in the Middle Ages: Latin and Vernacular Traditions of 
the Consolatio Philosophiae, ed. J. Hoenen and L. Nauta (Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des 
Mittelalters, Leiden, 1997), pp. 41–67.
28 R. Dean, ‘The earliest known commentary on Livy is by Nicholas Trevet’, Medievalia 
et Humanistica, iii (1945), 86–98; C. Wittlin, Titus Livius Ab urbe condita I.1–9. Ein 
mittellateinischer Kommentar und sechs romanische Übersetzungen und Kürzungen aus dem 
Mittelalter (Tübingen, 1970); G. Billanovich, La tradizione del testo di Livio e le origini 
del’Umanesimo (Padua, 1981), ch. 2; G. Crevatin, ‘Legger Tito Livio – Nicola Trevet, 
Landolfo Colonna, Francesco Petrarca’, Incontri triestini di filologia classica, vi (2006–7), 
67–79.
29 Nicholas of Prato, Epistola, ed. E. Franceschini, in Il commento di Nicola Trevet al Tieste 
di Seneca (Milan, 1938), pp. 1–2, trans. A. Minnis and A. Scott, in Medieval Literary Theory 
and Criticism c.1100–c.1375: the Commentary Tradition, ed. A. Minnis and A. Scott, with D. 
Wallace (rev. edn., Oxford, 1991), pp. 340–1. 
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of his commentary on Genesis).30 These are also all works which set up 
an approach to the writing of history which is strikingly at odds with the 
annals and chronicles Trevet himself went on to compose after 1320.
It is, of course, methodologically problematic to start from an assumption 
about what sort of text ‘should’ be produced by a particular writer at a 
particular time given a particular sort of intertextual background, but 
Trevet’s Annals and Chronicles offer a prime example. Take the conjunction 
of Boethius and Seneca which is so central to Trevet’s ‘literary’ output.31 
The Consolation of Philosophy emphasized the mutability of fortune and 
the transitoriness of worldly goods as counterpoints to the immutability 
of wisdom, virtue and truth. When Trevet expounded Boethius, he 
accordingly underlined the value of contemplating how temporal power 
and happiness can be so swiftly overthrown.32 The writing of history was 
a natural extension of this principle: ‘[A]ncient times are full, and the 
present times are full too, of examples of kings whose happiness changed 
to misfortune’.33 This was originally a Stoic insight: for Seneca, ‘the greatest 
solace exists in the thought that what has happened to you has been suffered 
by everyone before you and will be suffered by everyone who comes after. 
For that reason … it is the nature of things to have made common what is 
made hardest to bear so that the equality of fate might be a consolation for 
its cruelty’.34 However, it clearly resonated in late antique historiography, 
from Rufinus of Aquileia’s translation of Eusebius’s Ecclesiastical History 
to Orosius’s generalization from Virgil’s sententia, ‘perhaps it will help one 
day to remember even these things’ – remembrance of the past provided 
consolation for the sufferings of the present.35
30 R. Dean, ‘Cultural relations in the middle ages – Nicholas Trevet and Nicholas of 
Prato’, Stud. in Philology, xlv (1948), 541–64. As bishop of Spoleto, Nicholas of Prato was 
sent by Boniface VIII on a mission to England in 1301; promoted to cardinal-bishop of Ostia 
in 1303 by Benedict XI (Nicholas of Treviso, Dominican master-general from 1296–99), he 
was heavily involved in Tuscany and missions to Henry VII, before becoming dean of the 
College of Cardinals at Avignon from 1312 until his death in 1321. See Niccolò da Prato e i frati 
predicatori tra Roma e Avignone, ed. M. Benedetti and L. Cinelli (Memorie Domenicane, 
Florence, 2013), esp. pp. 345–71.
31 B. FitzGerald, Inspiration and Authority in the Middle Ages: Prophets and their Critics 
from Scholasticism to Humanism (Oxford, 2017), ch. 5.
32 Trevet, Super Boetio De Consolatione, ed. E. Silk <http://campuspress.yale.edu/trevet> 
[accessed 23 Apr. 2019].
33 Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, ed. and trans. S. Tester (Cambridge, Mass., 
1973), p. 250 (iii.5).
34 Seneca, On Consolation, in Moral Essays, ed. and trans. J. Basore (3 vols, Cambridge, 
Mass., 1928–35), ii. 359 (i.4).
35 Rufinus of Aquileia, Historia ecclesiastica (PL, xxi), cols. 461–4 (praef.); Orosius, 
Historiae adversus Paganos, ed. M.-P. Arnaud-Lindet (3 vols, Paris, 1990–1), ii. 8 (iv.praef.1–3); 
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When Trevet turned to Seneca’s Tragedies he emphasized their 
combination of pleasure and utility, defining the latter as the correction 
of moral conduct through exempla. Like a prudent doctor, Seneca coated 
bitter medicine with honey in order to cloak ethical teaching in pleasing 
fables, eradicating vice and cultivating virtue.36 Once again, however, the 
underlying theme is the impermanence of human power, set alongside the 
corrupting effects of worldly passion. The result is a narrative of fortune and 
fate, to which regal families (of Athens, Thebes and Troy) are particularly 
and destructively susceptible. This process is exemplified by the house of 
Atreus, in which the consequences of fraternal strife are played out across 
successive generations.37 Trevet accordingly introduces the Tragedies with 
a definition of the genre familiar from Isidore’s Etymologies: its subject 
matter is antiqua gesta, the misfortunes of kings and of great men and the 
res publica.38
Between Trevet’s exposition of the Consolation and the Tragedies came his 
commentary on Seneca’s Declamations.39 Schoolroom exercises on legal cases 
(causae or controversiae) were not the most obvious text, perhaps, for Trevet 
to choose, as he put it, to rescue from obscurity, but his justification was 
that they served a complementary function to Cicero’s De inventione and 
the Rhetorica ad Herennium. Eloquence, according to Cicero, is acquired in 
three ways: through art, imitation and exercise. Cicero himself, according to 
Trevet, provides guidelines for the first, but Seneca for the second and third. 
The primary value of the Declamations therefore lies in their epigrammatic 
sententiae – pithy and striking maxims for which Sallust is held up as a 
prime exponent. As a result, the text is shot through with reflections on the 
mutability of fortune, the impermanence of human happiness, on tyranny 
and tyrants and the degeneration of society through luxury and sloth.40
Virgil, Aeneid, i. 203; vi. 377.
36 Nicolai Treveti Expositio Herculis furentis, ed. V. Ussani (Rome, 1959), pp. 3–5 (prol.), 
trans. Minnis and Scott, Medieval Literary Theory, pp. 345–6.
37 Trevet, Il Commento.
38 Trevet, Il Commento, pp. 5–8. Cf. Isidore, Etymologies, ed. W. M. Lindsay (Oxford, 
1911), viii.7, xviii.45.
39 Trevet, Expositio super decem libros Declamationum (Oxford, Bodleian Library, Rawl. 
MS. G. 186, fos. 1–59). Cf. Seneca the Elder, Declamations, ed. and trans. M. Winterbottom 
(Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge, Mass., 1974); and Oratorum et Rhetorum Sententiae, 
Divisiones, Colores, ed. A. Kiessling (Leipzig, 1872).
40 Seneca, Declamations, p. 230 (ix.1.13). Cf.: ‘It is easier for us to learn by example what 
to imitate and what to avoid’ (p. 260, ix.2.27). For subsequent moralization of Seneca’s text, 
see N. Palmer, ‘Das “Exempelwerk der englischen Bettelmönche”: Ein Gegenstück zu den 
Gesta Romanorum?’, in Exempel und Exempelsammlungen, ed. W. Haug and B. Wachinger 
(Tübingen, 1991), pp. 137–72.
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When Trevet turned, finally, to Livy’s Ab urbe condita, he compiled 
supplementary material and chronology from a range of historical sources: 
Justin’s Epitome of Pompeius Trogus; Sallust; Virgil; Valerius Maximus; 
Eutropius; Augustine and Orosius. Livy’s own statement of intent is 
analysed as a rhetorical proemium designed to make its readers benevolent 
and teachable, especially through setting out its utility. Trevet accordingly 
reiterates the usefulness of imitating good examples and avoiding the 
wicked. He also draws out Livy’s concern to provide consolation from 
the decadence of an age ‘when neither our vices nor their remedies can be 
endured’. These evils, Trevet explains, are the avarice, lust and luxury which 
had been introduced by the passage of time (processus temporum) – this is 
Ovid’s age of iron, characterized by greed, lust for wealth and the luxury 
caused by sloth. Trevet chooses to expand on the consequences – avarice 
shortens human life and brings physical and material destruction – and 
gives Livy’s consolation from present evils a precise historical context: the 
pernicious and debilitating effects of the civil wars initiated by Caesar and 
Pompey. He makes this final point with a reference to Statius’s Thebaid, but 
also to Seneca’s Declamations: in writing about the deeds of the Romans (de 
gestis Romanorum sive de rebus Romanis), Livy was consciously emulating 
Sallust.41
The inference from all these commentaries is clear. Trevet’s literal 
exposition of Boethius, Seneca and Livy suggests an individual who, when 
it came to writing a history of his own, might reasonably be expected to 
have constructed a narrative of exemplary moral and political edification, 
of consolation for the mutability of temporal prosperity, for the vicissitudes 
of fortune to which rulers are subject from one generation to the next. 
This was, after all, the approach taken by Albertino Mussato, Trevet’s exact 
contemporary in Padua, another scholar in the orbit of Nicholas of Prato 
and another close reader of Boethius’s Consolation and Seneca’s Tragedies 
(including Trevet’s own commentary on Hercules furens). Mussato saw the 
writing of history explicitly in terms of tragedy (he describes himself as 
istoriographus et tragoedus) and as consolation for the fluctuations of time 
and fortune. This association made historiography the appropriate vehicle 
for his narrative of the rise and fall of rulers and led him to write separately 
on fortune and chance events; Seneca’s Tragedies provided the model for 
his Ecerinis (1314), in which Ezzelino da Romano serves as exemplary 
historical commentary on the contemporary threat of Can Grande della 
41 Trevet, Expositio super Titum Livium (Lisbon, BN, MSS. Illum. 134–5, fo. 1r–v); Livy, Ab 
urbe condita, ed. and trans. B. Foster et al. (Loeb Classical Library, 14 vols, Cambridge, Mass., 
1919–59), i. 2–8 (i.praef.). Cf. Trevet, Super Boetio, pp. 252–3 (ii.5); Ovid, Metamorphoses, ed. 
R. J. Tarrant (Oxford, 2004), p. 6 (i. 127–50).
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Scala.42 Mussato, moreover, was himself not just an observer, but an active 
participant in the political crises he narrated. His missions to Henry VII 
in 1311 to 1312 prompted a historical account of the emperor’s deeds, the 
Historia Augusta (1310–13), while imprisonment in 1314 and exile in 1318 
resulted in De Gestis Italicorum post mortem Henrici VII Caesaris (1313–21).43 
Here it was Mussato’s familiarity with Sallust and Livy (his fellow Paduan 
historiographer) which left the deepest imprint on his view of history as a 
means of analysing the corruption and decline of his native city.
Trevet, too, was writing in times of acute crisis – in the aftermath of 1311–
12 (the Ordinances); 1314 (the battle of Bannockburn); and the conflict of 
1317–18; in the midst of the civil war of 1321 to 1322 (Thomas of Lancaster); 
and against a backdrop of famine (1315–22), the flight of the Dominicans 
from London (1326) and the deposition and death of Edward II (1326–7). 
And yet tragic narrative is not the approach Trevet chooses for his history. 
Rather than produce an explanatory narrative of events, Trevet compiles 
a chronographic record of deeds done. In the Annals, a digest of events 
in the Angevin kingdom since 1135 is periodically expanded to include 
material from Capetian, imperial and papal affairs, as well as from Trevet’s 
own Dominican order, before stopping at Edward I’s death in 1307. While 
epitaphs, character descriptions, natural phenomena, miracles and official 
documents are included, these are pared down and subordinated to an 
annalistic format. In the Chronicles, Trevet limits himself to what he calls 
annotatio annorum or annotatio temporum, for which his explicit model 
is the comparative and synchronized chronography of Eusebius, Isidore 
and Bede. Indeed, Trevet makes a point of quoting criticism of both Livy 
and Sallust for having exceeded the scope of history (modus historiae) when 
they included direct discourse composed in their own style. Trevet’s own 
priority remained the resolution of conflicting chronologies for the events 
themselves.44
42 A. Moschetti, ‘Il De lite inter Naturam et Fortunam e il Contra casus fortuitos di Albertino 
Mussato’, in Miscellanea di studi critici in onore di Vincenzo Crescini (Turin, 1927), pp. 
567–99, at pp. 591–9; Humanist Tragedies, ed. and trans. G. R. Grund (I Tatti Renaissance 
Library, xlv, Cambridge, Mass., 2011), pp. 2–47.
43 Rerum Italicarum Scriptores, ed. L. Muratori (28 vols, Milan 1723–51), x, cols. 9–568, 
571–768.
44 R. Dean, ‘The life and works of Nicholas Trevet’ (unpublished University of Oxford 
DPhil thesis, 1938), pp. 446–9, at p. 448; Mantello, ‘Critical edition of the Gesta Temporum 
Edwardi Regis Anglorum’, appendix I, at p. 523. Cf. Justin, Epitoma historiarum Philippicarum 
Pompeii Trogi, ed. O. Seel (2nd edn, Stuttgart, 1972), p. 258 (xxxviii.3.11).
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Nicholas Trevet – the institution of the Dominican order
Why, then, did Trevet’s historiography express such literary and analytical 
restraint? The conventional explanation is that Trevet was in his sixties and 
simply too busy as Dominican lector to do anything more than compile a 
chronological digest of events.45 These same institutional duties may also 
have demanded this sort of approach. Trevet accepted that differences in 
aptitude and education meant people would come to the truth in different 
ways – some through logical demonstration, some through authority and 
some through fables. Such pedagogic flexibility was, in fact, the reason he 
had originally turned to Seneca. De disciplina scolarium (a text attributed 
to Boethius and widely read among English Dominicans) put Seneca first 
on its list of recommended authors for elementary instruction in grammar 
on the basis of his ability to handle and transmit his material (traditio).46 
This is a judgement which Trevet repeats: Seneca adapted his teaching and, 
for simple minds, this meant instruction though plain and unadorned 
precepts.47 It was the duty of a Dominican lector to accommodate his 
teaching to the capabilities of his audience; to speak clearly and intelligibly 
about useful and expedient subjects; to avoid novel opinions; to keep to old 
and more established ones; and never to talk about what he did not properly 
understand himself. Leaving aside the multitude of things which could be 
said about individual passages, the lector should only expound the letter of 
the text.48 Such institutional practice certainly fits Trevet’s approach to his 
commentaries on Boethius, Seneca and Livy, where his primary concern 
was always the literal meaning, making sense of the words themselves rather 
than elucidating their further significance. This was also the case with 
De civitate Dei, where Trevet’s exposition of allusions to classical history, 
mythology and poetry is expressly designed to make books I–X and book 
XVIII easier to read and comprehend.49
Applied specifically to historiography, a lector’s pedagogic priorities would 
certainly be consistent with the production of an updated chronographical 
45 Dean describes Trevet as ‘a collector of data rather than a critic or philosopher’ (‘Earliest 
known commentary’, pp. 97–8).
46 [pseudo-]Boethius, De disciplina scolarium, ed. O. Weijers (Studien und Texte zur 
Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, xii, Leiden, 1976), pp. 95 (i.8), 119–20 (iv.34–35); Trevet, 
Super decem libros Declamationum, fo. 1. Cf. Vincent of Beauvais, Speculum historiale, pp. 
309–20 (viii.102–36).
47 Trevet, Letter to Nicholas of Prato, ed. Franceschini, Il Commento, pp. 2–3; trans. Minnis 
and Scott, Medieval Literary Theory, pp. 341–2.
48 Humbert of Romans, Instructiones de officiis ordinis, in Opera de vita regulari, ed. J. J. 
Berthier (2 vols, Rome, 1888–9), ii. 254 (xi).
49 Trevet, In libros Augustini De civitate Dei (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS. 292, fos. 
119–48), fo. 119r–v (prol.).
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handbook. This seems to be the purpose of Trevet’s Computus Hebraeorum, 
for example, a 1310 treatise on the Jewish calendar which accompanied his 
commentaries on the Old Testament.50 It would also explain why Trevet 
incorporated so much material from Vincent of Beauvais and Martin of 
Troppau, viewing his own work as a continuation, adopting the annalistic 
style and the tabular format of his Dominican predecessors for events 
after 1277, but ensuring that information about popes and emperors was 
extended, in his own chronicle, to include deeds of the kings of England 
and of France.51 This is an ‘encyclopaedic’ approach to events of the past, 
in other words, an instrument and resource for Dominican teaching, 
following an approach which had its roots in Hugh of St Victor and Peter 
Comestor. Dominicans received such instruction under the heading de 
tadiumon temporum, a rubric covering the ages of the world, its duration 
and a chronology which comprised a brief chronicle of biblical history, 
kings, Christianity and other religions.52 Collections of moral exempla might 
subsequently draw on such historical material – as Humbert of Romans 
recommended, ‘there are many histories, not only amongst the faithful, but 
also amongst infideles, which work very well in preaching for edification’.53 
Such exemplification, however, was conceived as a separate exercise. Moral 
instruction may rest on the historical circumstances of person, place and 
time (and, as Vincent of Beauvais cautioned, res gestae which are presented 
without the certitude of chronology or regnal years are not to be accepted 
as history),54 but this always constituted a second level of interpretation.
If chronography and chronicles occupied a significant but circumscribed 
place within Dominican institutional education, Trevet’s approach 
bears comparison with his contemporary Bernard Gui. In 1304 Gui was 
commissioned by the general chapter at Toulouse to produce a historical 
compilation of the deeds and deliberations of the Dominican order, 
including biographical notices of individual friars and summaries of the 
proceedings of its chapters. In 1312–13 Gui put together a catalogue of Reges 
Francorum and began to assemble a universal chronicle from the birth of 
50 C. P. E. Nothaft, Medieval Latin Christian Texts on the Jewish Calendar: a Study with 
Five Editions and Translations (Time, Astronomy, and Calendars, iv, Leiden, 2014), ch. 4.
51 W.-V. Ikas, ‘Martinus Polonus’ chronicle of the popes and emperors – a medieval 
bestseller and its neglected influence on medieval English chroniclers’, Eng. Hist. Rev., cxvi 
(2001), 327–41.
52 M. M. Mulcahey, ‘First the Bow is Bent in Study’: Dominican Education before 1350 
(Toronto, 1998), pp. 204–5, 211.
53 Humbert of Romans, De eruditione praedicatorum, ed. Berthier, ii. 373–484, at pp. 401 
(ii.9), 426 (ii.19).
54 Vincent of Beauvais, Speculum maius, col. 4 (prol.5), quoting Hugh of Fleury, Historia 
ecclesiastica (iii.prol.) (PL, clxiii), col. 833.
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Christ, collecting and excerpting material from earlier chronicles and gesta, 
including Vincent of Beauvais, Gerard of Fracheto and Martin of Troppau. 
These Flores chronicarum were sent, in 1316, to the master-general, Berengar 
of Landorre, and, in 1319, to Pope John XXII; they were then continuously 
revised and supplemented until Gui’s own death in 1331. Unlike the 
explicitly exemplary and didactic purpose of Gui’s Speculum sanctorale (a 
hagiographical collection undertaken at the request, again, of Berengar and 
presented, in part, to John XXII in 1324), Gui’s chronicles were deliberately 
focussed on giving greater precision to the date and order of events. They 
were also explicitly distinguished from the writing of history. Historiography, 
Gui explains, concentrates on putting singular events together into a full 
written account of the history and sequence of gesta; chronography, on the 
other hand, is concerned primarily with annotating the times and running 
succinctly through the deeds to be remembered.55
Dominican historiography expressed an institutional practice which 
also went beyond its foundational role in an educational programme. A 
definitively chronographical approach served as a marked contrast to other 
forms of historical writing which were being produced at the same time. 
Orosius’s interpretation of the scourges [plagae] of Egypt as the antetype 
for ten persecutions of the Church – an interpretation whose presumption 
had been immediately questioned by Augustine – opened the possibility of 
reading historical events in the Bible as a programmatic template for the 
period between the New Testament and the Second Coming.56 Correlating 
the construction, destruction and restoration of the Temple at Jerusalem, 
for example, with the planting, scourging and reformation of the Church, 
or the rise and fall of the kingdoms of Israel and Judah with the rise and 
fall of Christian kingdoms, provided an attractively clear explanation for 
the vicissitudes of contemporary ecclesiastical and political events. Twelfth-
century writers such as Rupert of Deutz, Honorius Augustodunensis, 
Gerhoh of Reichersberg and Anselm of Havelberg had all pushed this 
pattern hard, identifying a specific providential order to events in the sixth 
age and finding it in the seven gifts of the holy spirit from Isaiah or the 
seven seals and the seven-headed dragon from Revelation. This approach 
culminated in Joachim of Fiore’s elaborate concordance of individual events 
in the Old Testament with individual events in Christian history since the 
New Testament – a pairing which revealed the imminence of the opening 
of the sixth seal in the third status of the Holy Spirit and a corresponding 
55 L. Deslisle, Notices sur les manuscrits de Bernard Gui (Paris, 1879), pp. 391–4, 421–4. Cf. 
A.-M. Lamarrigue, Bernard Gui (1261–1331): un historien et sa méthode (Paris, 2000).
56 Orosius, Historiae, iii. 70–4 (vii. 27); Augustine, De civitate Dei, pp. 650–2 (xviii.52).
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age of spiritual renewal.57 Bonaventure may have tempered Joachim’s 
conclusions, but he retained enough of this historicizing perspective to 
make his approach influential on subsequent Franciscan historiography.58 
Trevet was not oblivious to the dangers this could pose, since both Nicholas 
of Prato and Thomas Jorz (provincial prior of the English Dominicans) sat 
on commissions of inquiry into the work of Peter John Olivi. Apocalyptic 
frameworks of global history were also not exclusive to spiritual Franciscans: 
in 1255 Humbert of Romans had issued a joint encyclical with John of Parma 
which accepted a salvific role for both their orders; in 1300 the Dominican 
John of Paris responded to Arnaud of Villanova’s anticipation of Antichrist 
with a treatise which demonstrated familiarity, if not sympathy, with 
Joachim of Fiore’s historicism; in 1313 Henry of Harclay drew directly on 
Joachim when discussing whether astrology could be used to calculate the 
date of the Second Coming.59 Placed in this context, it remains a striking 
emphasis of Trevet’s dedicatory letter to his Chronicles not only that he was 
completing a work which had broken off after the first three of Augustine’s 
six ages, but also that Trevet himself thought it was finished once he had 
reached the end of the fifth age – that is, without moving on to the sixth. 
A careful reader of Augustine’s De civitate Dei knew providence did things 
differently there, that interpretation of the significance of events since the 
resurrection risked crossing the line separating history from prophecy.
Trevet’s approach to historiography as a Dominican lector was shaped, 
finally, by the insular and provincial context within which he was writing. 
The immediate sources for his account of the kings of the English in the 
twelfth century – Robert of Torigni, William of Newburgh and Ralph de 
Diceto – provided Trevet with clear definitions of, and justifications for, 
chronicles and chronography (chronographia, id est temporum descriptio),60 
57 M. Reeves, The Influence of Prophecy in the Later Middle Ages: a Study in Joachimism 
(Oxford, 1969).
58 B. McGinn, ‘The significance of Bonaventure’s theology of history’, Jour. Religion, lviii 
(1978), 64–81; B. Roest, Reading the Book of History: Intellectual Contexts and Educational 
Functions of Franciscan Historiography 1226–c.1350 (Groeningen, 1996).
59 F. Pelster, ‘Die Quaestio Heinrichs von Harclay über die zweite Ankunft Christi und 
die Erwartung des baldigen Weltendes zu Anfang des XIV. Jahrhunderts’, Archivio Italiano 
per la Storia della Pietà, i (1951), 25–82.
60 Robert of Torigni, Chronicle, ed. R. Howlett, Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry 
II, and Richard I (Rerum Britannicarum Medii Aevi Scriptores, lxxxii, 4 vols, London, 1884–
9), iv. 61 (prol.); Ralph de Diceto, Abbreviationes chronicorum, ed. W. Stubbs, The Historical 
Works of Master Ralph de Diceto (Rerum Britannicarum Medii Aevi Scriptores, lxviii, 2 vols, 
London, 1876), i. 3–263, at p.34, quoting Cassiodorus, Institutiones divinarum et saecularium 
litterarum, ed. R. A. B. Mynors (Oxford, 1937) p. 56 (i.17.2): ‘chronica … quae sunt imagines 
historiarum brevissimaeque commemorationes temporum’. Cf. Vincent of Beauvais, Speculum 
doctrinale, col. 297 (iii.127).
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together with a condemnation of the lies which could be propagated in 
fabulous and prophetic narratives such as Geoffrey of Monmouth’s Historia 
regum Britanniae (a text which Trevet also knew at first hand).61 When 
Trevet dealt with the kings of the thirteenth century, he made it clear that 
a major aim of his own Annals was to correct a selective understanding 
of the previous 120 years. In Trevet’s opinion, historical narratives since 
the beginning of John’s reign had been skewed, either by negligence or 
by a popular hostility to kings. Trevet’s appeal to the general utility of his 
work (communis utilitas) was accordingly more than a bland convention 
– it had correction of Roger of Wendover, Matthew Paris and the Flores 
historiarum firmly in its sights.62 This approach to Angevin historiography 
derived additional resonance from the institutional ties which bound the 
English province to the patronage of both Edward I and Edward II. Trevet’s 
connections here were personal: the body of Piers Gaveston lay in the 
Oxford convent until its translation to the new Dominican foundation at 
King’s Langley in 1314; John Lenham, dedicatee of Trevet’s Declamations, was 
Edward II’s confessor until 1315; John of Drokensford (Droxford), dedicatee 
of Trevet’s De officii Missae, was master of the wardrobe under Edward I and 
an important political figure under Edward II.63 Such proximity may well 
have heightened Trevet’s sensitivity to the abuse of history, therefore, when 
on 29 December 1314 Henry of Harclay delivered a sermon at Oxford for 
the feast of Thomas Becket which set out the punishments visited by God 
upon the second and third generations of those guilty of the archbishop’s 
murder. Starting with King John, whose conduct towards Stephen Langton 
had clearly imitated the sins of his father, and invoking the prophecies of 
Merlin (including one from Joachim of Fiore), Harclay suggested that the 
English defeat at Bannockburn might indicate a continuation of the same 
retributive justice.64 In 1317 Nicholas of Wisbech, the Dominican confessor 
to Margaret of Brabant (sister of Edward II and Mary of Woodstock), 
appears to have persuaded the king that, were Edward to be anointed with 
the holy oil of Thomas Becket, his prophesied travails as the fifth ruler after 
Henry II would come to an end.65 Viewed from this perspective (Wisbech’s 
61 William of Newburgh, Historia, pp. 3–10 (proem.).
62 Trevet, Annales, pp. 1–3 (prol.). For the particular hostility of Westminster to Edward 
II, see A. Gransden, ‘The continuation of the Flores historiarum from 1265 to 1327’, in A. 
Gransden, Legends, Traditions and History in Medieval England (London, 1992), pp. 245–65.
63 C. F. R. Palmer, ‘The king’s confessors’, The Antiquary, xxii (1890), 114–20; Dean, 
‘Nicholas Trevet, Historian’, p. 333.
64 E. W. Kemp, ‘History and action in the sermons of a medieval archbishop’, in The 
Writing of History in the Middle Ages: Essays presented to Richard William Southern, ed. R. H. 
C. Davis and J. M. Wallace-Hadrill (Oxford, 1981), pp. 349–65.
65 J. Maddicott, ‘Poems of social protest in early fourteenth-century England’, in England 
in the Fourteenth Century: Proceedings of the 1985 Harlaxton Symposium, ed. W. M. Ormrod 
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mission to John XXII – for which Edward II wrote a letter to Bernard Gui 
– was rejected), a historical narrative written by an Oxford Dominican of 
the deeds of English kings from Henry II to Edward I, let alone a narrative 
which included prophecies by Merlin, had to negotiate some sensitive 
political territory.66 In covering the deeds of Angevin kings towards Becket, 
Langton and Winchelsea, as well as the events of 1215, 1258 to 1264 and 1297 
to 1298, Trevet’s Annals needed to tread a delicate line. What was said in his 
historical narrative and, perhaps more significantly, left unsaid, had to be 
weighed very carefully indeed.67
All these institutional considerations, then, may constitute, in themselves, 
sufficient reason for Trevet to eschew the moralizing approach to history 
which was invited by his close reading of Boethius, Seneca and Livy and 
opt, instead, for the annotation of annals and chronography. However, if 
Trevet’s restraint was shaped by an appreciation of Seneca’s insistence that 
subtlety should be concealed behind an apparently straightforward, open 
text,68 then it might also serve as an example of a ‘scholastic’ approach to 
historiography conditioned by Augustinian and Aristotelian strictures on 
the distinction between history and aetiology, between what is humanly 
and divinely instituted. Trevet’s self-denial, in other words, also reflected a 
deliberate, theoretically informed understanding of his subject.
Historiography and causation
Historical causation was an issue Trevet had been compelled to confront 
by the extended discussion of divine and human causes which he found 
in the writings of Boethius. In part this derived from a distillation of 
Cicero’s analysis of intrinsic arguments drawn from circumstance – what 
happened before, during and after a particular event. Such argumentation 
concentrated on efficient causes and what they bring about. A knowledge 
of causes produces a knowledge of effects, but also vice versa: just as the 
cause shows what has been effected, so the effect demonstrates the cause. 
This extends to secondary causes – what the Stoics termed ‘fate’ – namely 
those things (place, time, material, means) which will not, in themselves, 
produce an effect, but without which that effect cannot be produced. Some 
(Woodbridge, 1986), pp. 130–44; J. Phillips, ‘Edward II and the prophets’, in Ormrod, 
England in the Fourteenth Century, pp. 189–201.
66 For Trevet’s handling of Merlin’s prophecies, see Annales, pp. 197–8, 280, 300.
67 Trevet, Annales, pp. 52, 56–7, 67, 70, 78–9, 179–80, 185–6, 192–3, 197, 242, 247–8, 
250–66, 333, 353–4, 357–8, 360–2, 366–8, 375–9. Trevet explicitly mentions the confirmation 
of Magna Carta under Henry III and Edward I; he quotes a Latin text of the Remonstrances 
in full.
68 Seneca, Declamations, pp. 20–2 (i.praef.21).
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of these secondary causes result from nature, some from human will; some 
are clear, some lie hidden; causes which are clear pertain to human will; 
causes which are hidden are subject to ‘fortune’, a term which serves as 
shorthand for causes that are unknown: ‘[S]ince nothing happens without 
a cause, fortune is simply what is effected by an obscure and hidden cause’.69
The exactness which Boethius brought to Cicero’s terminology, and the 
wider debate about the divine ordering of the universe on which he drew, 
had a profound impact on how the argumentation of cause and effect was 
subsequently understood. Boethius glossed Cicero’s use of the word ‘fate’, 
for example, as ‘a certain intricate interweaving and chain-like connection 
of antecedent causes and consequent events’.70 Like Cicero, Boethius was 
concerned to reserve freedom for the human will against the necessity of 
events. He did so by distinguishing between different types of antecedent 
cause. When discussing Cicero’s use of ‘fortune’, therefore, Boethius 
proffered a formulation based on Aristotle’s definition of chance (casus): 
[W]henever something is done for the sake of some given end, and another 
thing occurs, for some reason or other, different from what was intended, it is 
called chance … Now this is indeed believed to have happened by chance but 
it does not come from nothing; for it has its proper causes, and their unforeseen 
and unexpected coming together appears to have produced a chance event.71 
For Boethius, both fortune and chance were terms which denoted the 
consequence of some other cause. Either as the unintended consequence of 
a particular action or as the result of a conjunction of separate causes whose 
combined consequence may have been unforeseen by the individuals who 
performed the original actions, casus should be defined in terms of a chain 
of causes, not a random force.
Boethius provided scholastic writers with a wide theological and 
philosophical field in which to place their language of causality. Reference 
to the ‘fluctuations’ of fortune and chance might indicate no more than a 
comparison of the world to the unpredictable character of the sea. However, 
using the terms fortune and chance could also mark a recognition that 
unexpected events can arise from the conjunction of antecedent, secondary 
and efficient causes. In this respect Boethius’s Consolation of Philosophy 
dovetailed with Plato’s Timaeus, where Calcidius offers a comparable 
discussion of how a divinely ordained universe operates under providence, 
fate, human power, fortune and chance. Given that some things are necessary, 
69 Cicero, Topica, ed. T. Reinhardt (Oxford, 2003), pp. 144–8 (58–64).
70 Boethius, In Ciceronis Topica (PL, lxiv), col. 1146 (5).
71 Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy, pp. 387–9 (v.1), quoting Aristotle, Physica, ii. 4–6; 
Trevet, Super Boetio, pp. 673–5.
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some are possible and some are contingent (dubium), there is no intrinsic 
contradiction in distinguishing between a primary or principal cause and a 
secondary or incidental cause. Human deliberation over contingent subjects 
expresses a freedom to perform acts of virtue and vice, but the consequences 
of these actions may themselves interact and produce results which are 
beyond human control and at variance with their original intention. 
Fortune is therefore defined as ‘the concurrence of two simultaneously 
occurring causes that draw their origin from an intention, from which 
concurrence something happens that occasions surprise independently 
of what was hoped for’.72 This view of causation accommodated, rather 
than rejected, the epistemological uncertainty which might otherwise 
characterize a particular course of events. Appealing to providence and 
fortune, in other words, was not an admission of historiographical defeat; 
instead, it reflected a coherent scheme which acknowledged, not denied, 
the interweaving of causes and the temporal ordering of what happens in a 
world that is ultimately governed by God.
When Trevet commented on Boethius, he drew an explicit comparison 
with Augustine’s discussion of fate and fortune, noting his acknowledgment 
that fortune is shorthand for causes which human understanding cannot 
grasp.73 In explaining the operation of divine providence, Trevet also spelled 
out how the order of things (ordo rerum) is executed through the mediation 
of secondary causes, observing that the sequence or arrangement of these 
subordinate secondary causes is termed ‘fate’. These secondary causes include 
the actions of free human will, which are entirely consistent with divine 
foreknowledge. The appearance of disorder in the events of this world, not 
least the prosperity enjoyed by the wicked, is thus the result of an ignorance 
of causes (ignorantia causarum), but also of a human inability to judge who is 
good, who is bad and what might be beneficial for either – all that is evident 
to human eyes is individual human actions (gesta). Boethius himself had 
appealed, in this context, to Lucan’s reservations over the providential justice 
of Caesar’s victory over Pompey, given the latter’s support from the exemplary 
wisdom and virtue of Cato. Trevet adds Augustine’s similar concerns over 
the sufferings of the just at the hands of the wicked. The ordo rerum, Trevet 
concludes, has a dual aspect – natural and providential – and, while humans 
can chart the former, the latter remains inscrutable (Romans XI: 33).74
72 Calcidius, On Plato’s Timaeus, ed. and trans. J. Magee (Dumbarton Oaks Medieval 
Library, xli, Cambridge, Mass., 2016), p. 376 (159).
73 Augustine, Retractationes ed. A. Mutzenbecher (CCSL, lvii, Turnhout, 1984), p. 7 (i.1.2); 
Trevet, Super Boetio, pp. 605–6, 632 (iv.6).
74 Trevet, Super Boetio, pp. 610–13, 622, 625–6, 632, 637 (iv.6). Cf. Lucan, Pharsalia, ed. 
A. E. Housman (Oxford, 1926), pp. 3, 5–6 (i.67, i.126-8)
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If Trevet’s reading of Boethius made him familiar with a distinction 
between primary and secondary causes within the ordo rerum, this was given 
a still sharper historiographical edge by the discussion of God’s knowledge 
of future contingents which had been prompted by the propositions 
condemned at Paris in 1277.75 The question of the contingency of future 
events also had its roots in Boethius’s Consolation, but it extended to 
consideration of events in the past.76 In Augustine’s view, events which have 
happened in the past cannot be undone (nec infecta fieri possunt). However, 
if an event is contingent before it occurs, will it become necessary as soon 
as it has happened or does it retain its original contingency? At Oxford 
Trevet used his quodlibetic and disputed questions to discuss the precise 
nature of the causal relationship between providential foreknowledge and 
human agency. God’s knowledge may be a necessary cause of all things, 
he concluded, but this efficient cause can co-exist with the secondary 
and immediate causes of contingent events.77 In February 1315 Trevet was 
signatory to Henry of Harclay’s condemnation of some of the more extreme 
propositions which had been drawn from the notion of God’s absolute 
power.78 Viewed from this perspective, Trevet’s explicit distinction between 
a natural order of events, which takes place in time and can be known by 
humans, and a providential ordering of those same events, which may be 
unknown or unknowable, provides an important point of departure for 
his subsequent historiographical restraint in simply annotating the series 
temporum with a compilation of human gesta.79
Trevet’s apprehension of the divine institution of events in the ordo 
temporum, finally, was matched by an appreciation of the human institution 
75 R. Hissette, Enquête sur les 219 Articles Condamnés à Paris le 7 Mars 1277 (Louvain, 1977), 
pp. 39–43. Cf. C. Schabel, R. Friedman and I. Balcoyiannopoulou, ‘Peter of Palude and 
the Parisian reaction to Durand of St. Pourçain on future contingents’, Archivum Fratrum 
Praedicatorum, lxxi (2001), 183–300.
76 Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy, pp. 426–35 (v.6); Aristotle, Ethica, p. 480 (vi.2); 
Aristotle, De Interpretatione, ed. L. Minio-Paluello and G. Verbeke (Aristoteles Latinus, ii.1–
2, Bruges, 1965), pp. 13–18, 47–50 (ix). Cf. Aquinas, Summa theologiae, Ia, q. 25, a. 4, pp. 
166–8.
77 Basel University, MS. B. IV, fos. 47a–52a; M. Schmaus, ‘Nicolai Trivet Quaestiones 
de causalitate scientiae Dei et concursu divino’, Divus Thomas, ix (1932), 185–96. Cf. H. 
Gelber, It Could Have Been Otherwise: Contingency and Necessity in Dominican Theology at 
Oxford 1300–1350 (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, lxxxi, Leiden 
and Boston, 2014).
78 A. E. Larsen, The School of Heretics: Academic Condemnation at the University of Oxford 
1277–1409 (Education and Society in the Middle Ages and Renaissance, xl, Leiden, 2011), ch. 
4.
79 Cf. Seneca, Declamations, p. 456 (iv.6): ‘I do not know and therefore do not state’.
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of its narration. This point emerges from his commentary on the Psalms.80 
Bonaventure’s fourfold distinction between writer, compiler, commentator 
and author provided an influential framework within which both the form 
and the content of the Psalter could be discussed. A scriptor does not add 
or change anything which is written by others; a compilator adds to what 
is written by others but nothing of his own; a commentator adds his own 
material to that of others, but only for clarification; an auctor, finally, writes 
his own material, adding that of others only for support.81 The particular 
role of Ezra in the Psalms, compiling historical material whose primary 
and secondary efficient causes were God and David respectively, naturally 
invited discussion of the distinction which should be drawn between deeds 
or events (res gestae) and their subsequent collection and organization. Ezra’s 
compilation, Trevet observed, replaced the historical order of the Psalms with 
an artificial order so as to elicit their praise of God.82 The act of compilation, 
in other words, was not a neutral activity; it was itself an interpretative act. 
Maintaining the temporal sequence of historical deeds (ordo rerum gestarum) 
reflected a different level of meaning and interpretation from their literary 
re-presentation or artificial re-ordering. In his own historical writing Trevet 
was, by this measure, a writer and compiler of human deeds and events, 
not a commentator or author using them to support an opinion of his 
own; and, if he was a compiler, then this should not involve rearranging his 
material from the chronological order instituted by God.
Boethius’s discussion of causes which human understanding may or 
may not grasp, combined with Augustine’s distinction between the divine 
and human institution of history, gave Trevet a particular perspective on 
historiography. Reluctance to claim insight into the divine meaning of 
events was balanced by a well-developed language of causation and by 
an awareness of the causes which were more clearly discernible, namely 
individual human actions (res gestae). When Trevet presents the order of these 
events and deeds in his Annals and Chronicles, therefore, this was a deliberate 
acknowledgment of the limits on his own human understanding. This is 
of a piece with Aristotle’s classification of science, art and the experience 
of particulars, but also with Augustine’s distinction between history and 
aetiology. None of this amounted to a lack of interest in causation, be it the 
primary cause of God’s providence or the secondary cause of human gesta. 
80 A. Kleinhaus, ‘Nicholas Trevet O.P., Psalmorum Interpres’, Angelicum, xx (1943), 219–
36; A. Minnis, Medieval Theory of Authorship: Scholastic Literary Attitudes in the Later Middle 
Ages (Aldershot, 1988), pp. 85–6, 90–1, 151–2.
81 Bonaventure, Commentaria in IV libros Sententiarum (Opera theologica selecta, i–iv), i. 
12 (proemium q. 4).; Minnis, Medieval Theory of Authorship, pp. 94–5.
82 FitzGerald, Inspiration and Authority, pp. 69–72.
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Far from it. What it represented was a recognition that analysis of efficient 
and, above all, final causes would take a narrative of events beyond a strict 
definition of the series temporum, either towards moral instruction or to 
prophecy. Setting out and compiling the ordo rerum within the divinely 
instituted sequence of time, the divine institution of history, was one task; 
commenting on and understanding the providential order of those same 
events was quite another; using those individual human gesta as particular 
exempla to instruct a less learned audience in more general truths of ethical 
conduct, the human institution of history, was different again. In each 
case, the choice of literary format for the narrative of what was done – 
chronography, prophecy, poetry, tragedy, maxim, or homily – presupposed 
a particular explanatory purpose and a particular level of comprehension 
in an audience. Trevet’s chronography, therefore, indicates a choice, not a 
failure of historical imagination or a lack of conceptual and methodological 
sophistication. Reading Augustine, Aristotle and Boethius made Trevet 
aware of the line he had to tread; reading Geoffrey of Monmouth, Roger 
of Wendover, Matthew Paris and the Flores historiarum – and listening to 
Henry of Harclay – made him acutely aware of the dangers of getting it 
wrong.
Historical knowledge as a scholastic discipline
Aristotle’s epistemology presented scholastic historiography with a 
particular conceptual challenge. Given that the individual, by definition, 
constituted a unique collection of proper features not to be found 
elsewhere,83 historical narrative needed to find a means of universalizing or 
generalizing the accidents of time, place and position so that this experience 
(experimentum) could become the subject both of knowledge and teaching. 
Either individual things (res) could be ordered in terms of their causes, 
or their common features could be identified and abstracted so that an 
inductive comparison of these particulars produced general principles. 
Writers of historical deeds (res gestae) accordingly elicited an intellectual 
order either through chronology or through ethical typology. In the 
case of moral philosophy, this process yielded truths ‘for the most part’ 
(ut frequentius),84 exemplary paradigms of human conduct, or maxims of 
political counsel and deliberation. In the case of ordered causation in time, 
apprehension of the meaning of these individual res depended either on 
a simultaneous vision of the entirety of history or on prophetic insight; 
83 Porphyry, Isagoge, ed. L. Minio-Paluello (Aristoteles Latinus, i.6–7, Bruges and Paris, 
1966), pp. 13–14 (vii.22–24).
84 Aristotle, Ethica, p. 376 (i.3).
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otherwise, knowledge of the co-efficiency of their primary cause (divine 
providence) and secondary cause (nature, human will) will necessarily 
be tempered by ignorance. The series temporum, however, was a divinely 
instituted order which remained accessible to human understanding, even 
if it needed to be left as an open-ended record of events to be continued by 
successive generations and even if the sixth age imposed its own limitations 
on whether its events belonged to an overarching pattern of sacred history. 
The result, in short, was a bifurcation of historiographical approaches – on 
the one hand, universalized or exemplified individual human gesta, and, on 
the other, a sequence of events recorded within a universal chronography 
– each of which rested on, and expressed, a different understanding of the 
human experience of time.85
Trevet’s formal choice of annals and chronicles marked a deliberate 
restatement of Augustinian restraint at a time when the same historical 
material was clearly being deployed by other writers for very different 
theological and political ends. Trevet was an individual with his own 
contingent circumstances of time, place and position, moreover, and he 
intersected with a number of overlapping institutional structures and 
practices (the Dominican convents at Pisa, Florence, Paris and London; 
the university at Paris; the papal court at Avignon; the Angevin court in 
England). These reveal much about his ‘scholastic’ historiography, first and 
foremost the particular way in which, as a Dominican lector, he read and 
responded to a range of authoritative scriptural, patristic and classical texts 
by recovering and expounding the literal meaning which had been intended 
by their authors. Nor did Trevet have to move outside his Dominican order 
to become interested in the conjunction of Aristotelian philosophy and 
classical historiography. If he was sent to northern Italy in the late 1290s 
as part of the expansion of Dominican studia in the province, the friars 
with whom he is likely to have come into contact formed, in themselves, a 
classically learned group. Trevet himself states that he expounded Boethius 
in response to the entreaties of fellow Dominicans, sending a copy of his 
commentary to his former teacher and now colleague ‘Paulus’ (possibly Paulo 
dei Pilastri, prior of Santa Caterina in 1297 to 1298 and Santa Maria Novella 
in 1298 to 1299).86 Tolomeo of Lucca, whose interests extended to Livy, 
Sallust and Valerius Maximus, was prior of Santa Maria Novella from 1300 
to 1302, while Bartolomeo of San Concordio, who commented on Virgil 
85 H.-W. Goetz, ‘The concept of time in the historiography of the eleventh and twelfth 
centuries’, in Medieval Concepts of the Past: Ritual, Memory, Historiography, ed. G. Althoff, J. 
Fried and P. J. Geary (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 139–65.
86 E. Panella, ‘Priori di Santa Maria Novella di Firenze 1221–1325’, Memorie Domenicane, 
xvii (1986), 253–84, at pp. 259–63.
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and Seneca’s Tragedies and translated Sallust into Tuscan, was in Florence 
between 1297 and 1304.87 It was not access to, or interest in, classical texts 
themselves, however, which defined Trevet’s approach to historiography, 
but the particular Augustinian and Aristotelian perspective from which he 
did so. Trevet’s institutional practice, in this respect, remained the product 
of the provincial Dominican studium at Oxford and, in particular, of the 
pedagogic tradition initiated by Robert Kilwardby.
In expounding De civitate Dei, Trevet reveals that he followed the 
chapter divisions created by Kilwardby in order to facilitate the teaching 
and studying of Augustine’s text.88 Kilwardby’s influence extended to De 
ortu scientiarum, a work which Trevet describes as ‘fascinating and useful’ 
(curiosus utilisque).89 Following his commentary on the Posterior Analytics, 
Kilwardby had analysed how Aristotle’s ‘scientific’ methodology should be 
applied to both speculative philosophy and the active philosophy of ethics 
and mechanics, ‘linguistic disciplines’ (scientiae sermocinales) which deal 
with human actions. It was possible to attain knowledge of the latter, he 
argued, but only in so far as their singular subject matter is abstracted into 
the sort of universal that forms the basis of science. Knowledge of universals, 
he explains, is produced by intellectual reflection on what is common to 
the multitude of particular sense experiences and to the exclusion of the 
circumstances of time and place in which they occurred. The ‘sciences’ of 
ethics and mechanics, in other words, deal with the contingencies of human 
conduct, but these singulars have to contain a form of the universal in 
order to become known and be taught. For this last requirement, Kilwardby 
developed a concept of the ‘vague’ or indefinite singular (singulare vagum 
vel incertum) which he found in Avicenna: whereas the singular individual 
is specific to place and time, the vague individual is abstracted from the 
circumstances which properly individuate it.90
87 C. Davis, ‘Ptolemy of Lucca and the Roman Republic’, in C. Davis, Dante’s Italy 
(Philadelphia, Pa., 1984), pp. 254–89, at p. 267; R. Witt, ‘In the Footsteps of the Ancients’: the 
Origins of Humanism from Lovato to Bruni (Studies in Medieval and Reformation Traditions, 
lxxiv, Leiden, 2000), pp. 187–8.
88 Trevet, In Libros Augustini, fo. 119. Cf. D. A. Callus, ‘The Tabulae Super Originalia 
Patrum of Robert Kilwardby O.P.’, in Studia mediaevalia in honorem admodum Reverendi 
Patris Raymundi Josephi Martin, ed. B. L. van Helmond (Bruges, 1948), pp. 243–70. For 
Kilwardby’s influence on literal exegesis and pedagogic aids at Oxford, see J. I. Catto, 
‘Theology and theologians 1220–1320’, in The History of the University of Oxford, i. The Early 
Oxford Schools, ed. J. I. Catto and R. Evans (Oxford, 1984), pp. 471–517.
89 Trevet, Annales, p. 278.
90 R. Kilwardby, De Ortu scientiarum, ed. A. G. Judy (Turnhout, 1976), pp. 134–5, 151 
(xli.381, xlvii.437–438). Cf. Avicenna Latinus, Liber primus naturalium, ed. S. van Riet 
(Louvain and Leiden, 1992), pp. 12–14 (i).
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For scholastic writers of history, the danger posed by ethical exemplification 
was that it would become more and more detached from its contingent and 
individuating historical circumstances until historiography was modelled 
simply on the Facta et dicta memorabilia of Valerius Maximus.91 A case in 
point was John of Salisbury’s Policraticus, a work which, in Trevet’s own 
summary, persuaded its audience of moral virtue through exempla and 
fables.92 The risk of such detachment was accentuated if historical narrative 
was also categorized as a form of ethical instruction best suited for those 
who are less learned and who are therefore moved to action by exempla 
and enthymemes rather than by demonstrative proofs and syllogisms. 
Augustine’s view of the human institution of history warned against 
the presumption of divination, but he paired this category with ‘similar 
literature’ (et quaequae similes litterae) on the basis of a broader distinction 
between narrating what has been done (facta) and teaching what should 
be done (facienda). History may be useful in teaching through examples, 
in other words, but it becomes something different in the process. Hugh 
of St Victor picked up on this point when he established clear limits to the 
scope of historiography. History becomes tropology, he argued, when what 
has been done (factum) is changed into what should be done (faciendum), 
as we turn a narrative of someone else’s deeds to our own instruction by 
conforming to their example of how to live.93 Trevet’s writing of history 
embodied the same concern. History remained, in essence, the annotatio 
temporum rather than the institutio morum. It should therefore limit itself 
to a chronographical ordering of events in which the deeds of individuals 
express the co-efficiency of the primary cause of divine providence with 
the secondary cause of human agency. When it came to considering the 
relationship of these two efficient causes to the final cause, for a writer 
or compiler of history to accept restrictions on his human understanding 
might constitute more prudent counsel than his presumption of a prophetic 
proclamation of God’s will.
This did not mean Trevet was unable to conceive of an alternative 
approach to the writing of history: his close reading of Boethius, Seneca 
and Livy gave him a different model for historiography and Albertino 
Mussato demonstrated the type of narrative which could result. Mussato 
knew Aristotle’s Metaphysics, including the commentaries by Albertus 
91 B. Smalley, English Friars and Antiquity in the Early Fourteenth Century (Oxford, 1960).
92 Trevet, Annales, p. 95. Cf. P. von Moos, Geschichte als Topik. Das rhetorische Exemplum 
von der Antike zur Neuzeit und die historiae im ‘Policraticus’ Johanns von Salisbury (Hildesheim, 
1988).
93 W. M. Green, ‘Hugo of St Victor: De Tribus Maximis Circumstantiis Gestorum’, 
Speculum, xviii (1943), 484–93, at p. 491.
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Magnus and Thomas Aquinas, and his contact with Dominicans extended 
to a debate over the nature of poetic theology with the lector at Padua, 
Giovannino of Mantua (1315–16).94 Not enough is known about Trevet’s 
sojourn in northern Italy to say how much he may have been familiar 
with the Paduan ‘humanism’ initiated by Lovato dei Lovati, and there is 
no evidence that Trevet visited Padua in person (although the Dominican 
general chapter did meet there in 1308). Nonetheless, the comparison of 
Trevet with Mussato reveals one final institutional practice which may, in 
itself, account for the contrast in their approach to historiography.
If Aristotle was at his most ‘historical’ when setting out the contingent 
circumstances of individual communities in the Politics, he did so from the 
perspective of a specific medical diagnosis, namely the avoidance of stasis or 
mutatio. The efficient cause of political instability was an imbalance in the 
constituent elements of the body politic. This was a lesson, and an approach, 
which was taken to heart by Mussato: his understanding of historical 
causation may have been conditioned by the relationship of human agency 
to fortune, fate and the divine will, but it extended to considerations of 
nature, astrology and geography. In particular, Mussato recast his Sallustian 
and Livian emphasis on the corruption caused by avarice and luxury as 
a natural process of ‘constitutional’ development, from health to decay. 
Like Marsilius of Padua, who explicitly distinguished between primary 
and secondary efficient causation, sought the cause of tranquillity in the 
healthy disposition of the constituent parts of the political community and 
identified the hidden cause of illness as the historical gesta behind papal 
plenitude of power,95 Mussato’s approach to historical explanation drew on 
the epistemological model of medicine. Mussato’s friendship with Marsilius 
is well attested (Marsilius was the dedicatee of his dialogue on Seneca’s 
Tragedies in c.1315), but their shared institutional context in the studium at 
Padua is more suggestive still. Mussato had actively encouraged Marsilius 
to study medicine; and it is the relationship of both writers to the teaching 
of Peter of Abano which led them to concentrate on the secondary material 
and efficient causes of nature – including the history of human gesta.96
Viewed from the perspective of the divine and human institution 
of history, the primary and secondary efficient causation of gesta across 
time, the difference in emphasis between Trevet and Mussato is marked. 
In this respect Lorenzo Valla can serve as an illuminating codicil, not so 
94 FitzGerald, Inspiration and Authority, ch. 6.
95 Marsilius of Padua, Defensor pacis, ed. C. W. Previté-Orton (Cambridge, 1928), pp. 3 
(i.1.3), 68 (i.15.4), 447 (ii.28.17). 
96 N. G. Siraisi, Arts and Sciences at Padua: the Studium of Padua before 1350 (Toronto, 
1973), pp. 48–9.
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much for his virtuoso deployment of judicial rhetoric on the Donation 
of Constantine as for his commemoration of the deeds of Ferdinand of 
Naples. Valla’s prologue to these Gesta emphasizes the utility of history by 
turning Aristotle’s hierarchy of disciplines on its head. Some philosophers, 
he writes, not just any but the greatest and most ancient among them, 
have placed history beneath poetry on the grounds that poetry is closer to 
philosophy because it deals with what is general and sets down universal 
precepts on the basis of made-up exempla. Homer actually teaches people 
to become good and wise, whereas Thucydides merely narrates what 
Pericles did next. Aristotle, Valla responds, was simply wrong to claim that 
history does not deal with universal propositions. The second half of Valla’s 
prologue is then devoted to the task of demonstrating just how difficult 
history is to write. It requires care, insight and judgement to find out about 
something when it is the subject of so much disagreement; it is very rare, 
he points out, for the same action or event to be narrated in the same way 
by several people, because different individuals have different reasons for 
demonstrating either ignorance or credulity; it is also hardly possible for 
one person to perceive with their five senses all the individual circumstances 
which attend a particular deed. A historian’s investigation of the truth is, in 
this regard, an activity which requires no less accuracy and wisdom than are 
shown by a judge or a doctor (aut iudici … aut medico).97 Valla’s choice of 
comparison here is revealing.
For the writing of history to emphasize the particular contingencies of 
time and place which moral exemplification needed to transcend, and to do 
so without remaining at the level of experience or incurring the charge of 
unreflective sophistry, required association with the judicial rhetoric for which 
appreciation of these individual circumstances was essential to its forensic 
practice. For the writing of history to concentrate on natural causation 
rather than voluntary causation, on efficient causes which go beyond the 
human agency of gesta, required familiarity with an intellectual tradition 
– medicine and, by extension, astrology – that was more comfortable with 
drawing reliable causal inferences from individual experience and external 
effects. This is the aetiology embodied by Galen: establishing causes from 
external effects and signs, thereby securing the ‘scientific’ nature of medical 
knowledge against the inductive experience of the empiricists. In neither 
case was such an approach necessarily or fundamentally incompatible 
with Augustine’s view of the human institution of history. The phrase 
97 L. Valla, Gesta Ferdinandi regis Aragonum, ed. O. Besomi (Padua, 1973), pp. 3–8 
(proem.). Cf. A. Momigliano, ‘History between medicine and rhetoric’, in A. Momigliano, 
Ottavo contributo alla storia degli studi classici e del mondo antico (Rome, 1987), pp. 13–25.
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fides indicis (trustworthiness of a witness) literally points its finger to one 
aspect of this equation: the circumstances of time and place which are 
central to the rhetoric of judicial inquiry. The subsequent history of the 
term ‘aetiology’, however, indicates the other. As exemplified by Nicholas 
Trevet and Albertino Mussato, if a ‘scholastic’ approach to the divine and 
human institution of history was to move away from the chronographical 
historiography which had been adumbrated by Augustine and reinforced 
by Aristotle, then such a development would be precipitated, not by the 
reading or recovery of exemplary historical texts from antiquity, but by the 
study of law and medicine.
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a. Individuals and organizations
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5. The charismatic leader and the vita religiosa: 
some observations about an apparent contradiction 
between individual and institution
Gert Melville
The Decretum Gratiani includes a canon (C. 19 q. 2 c. 2) whose content, 
according to the legal historian Peter Landau, ‘was able to lead directly to 
a relativisation of any ecclesiastical legislation’. ‘There are two laws: one is 
public, the other private’ (Duae sunt ... leges: una publica, altera private), the 
paragraph begins and then explains. Lex publica was to be understood as 
the canon law which had been written down from the time of the Church 
Fathers; lex privata, by contrast, had to be seen as what was inscribed in the 
heart by an ‘impulse of the Holy Spirit’ (instinctu Sancti Spiritus; the term 
afflatus will be used for this). Subsequently, a relevant case is presented: a 
secular clergyman was permitted to join a monastery even if this conflicted 
with his bishop’s wishes, provided that – under inspiration from the 
holy spirit – he wanted to seek his salvation there. This is justified by the 
observation that the lex privata was worthier than the lex publica since the 
former was the law of the spirit of God and those who acted in the spirit 
of God were guided by the law of God. Who, then, as is asked in that 
paragraph, could defy the Holy Spirit? ‘Where the Spirit of the Lord is, 
there is freedom [ubi Spiritus Dei, ibi libertas]’; and thus a person guided by 
the spirit of God was exempt from any ecclesiastical law.1
Landau rightly deems the aforementioned lex privata to be the ‘right of 
freedom in relation to the prohibitions of the lex publica, the ius comune of 
the Church’. He continues that ‘the lex privata is valid independently of any 
written form … and can lead directly to a relativisation of the ecclesiastical 
legal order. It can be directly employed to break with positive legislation by 
means of the idea of a superordinate subjective law (überpositiven subjektiven 
Rechts)’.2 This interpretation refers to a legal norm which was equipped not 
1 2 Corinthians III: 17. See below.
2 P. Landau, ‘Officium und Libertas christiana’ (Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen 
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with a casuistic but with a general claim to validity and in fact represents 
a juridical legitimization liberating the individual from institutional 
constraints by way of a transcendental appeal to a higher authority – that 
of God.
According to this norm, any individuals who were convinced of their 
ability to invoke an afflatus of God could disregard all ecclesiastical 
institutions; in fact, the individual required no regulation of his life through 
the channels of the official Church. The personal discovery of a norm 
rooted by God in the heart – something which could only spring from 
the individual conscience and had to be claimed before that conscience3 – 
stood against the positive law of an institution which on principle defined 
itself as the mediator of salvation interposed between God and individual. 
Here, the institution was instead confronted with a statement of a person’s 
immediate access to God, from which, indeed, a basic right to individual 
freedom could be inferred. This chapter therefore explores how medieval 
Christian thinkers and leaders –  specifically ‘charismatic’ ones –  tried to 
articulate a freedom of movement which was not arbitrary but structured 
by the theological and canonical precepts of the tradition. These latter stand 
for ‘scholasticism’ as an approach here; and although this chapter does not 
particularly comment on scholasticism systematically per se, the norms 
of theology and law permeate an exploration of the Problematik of how 
charismatic individuals could articulate themselves and whether they could 
do so institutionally.
***
The ecclesiology of the period incrementally developed an understanding 
of the Church which was both the bride of Christ or the mystical body 
of Christ as well as the institution – as a community (universitas) – of 
redemptive power.44 The two were not mutually exclusive. From its roots 
Akademie der Wissenschaften, philosophisch-historische Klasse 1991, i, Munich, 1991), pp. 
55–96, at p. 60.
3 M. Breitenstein, ‘Das “Haus des Gewissens”. Zur Konstruktion und Bedeutung 
innerer Räume im Religiosentum des hohen Mittelalters’, in Geist und Gestalt. Monastische 
Raumkonzepte als Ausdrucksformen religiöser Leitideen im Mittelalter, ed. J. Sonntag (Vita 
regularis, lxix, Berlin, 2016), pp. 19–55.
4 S. A. Chodorow, Christian Political Theory and Church Politics in the Mid-Twelfth 
Century: the Ecclesiology of Gratian’s Decretum (Berkeley, Calif., 1972); P. von Moos, ‘Krise 
und Kritik der Institutionalität. Die mittelalterliche Kirche als “Anstalt” und “Himmelreich 
auf Erden”’, in Institutionalität und Symbolisierung. Verstetigung kultureller Ordnungsmuster 
in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart, ed. G. Melville (Cologne and Vienna, 2001), pp. 293–340.
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in the apostles’ charismatic community and resting on its gospel base, the 
Church institutionalized itself over the centuries as a spiritual system and, 
at the same time, a firmly established organization. It was increasingly 
furnished, on the one hand, with a gradually solidifying body of sacraments 
in terms of perceptible, grace-conferring signs, as well as with the sacrality 
of ordinations, etc.; and, on the other hand, with precisely defined offices 
in pre-set hierarchies with both codified norms and normative practices 
together with juridical and administrative proceedings with rituals and 
symbols. This institutionalizing process generated normative traditions 
which were understood as divine revelations and thus linked with the 
Gospel. Their accessibility and connection to the truth of Church teachings, 
and thereby also to the latter’s redemptive power, were consequently based 
on two principles (sacraments and offices), the proper understanding of 
which was handed over to the judgement of the ecclesiastical magisterium. 
At the latest from the late eleventh-century Gregorian reforms onwards a 
proposition was in force, one set in stone: ‘S/he is not held a Catholic who 
does not agree with the Church of Rome’ (Quod catholicus non habeatur, qui 
non concordat Romane ecclesie),5 a phrase which gained its normative depth 
in connection with the dictum already formulated in patristic writings: 
‘outside the church, no salvation’ (extra ecclesiam nulla salus).6
The Church was thus an institution conceived as God’s foundation, 
armed with a well-functioning organization with the ability to assert itself 
legally and through a symbolic world anchored in spiritual transcendence. 
Confrontation with just such a power was necessary for all those who 
believed that by appealing to the call of the Holy Spirit it was possible to 
derive a right to individual freedom from ecclesiastical regulation. If the 
formula ubi Spiritus Dei, ibi libertas is already found in Paul’s second Letter 
to the Corinthians (2 Corinthians III: 17) and delineated the Church’s 
basic ‘pneumatic’ principle, it nevertheless finds itself similarly faced with 
the Gregorian proposition stressing the rights of the Church.7 It was no 
coincidence that the fundamental tension between the official Church and 
individual freedom in the Spirit of God was extremely explosive during just 
5 H. Fuhrmann, ‘“Quod catholicus non habeatur, qui non concordat Romanae ecclesiae”. 
Randnotizen zum Dictatus Papae’, in Festschrift für Helmut Beumann zum 65. Geburtstag, ed. 
K. U. Jäschke and R. Wenskus (Sigmaringen, 1977), pp. 263–87.
6 J. Johrendt, ‘“Nulla salus extra ecclesiam”. Innocenzo III e la chiesa come istanza 
mediatrice di salvezza’, in Il lateranense IV: le ragioni di un concilio. Atti del LIII convegno 
storico internazionale: Todi, 9–12 ottobre 2016 (Spoleto, 2017), pp. 245–60.
7 In the sense of pneuma as spiritual rather than earthly wind. On the medieval reception 
of 2 Corinthians III: 17 cf. von Moos, ‘Krise’, pp. 326–36; briefly also G. Melville, ‘“Dove c’è 
lo Spirito del Signore, lì è la libertà”. Aspetti del trascendimento istituzionale medievale’, in 
Libertas (secoli X–XIII). VI Settimana della Mendola, ed. N. d’Acunto (Milan, forthcoming).
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this period, that is, from the late eleventh century onwards. In principle, 
this was about the confrontation between the official Church and those 
religious movements which – undoubtedly exacerbated by the conflicts of the 
investiture controversy – propagated a new religiosity stressing conscience 
and personal responsibility and which spread through Christendom 
generally, but predominantly in France and Italy.8 This religiosity was 
meant to lead to a new religious life by implementing evangelical counsels, 
imitation of the apostles and relinquishment of all possessions. In the person 
of charismatically effective holy men – both hermits and itinerant preachers 
– together with large followings across all social groups, this religiosity had 
found an extremely diverse, effective embodiment.9
Thus, that Pauline statement of free and liberating choice grounded 
on the lex privata did not stand alone. For instance, a letter of Lanfranc 
of Canterbury (c.1010–89) circulated widely and was quoted many times. 
Lanfranc wrote that he would leave a monastery if he realized he was unable 
to save his soul there – even if he had sworn never to leave it. This would not 
be grounds for accusing him of having broken his oath since one did not 
break away from God if one abandoned the wrong path in order to remain 
with him.10 Perhaps the weightiest case of a consequence resulting from 
such a divinely obliged imperative was the founding of Cîteaux and thus the 
origins of the Cistercian order at the turn of the twelfth century.11 Robert, 
abbot of Molesme (1027–1111), came to think he could not properly fulfil 
his profession to follow the Rule of Benedict there and that if he remained 
in the monastery entrusted to him he would persistently transgress against 
the Rule. As a result he was fearful of the judgement of the heavenly ruler. 
He thus decided, together with a part of the monastery at Molesme, to 
travel to Cîteaux, although doing so gravely transgressed the fundamental 
canonical commitment to stability of place (stabilitas loci, that is, remaining 
at one’s monastery) and his abbatial duty of care. He justified his actions 
8 See H. Grundmann, Religious Movements in the Middle Ages: the Historical Links 
Between Heresy, the Mendicant Orders, and the Women’s Religious Movement in the Twelfth 
and Thirteenth Century, trans. S. W. Rowan (Notre Dame, Ind., 1995); G. Melville, Medieval 
Monasticism: its History and Forms of Life, trans. J. Mixson (Collegeville, Minn., 2016), pp. 
89–124.
9 See H. Leyser, Hermits and the New Monasticism: a Study of Religious Communities in 
Western Europe 1000–1150 (London, 1984); Ermites de France et d’Italie, XIe–XVe siècle, ed. A. 
Vauchez (Rome, 2003).
10 Beati Lanfranci Cantuariensis archiepiscopi epistolarum liber, Ep. lx, in PL 150, col. 549 
sq. 
11 Cf. G. Melville, ‘Die Zisterzienser und der Umbruch des Mönchtums im 11. und 12. 
Jahrhundert’, in Norm und Realität. Kontinuität und Wandel der Zisterzienser im Mittelalter, 
ed. F. J. Felten and W. Rösener (Vita regularis, xlii, Berlin, 2009), pp. 23–43.
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by the fact that he would have committed a sustained breaking of his vows 
had he remained. A generation later, the greatest of the period’s Cistercians, 
Bernard of Clairvaux (1090–1153), affirmed the propriety of the decision 
and recommended the same course of action to his contemporaries in times 
of need: ‘If in a given place life cannot be lead in accordance with the Rule, 
I advise you without reservation to follow the spirit of freedom [spiritui 
libertatis in reference to 2 Corinthians III: 17] and to transfer to another 
monastery’.12
A more pronounced reference to 2 Corinthians III: 17 and the passage 
from Gratian was employed in order to justify the tenacity of Clare of Assisi 
(1193/94–1253). The Legenda versificata Sanctae Clarae redacted in the mid 
thirteenth century describes how pope Gregory IX urged Clare to renounce 
her absolute poverty by accepting provisions in the form of land grants. She 
refused to accept them, the account continues, as she wanted in no way to 
be absolved from following Christ (sequela Christi). The Legenda, however, 
adds another striking commentary to the account of this occurrence. 
First, the text acknowledges Clare’s opposition as a remarkable risk by 
underlining Gregory’s position as Summus pontifex, thereby stating that 
‘the divine power, the highest authority, granted him the right to loosen 
and to bind!’ (Pontifici summo, solvendi, sive ligandi | Suppremum cui posse 
dedit divina potestas!). The Legenda then explains Clare’s behaviour, arguing 
‘that the Holy Spirit led her from within’ (quod agebat eam divinus Spiritus 
intus) and that the following principle thus holds true: ‘[W]here the spirit 
breathes, there is freedom. Those he moves are not beneath the law: he 
prejudges every law’ (Est ibi libertas, ubi spirat; quos agit, illi | Non sunt 
sub lege: legi preiudicat omni).13 The author thus bore witness to personal 
empowerment, granted by God to the individual souls from within and 
freeing them from institutional compulsion. This empowerment was 
viewed as greater than the general authorization granted by God to the 
highest office of the Church for the institutionalized ‘power of binding and 
releasing’ (potestas ligandi et solvendi).14 The statement on Clare’s position 
12 Bernard of Clairvaux, De praecepto et dispensatione, in Sancti Bernardi opera (8 vols, 
Rome, 1957–77), iii. Tractatus et opuscula, ed. J. Leclercq and H.-M. Rochais (Rome, 1963), 
pp. 252–94, at p. 284.
13 Legenda versificata Sanctae Clarae, in Fontes Franciscani, ed. E. Menestò and S. Brufani 
(Assisi, 1995), pp. 2347–99, at p. 2360. Cf. also on the Franciscan context, G. Melville, 
‘“Homo spiritum habens”. Francesco fra Chiesa istituzionale e transcendenza individuale’, 
Collectanea Franciscana, lxxxviii (2018), 281–300. For the historical background of Clara’s 
afterlife and influence, see M. P. Alberzoni, Chiara e il papato (Milan, 1995); Clara Claris 
Praeclara: l’esperienza cristiana e la memoria di Chiara d’Assisi in occasione del 750 anniversario 
della morte, Assisi 20–22 novembre 2003 (Assisi, 2004).
14 I.e., the commission given by Christ to Peter in Matthew XVI: 29, also XVIII: 18.
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greatly exceeded Gratian’s postulation and thereby created an extremely 
broad view regarding the freedom of the holy spirit. With Gratian, it was a 
matter of ‘breaking away from positive legislation’, as Landau rightly notes. 
Here, however, we witness a hierarchical differentiation between two divine 
norms: a differentiation between a lex privata and a lex publica, which in 
this case were both divinely inspired law, whereby the lex of human freedom 
licensed the leapfrogging over another, more generally applicable, divine 
regulation.
Such disregard for existing norms found a justification in a considerably 
more fundamental and comprehensive framework by means of increased 
ecclesiastical recourse to 1 Timothy I: 9: ‘[T]he law is not laid down for the 
just but for the lawless’ (quia iusto lex non est posita sed iniustis). Already 
Augustine had connected this passage to his famous dictum ‘Love and do 
what you will!’ (Dilige et quod uis fac) because he wanted to express his view 
that there was no need for laws in the presence of absolute love. He had 
also connected it to his statement that ‘where everything is good, there is 
no order, for highest equality does not require any order’ (ubi omnia bona 
sunt, ordo non est. Est enim summa aequalitas quae ordinem nihil desiderat).15 
This dictum similarly enjoyed increased circulation from the late eleventh 
century onwards. It was in just such a way that Thomas Aquinas interpreted 
ubi spiritus Domini, ibi libertas, namely that ‘only that person is free who 
has ruled over him/herself ’. In other words, the Holy Spirit has so perfected 
the human soul that, saturated with love for God, it is ready to avoid evil on 
account of its own will, not because a written law forbids it. With that, the 
soul has reached the summit of religious exertion – and thereby liberated 
itself from every institutional constraint, including laws, because it no 
longer needs them.16
In all the above remarks, the individual appeared free from the obligation 
to act according to the rules of institutionalized systems of order. As a 
result, a trans- or supra-institutional space seemed to open up in which 
the individual will could develop freely. (This space could even result in 
an anti-institutional position.) At first glance, this finding appears to be 
15 For Augustine, see De ordine, ed. W. M. Green, in Sancti Avrelii Avgvstini Contra 
academicos, De beata vita, De ordine, De magistro, De libero arbitrio (CCSL, xxix, Turnhout, 
1970), pp. 87–137, at p. 107. Cf. G. Constable, ‘Love and Do What You Will’: the Medieval 
History of an Augustinian Precept (Kalamazoo, Mich., 1996); G. Melville, ‘“Liebe und tue, 
was du willst!” – Eine Herausforderung für den mittelalterlichen Menschen’, in Sorge, ed 
G. Melville, G. Vogt-Spira and M. Breitenstein (Europäische Grundbegriffe im Wandel: 
Verlangen nach Vollkommenheit, ii, Cologne and Vienna, 2015) pp. 79–95.
16 Thomas Aquinas, Super II Epistolam b. Pauli ad Corinthios lectura, cap. 3, lectio 3, n. 112, 
in Sancti Thomae Aquinatis, Super Epistolas s. Pauli lectura, ed. R. Cai (2 vols, Turin/Rome, 
1953), i. 463–4.
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accurate; yet if looked at more closely it has to be qualified. Severing ties 
to the rules of earthly institutions was only possible for individuals who 
knew they were bound to the rules of God and the divine order and acted 
in compliance with them: that is to say, to act not according to one’s own 
will but according to God’s will. Here lay the ethical core of individual 
autonomy apart from the institutions of this world. At the same time, 
however, this concrete anthropological articulation was only possible within 
a framework in which man gained this autonomy as a divine creature which 
obeyed its creator lovingly, which is why the Spirit of God endowed it with 
the exceptional ability to recognize the divine will.17 This brings us to the 
heart of the matter: the person inspired by the holy spirit was permitted to 
transcend the earthly institution only insofar as he or she was also bound 
up in God’s transcendence. 
***
With that, we have outlined the question and its implications sufficiently 
to situate the special position of charismatic individuals in their particularly 
medieval tension between individuals and institutions. What has so far 
been explained with regard to individuals generally applies equally to 
medieval charismatic figures. This chapter will deal with several charismatic 
leaders of religious movements from the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries 
because the assumption that an individual leader – as a leader – must be 
definitionally opposed to existing institutional norms appears to relate to 
them most of all. This raises the question of how to define the idea of a 
charismatic leader per se. In the structural sense, a charismatic leader was a 
highly particular sort of individual who, because of his inherent capabilities, 
would more readily come into conflict with institutions. Such leaders not 
only claimed they were legitimately free from institutional norms but, still 
further, claimed that they themselves were also bearers, enunciators and 
enforcers of norms.18
17 See for early roots, J. K. Lee, ‘The Church and the holy spirit: ecclesiology and 
pneumatology in Tertullian, Cyprian, and Augustine’, Studia patristica, xci (2017), 189–206.
18 Cf. Charisma und religiöse Gemeinschaften im Mittelalter, ed. G. Andenna, M. 
Breitenstein and G. Melville (Vita Regularis, xxvi, Münster, 2005); Das Charisma. 
Funktionen und symbolische Repräsentation, ed. P. Rychterová, S. Seit and R. Veit (Beiträge zu 
den historischen Kulturwissenschaften, ii, Berlin, 2008); Charisma and Religious Authority: 
Jewish, Christian, and Muslim Preaching, 1200–1500, ed. K. L. Jansen (Europa sacra, iv, 
Turnhout, 2010); Faces of Charisma: Image, Text, Object in Byzantium and the Medieval West, 
ed. B. M. Bedos-Rezak and M. D. Rust (Explorations in Medieval Culture, ix, Leiden, 
2018).
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By way of illustration, this chapter focuses on five charismatic religious 
figures as examples: Stephen of Muret (c.1047–1124); Stephen of Obazine 
(d. 1159); Norbert of Xanten (c.1080–1134); Robert of Arbrissel (d. 1117); 
and Francis of Assisi (1181/2–1226). By reference to these personalities, it is 
possible to establish proof of norm-creation and anti-institutional behaviour 
which strikingly match Max Weber’s thesis about periods of charismatic 
intensity. Weber argued that:
charisma is the great revolutionary power in eras founded on bonds of tradition. 
However, it operates in contrast to the equally revolutionary power of ‘reason’ 
[ratio, i.e., instrumental reasoning] which either works directly from the outside 
in –  through changing living conditions and practical problems and hence, 
indirectly, through the changing attitudes to these which result: or, on the other 
hand, through intellectualizing them. Charisma can be transformative from 
the inside out, it signifies a conversion of the fundamental direction of both 
desire and action – arising from duress or enthusiasm – producing a completely 
new orientation of all attitudes towards all given ways of life and to the ‘world’ 
generally.19
Stephen of Muret broke with every tradition of the vita religiosa in the 
most radical way.20 In 1076 he withdrew to the solitude of the woods near 
Limoges; took his vows alone there without any ecclesiastical intermediary 
and thus directly in front of God; and then provided his disciples (who 
had gathered around him quite quickly) with the following words: ‘There 
is no rule beyond the Gospel of Christ, for this is the rule of rules’.21 Rules 
such as those of St Basil, Augustine or Benedict were not the source of 
piety (origo religionis) but merely its outgrowths (propagines); not the root 
19 ‘Das Charisma ist die große revolutionäre Macht in traditional gebundenen 
Epochen. Zum Unterschied von der ebenfalls revolutionierenden Macht der “ratio”, die 
entweder geradezu von außen her wirkt: durch Veränderung der Lebensumstände und 
Lebensprobleme und dadurch mittelbar der Einstellungen zu diesen, oder aber: durch 
Intellektualisierung, kann Charisma eine Umformung von innen her sein, die aus Not 
oder Begeisterung geboren, eine Wandlung der zentralen Gesinnungs- und Tatenrichtung 
unter völliger Neuorientierung aller Einstellungen zu allen einzelnen Lebensformen und zur 
“Welt” überhaupt bedeutet’ (M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, ed. J. Winckelmann, 
(5th edn, Tübingen, 1972), p. 142) (author’s translation).
20 C. A. Hutchison, The Hermit Monks of Grandmont (Kalamazoo, Mich., 1989); J. 
Becquet, Etudes grandmontaines (Ussel, 1998); G. Melville, ‘“In solitudine ac paupertate”. 
Stephans von Muret Evangelium vor Franz von Assisi’, in In proposito paupertatis. Studien 
zum Armutsverständnis bei den mittelalterlichen Bettelorden, ed. A. Kehnel and G. Melville 
(Vita regularis, xiii, Münster, 2001), pp. 7–30.
21 Liber de doctrina uel Liber sententiarum sev rationvm beati viri Stephani primi patris 
religionis Grandimontis, in Scriptores ordinis Grandimontensis, ed. J. Becquet (CCCM, viii, 
Turnhout, 1968), pp. 3–62, at p. 5.
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but only the branches; they were merely the work of man. Thus, the gospel 
alone showed the right way. Francis of Assisi spoke out in a very similar 
way when he was requested to adopt one of the conventional rules:22 ‘My 
brethren, God Himself called me to the path of humility and showed me 
the path of simplicity ... And so I do not want you to name any rule to me, 
neither that of Holy Benedict nor that of Holy Augustine or that of Holy 
Bernard, and in general no way or form of life apart from the one that God 
pitying me has shown and sent’.23 Norbert of Xanten’s followers are said to 
have asked him to renounce any adoption of an already existing rule since 
his conduct was entirely sufficient as a guideline of communal life for all:24 
‘The brothers who followed him believed that what they heard from his 
mouth would suffice for salvation’.25
In all these cases there was frank disregard for traditional norms in 
favour of constituting norms of one’s own. These appeared, in principle, 
as a fundamental, coherent power which, in Max Weber’s already quoted 
words, is indeed to be defined as a ‘completely new orientation of all 
attitudes towards all given ways of life and to the “world” generally’. 
Those charismatics wanted a form of the vita religiosa which represented 
a complete alternative to the existing monasteries under the Benedictine 
observance. One pivotal element of this different form was strict poverty. 
When, on his deathbed, Stephen of Muret’s disciples asked him what he 
would leave them, he said: ‘If you adhere to God steadfastly out of love of 
poverty [amando paupertatem] and do not stray from this path of truth, He 
Himself will give you in abundance in accordance with His providence, 
through which He rules all things’.26 This poverty was a frontal assault 
on the rich monasteries of his time, which collected tithes and had their 
22 Cf. La regola dei Frati Minori. Atti del XXXVII Convegno internazionale, Assisi, 8–10 
ottobre 2009 (Spoleto, 2010); A. Thompson, Francis of Assisi: a New Biography (Ithaca, N.Y., 
2012); P. Alberzoni, Santa povertà e beata semplicità: Francesco d’Assisi e la Chiesa romana 
(Milan, 2015); F. Accrocca, Francesco e la Santa Chiesa Romana (Assisi, 2015); J. Dalarun, 
François d’Assise en questions (Paris, 2016).
23 Compilatio Assisiensis, ed. in Menestò and S. Brufani, Fontes Franciscani, pp. 1471–1690, 
at p. 1498, cap. 18.
24 Cf. Norbert von Xanten. Adliger, Ordensstifter, Kirchenfürst, ed. K. Elm (Cologne, 1984); 
F. J. Felten, ‘Norbert von Xanten, die Gründung von Prémontré und die Entstehung des 
Prämonstratenserordens’, in Norbert von Xanten und der Orden der Prämonstratenser, ed. 
C. Dölken (Magdeburg, 2010), pp. 7–32; S. Weinfurter, ‘Norbert von Xanten und sein 
neuer Lebensentwurf. Gesellschaftsordnung und Wertewandel im frühen 12. Jahrhundert’, 
in Dölken, Norbert von Xanten, pp. 151–74.
25 Vita Norberti archiepiscopi Magdeburgensis, ed. R. Wilmans (MGH, SS, xii, Hanover, 
1856), p. 683.
26 Vita venerabilis viri Stephani Mvretensis a Stephano de Liciaco seu alio coaeuo redacta, in 
Becquet, Scriptores ordinis Grandimontensis, pp. 101–37, at pp. 123–4.
148
Individuals and Institutions in Medieval Scholasticism
services in matters of faith remunerated by extensive land grants and other 
donations, a practice which met with general acceptance in the institutional 
surroundings.27 On the part of such charismatics, these monasteries were 
now reproached for merely satisfying the ‘observances of the cloister’ 
(claustrales observantiae) with Pharisaic arrogance while neglecting the 
internalization of the true commandments of the Lord.28 By contrast, the 
hermit Stephen of Obazine29 emphasized that his disciples were ‘veterans of 
the celestial militia’ but uneducated in terms of monastic regulations.30 His 
Vita explained this in the following way: ‘And since one had not adopted 
any statute law of any order, the instructions of the master were valued 
in lieu of law – instructions that taught nothing but humility, obedience, 
poverty, discipline and, above all, enduring love. One did not bother about 
Pharisaic traditions’.31
Such an unregulated way of life indeed corresponded to Max Weber’s 
above-quoted definition of charisma’s effects as ‘a conversion of the 
fundamental direction of both desire and action’. It could, however, only 
be achieved by the ‘extraordinary virtue’ through which – to quote Weber 
further – the charismatic was believed to be endowed ‘with supernatural, 
superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities, 
inaccessible to others’.32 It is precisely on that note that the Vita of Stephen 
of Obazine reads: ‘His word is like a burning fire that inflames the souls 
of his hearers and inebriates them with so much love that … the nature of 
their life and their ways is changed. And his outer appearance as well as his 
bearing are a sermon, as it were, and exhibit nothing but an ordered way of 
life and discipline in customs and action’.33 Such characterizations have been 
handed down with reference to all charismatic leaders from any period. The 
effect of a charismatic is most essentially – albeit not exclusively – linked 
to the ‘performance’ of his personal body rather than the grandeur of a 
transpersonal office. This effect could – as Weber asserts34 – certainly even 
assume magical forms of symbolical immediacy. Of Norbert of Xanten, for 
27 G. Constable, Monastic Tithes from Their Origins to the Twelfth Century (Cambridge 
Studies in Medieval Life and Thought, n.s., x, Cambridge, 1964).
28 G. Morin, ‘Rainaud l’ermite et Ives de Chartres: un épisode de la crise du cénobitisme 
au XIe–XIIe siècle’, Revue Bénédictine, xl (1928), 99–115, at pp. 109–10.
29 G. Melville, ‘Stephan von Obazine: Begründung und Überwindung charismatischer 
Führung’, in Andenna, Breitenstein and Melville, Charisma, pp. 85–102.
30 Vie de saint Étienne d’Obazine, ed. and trans. M. Aubrin (Clermont-Ferrand, 1970), p. 
106.
31 Aubrin, Vie de saint Étienne, p. 70.
32 Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, p. 140.
33 Aubrin, Vie de saint Étienne, p. 58.
34 Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, p. 141.
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instance, it was said that when he was absent demons incessantly and cruelly 
tormented his disciples, yet as soon as he was present again, they vanished at 
once.35 Unconventional clothing which symbolically expressed the guiding 
principles of conduct could be of particular effect, too. Robert of Arbrissel 
was accused of damaging the reputation of the Church through his ragged 
appearance; Norbert of Xanten used his torn frock to style himself as John 
the Baptist. Both saw in their garments the message of the purity of the 
soul, of poverty and of contempt for the world.36
Attacks by the Church were bound to ensue and initially pushed each 
of those charismatics into the border zone of heresy, even though it was 
sometimes recognized that these leaders were inspired by God. Probably 
the most calculated accusation was made by the famous canonist Ivo of 
Chartres.37 He accused the charismatically led groups which had removed 
themselves into solitude of living ‘in concealed places according to their own 
law’ (in privatis locis, proprio iure) because they evaded all integration into 
the official Church and behaved like Sarabaites – those groups of monks in 
late antiquity who lived neither according to a rule nor in keeping with fixed 
conventions and who had already been condemned by the Benedictine rule. 
Here an extremely pejorative meaning was attributed to the term privatum. 
As it had, however, been formulated from exactly the point of view of the 
official Church, this in fact splendidly proves how strongly ‘individual 
freedom’ is linked to the privatum in the quotation from Gratian with 
which this chapter began. Therefore, in terms of how they positioned 
themselves relative to other groups, and how they perceived themselves and 
others perceived them, charismatically led groups truly seemed to stand in 
opposition to any form of institutionalism – as appears to be the case with 
people inspired by the holy spirit, who transcend worldly institutions.
Was this, however, actually the case? So far we have regarded only one part of 
the charismatic potential: the opposition to traditional authorities (as Weber 
described them) through the alternative modes of living accompanying the 
extraordinary virtue of the charismatic. In this one doubtlessly encountered 
that divergence. Yet if one looks around a little further, one indeed recognizes 
close points of contact with institutional forms – one can perhaps even discern 
an institutional structure in charisma itself. It depends on what one applies 
the term ‘institution’ to and how one defines it.
35 Wilmans, Vita Norberti, p. 685.
36 Melville, Medieval Monasticism, pp. 113, 116.
37 See G. Melville, ‘“In privatis locis proprio jure vivere”. Zu Diskursen des frühen 
12. Jahrhunderts um religiöse Eigenbestimmung oder institutionelle Einbindung’, in G. 
Melville, Frommer Eifer und methodischer Betrieb. Beiträge zum mittelalterlichen Mönchtum, 
ed. C. Andenna and M. Breitenstein (Cologne, 2014), pp. 33–48.
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The weakest point of charismatic figures is the fact they are mortal. In 
order to save their life’s work, namely, their guiding principles and values, 
they have to make them immortal. To this end, however, the charismatic 
figure needs an institutional form, for only institutional organizations 
never die (universitas non moritur [the group/corporation never dies]).38 The 
group around Stephen of Obazine took the most radical measures, as has 
been handed down with astonishing explicitness: ‘Yet since the days of man 
are short [Job XIV: 5] and human instruction has an effect only as long as 
the instructor lives and is present, they decided to adopt the creed of one of 
the orders that are authorized in the Church, so that even after the mentor’s 
end the authority of the written law would remain with them as a never-
ending one’.39 Ultimately, this course of action led to their admission to the 
Cistercian order while Stephen was still alive. However, the intention that 
written norms should outlast the transience of the body was of fundamental 
importance. Other charismatics pursued the same aspiration. With almost 
the same words, Norbert of Xanten answered his disciples when they 
suggested there was no need for written norms on account of Norbert’s 
exemplariness; and he introduced the rule of St Augustine to his group 
because it was the one which most corresponded to his concerns.40 Robert 
of Arbrissel authored statutes which were not only to be in force after his 
death but applicable straightaway whenever he was absent.41 For many years 
Francis worked on a rule which was predominantly based on quotations 
from holy scripture.42 Above all, he wrote his spiritual will and ‘testament’ 
in order to immortalize his message (although Pope Gregory IX abrogated 
it in his bull Quo elongati).43
Such written law inevitably articulated organizational institutional 
structures since an organization was needed, in turn, for the very purpose of 
guaranteeing the observance of the written law.44 Thus, a circular reference 
came into being which could rightly be understood as an institutionalization 
of the original charismatic guiding principles and values and which – in many 
cases with support from the official Church – led to the organizational form 
38 E. H. Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies: a Study in Mediaeval Political Theology 
(Princeton, N.J., 1981 [1957]), pp. 302–13.
39 Aubrin, Vie de saint Étienne, p. 96.
40 Wilmans, Vita Norberti, p. 683.
41 J. Dalarun, ‘Les plus anciens statuts de Fontevraud’, in Robert d’Arbrissel et la vie 
religieuse dans l’ouest de la France, ed. J. Dalarun (Turnhout, 2004), pp. 139–72.
42 L Pellegrini, ‘La tradizione manoscritta della Regula non bullata; la genesi di un testo e 
la sua vicenda nella storia dell’Ordine minoritico’, in La regola dei Frati minori, pp. 83–116.
43 H. Grundmann, ‘Die Bulle “Quo elongati” Papst Gregors IX’, Archivum Franciscanum 
historicum, liv (1961), 3–25.
44 On ‘institutions’ as distinct from ‘organizations’, see my conclusion below. 
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of a religious order. One must note, however, that there was a substantial 
difference on a sliding scale between one who transfers into another, pre-
existing organization (Stephan of Obazine), the adaptation of a traditional 
rule (Norbert of Xanten) and a textualization of norms by the charismatic 
leader himself (Robert of Arbrissel).
To analyse both ends of this spectrum, Weber offered the model of the 
‘routinization [Veralltäglichung] of charisma’.45 However, a reference to his 
threefold typology of authority (Herrschaft) – the legal, the traditional and 
the charismatic46 – will prove more fruitful here. As has been shown, religious 
movements under the individual leadership of a charismatic figure opposed 
the validity of ‘traditional authorities’. Ironically, then, with the translation 
of their guiding principles into written norms, they directly created a form 
of legal authority which, according to Weber, is characterized by its ‘resting 
on a belief in the legality of enacted rules and the right of those elevated to 
authority under such rules to issue commands’.47 The charismatic figure’s 
revolutionary power of liberation from traditionally oriented institutions 
led to a renewed institutionalization which now constituted the attempt 
at legal continuation of the charismatic power itself. Provided that such a 
system of legal authority was actually realized (that is, an order was formally 
founded), this power of the liberation of the individual could not, however, 
be transferred immediately to the followers. The latter now became 
institutionalized members of the order, subject to binding rules and laws. 
At best, they retained a right of co-determination regarding the writing 
of laws, something which had never been the case in traditional monastic 
communities.48
What, however, gave charismatic leaders the drive to want their work 
to continue beyond death? The answer to this question is of particular 
significance since it also contains the clarification of the afore-mentioned 
assumption that a particular institutional structure can be discerned in 
charisma itself. Let us remember the observation made at the beginning: 
although acting instinctu Sancti Spiritus signified the desire to obtain 
autonomy from the rules of earthly institutions, this did not imply pure 
arbitrariness but signified following the will of God. All charismatic leaders 
and their followers were convinced they were acting on behalf of God and 
45 Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, pp. 142–8.
46 Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, p. 124.
47 Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, p. 124.
48 G. Melville, ‘The abbot of Cluny at the turning point from the charismatic traditional 
to legal authority: an analysis referring to Max Weber’s model’, in Abbots and Abbesses as a 
Human Resource in the Ninth- to Twelfth-Century West, ed. S. Vanderputten (Vita regularis, 
lxxiv, Berlin, 2018), pp. 151–64.
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in accordance to his providence. Here, the sociological meaning of the 
term ‘charisma’ coincides with the pneumatic one of the apostle Paul to 
the greatest possible extent.49 Stephen of Obazine’s Vita described the point 
when he was still seeking ecclesiastical instruction, but then decided to live 
as an autonomous hermit, thus: ‘The almighty God did not want him to 
be subjected to the guidance [magisterium] of anyone, so that might be 
fulfilled which He had intended for this holy man’.50 Robert of Abrissel 
once delivered a sermon before Pope Urban II; and the Pope believed that 
‘the Holy Spirit had personally opened Robert’s mouth’.51 Francis of Assisi 
had two decisive visions of Christ which showed him the way.52 When he 
was writing the last version of his rule, he turned away all who wanted any 
changes and justified this by stating that the text did not originate from him 
but from Jesus himself: ‘Christ told me this, Christ told me this!’ (Christus 
mihi dixit, Christus mihi dixit!). In these examples the blessing of God was 
bestowed directly and linked with clear mandates. Thus, Francis was able 
to trust in bibliomancy when he blindly opened the gospel in order to find 
behavioural norms for himself and his first companions. Later he was able 
to emphasize in his will and testament that the Most High had instructed 
him to live according to the form of the gospel; that the Lord had shown 
him he had to commence a life in atonement; and that he had led him 
among the lepers in order to practise compassion.
Those charismatic leaders, who perceived themselves as acting on 
behalf of God, possessed the legitimization of their work through this 
transcendent reference. They were incarnations, living symbols of divine 
norms, which they exemplified perfectly and which they tried to enforce: 
atonement, solitude, poverty, homelessness, love of one’s neighbour, 
compassion. The significance of these norms was, however, that they 
constituted truths of life which were claimed to be of timeless, eternal 
validity and neither to need tradition nor be subject to change by traditions 
– according to the word of Christ, who did not say: ‘I am the custom’, 
49 For a comparison see K.-S. Rehberg, ‘Rationalisierungsschicksal und Charisma-
Sehnsucht. Anmerkungen zur “Außeralltäglichkeit” im Rahmen der institutionellen 
Analyse’, in Andenna, Breitenstein and Melville, Charisma, pp. 3–23; K. Tanner, ‘Die 
Macht des Unverfügbaren. Charisma als Gnadengabe in der Thematisierung von 
Institutionalisierungsprozessen im Christentum’, in  Andenna, Breitenstein and Melville, 
Charisma, pp. 25–44.
50 Aubrin, Vie de saint Étienne, p. 48.
51 Baudri de Bourgueil, Historia magistri Roberti, in Les deux Vies de Robert d’Arbrissel, 
fondateur de Fontevraud. Légendes, écrits et témoignages – The Two Lives of Robert of Arbrissel, 
Founder of Fontevraud: Legends, Writings, and Testimonies, ed. J. Dalarun (Disciplina 
monastica, iv, Turnhout, 2006), pp. 130–87, at p. 156.
52 For the following, see Melville, “‘Homo spiritum habens”’.
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but ‘I am the truth’ (John XIV: 6). Thus, for instance, when defending 
his community against accusations of possessing no rule and no order 
because a habit alone did not justify identifying them as monks, Stephen 
of Muret used the following significant logic, which went even further: 
was there no rule and no order here when he required everyone to live in 
poverty, seclusion from the world, mutual love and so forth – that is to say 
– when he maintained the unalterable, basic values which marked out the 
religious life?53 Clearly, he wished to remain within the realm of these core 
values. Fundamentally, the term ordo generally signified every religious 
form of life practised communally and exclusively under the norms of 
‘divine precepts’ (diuina praecepta) and the ‘gospel of Christ’ (euangelium 
Christi). In sum, it was ultimately only those who stood ‘outside all order 
or rule’ (extra omnem ordinem uel regulam) who deviated from diuina 
praecepta. In Stephen’s view, rule and order were manifested primarily by 
the spirit and not by the letter of the law.
***
Institutions are, in the first place, symbolic systems, regardless of whether 
they shape organizations around themselves or only substantiate themselves 
in social practices.54 All institutional forms ensure perpetuation and 
reiteration – an achievement which, however, can only be unalterably secured 
if contextual circumstances can be transcended and produce unchangeable 
frameworks: that is, if the institutions symbolize deep values and guiding 
principles through which they create and derive meaning. This criterion also 
gels effectively with the idea of the Church as an institution, as exemplified 
by the above-mentioned image of the bride of Christ as a symbol of divine 
transcendence. That image may itself stand for the virtually inexhaustible 
set of liturgical rites, daily rituals and sacramental signs and consecration 
which themselves render the normally unattainable divine symbolically 
– and in the eucharist even truly – present. These symbolizations were 
tied to abstract models of behaviour, ‘correct’ sequences of action, offices 
and formal norms which were applicable to every believer.55 They were 
53 For this, see Becquet, Liber de doctrina uel Liber sententiarum, pp. 3–62, at pp. 60–2.
54 G. Melville, ‘L’institutionnalité médiévale dans sa pluridimensionnalité’, in Les 
tendances actuelles de l’histoire du Moyen Âge en France et en Allemagne, ed. J.-C. Schmitt and 
O. G. Oexle (Paris, 2002), pp. 243–64; K.-S. Rehberg, Symbolische Ordnungen. Beiträge zu 
einer soziologischen Theorie der Institutionen, ed. H. Vorländer (Baden-Baden, 2014).
55 For monastic institutions, cf. J. Sonntag, Klosterleben im Spiegel des Zeichenhaften. 
Symbolisches Denken und Handeln hochmittelalterlicher Mönche zwischen Dauer und Wandel, 
Regel und Gewohnheit (Vita regularis, xxxv, Berlin, 2008).
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transpersonal, that is, not restricted to the individuality of a person, and 
were thus persistent and durable.56
Medieval Christian charismatic figures drew on this wider symbolic 
grammar, notwithstanding their individuality. With it their entirely 
individual conduct could render the continuous, ubiquitous validity of this 
transcendent order-system present, visible and tangible here in this world, 
embedding it in earthly realities in a meaningful way. Since, as individuals, 
they were symbolic embodiments of divine order, they had an eminently 
institutional function – without requiring an organization or an office in 
that regard at all. When a person, as an individual, becomes an institution, 
that person has to carry and guarantee its continuity just as organizations 
do. With persistent commitment to a guiding principle and a certain 
methodical approach this can be achieved for a lifetime, as we have seen in 
the charismatic figures discussed above. Yet only ever for one lifetime! 
This is the case unless one immortalizes – and thereby universalizes – the 
values of the special, unique and limited life of a given charismatic figure. 
As shown above, this could be done through institutionalizing a person’s 
exemplary life in the form of a community under a ‘legal authority’ (in 
Weber’s terms). At this point, what had been a charismatically effective 
force gradually disappeared into honoured memory, receding behind 
transpersonally valid norms which became the institution’s moving force. 
This is precisely what happened with Robert of Molesme57 as the initiator 
of the Cistercian order, or Dominic58 as the founder of the Order of 
Preachers. Yet such an immortalization can also take place by means of a 
continued existence of the charismatic in a cult of remembrance, granting 
the dead leader a perceptible and mental presence. For this it also required 
more ‘evangelists’ who wrote vitae;59 iconographic programmes; funerary 
monuments (such as the Basilica San Francesco in Assisi); and redactors of 
rules who aimed to present retrospectively the dead charismatic figure, such 
as occurred with Stephen of Muret and others. In this way the individuality 
of the charismatic became the immortal model or exemplar, the symbolic 
point of reference for all subsequent generations searching for the ‘truth’ of 
56 Cf. Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies, pp. 373–83.
57 T. Merton, ‘Saint Robert of Molesme, 1028 to 1111’, Cistercian Stud. Quart., xlvi (2011), 
273–6.
58 A. Wesjohann, ‘Flüchtigkeit und Bewahrung des Charisma, oder: War der heilige 
Dominikus etwa auch ein Charismatiker?’, in Andenna, Breitenstein and Melville, 
Charisma, pp. 227–60.
59 See the important contribution by S. C. Jaeger, ‘The saint’s life as a charismatic form: 
Bernard of Clairvaux and Francis of Assisi’, in Bedos-Rezak and Rust, Faces of Charisma, pp. 
181–204.
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life. That dead individuality became precisely – in order to penetrate the 
heart of the matter – the institutionalized form, figure, model and rule of 
life (forma, figura, exemplum and regula vitae) which imparted identity to 
the religious order.60
It is most remarkable how the individual impact of a charismatic leader, 
necessarily opposed to the institutional structures of established authorities 
to begin with, was then also able to turn into an institutional form which 
could provide a legitimate counterweight to these authorities.61 It must be 
mentioned that this occurred without neutralizing the individuality of the 
protagonist in the process. On the contrary: religious orders continued to 
direct believers to their founding figure to the highest degree, even if later 
generations incessantly quarrelled about precisely how this individuality 
should be seen as a model.
60 K. Elm, ‘Die Entwicklung des Franziskanerordens zwischen dem ersten und letzten 
Zeugnis des Jakob von Vitry’, in K. Elm, Vitasfratrum. Beiträge zur Geschichte der Eremiten- 
und Mendikantenorden des zwölften und dreizehnten Jahrhunderts, ed. D. Berg (Werl, 1994), 
pp. 173–93, at p. 192.
61 For the exemplary case of Francis of Assisi, see Melville, ‘“Homo spiritum habens”’.
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Francis of Assisi had no intention of creating a new institution. His 
conversion to a life of destitution was, first and foremost, a personal 
experience. The so-called Legend of the Three Companions, which provides 
the fullest treatment of his gradual severing of social ties, was apparently 
written by someone who possessed detailed information about his youth in 
Assisi and his early spiritual practices.1 It recalls that, after spending some 
time caring for the lepers, he was drawn to San Damiano to pray. There the 
crucifix told him: ‘Francis, can’t you see that my home is falling apart? Go 
and mend it!’ He understood the message as a literal command to repair the 
derelict building.2 The only prophetic meaning he gave at the time to these 
works of restoration was that the premises would one day be devoted to a 
nunnery.3 Two years later, when he started to live as a wandering penitent, 
soon joined by a few companions, he still conceived of his mission as being 
in support of the Church, not actually as a part of it. The famous statement 
found in the Testament (‘After the Lord gave me brothers, no one showed 
me what I should do, but the Most High revealed to me that I ought to live 
according to the form of the Holy Gospel’) is not an abstract reflection.4 
It strictly corresponds to the scene when Francis, together with his first 
* My thanks to John Sabapathy for his help with this article.
1 Jacques Dalarun believed the author was Rufinus, cousin of Clare of Assisi, which 
makes considerable sense. For references and the respective roles of the companions, see S. 
Piron, ‘Note sur Léon et Rufin, l’écriture et le corps’, Archivum Franciscanum historicum, cxi 
(2018), 365–75.
2 Legenda trium sociorum, in Francis of Assisi: Early Documents, ed. R. J. Armstrong et al. 
(4 vols, New York and London/Manila, 1999–2004), ii. 66–110, at p. 76 (§ 13).
3 Legenda trium sociorum, p. 83, § 2 4.
4 Francis of Assisi, Testament (Early Documents, i. 124–7, at p. 125, § 14).
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companions Bernard and Peter, entered the church of San Nicolò in Piazza, 
opened a liturgical gospel book three times and repeatedly came across the 
evangelical counsels which would define their way of life: ‘If thou wilt be 
perfect, go and sell that thou hast, and give to the poor’; ‘Take nothing 
for your journey, neither staves, nor pack, neither bread, neither money; 
neither have two coats apiece’; and ‘If any man will come after me, let him 
deny himself ’.5 Those verses constitute the nucleus of a series of counsels 
which served as guiding principles to the penitents and were later expanded 
in different early versions of the rule. This reading through biblical sortilege 
(sortes biblicae) defined not only the contents but also the most distinctive 
character of the Franciscan experience, as rooted in unmediated obedience 
to the word of God.
Such bypassing of the ecclesiastical hierarchy in order to establish a 
direct connection to Christ continued throughout Francis’s life, turning 
at times into a genuine face-to-face dialogue, yet it went together with an 
intense respect for and submission to the Church. This might be a reason 
for giving preference to the earlier version of the San Nicolò episode, in 
which the three young men asked a priest to open the book for them and 
to translate the passages.6 The first half of the Testament (§§ 4–13) forcefully 
reiterates what is apparent in many other early documents: a veneration 
for churches and the priests who minister the holy body of Christ, as well 
as for the ‘theologians’ who proclaim his holy word. The argument put 
forward by Francis does not imply respect for the ecclesiastical institution 
as such. Instead, it arises from an existential perception of how the divine 
is concentrated into a limited number of instances of the sacred. Nothing 
of the Lord is visible on earth apart from his presence in scripture and the 
eucharist.7 The Church and her ministers have to be revered as the only 
vessel through which God is made present and manifest to all. The all-
encompassing notion which best describes this attitude towards the clergy 
is that of a claim to absolute inferiority (minoritas). The same notion also 
5 Matthew XIX: 21; Luke IX: 3; Matthew XVI: 24; Legenda trium sociorum, pp. 85–6, 
§§ 28–9. Since they found it on the altar, the book was not a whole Bible but a liturgical 
codex. Neither was it a full lectionary, since they were specifically looking for ‘the word of 
the Gospel’. 
6 De inceptione ordinis (Early Documents, ii. 34–59, at p. 38, § 11a). The usual designation 
of this text as ‘The Anonymous of Perugia’ is irrelevant since we know this narrative was 
written by Brother John, companion of Giles of Assisi.
7 This notion first appears in the Epistola ad clericos (Early Documents, i. 52), probably 
written in 1220. The devotion to the eucharist is also expressed in the first of the Admonitions 
(Early Documents, i. 128–37, at pp. 128–9). Even if these texts were produced in the wake of 
the Fourth Lateran Council, which defined the dogma of the transubstantiation of the bread 
and wine, it cannot be doubted that these words represent an early concern for Francis.
159
An institution made of individuals
implies a radical detachment from all sorts of social manners and duties; and 
an indifference to the frequent mockeries and humiliations the first friars 
had to endure owing to what was popularly perceived as their outrageous 
nakedness.8 This submission would later even be extended to all animals as 
part of a universal compassion towards all creatures.9 The Testament sums it 
up in the tersest way: ‘we were illiterate and subject to all’ (eramus idiotae et 
subditi omnibus). Even as the number of his followers rapidly grew, Francis 
still conceived of their mission not as taking part in the institution but as 
dwelling within it as ‘pilgrims and foreigners’.10 Although nobody would 
have been in a position to express it clearly at the time, a tremendous 
amount of tension was lodged in this unheard-of situation. Achieving a life 
based on a strict and literal adherence to the gospel amounted to an implicit 
challenge to all other forms of Christian life, a theme which became explicit 
decades later with the notion of ‘evangelical perfection’. 
The sheer success with which Francis and his first companions met as they 
toured central Italy made it impossible for them to remain for much longer 
on the margins of the Church.11 In the process through which an informal 
band of penitents evolved into a full-blown institution, the support of the 
papacy was obviously crucial. The various reports of the first encounter with 
Innocent III in 1209 are replete with too many interpolations to be taken 
at face value.12 The only sure facts may be summarized as follows: besides a 
general approval of his ‘way of living’ (propositum vitae), Francis was granted 
permission to preach penance; and only he would be entitled to allow some 
of his companions to act in a similar fashion. The acquaintance he made on 
that occasion, and during further stays in Rome, of a number of important 
people at the curia proved as important as the initial approbation. This trip 
was soon followed by an unexpected, yet inevitable, outcome which had 
the potential to undermine the whole project of minoritas. Starting with 
Sylvester, who had supported Francis at an early date, a few priests were 
admitted into the group as soon as 1210. In a world in which the distinction 
between lay and clerical status was a fundamental social divide, the presence 
of clerics among them meant the brotherhood of penitents had now to be 
8 Armstrong et al., De inceptione, pp. 42–5, §§  19–23, based on Giles’s memories. See 
the Chronica by Jordan of Giano about the initial missions to Hungary and Germany, J. 
Schlageter, ‘Die Chronica des Bruders Jordan von Giano: Einführung und kritische Edition 
nach den bisher bekannten Handschriften’, Archivum Franciscanum historicum, civ (2011), 
3–63, at p. 35, §§ 5–6.
9 A Salutation of the Virtues (Early Documents, i. 164–5, at p. 165, §§ 16–17).
10 1 Peter II: 11, quoted in the Regula bullata (Early Documents, i. 99–106, at p. 103, § 6).
11 F. Delmas-Goyon, Saint François d’Assise. Le frère de toute créature (Paris, 2008), pp. 
124–36.
12 R. Manselli, François d’Assise, trans. H. Louette and J. Mignon (Paris, 2001), pp. 237–48.
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treated as part of the ecclesiastical institution. This meant Francis had to be 
ordained a deacon so that a lay person would not be placed over a cleric. 
As the number of friars grew, his personal hold over his movement 
gradually loosened. By 1217 it was described as the ‘religion of friar minors’, 
not quite yet an ‘order’, but a formal way of life characterized by some 
distinctive habits and practices. The institution was now divided into twelve 
provinces, placed under the responsibility of ministers who had the capacity 
to test and themselves admit new friars. The delegation of authority was 
even more dramatic when Francis travelled to Egypt (1219–20), leaving two 
vicars in charge. Hearing they had introduced a stricter rule concerning days 
of fasting, upon his return Francis headed first to Rome to obtain support 
from the papacy and then had Cardinal Hugolino of Segni appointed as a 
permanent cardinal protector. Nevertheless, Francis’s attempt at regaining 
control over the evolution of his creation was doomed to failure. What 
the papacy now conceived of as an ordo, in which a year-long noviciate 
was made compulsory for newcomers, had to be regulated by a specific 
rule. Responding to Cardinal Hugolino and the ‘learned friars’ in some 
dramatic speeches recorded by Brother Leo, Francis at first refused to accept 
any type of monastic rule, being content only to follow the gospel.13 The 
document drawn up in 1221 (the Regula non bullata) was still designed as 
an anthology of evangelical counsels and rejected as such by Pope Honorius 
III. The shorter version eventually approved in 1223 (the Regula bullata) 
more closely resembled a standard, normative, monastic text, but the 
personal voice of Francis was still strongly present, warning and urging the 
friars in the first person. Yet, by that date he had long since resigned as head 
of the order. Although the hagiographical documents insist his abdication 
was due to his poor health, the chronology rather suggests that Francis gave 
up his position as a response to the pressure exerted upon him to normalize 
his ‘religion’. Many episodes narrated by Brother Leo bear witness to his 
discontent with an institution which did not match his initial inspiration. 
As Francis dictated his Testament to Leo in spring 1226, he spoke in the 
same voice he had used in the rule in the name of his charismatic authority. 
When Hugolino as Pope Gregory IX eventually decreed in Quo elongati 
(1230) that this declaration was not binding, the process of normalization 
had apparently been achieved. However, many seeds of discord had been 
sown which would bear fruit at different moments. Besides the Testament 
and Leo’s record of Francis’s intentions, the rule itself provided the friars 
with an important restriction on standard monastic obedience. It requested 
them ‘to obey their ministers in everything they have promised the Lord to 
13 Compilatio Assisiensis (Early Documents, ii. 118–230, at pp. 132–3, § 18).
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observe and which is not against their soul or our rule’.14 The possibility of 
such a reservation implied that individual friars could oppose their personal 
compliance with the rule to the orders of their superiors.
***
Angelo Clareno died in utmost solitude in June 1337, in a small hermitage in 
western Lucania. The collection of miracles performed at his grave offers the 
image of a local saint attracting pilgrims within a radius of less than thirty 
miles, mostly from the valley of Val d’Agri.15 This record stands at odds with 
the vast network of correspondents with whom he had been in touch for 
decades and his much wider expectations of historical change. In a letter he 
sent in his final years to the Neapolitan noble on whose land he was hiding, 
Angelo complained he had suffered many tribulations for almost sixty years 
while hoping to witness the reformation of Christ’s life which had been 
initiated by Francis.16 Since he had joined the order sometime around 1274 
in the Italian Marches, Angelo and his companions had indeed often been 
badly treated by their superiors, spending a fair amount of time in prison, 
on the sole account of their desire ‘to adhere to the conscience and teaching 
of the founder’.17 
The strife had started at the time of the second Council of Lyons (1274), 
as a rumour spread through the region that the pope might force the friars 
minor to accept ownership of possessions. In what appears to have been 
a public dispute held during a provincial chapter, the zealous (zelanti) 
asserted that it did not fall within the power of the pope or the general 
council to modify a rule which was evangelical by definition.18 The debate 
over various practices which those friars rejected as unfit was merely an 
extension of this core issue. Essentially, the fight was not about the intensity 
of poverty practised in the region, but rather touched upon a matter of 
principle concerning the nature of the Franciscan rule, arguing about 
14 Regula bullata (Early Documents, i. 99–106, at p. 105, § 10).
15 F. Accrocca, Un ribelle tranquillo. Angelo Clareno e gli Spirituali francescani tra Due e 
Trecento (Assisi, 2009), pp. 133–9. Identification of places in A. Sancricca, I ‘fratres’ di Angelo 
Clareno (Macerata, 2015), pp. 67–70.
16 A. Clareno, Epistole, ed. L. von Auw, in Angeli Clareni opera (Rome, 1980), i. 204; G. L. 
Potestà, Angelo Clareno. Dai poveri eremiti ai fraticelli (Rome, 1990); D. Burr, The Spiritual 
Franciscans: From Protest to Persecution in the Century After Saint Francis (University Park, 
Pa., 2000), pp. 279–301.
17 A. Clareno, A Chronicle or History of the Seven Tribulations of the Order of the Brothers 
Minor, trans. D. Burr and E. R. Daniel (St Bonaventure, N.Y., 2005), p. 150; also Clareno, 
Epistole, pp. 241–4.
18 Clareno, Chronicle, pp. 148–9. 
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whether its ultimate authority stemmed from divine inspiration or its papal 
approbation. The two views were ultimately irreconcilable. This explains 
the fury of those opposed to the zelanti, who had the small group jailed 
without a trial, not even spelling out the nature of their actual misdeed 
(probably in 1278). The details of their imprisonment are not perfectly clear. 
In one letter Clareno mentions a transfer of the prisoners to Rome, where 
they were exposed in public during holy week and then brought back to 
Ancona. They must have managed to escape, since the same letter adds that 
they were seized again in southern Sicily two years later (maybe around 
Easter 1281), exhibited as criminals in every city from Gela to Messina and 
then expelled to the shores of Calabria.19 
At any rate, by 1290 they were back in prison in Ancona when the general 
minister Raymond Geoffroy ordered their release and had them sent to the 
king of Armenia, Hethum II, who himself took the Franciscan habit soon 
afterwards. There, they fell into trouble again with friars from Syria and 
Cyprus. In 1294, upon their return to Italy, Celestine V allowed them to 
form a separate order as ‘Poor Hermits’, changing their name in order to 
let them fulfil their vocation.20 Boniface VIII swiftly cancelled that decision 
when he took power, prompting the group to set sail anew towards the east. 
In his long quest to obtain the reformation of the ‘Poor Hermits’ during 
the following decades, Angelo was again submitted to a certain amount of 
rough treatment until John XXII freed him from obedience to his superiors 
by transferring him to the branch of the Benedictine order founded by 
Celestine himself. As Angelo settled, not with the Celestines but at the 
Benedictine monastery of Subiaco, he retained the observance of Francis’s 
commands and probably never took off his habit. Although he had by then 
given up all hope of re-establishing the ‘Poor Hermits’ as an institution, 
the major works he composed at Subiaco in the 1320s were a Chronicle 
of the Franciscan order and a commentary on its rule (Expositio Regulae), 
quite telling signs that he was not in the least alienated from the Franciscan 
project. 
Written at the request of a friar named Tommaso, the Expositio displays 
a very neat sense of a hierarchy of norms. As the opening sentence shows, 
the main purpose of this work is not to elucidate the text alone, but rather 
to explain ‘the pure, simple and ultimate intention of the seraphic man 
Francis in the rule that was divinely inspired to him by Christ’.21 Thus, 
19 Clareno, Epistole, p. 80. The letter continues with a reference to a journey overseas to 
Cyprus and Romania which took place in the following decade.
20 Clareno, Epistole, p. 244; Potestà, Angelo Clareno, pp. 126–7.
21 Early Commentaries on the Rule of Friars Minors, iii: Angelo Clareno, ed. and trans. D. 
Burr (St Bonaventure, N.Y., 2014), p. 1.
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throughout the commentary the rule has to be understood in the light 
of other documents in which Francis explained the nature of his project, 
namely, ‘[i]n his Testament, Admonitions, Letters, and other words, and 
especially in the replies which that holy man, Brother Leo, writes that 
he [Francis] gave to his companions when, toward the end, they asked 
him about such matters’.22 The reference to Leo is crucial here. Clareno 
builds on various extracts from the collection currently known as the 
‘Assisi Compilation’ in order to explain in what frame of mind and in the 
midst of what tensions the rule was written: ‘In order to understand it … 
it is extremely helpful to know accurately the story of its beginnings and 
the circumstances surrounding its creation’.23 The prologue and the first 
chapter of the Expositio include a summary of Francis’s life, while other 
parts explain the wording of the rule in the light of Francis’s reluctance to 
write it and of his prophetical warnings of the dangers awaiting the friars 
in the future.
Throughout his work Clareno makes numerous references to the Regula 
non bullata, presented as the document approved by Innocent III. Despite 
their differences, both rules are seen as complementing each other since 
all evangelical quotations present in the longer text are considered as 
implicitly referred to in the officially published version.24 The concordance 
of all Franciscan documents demonstrates that the founder’s first and final 
intention was simply to follow the Gospel. Therefore, professing the rule 
amounts to following a ‘law of grace, truth and charity’ which immediately 
connects the individual friar to Christ. The sense of belonging to a community 
comes second: common life, compliance to the uniformity of habit and 
practices and strict obedience to the superiors are requested as ways to foster 
the evangelical virtues. Nonetheless, Clareno also emphasizes the necessity 
of disobedience in certain situations in which the strict observance of 
Christ’s life would otherwise be in danger. In the rule Francis had promised 
obedience to Honorius and all his ‘canonically elected’ successors, having in 
mind the many anti-popes of the twelfth century. In turn, this very phrase 
fuelled the prophetic expectation that one day a usurper would be falsely 
elected whom the true professors of evangelical perfection would have to 
resist.25 In Clareno’s eyes this moment had not yet come. Despite his sharp 
criticism of John XXII and the corrupt Church hierarchy, he consistently 
maintained the duty of obedience to a legitimate papacy as a crucial part 
of the vow. Distancing himself from the centre of power by ‘fleeing to the 
22 Burr, Angelo Clareno, p. 1.
23 Burr, Angelo Clareno, p. 9.
24 Burr, Angelo Clareno, p. 28.
25 Burr, Angelo Clareno, p. 39.
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mountains’ (in the evangelical phrase he used) was the surest way to avoid 
having his submissiveness put to the test.26 
An original feature of Clareno’s approach lies in his abundant use of 
patristic references and especially of numerous Greek Fathers, many of 
whom he translated specifically for these works. Among them Basil of 
Caesarea and his rule hold a central place. Clareno sometimes translates him 
speaking in a typically Franciscan vocabulary, describing his community 
as a ‘fraternity’ devoted to the fulfilment of evangelical perfection and 
renouncing any landed property.27 Besides his two stays in the east, during 
which he certainly made contact with Greek speaking monks, Angelo had 
a good motive to rely so heavily on the Cappadocian Father. This move was 
justified by one of Francis’s stronger statements, in which he vociferously 
refused to follow any monastic rule, naming those of Benedict, Augustine 
and Bernard. Having the first two in mind, Clareno lists the ways in which 
the Franciscan rule ‘differs from the two rules that hold primacy in the 
Roman church, and how arduous it is compared to them’.28 By contrast, 
the Greeks provided an undisputed authority, located much closer to the 
source of the evangelical tradition than any Latin Father. Clareno’s precise 
historical awareness shows, for example, in the way he refers to Jerome 
as a disciple of Gregory of Nazianzus.29 Since Jerome not only translated 
the Bible into Latin, but also transmitted to the west many testimonies of 
eastern asceticism, this detail somehow manages to subordinate one whole 
tradition to the other. The result of the operation is remarkable. Hosted in 
the very premises in Lazio where Benedict of Nursia had his first eremitic 
experiences before founding the monastery of Monte Cassino, for which 
he composed his famous rule, Clareno bypasses the father of western 
monasticism in order to present the Franciscan project as a true renewal 
of the evangelical life. Yet, such a conjunction was not totally unheard of, 
since the sacred cave (sacro speco) of Subiaco also preserves the oldest known 
representation of Francis, drawn during his lifetime.
However, the most pervasive source of inspiration for the Expositio is 
certainly Peter John Olivi. His name shows up only three times in the final 
pages, accompanied by some extraordinary praise.30 However, as Gian Luca 
26 Burr, Spiritual Franciscans, pp. 293–5. The allusion is to Matthew XXIV: 16. 
27 Burr, Angelo Clareno, p. 15.
28 Burr, Angelo Clareno, p. 16.
29 Burr, Angelo Clareno, p. 151.
30 He is ‘that man of great sanctity and virtue as well as outstanding wisdom’ (Burr, Angelo 
Clareno, p. 169), ‘the holy man of God’ (p. 224), ‘this man who, above all others in his time, 
was a lover and extoller of his order … a man Christ loved and singularly illumined with his 
wisdom’ (p. 231).
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Potestà noted, Olivi’s own commentary on the rule is the real backbone 
of Clareno’s work.31 Their relationship is even stronger than historians 
have supposed. In his letter to Roberto of Mileto (quoted above), Angelo 
started by remembering that, ‘about forty years ago, taught by Christ, [he] 
recognized that the Father of mercy and light had decided to place the spirit 
of the founder in the man of God, Peter’, whom he then decided to follow 
and obey as the herald of Francis’s foundation.32 Following Livier Oliger, 
Potestà understands this reference as recording the decision to accept Olivi’s 
advice, given in September 1295 in a letter to Conrad of Offida, to admit 
the legitimacy of Celestine’s resignation and Boniface’s election. However, 
the wording of Clareno’s remembrance is so strong that it rather seems to 
imply a continuous commitment to Olivi as a spiritual model. To be valid, 
such an interpretation would require some degree of personal acquaintance.
Although the hypothesis has never been tested, there are grounds for 
thinking that such an encounter did actually take place and on the exact 
date indicated in the letter. One important clue has surfaced recently. In his 
treatise on the mass (De missa) (before 1298), Olivi quotes an extract from 
‘Climacus’ which he could only have come across in Clareno’s translation 
of the Ladder of Paradise (Scala paradisi).33 This implies that the translation 
was produced not in Greece after 1295, as is usually thought, but during 
the stay in Cilicia before 1294. A confirmation that some contact was made 
between the Languedoc friar and the exiled Marchegiani comes from a letter 
in which Angelo recalls the chicanery of Jerome of Catalonia, later bishop 
of Caffa, who approached his group in Greece, around 1300, claiming he 
was carrying some books Olivi was sending them.34 Without providing 
a full reconstruction here, it is only possible to stress the plausibility of 
some otherwise undocumented events. Between Celestine’s election in July 
and his resignation in December 1294, either during his stay at L’Aquila or 
while he was taken to Naples by King Charles II, Olivi could have taken a 
trip from Narbonne to meet the new pope and the Italian Spirituals who 
were still present at the court. This is when a personal meeting could have 
occurred, one which produced a deep impression on the Italian friar.
31 Potestà, Angelo Clareno, p. 155.
32 ‘Christo docente, cognovi, iam fere sunt anni XL elapsi quod Pater misericordiarum 
et luminum decreverat in homine Dei P. ponere spiritum fundatoris, ideo subesse, sequi 
et conformare me ei tanquam nunctio signato primi lapidis angularis Francisci, integre et 
cordialiter amo’ (Clareno, Epistole, p. 203).
33 S. Piron, ‘La bibliothèque portative des fraticelles, 1. Le manuscrit de Pesaro’, Oliviana, 
v (2016), at §§ 21–7 <http://journals.openedition.org/oliviana/804> [accessed 7 July 2019].
34 ‘portans secum libros … nobis missos a sancte memorie Petro Iohanne’ (Clareno, 
Epistole, p. 248).
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This timing may fit in well with the dates Clareno recalls in his ‘testament’. 
Scholars tend to agree the letter should be dated to sometime soon after 
the summer of 1334, when he arrived alone in Lucania after having had 
to leave Subiaco in haste in order to escape the inquisitor sent to catch 
him.35 A period of ‘almost sixty years’ of tribulations points precisely to 
the controversies which started in the Marches soon after the end of the 
second Council of Lyons in 1274, while ‘almost forty years’ would match 
perfectly a meeting with Olivi at the court of Celestine. Establishing 
such a personal connection has more than merely anecdotal value. On 
the contrary, it helps to understand the importance of the individual 
relationships which constitute the core of a ‘Franciscan’ life outside the 
regular institution. There is some debate as to whether Angelo conceived of 
himself as a ‘general minister’ of the Fraticelli who admitted his leadership.36 
The extant documentation rather suggests he only exerted his authority by 
acting as a spiritual master towards a number of individuals or small groups 
of friars by way of epistolary contacts or personal guidance. Some among 
his disciples, such as the Augustinian friar Simone Fidati da Cascia, would 
behave in turn as spiritual masters along slightly different lines.37 After the 
condemnation of the Languedoc Spirituals in 1317 and his own exit into the 
Benedictines, Angelo’s re-enactment of the Franciscan project had faded to 
the point of becoming a personal network of devotees committed to the 
imitation of Francis’s way of life and the expectation of its imminent return. 
His continuing references to the Franciscan rule and the order suggest he 
perceived these loose groups as embodying the true institution, ready to 
fulfil its historical mission in the apocalyptic future – hence his highly 
selective approach and account of the reception of new friars, illustrated 
with many examples from Greek monasticism. This issue was crucial, ‘for 
faulty and indiscrete reception into this religion will be one of the ways in 
which the demons attack it’.38 When reflecting on an ideal order – which 
he kept on calling by its early name of ‘religion’ – what Angelo had in 
mind was a charismatic institution, consisting of just a handful of heroic 
individuals, connected by their sense of continuing a historical mission 
started by Francis.
***
35 Potestà, Angelo Clareno, pp. 279–95.
36 Potestà, Angelo Clareno, pp. 283–6.
37 X. Biron-Ouellet, ‘Simone Fidati da Cascia’s spiritual direction in fourteenth-century 
Italy’, in Agostino, Agostiniani e Agostinismi ne Trecento italiano, ed. J. Bartuschat, E. Brilli 
and D. Carron (Ravenna, 2018), pp. 67–86.
38 Burr, Angelo Clareno, p. 45.
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Peter John Olivi was certainly a charismatic figure. At the very least, the 
amount of hatred and hostility concentrated on him during his lifetime 
and after his death bears testimony to the passions he was able to arouse. 
His grave in Narbonne was the site of a pilgrimage for two decades until 
it was destroyed by order of the pope in 1318, when four of his supporters 
were burnt at the stake in Marseilles. Although the doctrinal trial against 
his commentary on the Apocalypse (Lectura super Apocalypsim) had not yet 
reached a conclusion, he was treated post mortem as a heretic and his ashes 
were scattered in the Rhône in Avignon at night.39 During this period of 
twenty years some celebrated him as a saint and miracles took place at his 
tomb, of which we know next to nothing save for a few echoes which survive 
in inquisitorial depositions. The only hagiographical document to cast some 
light on his person is actually the section of the Chronicle which Angelo 
Clareno devotes to him.40 It should be noted that, besides Francis, only 
John of Parma receives similarly extensive treatment. Apparently, Clareno 
obtained information from witnesses who had first-hand knowledge and 
fused it with a number of legends he could gather while himself attending 
the celebration of Olivi’s feast in Narbonne in March 1313.
Charisma is a very general notion. It may be useful to try to discern the 
aspects under which it applies to this remarkable friar. Had his sainthood 
been recognized by the papacy, he would have been classified as a saintly 
scholar, alongside Thomas Aquinas, who was indeed canonized in the very 
years of Olivi’s condemnation. The quantity and depth of his writings made 
a strong impression among his followers, in his lifetime and for generations 
after his death. References to his writings (scriptura) abound in inquisitorial 
documents from lay people who could only access them on the occasion 
of collective readings of vernacular translations, performed in small circles 
in which members of the Franciscan third order usually described as 
‘beguins’ would gather weekly.41 Clareno records different episodes which 
illustrate his considerable scholastic ability to produce arguments and 
counter-arguments. Judging by the number and complexity of the disputed 
questions he held before obtaining any university degree, his versatility 
and subtlety must have distinguished him very early on. This professorial 
charisma may have extended to his actions as a preacher, but this side of 
his activity is less well documented since only a handful of sermons have 
been preserved, all belonging to the scholarly genre of the inaugural lecture 
39 S. Piron, ‘Censures et condamnation de Pierre de Jean Olivi: enquête dans les marges 
du Vatican’, Mélanges de l’École française de Rome. Moyen Age, cxviii (2006), 313–73, at p. 353.
40 Clareno, Chronicle, pp. 129–44.
41 L. A. Burnham, So Great a Light, So Great a Smoke: the Beguin Heretics of Languedoc 
(Conjunctions of Religion and Power in the Medieval Past, Ithaca, N.Y., 2007). 
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(principia). Besides this facet of his life as a public teacher, a few clues show 
that Olivi also acted towards some persons as more of a private instructor. 
Ubertino da Casale describes him acting as a spiritual master in the period 
they both spent in Florence at Santa Croce (1287–89).42 Even more secretly, 
Olivi admitted on his deathbed to having received some knowledge through 
divine inspiration. The record of his last moments which circulated among 
his followers extends this inspiration as the source of ‘all his learning’, which 
is obviously an exaggeration. The content of this revelation, which is said 
to have happened in Paris and therefore at the beginning of his teaching 
career, is beyond the scope of critical enquiry, although one may surmise 
it had to do with the historical meaning of Francis’s revival of evangelical 
perfection.43 Nevertheless, the very fact of such a revelation has to be taken 
into account and helps to make sense of the astonishing self-assurance Olivi 
demonstrated throughout his own tribulations. As for the personal qualities 
of the ‘holy man’ presented in Clareno’s account of his life and in the few 
personal letters he sent to his friends, qualities such as humility, compassion 
and patience, one has to decide for oneself. However, since the coherence 
between teaching and action is one of his major ethical claims, there may be 
reason not to dismiss totally such testimonies or declarations.
What makes Olivi such an interesting character owes even more to the 
historical circumstances into which he was thrown. He entered the order in 
Béziers in 1260 at the age of twelve, just as hundreds of friars were gathering 
at a general chapter at the nearby city of Narbonne and most probably 
under the effect of their example. The only record of his initial education in 
lower Languedoc shows him sharing the memories of the early generations 
of friars minor. As a novice he was taught by the elderly Raymond Barrau, 
who had become a friar sometime around 1233, having previously spent 
at least two decades as a canon in Carcassonne cathedral, being in that 
quality a personal acquaintance of St Dominic and a witness of the arrival 
of the first Franciscans in the region.44 Besides this connection to the heroic 
period of the founding fathers, Olivi also enjoys the peculiarity of being one 
of the first major intellectuals exclusively taught within the order, whereas 
42 A. Montefusco, ‘Autoritratto del dissidente da giovane. Gli anni della formazione di 
Ubertino nel primo Prologo dell’Arbor vitae’, in Ubertino da Casale: atti del XLI Convegno 
internazionale: Assisi, 18–20 ottobre 2013 (Spoleto, 2014), pp. 27–82.
43 According to Pierre Tort’s deposition, this happened while Olivi washed his hands, 
preparing himself to celebrate a mass in Paris (Burr, Spiritual Franciscans, p. 226). This 
implies he must have been at least 25 and probably not much more since his presence in 
Paris is recorded only up to 1273, when he was precisely that age.
44 É. Griffe, ‘Un chanoine de Carcassonne, ami de Saint Dominique’, Bulletin de littérature 
ecclésiastique, lxxviii (1977), 54–7.
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theologians from earlier generations, up to Bonaventure or John Peckham, 
all joined when they were already university students.
His intellectual achievement was, therefore, entirely shaped by his 
Franciscan identity. To a lesser degree, a similar claim could be made 
concerning Bonaventure, whom Olivi presents as the greatest master he 
encountered during his studies in Paris (c.1266–73) and the only one worth 
mentioning. It is, therefore, telling to observe the core issues on which they 
differ.45 One key idea for Bonaventure is the participation of all creatures 
in the divine nature, humans having, in addition, the privilege of a ‘special 
resemblance’ by way of the three powers of the soul which bear a similarity 
to the Trinity. In this theology God is forcefully present within the world. 
In a sharp contrast, Olivi insists on the abyssal divide which separates God’s 
inconceivable perfection from the limits and imperfection of all creatures. 
The crucial factor for this reversal of perspective comes from the stress he 
places on the freedom of the will, both human and divine, which radically 
sets apart all intellectual and spiritual beings. This move may be perceived as 
a result of the ongoing philosophical disputes of the 1270s and, in particular, 
of his confrontation with the Parisian ‘Averroists’ in an effort to counter 
a perception of the world as consisting of emanations flowing from the 
first principle.46 However, under another angle, this metaphysical approach 
can also be understood as being part and parcel of his reflection on the 
Franciscan vocation.
David Burr is the first scholar to have reached a global view of Olivi, both 
as a sophisticated thinker active in many different fields and as an intriguing 
personality. When discussing his contribution to the debate on poverty, Burr 
correctly emphasized that the main issue at stake was not so much the degree 
of asceticism as the definition of the Franciscan vow.47 In the summer of 1279 
Olivi wrote an impressive series of ‘Questions on evangelical perfection’ 
(QPE), while a commission of prelates, including many Franciscans, 
were working on a new explanation of the rule, which Pope Nicholas III 
published on 14 August as Exiit qui seminat. The questions on obedience, 
which focused mainly on obedience to papal power, were certainly written 
while the commission was at work. Olivi, like other friars, seems to have 
been extremely worried about the outcome. The very title of this series also 
indicates a sense of continuity with similar works produced a decade or two 
45 S. Piron, ‘Olivi and Bonaventure: paradoxes of faithfulness’, Franciscan Stud., lxxiv 
(2016), 1–14.
46 S. Piron, ‘Olivi et les averroïstes’, Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie, liii 
(2006), 251–309.
47 D. Burr, Olivi and Franciscan Poverty: the Origins of the Usus Pauper Controversy 
(Philadelphia, Pa., 1989).
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earlier by Bonaventure and Peckham on ‘evangelical perfection’. In many 
respects the Languedoc friar was correct in thinking he was following in 
his elders’ footsteps. The major development Olivi introduces lies in his 
shifting of the debate from the rule to developing instead a theology of the 
vow. A brief but fundamental question (QPE 5) enquires whether it is better 
to achieve a good action through a vow or a one-time decision (simplex 
propositum).48 The former is certainly preferable. Whereas the goodness of 
an act is limited both in time and scope, a vow implies that all the freedom 
and power to accomplish such acts are offered to God. Since this power 
potentially contains an infinity of acts, its dedication is, therefore, infinitely 
superior to the achievement of a single action. One crucial argument is set 
out along the way. Since this freedom is constitutive of human nature, once 
assumed it can never be abdicated: ‘This grant that is made to God by a vow 
does not remove the property [proprietas] we have, in that we are naturally 
the proprietors [domini] of our acts and of everything that depends on our 
faculty of free will’.49 Thus, a perpetual vow cannot be pronounced once 
and for all. Instead, it has to be repeated at every instant and is correctly 
defined as a ‘continual vow’ (votum continuatum). The retention of freedom 
in the very act of self-abnegation is the most original philosophical feature 
in Olivi’s approach. It should be stressed that such a definition constitutes 
a complete reversal of the Benedictine rule, in which the monk is requested 
to give up his free will in total submission to his abbot.
There are good reasons for describing Olivi as the most radical thinker on 
the freedom of the will in the western philosophical tradition. The intensity 
of his involvement on that issue would not be comprehensible were it not 
for the central purpose to which he wished to apply it. First, total freedom 
is a necessary condition for engaging oneself in the pursuit of evangelical 
perfection, since here no vow could tolerate even the slightest form of 
constraint. The evangelical vow then opens up a whole field of action in 
which freedom is constantly required. This is particularly true of achieving 
the highest poverty. Renouncing all rights over any material goods (abnegatio 
juris) implies that all legal relationships are voluntary, a notion which in turn 
became central to Olivi’s acute economics.50 Evangelical poverty implies a 
48 The ‘Questions on evangelical perfection’ are edited in A. Emmen, ‘La dottrina 
dell’Olivi sul valore religioso dei voti’, Studi Francescani, lxiii (1966), 88–108.
49 ‘donatio facta Deo per votum non aufert proprietatem illam quam habemus per hoc 
quod naturaliter sumus domini actuum nostrorum et omnium eorum quae subiacent 
facultati liberi arbitrii.’ It continues, ‘Donatio etiam ipsa, qua datum fuit a principio quod 
erat iuris proprii, in eo cui votum placet, semper manet et semper replicatur’ (Emmen, La 
dottrina dell’Olivi’, p. 104). The translation is mine.
50 P. J. Olivi, A Treatise on Contracts, ed. S. Piron and trans. R. Thornton (St Bonaventure, 
N.Y., 2016); original Latin text and French translation in P. J. Olivi, Traité de contrats, ed. 
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constant will not to possess or attach oneself to any thing. The crucial test is 
not to claim any goods in court, even if they were unjustly seized by a third 
party. However, the severing of all legal bonds (abdicatio omnis iuris) is not 
sufficient in itself to define a positive relationship to the material world. 
Such poverty would be ‘formless and confused, unstable, elusive and empty 
or vain and sterile’ without a moral limitation described as ‘poor use’.51 Usus 
pauper is the Olivian concept which provoked the sharpest discussion. As 
David Burr demonstrated, the core of the matter was not the harshness 
of the practices it involved. On the contrary, the notion was meant to 
encompass as valid different levels of ascetic achievement according to the 
capacities of each individual. Usus pauper was conceived as a virtue in an 
Aristotelian way, admitting variations within a certain breadth (latitudo). 
The conflictual issue was its inclusion in a vow which Olivi conceived of as 
‘indeterminate’. Precisely because it consists in the exercise of freedom, the 
vow cannot be reduced to the observance of a series of fixed precepts. The 
proper behaviour may have to be adjusted according to the circumstances. 
His opponents objected by pointing to the dangers of obliging oneself to 
duties whose contents are not known in advance at the risk of falling into 
mortal sin unknowingly. Olivi’s answer was simply that one should put 
one’s trust in the gospel. He who professes to follow the life of Christ shall 
always find the proper measure of all actions in his conscience. It would be 
hard to be closer to what Francis meant when he said he did not care about 
a rule. Equally, and in turn, the Franciscan order as an institution was not 
ready to accept such a high degree of risk and indeterminacy.
The keystone of evangelical perfection was, therefore, located within the 
conscience of the individual. In expressing such views, Olivi was drawing 
the ultimate consequences of a strict identification of the Franciscan rule 
with the gospel.52 All his discussion constantly refers to ‘evangelical vows’, 
taken immediately to Christ. In the face of such a commitment, the duty of 
all religious and ecclesiastical superiors is to support its fulfilment and never 
to impede it. Ultimately, the evangelical vow implies a potential limitation 
of the power of the pope. This was the most problematic corollary of Olivi’s 
indeterminate conception of the Franciscan vow. According to Olivi, the 
sovereign pontiff does not have the authority to modify the contents of 
the vow, since that would amount to ruling against the gospel. A pope 
and trans. S. Piron (Paris, 2012). 
51 P. J. Olivi, Quaestio de usu paupere. The Quaestio and the Tractatus, ed. D. Burr (Florence 
and Perth, 1992), p. 35: ‘Unde sicut materia sine forma est informis et confusa, instabilis, 
fluxibilis et vacua seu vana et infructuosa, sic abdicatio omnis iuris sine paupere usu se 
habet’. The translation is mine.
52 R. Lambertini, ‘Idem quod evangelium Christi: interpretazioni dell’identità tra regola 
francescana e Vangelo da Olivi a Clareno’, Cristianesimo nella storia, xxxvi (2015) 299–327.
172
Individuals and Institutions in Medieval Scholasticism
who would attempt to diminish the Franciscan rule would fall into heresy 
by doing so.53 What Olivi discussed as a working hypothesis in 1279 had 
gained much more reality by the time of John XXII’s election to the papacy. 
The ‘Spiritual’ friars from Languedoc resisted their superiors on the basis 
of the same texts and then repeated their opposition to the Franciscan 
inquisitor Michael Monachus (Monge). The general sermon he delivered 
in Marseilles in May 1318, returning four rebels to the secular arm, contains 
the sharpest expression of the conflicting visions of the two sides: ‘This 
rule is not identical to the Gospel, but some sort of laudable way of life 
approved and confirmed by the Roman pontiffs and simply and absolutely 
subjected to their declarations, modification and decisions’.54 As a response 
to the Spirituals’ evangelical understanding of the rule, the normalization 
of the Franciscan order as simply one part of the Roman Church had never 
been expressed so strongly.
Often, what matters more is not what one does, but the reasons for which 
one does it. For Olivi and his followers the stress put on the freedom of the 
will was not a simple scholastic device, but a vital choice which characterized 
their conception of the Franciscan project and for which they were ready 
to sacrifice their lives. In their perception, the fabric of the ‘institution’ 
consisted in a set of free individuals bound together and united by the goal 
they were pursuing in common. This does not mean they had no sense of 
the institution as such, nor that they despised the need to maintain some 
degree of uniformity within it so as to preserve its unity. On the contrary, 
the Spirituals also attributed a powerful meaning to the Franciscan order as 
an institution which was achieving a specific historical function. Moreover, 
Olivi developed a remarkable and unusual reflection on what constitutes 
an ‘institution’. These are the final pieces we need to put together briefly in 
order to obtain a full vision of the puzzle.
***
53 P. J. Olivi, Quaestiones de Romano pontifice, ed. M. Bartoli (Grottaferrata, 2002).
54 ‘Regule vero predicte et quorumcunque religiosorum omnis tenor et vigor sic a romane 
sedis potestate manat ut nulla sit eius auctoritas que ab indulgencia seu confirmacione 
sedis apostolice non decurrat. Non faceret igitur romanus pontifex contra evangelium et 
fidem Christi, etiamsi statueret contra, mutaret vel tolleret ipsam regulam. Nec est ipsa 
regula idem quod evangelium, sed est quedam vite laudabilis forma a romanis pontificibus 
approbata et confirmata, ipsorum declarationi, mutationi et omnimode dispositioni 
simpliciter et absolute subiecta’ (M. Monachus, ‘Inquisitoris sententia contra combustos in 
Massilia’, Oliviana, ii (2006), § 8 <http://journals.openedition.org/oliviana/36> [accessed 7 
July 2019]).
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As an opening to his discussion of the sacraments Olivi raises an unexpected 
question: what sort of reality is posited by civil right or political power (Quid 
ponat ius)?55 This intriguing text is often referred to, but its implications are 
rarely explained in full. A significant part of its importance is what it reveals 
about both the power – and therefore the risk – which Olivi associated with 
the reification of spiritual impetus within regularized forms which then took 
priority over the impulses. It takes as its starting point an expression used by 
Bonaventure while discussing Peter Lombard’s definition of the sacrament 
as ‘the sign of something sacred’ (sacrae rei signum). If the sacrament belongs 
to the category of signs, it cannot be of the type which signifies according 
to its nature (as a scream naturally connotes pain or fear). Owing to the 
fact that it has been instituted by God in order to convey some specific 
meaning, the sacrament has to be qualified as a ‘voluntary sign’.56 Accepting 
this term, Olivi opens a much wider discussion, bringing together other 
types of ‘voluntary signs’, such as rights, power and language. The question 
he raises is concerned with the metaphysical qualification of such signs 
and of the obligations they create. Do they posit any reality which adds to 
the subjects in which they are grounded? It would not be inappropriate to 
translate the question in modern terms as: what does an institution consist 
of? 
Olivi’s answer is not immediately eloquent. Those signs do produce some 
real effects, as an impressive series of examples makes clear, but they do 
not add any new essence to their subjects. They only consist in being the 
object of the divine will. To grasp fully the meaning of such a phrase, it is 
necessary to recall a central feature of Olivi’s metaphysics. Breaking with 
all forms of ‘participation’ of the creatures in the Creator, he also rejects 
the notion that the first cause would be operating in each operation of the 
secondary causes, to paraphrase Aquinas.57 For Olivi the transcendence of 
divine will is such that it can only translate into immediately creative acts. 
Therefore, God does not act within or through his creatures. Instead, he 
provides them with autonomous agency while preserving them in existence 
at every instant (since he could as well annihilate them instantly). 
The reflection on ‘voluntary signs’ takes on a clearer meaning in such a 
perspective. Humans are not solely defined by their free will. Their rational 
nature also requires them to demonstrate towards each other the virtues of 
justice, concord and friendship and to exert their domination over irrational 
55 P. J. Olivi, ‘Quid ponat ius vel dominium’, ed. F. Delorme and S. Piron, Oliviana, v 
(2016) <https://journals.openedition.org/oliviana/882> [accessed 7 July 2019].
56 Bonaventure, Commentaria in quattuor libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi, in 
Opera omnia (10 vols, Ad Claras Aquas, 1882–1902), iv. 14.
57 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I, q. 105, a. 5. 
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beings.58 Such requirements imply they possess some normative capacity 
through which they may organize their communication and coexistence by 
setting out political, juridical and linguistic rules. In order to make such 
rules binding, God wants them to stand as if they were taking his place. 
Those institutions can, therefore, be said to be the object of God’s will, while 
being strictly human institutions. Unusual in its formulation, the question 
draws the consequences of the full autonomy granted to secondary causes 
into the realm of human sociability. The same metaphysical principles also 
underlie Olivi’s approach to economics, in which he stresses likewise the 
voluntary nature of contractual relationships. 
Olivi’s brief Quid ponat ius? does not discuss the metaphysical consistency 
of the Franciscan order or of the Roman Church as a whole, yet the way 
in which he refers to those institutions in his commentary on Revelation 
or his questions on evangelical perfection leaves no doubt they should be 
understood along the same lines. It is worth also observing the polysemy 
of the notion of ordo in Revelation. The word does not only refer to some 
ranks within the Church, as in Pseudo-Dionysius’s vocabulary (priestly, 
pontifical order; ordo sacerdotalis, pontificalis, etc.), or to forms of Christian 
life appropriate to the different stages of history, as in Joachim (order of 
martyrs, doctors (ordo martyrum doctorum), etc.). Instead, when discussing 
the latest stages of history, it applies to specific modern institutions. Among 
them, the evangelical order (ordo evangelicus), which is meant to play a 
major role in the confrontation with the soon-to-come Antichrist, clearly 
stands for the order of friars minor.59
The reference to Francis as possessing a distinctive historical signification 
was common in the central decades of the thirteenth century, including his 
depiction as an other Christ (alter Christus), or as the angel of the seventh seal. 
Such typological identifications would point to him as a person, or might 
sometimes extend to the group of his companions. Even so, it is striking 
that the tendency to attribute a strong historical meaning to the Franciscan 
institution itself would develop especially among a minority group; and 
that this use would grow stronger the more they were marginalized and 
‘de-institutionalized’. 
In order to understand the rise of the ‘order’ as a historical agent, we must 
again turn to Brother Leo. For years Leo had been Francis’s closest associate, 
acting as his confessor and secretary, writing under his dictation many of the 
Latin texts which are currently known as Francis’s writings. Understandably, 
58 ‘Natura rationalis … est etiam debitrix virtutis iustitie et unanimis ac fidelis concordie 
et amicitie ad omnes personas rationales’ (Olivi, ‘Quid ponat ius’, § 30).
59 P. J. Olivi, Lectura super Apocalipsim, ed. W. Lewis (St Bonaventure, N.Y., 2015).
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this relationship continued after Francis’s death, in the form of visions and 
apparitions in which the saint would sometimes explain the meaning of 
his earlier prophetical announcements.60 When Leo first wrote his account, 
twenty years after Francis’s death, he made few references to such visions. 
However, Leo lived on much longer and added more testimonies in which 
he (and the saint’s speech to him) grew increasingly bitter towards what the 
institution was becoming, especially in the collection known as Verba sancti 
Francisci, and stronger still in what Leo told Conrad of Offida in the late 
1260s.61
In those texts, one prophecy attributed to Francis deserves particular 
attention. It claims that the order will never cease but will be reduced to a 
very few friars during the sharpest tribulations; they will resist the Antichrist 
and regenerate the Church in the new Age of the Spirit after his downfall. 
In a way which is not without examples in modern political movements, 
the minority asserts a claim to represent the whole, claiming to be its most 
legitimate incarnation. In his lifetime Olivi could still feel that the number 
of true practitioners of the rule within the order was sufficient to defend 
it as a whole. When the confrontation really started the leaders claimed to 
represent the ‘community’ of the order while the ‘Spirituals’ asserted their 
identity as ‘true’ friars minor.62 Although he had been often rejected and even 
expelled, Clareno still imagined himself and his band as representing the 
true order. At an even later date, in the mid fourteenth century, the prophet, 
visionary and alchemist John of Rupescissa kept on defending a vision of 
the order as non-dependent on the institution. After all, he admitted the 
pope could change or suppress the order in the eventuality that no one was 
following the rule any longer.63 As a prophet, he knew this would never be 
the case and that the order could live on, reduced to one person only. This 
is a striking – logical – conclusion to the trajectory described here across 
several generations of Franciscans. It was already implicit in Celestine’s 
permission to Angelo and his group to practise their Franciscan vocation 
outside the Franciscans and within the ‘Poor Hermits’. All were wrestling 
with the problem set by Francis, namely how to reconcile or even articulate 
60 E.g., Thomas de Celano, The Remembrance of the Desire of a Soul, bk ii, ch. 23 (Early 
Documents, ii. 239–393, at pp. 281–3), also reflected in Actus beati Francisci et sociorum ejus, 
ed. P. Sabatier (Collection d’études et documents, iv, Paris, 1902), p. 38.
61 Verba fratris Conradi. Extrait du Ms. 1/25 de S. Isidore, ed. P. Sabatier, in Opuscules de 
critique historique (Paris, 1903), pp. 370–92.
62 M. Cusato, ‘Whence “the community”?’, Franciscan Stud., lx (2002), 39–92; S. Piron, 
‘Le mouvement clandestin des dissidents franciscains au milieu du XIVe siècle’, Oliviana, iii 
(2009) <http://journals.openedition.org/oliviana/337> [accessed 7 July 2019].
63 S. Piron, ‘L’ecclésiologie franciscaine de Jean de Roquetaillade. À propos d’une édition 
récente’, Franciscan Stud., lxv (2007), 281–94, at p. 292.
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the inbuilt tensions of a spiritual impulse which was never supposed to be 
an institution, let alone a formal religious order. Within it, as Olivi and 
some others argued, the vow took precedence over any set of rules, most 
fundamentally because such an evangelical vow was always larger and more 
all-encompassing than any particular set of institutionalized prescriptions, 
Franciscan or otherwise.
***
As a conclusion to the third book he devoted to Olivi, David Burr brilliantly 
summarized his understanding of him: ‘[H]e could be the patron saint of 
those who refuse to put their trust in institutions’.64 This is a comment 
which has served me as a compass while trying to navigate the immensity 
of Olivi’s works. A coda may now be added: Olivi’s distrust is even more 
understandable, since he knew all too well the power of institutions.
64 D. Burr, Olivi’s Peaceable Kingdom: a Reading of the Apocalypse Commentary 
(Philadelphia, Pa., 1993), p. 263.
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7. Rolando of Cremona and the earliest inquisition 
depositions of Languedoc∗
Peter Biller
In this chapter we speculate about the possible contribution of a scholastic 
theologian, Rolando of Cremona, to a procedure and a document which 
came to be at the heart of inquisition into heresy: an interrogation 
recorded in a deposition. The inclusion of inquisition in a collection of 
essays discussing scholastic institutions might raise some eyebrows, for its 
‘institutional’ character was one of the targets in the late twentieth-century 
dismantling of the medieval version of ‘The Inquisition’. We begin, then, 
with brief comment on this question. The ‘scholastic’ implications will 
emerge in due course. 
An institution?
Because most of it was so obvious, the demolition job was easy. All that 
was needed was a crowbar. First, there was a new historiographical classic 
in Edward Peters’s general history of inquisition. Its later chapters were on 
early modern inquisition and the modern black legend of inquisition – riffed 
on in Monty Python’s sketch ‘Nobody expects the Spanish Inquisition!’1 
These were salutary reminders of the humble and decentralized character of 
the medieval precedent. Second, a historian of medieval law, Henry Kelly, 
provided another salutary reminder that inquisition was just one example 
among various inquisitions, enquiries into various things, conducted 
by variously denominated enquêteurs and inquisitors. Inquisition and 
inquisitors needed to be brought down to size and set among the others.2 
* My largest debt is to Lucy Sackville, for sharing ideas and materials about two 
Dominicans of Cremona, Rolando and Moneta and for comment on this chapter. Editorial 
suggestions for improvement have been of unusual care, penetration and helpfulness.
1 E. Peters, Inquisition (Berkeley, Calif., 1988). The Python sketch can be found at 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HqF_nPbX_Ow>.
2 H. A. Kelly, ‘Inquisition and the prosecution of heresy: misconceptions and abuses’, 
Studies in Church History, lviii (1989), 439–51. 
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Finally, Richard Kieckhefer produced a comprehensive criticism of the 
assumption, present in most work on medieval inquisition, that it and its 
officials constituted an ‘institution’. Rather, we needed to set these aside and 
think instead of a task, job or office carried out by an individual equipped 
with one-off authorization. Medieval inquisition did not tick the boxes of a 
list of institutional attributes derived from Max Weber.3 
This ‘institutional turn’ made the older, insouciant language intellectually 
incorrect. There were semantic and typographical consequences. Medieval 
historians of ‘The Inquisition’ and the ‘Office of the Inquisition’ lowered 
the initial capital letters of the key nouns and dropped the definite article. 
There came to be preference among some scholars for the word ‘inquest’ and 
the plural ‘inquisitions’ over plain ‘inquisition’. The multiplicity of types of 
inquisition gave the historian a duty to remind the reader of specificity, 
inquisition ‘into heresy’. 
This was not a total victory. Even Kieckhefer did not claim it. He conceded 
that inquisition must have become an institution by the later middle ages, 
for how, otherwise, could we have arrived at the early modern upper-case 
Inquisition? Some of the troops were disgruntled and murmured, especially 
those belonging to two special units. One of these units comprises the 
scholars who burrow patiently in the archives in their reconstruction of 
local inquisitions in the middle ages. Their documents show them a local 
inquisition equipped with a special building (‘house of inquisition’), 
financial organization, a household of servants and officials, local continuity 
and symbolic representation in a seal. This is how things appear in a new 
general study of inquisition in Italy, which argues that it was clearly an 
‘institution’ by around 1250.4 Another unit comprises those who study 
the manuscripts of inquisitors’ how-to-do-it manuals, compendia of law 
relating to inquisition and procedural formulae: Vasil Bivolarov, Riccardo 
Parmeggiani and Lucy J. Sackville.5 In his 327-page study with editions 
3 R. Kieckhefer, ‘The office of inquisition and medieval heresy: the transition from 
personal to institutional jurisdiction’, Jour. Eccles. Hist., xlvi (1995), 36–61. For more recent 
discussions of inquisitions, see L’enquête au moyen âge, ed. C. Gauvard (Rome, 2008); and 
J. Sabapathy, ‘Some difficulties in forming persecuting societies before Lateran IV Canon 
8: Robert of Courson thinks about communities and inquisitions’, in The Fourth Lateran 
Council: Institutional Reform and Spiritual Renewal, ed. G. Melville and J. Helmrath 
(Affalterbach, 2017), pp. 175–200. 
4 J. Moore, Inquisition and its Organisation in Italy, 1260–1350 (Heresy and Inquisition in 
the Middle Ages, viii, Woodbridge, 2019). 
5 V. Bivolarov, Inquisitoren-Handbücher. Papsturkunden und juristische Gutachten aus dem 
13. Jahrhundert mit Edition des Concilium von Guido Fulcodii (MGH, Studien und Texte, lvi, 
Wiesbaden, 2014); R. Parmeggiani, ‘Introduzione’, in R. Parmeggiani, I consilia procedurali 
per l’inquisizione medievale (1235–1330) (Bologna, 2011), pp. ix–xxxv; and Explicatio super 
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Bivolarov consigned the topic of ‘institution?’ to a footnote startling in its 
brevity and disdain. Its thirty words provide: an approving quotation from 
a great historian of an older generation, Yves Dossat, on the foundation of 
‘The Inquisition’ as immediately ‘a special permanent tribunal’; the citation 
of Kelly’s and Kieckhefer’s articles; and their condemnation as ‘utter rubbish’ 
(völlig irrig).6 Weber is not mentioned.
We can imagine that this verdict arises from Bivolarov’s prolonged 
exposure to several things: first, the interchanges and conversations between 
the inquisitors and inquisition of France and Italy; second, the extraordinary 
growth in the thirteenth century of specialized law and procedures for 
inquisition into heresy; and, especially, third, the new genre of inquisitors’ 
professional literature. In this context it would be useful to hear a systematic 
exposition of the case contra demolition. 
The emergence of the inquisition deposition
There is one document which was at the centre of inquisition into heresy. 
Though it was preceded and succeeded in the process by various forms 
– summonses; lists of set questions; abjurations; and executive summaries 
of items of guilt called culpae and sentences – the deposition was the key 
document in the proceedings. Its form was new. Very quickly in the 1240s 
we find specification of many of its elements in the legislation of Church 
councils and the procedural formulae of inquisitors’ manuals, themselves 
shared between different regions – a story of dissemination which continues 
throughout the middle ages. There were shifts in emphasis and varying 
degrees of elaboration and ponderousness. However, its fundamental form 
is still recognizable centuries later, for example, in inquisitions in Szczecin 
between 1392 and 1394 or Piedmont in the 1480s, by which date no one 
doubts ‘The Inquisition’.7 The character and history of this unique artefact 
of the inquisition might well play a role in the discussion of inquisition as 
institution; here our concern is with its genesis. 
Let us go back in time and look at one deposition which originated in 
Languedoc late in 1237.8 The text is in Latin. After specifying the date, 5 
officio inquisitionis. Origini e sviluppi della manualistica inquisitoriale tra due e trecento, 
ed. R. Parmeggiani (Rome, 2012), pp. vii–lxvi; L. J. Sackville, ‘The inquisitor’s manual at 
work’, Viator, xliv (2013), 201–16; and ‘The earliest inquisitor’s manual: the Ordo processus 
Narbonensis’ (forthcoming). 
6 Bivolarov, Inquisitoren-Handbücher, p. 259, n. 17. 
7 P. Biller, ‘Inquisitors’ interrogations of Waldensians’, in A Companion to the Medieval 
Waldenses, ed. M. Benedetti and E. Cameron (Brill Companions to the Christian Tradition, 
Leiden, forthcoming), provides a general survey for one sect from the early 13th century to 1500.
8 Paris, BNF, MS. Collection Doat 24, fos. 108v–116v.
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October 1237, it names a deponent, Bartac, alias William Matfred, knight 
of Puylaurens, and records his taking the oath to tell the truth. Replies to 
questions follow. The first is his initial sighting of a heretic: who the heretic 
was; where he saw him; who else was there; and how many years ago this 
was. All Bartac’s later responses also have these follow-up questions: who, 
where, who else and when. A neat pattern is discernible. The follow-up 
questions to the first heretic to be seen, Bernard Engelbert, are related to 
the first time (six years before), then the second time (five years before), 
the third time (three years before) and the fourth time (two years and a 
bit). The pattern is repeated with the second heretic to be seen, Raymond 
of Carlipa, with his sightings in chronological order, each with follow-up 
questions. At the end the text of the deposition states that Bartac appeared 
in front of the friars Ferrier and Peter of Alès; these inquisitors had been 
deputed to work in the dioceses of Carcassonne, Narbonne and Albi.9 The 
five men who witnessed the proceedings are then listed and then the scribe: 
‘And Bertrandus de Farico who wrote this (Et Bertrandus de Farico, qui hæc 
scripsit)’.10 Bartac appeared again two days later. He added (addidit) to his 
previous confession. There is again, within the framework of the document, 
the same pattern of sightings and dealings with heretics. The deposition 
again concludes with the statement of Bartac’s appearance before the two 
friars, the listing of witnesses (now seven of them) and the same scribe’s 
declaration that he had written these things. 
The only questions Bartac was asked – insofar as his answers imply them 
– concerned actions. These were things such as seeing heretics; speaking 
with them; escorting them; adoring them; and seeing them administer their 
ritual consolamentum; and in what contexts: where; who else was there; who 
else did the same things; and when? Questions included listening to what 
heretics said, but not its substance, nor what Bartac believed. In later and 
virtually identikit depositions (1245–6) there are a few modifications to this. 
One was a concluding question about belief in the heretics or their errors, 
or whether they were good men. Another was a super-rapid, summary 
question on a quintet of errors: God not making visible things; the host 
9 Y. Dossat, Les crises de l’inquisition toulousaine au xiiie siècle (1233–1273) (Bordeaux, 
1959), p. 140, n. 241. 
10 It has not proved possible to identify Bertrand’s place of origin. He witnessed three 
depositions for the Carcassonne inquisition in 1250 (Documents pour servir à l’histoire 
de l’inquisition dans le Languedoc, ed. C. Douais (Paris, 1900), pp. 254, 270, 275). When 
witnessing a charter for the abbey of La Grasse in 1268, he was given as ‘Bertrandi de Faricon. 
monachi Caunensis’, that is, monk of the Benedictine abbey of Caunes in the Minervois 
(Recueil des chartes de l’abbaye de La Grasse, ed. E. Magnou-Nortier, A.-M. Magnou and C. 
Pailhès (2 vols, Paris, 1996–2000), ii. 372). Here and elsewhere the English translations are 
the author’s.
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not being the body of Christ; baptism and marriage not helping salvation; 
there being no resurrection of the flesh.11 One minor formal change was the 
switch from third to first person in the scribe’s or notary’s conclusion, which 
became ‘and I Bertrandus who wrote this’ (et Bertrandus qui hæc scripsi). 
Bartac’s deposition already has the fingerprints of the full models 
prescribed in the legislation and inquisitors’ manuals of the 1240s (e.g., 
the formula interrogatorii), but it comes from the previous decade. What 
can we see bearing upon its emergence? The reconstructions of the 1230s 
in general histories of inquisition and the evidence of the bulls with which 
Gregory IX mandated early Dominican inquisitors in Languedoc make 
the decade seem very familiar to us – we know it rather well, we think.12 
However, they are a smoke-screen, for there is not much with which to 
work. We need a quick reminder of the little we do have, beginning with its 
chronological boundaries. At one end there is evidence relating to 1229–30, 
when the provisions of a provincial Church council and description in a 
chronicle provide a view of procedure and the records these years may have 
produced in Toulouse. The papal legate Romano, Cardinal of Sant’ Angelo, 
held a council in Toulouse in November 1229.13 In the existing system for 
the repression of heresy, a bishop visited a parish and took sworn evidence 
from a few trustworthy laymen. The council’s first provision tweaked this, 
stipulating the addition of a priest to the oath-taking laymen in each parish 
and turning them from passive-reactive into active: they were to hunt 
out heretics and report them to ecclesiastical or secular authorities. In a 
chronicle written forty-five years later we have a description of what the 
papal legate then did, in the wake of the 1229 council. He ran an inquisitio, 
which William of Puylaurens (born c.1200) described. William was a man 
of senior administrative experience and a sometime inquisition witness 
and temporary inquisitor. Although in his seventies when writing, he still 
11 P. Biller, ‘Cathars and the material world’, in God’s Bounty? The Churches and the Natural 
World, ed. P. Clarke and T. Claydon, Studies in Church History, xlvi (2010), 89–110, at pp. 
98–106. 
12 Dossat, Crises, pp. 108–45; H. Maisonneuve, Études sur les origines de l’inquisition (2nd 
edn, L’Église et l’État au Moyen Age, vii, Paris, 1960 [1942]), pp. 237–42, 270–5; W. L. 
Wakefield, Heresy, Crusade and Inquisition in Southern France, 1100–1250 (London, 1974), ch. 
8; L. Kolmer, Ad capienda vulpes. Die Ketzerbekämpfung in Südfrankreich in der ersten Hälfte 
des 13. Jahrhunderts und die Ausbildung des Inquisitionsverfahrens (Bonn, 1982). 
13 On Romano, see W. Maleczek, Papst und Kardinalskollege von 1191 bis 1216. Die 
Kardinäle unter Coelestin III. und Innocenz III (Vienna, 1984), pp. 189–95. The council’s 
canons were printed in G. D. Mansi, Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio (54 
vols in 59, Graz, 1960–1; repr. of edition published in 1902–27), xxiii. 191–204. They are 
translated in Heresy and Inquisition in France, 1200–1300, ed. and trans. J. H. Arnold and P. 
Biller (Manchester Medieval Sources, Manchester, 2016), pp. 190–7. 
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displayed a very crisp, clear mind.14 ‘It was organized like this’ (Fuit sic 
ordinata), wrote William.15 The bishop of Toulouse, Fulk, produced the 
witnesses. To expedite matters the jobs were shared. Each bishop examined 
some of the witnesses and each bishop returned the statements recording 
in writing (dicta in scriptis redacta) to Bishop Fulk. Summoned first were 
those people who were regarded as faithful and Catholic; and they were 
presumably questioned about the fama (public reputation) of suspects. 
Summoned second were the suspects. The suspects who did appear carefully 
avoided saying anything against each other. If only we could see the 
records of the dicta in scriptis redacta of this second category, the suspects! 
Unfortunately, when the papal legate returned to Rome he took the whole 
lot away with him: secum totam inquisitionem exportavit. However much 
we can appreciate the wit and hint of the bureaucrat’s regret in these words, 
the main thing is that we are up against a brick wall. William is all we have. 
At the other end we have Bartac’s deposition. It is the earliest to survive. 
The space between 1229/30 and October 1237 is almost entirely devoid of 
texts directly emanating from the examination of heretics. Almost: apart 
from two texts, which are not straightforwardly helpful. One of these is a 
set of earlier written testimonies about heresy from, almost certainly, early 
1234. They are legally and procedurally traditional: sworn testimonies, made 
by reputable ecclesiastics and laymen, about the fama of involvement in 
heresy of members of a powerful aristocratic family, the Niorts.16 The other 
is nearer our concerns. Bartac’s deposition has a twin, which is the only other 
extant deposition from hearings before the inquisitors Ferrier and Peter of 
Alès when acting together. It is from a few months later, dated 18 February 
1238, and appears to be a, possibly compressed, 1238 copy of a confession 
made to William Arnold (discussed below) in 1235. There is nothing else. If 
14 The best modern discussion of William is in M. Meschini, ‘Il “negotium pacis et fidei” 
in Linguadoca tra XII e XIII secolo secondo Guglielmo di Puylaurens’, in Mediterraneo 
medievale. Cristiani, musulmani ed eretici tra Europea e Oltremare (secoli IX–XIII), ed. M. 
Meschini (Milan, 2001), pp. 131–68. Additional evidence is noted in Inquisitors and Heretics 
in Thirteenth Century Languedoc: Edition and Translation of Toulouse Inquisition Depositions, 
1273–1282, ed. P. Biller, C. Bruschi and S. Sneddon (Studies in the History of Christian 
Traditions, cxlvii, Leiden, 2011), pp. 56, 108–9, 510–13. 
15 The current paragraph summarizes William’s account: Guillaume de Puylaurens, 
Chronique, ed. J. Duvernoy (Paris, 1976), pp. 138–41 (§ xxxviii, parallel Latin and modern 
French translation); The Chronicle of William of Puylaurens: the Albigensian Crusade and Its 
Aftermath, ed. and trans. W. A. Sibly and M. D. Sibly (Woodbridge, 2003), pp. 83–5. 
16 BNF, MS. Collection Doat 21, fos. 34–50v. On this, see W. L. Wakefield, ‘The Family 
of Niort in the Albigensian crusade and before the inquisition. Part 1’, Names, xviii (1970), 
97–117, at pp. 111–13; Y. Dossat, ‘La repression de l’hérésie par les évêques’, in Le credo, la 
morale et l’inquisition (Cahiers de Fanjeaux, vi, Toulouse, 1971), pp. 217–51, at pp. 241–7; 
Kolmer, Ad capienda Vulpes, pp. 82–107. 
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we cannot trace the evolution of the deposition as a practical tool through a 
neat chronological set of textual examples, what is left for us to do?
A cluster of people
One of the most distinctive voices in modern writing about the Church 
in the decades around 1200 is that of the American scholar Jessalynn Bird. 
In a way that is reminiscent of John Baldwin, she uses everything, from 
theological and legal commentaries to exempla, sermons and chronicles. She 
interweaves many themes, new religious orders, reform, preaching, crusade 
and dealing with heresy. The canvas she paints is that of the pointilliste period 
in French impressionism. There are many coloured dots: writers, legates, 
reformers, bishops, cardinals and preachers. She includes as many of them 
as she can in her picture; and shows them working, preaching, travelling, 
meeting and exchanging knowledge and ideas.17 Bird’s remarkable success 
in grasping and presenting a substantial fraction of how that world actually 
worked is a very useful reminder. We may not have a parchment trail, but 
we do have a picture crowded with the people who were around in Toulouse 
during the years in question. It was painted by the Dominican William 
Pelhisson in his chronicle of the Toulouse convent.18 
Pelhisson came from a (probably) middling Toulouse family and entered 
the order (probably) by 1230. He acted both as inquisitor and as a witness 
to hearings, was for some years master of works (operarius) of the Toulouse 
convent and died in 1268.19 A later Dominican historian, Bernard Gui, 
17 A representative as well as very important work is J. Bird, ‘The wheat and the 
tares: Peter the Chanter and the fama-based inquest against heresy and criminal sins, 
c.1198–c.1235’, Proceedings of the Twelfth International Congress of Medieval Canon Law, ed. 
U.-R. Blumenthal, K. Pennington and A. A. Larson (Monumenta iuris canonici, series C, 
Subsidia, xiii, Vatican City, 2008), pp. 763–856. 
18 Guillaume Pelhisson, Chronique (1229–1244), ed. J. Duvernoy (Paris, 1994); particularly 
useful is the annotation to the English translation in Wakefield, Heresy, pp. 207–36. Bernard 
Gui copied Pelhisson’s treatise on Toulouse convent properties into his De fundatione et 
prioribus conventuum provinciarum Tolosanae et Provinciae Ordinis Praedicatorum, ed. P. A. 
Amargier (Rome, 1961), pp. 32–42. 
19 Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum, ed. T. Kaeppeli and E. Panella (4 vols, Rome, 1970–
93), ii. 132–3, iv. 105; Dossat, Crises, pp. 123–4, 128, 130–2, 134–5, 138, 221, 241; Y. Dossat, 
‘Patriotisme méridionale du clergé au xxxe siècle’, in Les évêques, les clercs et le roi (1250–
1300) (Cahiers de Fanjeaux, vii, Toulouse, 1972), pp. 419–52, at pp. 428–30; J. Feuchter, 
Ketzer, Konsuln und Büßer. Die städtischen Eliten von Montauban vor dem Inquisitor Petrus 
Cellani (1236/1241) (Spätmittelalter, Humanismus, Reformation, xl, Tübingen, 2007), pp. 
278–80; C. C. Ames, Righteous Persecution: Inquisition, Dominicans and Christianity in the 
Middle Ages (Philadelphia, Pa., 2009), pp. 114–18. A master Arnold Pelhisson was canon and 
precentor of St Stephen’s in Toulouse (from 1236), witnessed interrogations and sentences 
(1237, 1245–7) and at some stage received heresy confessions (Pelhisson, Chronique, pp. 8–9). 
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confined his comments to Pelhisson’s role as operarius. Gui’s careful words 
about his conscientiousness, hard work and more than medium usefulness 
carry a hint of faintness of praise: ‘diligent, hard-working and not 
moderately productive’ (sollicitus, laboriosus et non mediocriter fructuosus).20 
Pelhisson had an eye for mundane things. Notable in his treatise on the 
Toulouse convent’s acquisition of properties is its detailing of the locations 
and entrances of the lavatories. 
Though Pelhisson does have a stab at spelling out the purpose of preserving 
history and providing the theme of the early friars’ great deeds and travails, 
most of the time what his chronicle provides are the streets and buildings 
of the city, crowds and people talking and doing things. The stories about 
dealing with heretics convey both drama and a jumbled, improvised and 
‘let’s all muck in’ impression of these years. While historians of inquisition 
despair as they try to extract a precise chronology from Pelhisson, here we 
are trying to see the procedural disorder, experiment and creativity of this 
period through the frosted glass of Pelhisson’s mind. However, Pelhisson 
does paint people – and many of them. At one point he says there were 
about forty friars in the convent and he proceeds to name many of them: 
Dominic of Baretge; John of St Michel; Geoffrey, an Englishman and great 
cleric – and so on.21 Many more strut across his pages, including others 
from England and Italy. 
Pelhisson was a Douanier Rousseau, a Sunday painter, not a sophisticated 
pointilliste. Nevertheless, let us try to use him in an exercise inspired by 
Bird. From Pelhisson’s Toulouse gallery we shall pick out four: Peter Seila; 
William Arnold; Rolando of Cremona; and Peter of Alès. We shall set them 
and their training and outlook alongside the inquisition deposition which 
was emerging in these same years and its characteristics. Salient in particular 
are the following: the form of a legally authenticated document; the near 
total confinement of topics in the formula interrogatorii to actions rather than 
beliefs; the compression of the latter to a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ question about belief in 
the heretics or their errors; and the modification of this by the intrusion – 
sometimes – of a quintet of beliefs. If we take these four characteristics and 
Pelhisson’s four persons we shall, with patience, be able to suggest something 
about the institutional nature of inquisition during this period and some 
intellectual and scholastic trends within it. The reader should be warned that 
scholastic theology only enters with the third figure, Rolando of Cremona. 
A Durand Pelisson was one of 1028 Toulouse men taking an oath in 1243 to maintain the 
Peace of Meaux-Paris (J. H. Mundy, Society and Government at Toulouse in the Age of the 
Cathars (Toronto, 1997), pp. 371, § 14). See p. 155 on these not including the poor. 
20 Gui, De fundatione et prioribus, p. 42. 
21 Pelhisson, Chronique, p. 48; Wakefield, Heresy, p. 211.
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A gallery: Peter Seila, William Arnold, Rolando of Cremona and Peter 
of Alès
Peter Seila
Our figures begin with Peter Seila, the first man to join Dominic and at that 
point already an old man.22 Belonging to what Feuchter calls the ‘capitalist 
elite’ of Toulouse, he had come from a family which combined wealth with 
a tradition of high administrative service. The earliest extant act witnessed 
by one of the family was written and authenticated in the house of William 
Seila in 1168.23 Peter himself had served in the courts of three successive 
counts of Toulouse, Raymonds V–VII. He had survived tough treatment 
by Richard the Lionheart after his capture.24 Peter gave the friars their first 
building in Toulouse, which came to function as the house of inquisition 
(domus inquisitionis). Alongside William Arnold and Pons of Saint-Gilles 
he was one of the three earliest inquisitors in the Toulouse region; and as 
a very old man he was still one of the most vigorous of all inquisitors and 
clearly a towering figure. Bernard Gui may have been reserved in his words 
about Pelhisson, but he let rip with Peter: he ‘grew old upon the earth, like 
one of the prophets of old’.25
The texts surviving from Seila’s inquisitions are not his depositions but his 
culpae, meaning extracts of the bad things, confessed in depositions, which 
would be useful for the inquisitor’s calculation of an appropriate penance. 
Given the commonplace that inquisitors’ interrogations were shaped by 
both formulaic questions and an individual inquisitor’s outlook, it is worth 
looking at what can be inferred about Seila from these culpae. On the one 
hand, there is much in them which reflected what was becoming standard 
in these years. Old he may have been and educated long before ‘Dominican 
scholasticism’, but the bright and very experienced Seila will have learnt 
quickly. However, there is one thing in his culpae which is very striking: 
they are densely packed with references to writing – from written prayers 
and vernacular gospels to the drawing up of wills. Among inquisitorial 
minds, Seila’s was the one most alert to texts, their drawing up, possession 
and use.26 There is nothing quite like it elsewhere, in the approximately 1.8 
22 The fundamental account of Peter is Feuchter, Ketzer, Konsuln und Büßer, ch. 5; and 
of the Seila family Mundy, Society and Government at Toulouse, pp. 341–5. On their comital 
service see also L. Macé, Les comtes de Toulouse et leur entourage. Rivalités, alliances et jeux de 
pouvoir, xxe–xiiie siècles (Toulouse, 2000), pp. 131, 338, 391, n. 75. 
23 L. Macé, Catalogue raimondins. Actes des comtes de Toulouse, ducs de Narbonne et marquis 
de Provence (1112–1229) (Toulouse, 2008), pp. 129–30, #117; see also pp. 170–1, #186.
24 Chronica Magistri Rogeri de Houedene, ed. W. Stubbs (4 vols, London, 1868–71), ii. 339. 
25 Gui, De fundatione et prioribus, p. 59.
26 L’inquisition en Quercy. Le registre des pénitences de Pierre Cellan 1241–1242, ed. J. 
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million words of the extant inquisition records of Languedoc between the 
1230s and 1320s.27 
Though the point is obvious and could be urged using other figures, it still 
needs stating. The convent was situated in a city noted for the precocious 
development of the notarial profession from around 1100 and for its massive 
production of authenticated acts.28 In the early 1230s the friars embraced, 
on the one hand, the humble Pelhisson ferreting around in the convent’s 
charters and authenticated documents, ‘in charters and instruments’ (in 
cartis et instrumentis) when writing his history of convent properties; 
and, on the other hand, one of the most distinguished bureaucrats of the 
previous fifty years. As the classic inquisition deposition was emerging, it 
was bound to acquire the formal clothing of the authenticated instruments 
of this time and place. It would be surprising if Seila’s immense authority 
and administrative experience did not affect it: even if in no longer precisely 
discernible ways. 
William Arnold
The second figure is the inquisitor William Arnold, famous for his murder 
at Avignonet along with all the members of his household in 1242.29 Why 
might he figure in our gallery? There has already been mention of one of 
the main characteristics of the deposition: that questions concentrated on 
actions rather than beliefs. This had a legal and a theological facet; and it is 
Duvernoy (Castelnaud La Chapelle, 2001), pp. 34 (gospel in Occitan; letters; legacy), 40 
(heretics’ book in peace ritual), 56 (carrying heretics’ book), 60 (legacies), 66 (keeping 
heretics’ book), 72 (writing a will for heretics), 80 (reading in heretics’ book), 82 (heretic 
reading), 84 (keeping heretics’ book, read by anyone who wanted to read it), 94 (heretics’ 
letters), 102 (receiving book from a heretic), and passim. 
27 This figure is based on counting a few sample pages and leaves of the principal sets 
of printed and manuscript records and multiplying by the page or leaf numbers. While 
digitization will ultimately correct this elementary calculation, it does provide an order of 
magnitude. 
28 J. H. Mundy, Liberty and Political Power in Toulouse, 1100–1250 (New York, 1954), 
pp. 35–7, 115–21; and J. H. Mundy, Men and Women at Toulouse in the Age of the Cathars 
(Toronto, 1990), pp. 10–12. 
29 William Arnold’s name is on many inquisition documents and therefore appears on 
many pages of histories of early inquisition; and there are several eye-witness accounts of his 
murder. Hardly anything else is known. According to Pelhisson he was from Montpellier 
and a legal expert. The earliest known date of his authorization as inquisitor seems to be 
January or February 1234 (Dossat, Crises, p. 122). Although in his list of Toulouse priors 
Bernard Gui put William Arnold between Peter Seila (1235–7) and Colombe of Provence 
(from 1242), he was also clear that little was known. He was ‘prior for some time, but I have 
not found in what year or for how long’ (Gui, De fundatione et prioribus, p. 50). He was 
murdered during the night of 28 May 1242. 
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the legal story which is our concern in this section. Its recapitulation is most 
usefully done in reverse chronological order. In the early to mid 1240s the 
texts of a wide range of southern French and Spanish Church councils are 
awash with definitions of various categories of supporters of heretics, chief 
among them that of the credentes, the believers. They were mainly defined 
by actions; and behind that lay a decade or more of experience, thought, 
and debate. The substantial contribution of lawyers is very clear in two texts. 
One is a consilium from the lawyer and former royal official Guy Foulcques 
(later Pope Clement IV, 1265–8). The consultation’s date of composition has 
recently been revised: it may come from as early as 1238.30 There is first a 
brief statement of the tautology, that admitting to believing in what heretics 
say amounts to believing in the errors of heretics. There then follows a 
long, brilliant discussion of the inaccessibility of the secrets of the human 
heart and consideration of proof of someone’s inner disposition in Roman 
law.31 This meant actions. Earlier, in 1235, Dominicans had asked a group of 
legal experts in Avignon to consider and define what constituted a ‘believer’ 
in Waldensian heretics. Following the tautology is the core of the formal, 
detailed answer they received, which was, of course, a list of actions.32 
As we ponder what precedes this, we have in our mind three solid 
things about 1235. What constituted a believer was a live issue at that date. 
Dominican inquisitors were obtaining formal legal advice on it. The law 
schools at this time were to the east, in the cities of Provence, especially 
Avignon and Montpellier. A lawyer’s view of a ‘believer’ may have come 
earlier than this, from the other ‘first’ inquisitor, William Arnold. Legal 
reflection clarified inquisitorial categories, for when William Arnold is first 
depicted in his chronicle, Pelhisson tells us only two things about him: 
that he was learned in law, a jurist (iurisperitus); and that he came from 
Montpellier.33 
30 Bivolarov, Inquisitoren-Handbücher, pp. 239–41; date: pp. 215–17.
31 P. Biller, ‘“Deep is the heart of man, and inscrutable”: signs of heresy in medieval 
Languedoc’, in Text and Controversy: Essays in Honour of Anne Hudson, ed. H. Barr and A. 
M. Hutchison (Turnhout, 2005), pp. 267–80. 
32 Quellen zur Geschichte der Waldenser, ed. A. Patschovsky and K.-V. Selge (Texte zur 
Kirchen- und Theologiegeschichte, xviii, Gütersloh, 1973), pp. 50–4; Parmeggiani, I consilia 
procedurali, pp. 10–13, with further bibliography at p. 11; translated in Arnold and Biller, 
Heresy and Inquisition, pp. 215–17. 
33 Pelhisson, Chronique, p. 44. Since William Arnold was a common name, there is no 
surprise in finding another William Arnold who was a jurist, still active 10 years after the 
inquisitor William Arnold’s death (Y. Dossat, ‘L’université de Toulouse, Raymond VII, les 
capitouls et le roi’, in Les universités du Languedoc au xiiie siècle (Cahiers de Fanjeaux, v, 
Toulouse, 1970), pp. 58–91, at pp. 77–8. 
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Rolando of Cremona
Pelhisson’s gallery contains only a few learned men who could be candidates 
for inclusion in a discussion of scholasticism. Near the beginning of his 
chronicle he states many Paris masters and scholars had been sent to Toulouse 
so that there might be a mendicant university (studium generale) and the 
faith might be taught there, as also the liberal arts (scientia liberales).34 He 
does not date this and names no names, confining himself to a scathing 
comment on their ineffectiveness. They did not manage to uproot heresy. 
Rather, when hearing ‘unfamiliar things’ (insolita) from them, heretical 
sympathizers mocked them. These ‘unfamiliar things’ were presumably the 
technical vocabulary as well as the topics of the Paris schools, not adapted 
to a Toulouse audience.
Shortly after this Pelhisson moves nearer to his own times. He begins 
to include dates, though in an insouciant manner relying heavily on ‘in 
those days’ (in illis diebus) and ‘at that time’ (tunc temporis). He interweaves 
into the story a chronological sequence of three masters who came from 
Paris to lecture on theology: Rolando of Cremona, John of St Giles and 
Lawrence, the arrival of the latter dated 5 or 6 November 1235. While John 
and Lawrence have small spaces in Pelhisson and no words or actions are 
attributed to them, Rolando, as we shall see, cuts a large figure. 
He was born around 1178. By the second decade of the thirteenth 
century Rolando had become a famous figure at Bologna, where he taught 
medicine and philosophy. His writings indicate a mind well-stocked and 
familiar with Greco-Latin and Arabo-Latin translations of a remarkable 
range of philosophical and medical writings, with a penchant for moving 
fast into medical and bodily vocabulary and analogies. He was one of the 
early coups in recruitment for the high university by the young Dominican 
order, entering it perhaps in July 1218. He was sent to Paris in 1219 to teach 
the friars at Saint Jacques, did this briefly and then probably returned to 
Lombardy. He was in Paris again in the late 1220s and was awarded the chair 
in theology in 1229: the first Dominican in this new position. He held this 
for perhaps a year and then went to Toulouse.35
His main writings are a Summa of theology in four books and a Postilla 
in Job, whose references to the Summa (but not vice versa) indicate that 
34 Pelhisson, Chronique, p. 38. 
35 R. Parmeggiani, ‘Rolando da Cremona († 1259) e gli eretici. Il ruolo dei frati predicatori 
tra scatologismo e profezia’, Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum, lxxix (2009), 23–84, 
at pp. 24–5. Still fundamental is E. Filthaut, Roland von Cremona O.P. und die Anfänge 
der Scholastik im Predigerorden. Ein Beitrag zur Geistesgeschichte der älteren Dominikaner 
(Vechta-im-Oldenburg, 1936).
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they were produced in that order.36 The most frequent evocations of the 
contemporary world in the Summa suggest that the geographical poles of 
Rolando’s mind were northern France (Francia) and Lombardy. (Wine is 
more expensive in northern France than in Lombardy, Rolando observed.37) 
Paris moulded the two texts in important ways. First, one Paris master often 
named in the Summa was William of Auxerre.38 Rolando’s own Summa 
acquired its shape and core through its copying and incorporation of the 
questions of William’s Summa aurea. Second, Rolando’s commentary on 
Job was produced in compliance with the duty of the regent master in 
theology in Paris: to lecture and comment on a particular book of the Bible. 
Rolando turned this duty into the opportunity to write in his Postilla a 
virulent attack on heresy, in particular the Cathars (Cathari, his usage) and 
another group of heretics who were in his eyes less dangerous, the Lyonists 
(Leoniste – meaning Waldensians). While his Summa naturally does not 
have this narrowness of focus, since it is a general theological treatise, a 
comparison between Rolando’s Summa and William’s Summa always shows 
a contrast, one which betrays Rolando’s preoccupation. Where William 
does deal with heresy or heretics, Rolando picks up the ball and runs with 
it. What is a short passage in William on heretics’ willingness and ability 
to endure the pain of being burnt to death is tripled in length in Rolando 
and dealt with from several more angles; and Rolando keeps returning to 
the topic.39 In various questions which the authors share, Rolando inserts 
heresy and repression where William is silent. 
The knowledge, memories and rumours likely to be found in both of 
Rolando’s milieux – Bologna and Paris – are suggested in passing allusions, 
which also help to locate Rolando chronologically. In his Verbum adbreviatum 
(1191–2) Peter the Chanter had advocated imprisonment rather than execution 
36 The most accessible work is Summae Magistri Rolandi Cremonensis O.P. Liber Tercius, 
ed. L. Cortesi (Bergamo, 1962), a transcription with hardly any apparatus of a work about 
550,000 words long; Luigi Cortesi’s first name was rendered as Aloysius in Latin, hence the 
A. Cortesi of some catalogues. There are references in the 3rd book to the 1st and 2nd books, 
but not to the 4th (Summa, pp. 266, 294, 548, 994). Around 1960 Cortesi made incomplete 
transcriptions of books 1, 3 and 4 of the Summa and the Postilla in Job; these have now 
been published by U. Midali (Bergamo, 2015–17). In this chapter we rely on the 3rd book 
of the Summa in Cortesi’s edition and on the Postilla through the extensive quotation of it 
in A. Dondaine, ‘Un commentaire scripturaire de Roland de Crémone: “Le livre de Job”’, 
Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum, xi (1941), 109–37; and in Parmeggiani, ‘Rolando da 
Cremona’. We follow Parmeggiani’s approach to the works’ dates and their Paris context. 
37 Rolando, Summa, p. 1068.
38 Rolando, Summa, pp. 672, 734, 995, 1105, 1107, 1108, 1133, 1224, 1340; Filthaut, Roland 
von Cremona, p. 83. 
39 William of Auxerre, Summa aurea, ed. J. Ribailler (Spicilegium Bonaventurianum, xvi–
xx, 5 vols in 7, 1980–7), iii, pt. 2. 825 (bk. iii, § 43.2); Rolando, Summa, pp. 1132–3. 
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for Cathars who confessed and were convicted of heresy.40 The airing of these 
ideas in Paris and among the Chanter’s followers may be the background 
to Rolando’s restatement and rejection of the proposition put forward by 
some: that heretics should not be killed.41 Elsewhere Rolando asks who was 
responsible for a heretic’s death: the capturer who handed the heretic on; or the 
secular authority which ordered the execution? Discussion of the responsibility 
of secular authorities led on to the topic of authorities which killed heretics 
regardless of the latter’s willingness to return to the faith. Perhaps there was 
a ‘Blackadder’ element in Rolando’s humour, for he illustrates this with a 
rumour about a well-known uncontrollably bad man: ‘King John, who had 
heretics in prison, is said to have acted like this. He said to them, “Whether 
you want to return or not, I’m going to kill you!”’. 42 This probably goes back 
to 1206 and John’s successful siege of Montauban, followed by the capture 
of many of its inhabitants.43 The likelihood of these containing adherents of 
heretics is very high, for in the 1230s Peter Seila interrogated and sentenced 
256 of them.44 
Peter the Chanter’s argument and (probably) King John’s capture of 
Montauban put forward the dates 1191–2 and 1206; and other dates – some 
only probable, some surer – begin to supply the outlines of a chronology. 
Rolando’s discussions of summary executions of heretics by secular authorities 
could be put alongside various examples from the Albigensian crusade, for 
example, the execution of 140 heretics after the capture of Minerve in 1210. 
The last session of the Fourth Lateran Council in November 1215 was evoked 
in a reference to the count of Toulouse losing his lands through support for 
heresy.45 The allusions to those with the role of podestà acting against heretics 
may refer to events in Lombard cities between 1228 and 1229.46 Finally, there 
is the most significant chronological point in Rolando’s discussions of heresy. 
He assumes it is bishops who proceed against heretics.47 At the same time there 
40 J. W. Baldwin, Masters, Princes and Merchants: the Social Views of Peter the Chanter and 
His Circle (2 vols, Princeton, N.J., 1970), i. 322; Peter the Chanter, Verbum adbreviatum. 
Textus conflatus, ed. M. Boutry (CCCM, cxcvi, Turnhout, 2004), p. 508 (§ i.76). 
41 Rolando, Summa, p. 1365; Parmeggiani discusses later debate on the topic (‘Rolando da 
Cremona’, pp. 75–6). 
42 Rolando, Summa, p. 1364: ‘Sic enim dicitur fecisse rex Iohannes qui habebat hereticos 
in carcere. Dixit enim eis, “Sive velitis, sive non, ego interficiam vos”’. 
43 Roger of Wendover, Flores Historiarum, ed. H. G. Hewlett (3 vols, London, 1886–9), ii. 
13–14. 
44 Feuchter, Ketzer, Konsuln und Büßer, p. 244. One of them had sold wine to King John 
in 1205 (Feuchter, Ketzer, Konsuln und Büßer, pp. 153–4). 
45 Dondaine, ‘Un commentaire scripturaire’, p. 117. 
46 Parmeggiani, ‘Rolando da Cremona’, p. 65. 
47 Rolando, Summa, pp. 1362, 1366.
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is a total absence of any reference to mendicant friars possessing authorization 
and exclusive competence in this area.48 Leaving aside occasional references to 
early Church heresies, we see a precise chronology in Rolando’s mind: from 
the 1190s to around 1230, in other words, shortly before the institution of 
mendicant inquisition. 
Rolando himself had already been at work directly with heretics. In one 
reminiscence he talks about questioning heretics and overpowering them in 
argument; and in another he claims to have captured eighteen in a day.49 
Nothing helps us to contextualize these anecdotes. However, they do not 
argue for a later date, for there is nothing surprising in Dominicans helping in 
repression in the years before the formal institution of mendicant inquisition. 
The Dominican Ferrier was already active against heretics in 1229, authorized 
by the archbishop of Narbonne.
These then are the outlines of the life and writings of Rolando, before his 
move from Paris to Toulouse and into a leading role in Pelhisson’s chronicle. 
‘Master Rolando lectured in theology’ in Toulouse, Pelhisson tells us, and 
then he recounts three stories. In the first, the people of Toulouse reacted 
strongly against a Dominican sermon stating that there were heretics in the 
city, holding assemblies there and spreading heresies. ‘Very agitated and 
worked up’, they summoned the prior of the Dominicans to the house of 
the commune and ordered him to tell the friars to stop preaching such stuff. 
They uttered threats. When master Rolando heard this from the prior he 
declared, ‘Certainly now what we should do is press on even more and more 
with preaching against the heretics and their believers’. Rolando did this 
manfully and powerfully; and the others did likewise. Pelhisson goes on to 
the second story. A donat (lay brother)50 of St Sernin had become a canon 
on his deathbed and was buried in the cloister wearing the surplice. The 
canons had not known that he had also been hereticated (that is, received 
the consolamentum). When Master Rolando came to hear this, he went off 
with friars and some clergy and they dug up the body, dragged it to a fire and 
burnt it. The third story is about a great leader of Waldensians called Galvan, 
who had died. This did not escape Master Rolando’s notice and he stated it 
publicly in a sermon. Friars, clergy and people went off to Galvan’s house, 
destroying it and converting it into a sewer. They dug up Galvan’s body from 
the cemetery in the new town, processed through the town with it and burnt 
it on common ground outside the town.51 
48 Parmeggiani, ‘Rolando da Cremona’, p. 69. 
49 Rolando, Summa, pp. 1364, 1376. 
50 On donats, see C. de Miramon, Les donnés au moyen âge: une forme de vie religieuse 
laïque (vers 1100–vers 1500) (Paris, 1999). 
51 Pelhisson, Chronique, pp. 40–5. 
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In each story Rolando heard something and this led to action. This 
pattern acquires more force through repetition. Pelhisson’s text constructs 
the polar opposite of the ineffective Paris masters and scholars who had 
come earlier to Toulouse: Rolando was a figure of dynamism and energy. 
However, he is a figure in three strip cartoons, for Pelhisson did not have 
the outlook or range to assess and depict Rolando’s presence in any other 
way. 
Let us recapitulate. Rolando came from Paris to Toulouse around 1230 and 
left Toulouse for Lombardy three years later in 1233. Roland will narrowly 
have missed the clear-up work undertaken in the aftermath of the Council 
of Toulouse by southern bishops. In November 1229 they had been at work 
examining successively Catholic witnesses and heresy suspects and delivering 
written records of these proceedings to Fulk, the bishop of Toulouse. At the 
other end of Rolando’s years in Toulouse there is the earliest date we know 
Rolando was back in Italy, October 1233. He may still have been in Toulouse 
in April, when the letters started arriving from Gregory IX which mandated 
southern French Dominicans to carry out inquisitions. During this period 
one of the cleverest, most learned men in Latin Christendom, and one who 
was almost obsessed with the fight against heresy, was lending his support 
to the prior and friars of the Dominican convent and lecturing in theology. 
Rolando’s northern French, German (probably) and Lombard knowledge 
and experience of proceedings against heretics will have contributed much 
savoir-faire. Further ransacking of his writings would add to our view of 
what Rolando brought to the table. However, here we shall concentrate on 
the significance of Rolando’s importation into Toulouse of a commonplace 
of Parisian theology about simple believers.
In Rolando’s Postilla in Job heresiarchs and their believers form part of 
the devil’s body; prelates and Catholic believers the body of Christ or the 
Church.52 The heresiarchs and prelates in the Church, for example, are 
the bones. Rolando concentrates mostly on heretics (that is, the leaders), 
particularly their believers. ‘In these believers lies the strength of heretics’, 
wrote Rolando. ‘They join themselves to the heretics’, he continued, ‘by 
defending them and lodging them’ (in quibus credentibus herreticorum 
fortitudo est. Illi enim hereticos defendant, et hospitando sibi conjungunt). He 
deliberately uses the words denoting categories of support for heresy which 
had been deployed in Church legislation since the decretal Ad abolendam 
in 1184. The intimacy and strength of the link are strengthened by Rolando 
52 The following is based on Parmeggiani, ‘“Rolando” da Cremona’, pp. 45–9. At the 
time of writing, Expositio libri beati Job Magistri Rolandi Cremonensis, ed. L. Cortesi and U. 
Midali (Bergamo, 2017), was not available to me. 
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the medic, relishing the opportunity to deploy the corporeal language of 
Job XL: 12. If the heresiarchs are hardened fistulae or bones, their believers 
are the surrounding cartilage. If the heresiarchs are testicles, their believers 
are nerves within these testicles. In the consumption of error, heresiarchs 
provide the molar teeth which grind the doctrine, while believers’ anterior 
teeth continue the job. 
Let us keep in mind the startling physicality of this, the focus on believers 
and the formal parallels between the parallel pairing of heresiarchs-prelates 
and believers-simple faithful in the bodies of both heretical sect and Church, 
as we turn to Rolando’s discussion of faith in book 3 of the Summa. At 
one point he investigates a theme which had been given important earlier 
formulations by Hugh of St Victor, Peter Lombard and William of Auxerre: 
the faith of the simple faithful (fideles simplices).53 The question was this: what 
degree of precise comprehension and ability to articulate and distinguish 
between specific articles of faith was required of a simple believer? This 
believer was specified by some commentators as stupid or uneducated and 
also came eventually to be represented by the stock figure of a vetula, a little 
old woman. William of Auxerre had introduced or secured the currency 
of the phases and notions of ‘implicit’ and ‘explicit faith’.54 ‘Implicit faith’ 
meant a ‘simple believer’ believing what the clergy set above them believed. 
Discussions had also introduced the idea of a handful of doctrines, just four 
or five, which were the irreducible minimum of explicit belief. Rolando of 
Cremona uses the same heading, ‘On implicit and explicit faith’; he repeats 
the language and all the points; and the main difference is that he triples 
the length of William’s discussion. Novelty in Rolando’s usage of these 
distinctions and contrasts is not the issue: their inclusion in his luggage 
when he arrived in Toulouse is.55 
A recapitulation and a conjunction: Peter of Alès
Let us recapitulate the suggestion that two areas of higher learning, Roman 
law and scholastic theology, shaped inquisitors’ questions. Consulted on 
who should be adjudged a credens, Avignonese lawyers provided – alongside 
the simple fact of saying that one believed in the heretics or their faith – 
a list of actions. Foulques’s later consultation spelled out the reasoning: 
Roman law on the problem of proof of inner disposition. Hence we see 
53 There is a short general account by P. Biller, ‘Intellectuals and the masses: oxen and she-
asses in the medieval Church’, in The Oxford Handbook of Medieval Christianity, ed. J. H. 
Arnold (Oxford, 2014), pp. 323–42, at pp. 324, 328–9. 
54 William of Auxerre, Summa aurea, iii, pt 1, pp. 212–13 (bk. iii, § 12.5).
55 Rolando, Summa, pp. 312–16; Rolando’s minimum was God’s creation of visible and 
invisible things, the trinity, passion and resurrection (p. 316). 
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the typical early deposition, in which a credens is asked numerous questions 
about seeing heretics, lodging them, giving them things and so on; and 
finally one brief ‘yes’ or ‘no’ question on belief in heretics. Converging with 
Roman law was scholastic theology. Against the background of the parallel 
taxonomies of Church and sect – clergy and lay people in one, heretics 
and credentes in the other – there was a powerful line of thought about the 
‘explicit’ faith required of the clergy and the ‘implicit’ faith required of the 
simple lay person. The minimum – a lay person believing what his parish 
priest believed – was the equivalent of a credens believing what his heretic 
believed. The scholastic theological concept of the implicit faith of the simple 
faithful drove in the same direction as Roman law: reduction in what one 
expected of subditi, those subordinate either to clergy or to heretics. There 
was a small modification for both groups. Scholastic discussions of explicit 
faith produced four or five doctrines in which the simple faithful had to 
have explicit faith. By the mid 1240s some inquisitors were concluding their 
action-questions put to credentes with a follow-up on four or five heretical 
doctrines.56 
While these consultations demonstrate the influence of law, the case 
for the input of scholastic theology is conjectural: it rests upon modern 
scholarship putting together what Rolando wrote, the way a local historian 
saw him and chronology. After teaching in Paris, Rolando lived in Toulouse 
for these three years, lecturing in theology and visibly leading the fight 
against heresy. While Pelhisson was contemptuous of the ‘remote and 
ineffectual’ earlier immigrant dons, Rolando was his powerful hero. There 
is one eerie coincidence: the earliest deposition, that of Bartac in 1237, 
records an interrogation by two inquisitors, one of them the former prior 
of Toulouse, Peter of Alès.57 Pelhisson records one conversation between 
Rolando and a friar in the Toulouse convent. It is Peter of Alès. Peter asks 
Rolando what to do. Rolando tells him what to do.
56 If this was through the influence of discussions of implicit faith, we would investigate 
the later development of theological learning in Toulouse after Rolando’s departure from the 
city. 
57 Pelhisson, Chronique, pp. 40–5. Gui found documents naming him as the prior of 
Prouille in 1226, 1227 and 1231 (Gui, De fundatione et prioribus, pp. 14, 24). Pelhisson’s 
treatise on Toulouse properties refers to him as prior of Toulouse in 1232; and Gui says he 
was prior from this year; he lists the next one as prior from the year 1233 (Gui, De fundatione 
et prioribus, pp. 33 and 49). Though sometimes referred to as ‘of Alais’ or ‘of Alet’, Peter’s 
place of origin (Alestum) is Alès, a diocese in the Gard département (Pouillés des provinces 
d’Auch, de Narbonne et de Toulouse, ed. M. François, C.-E. Perrin and J. de Font-Réaulx (2 
vols, Paris, 1972), ii. 859). 
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Institution
Let us return to the institutional question through Bernard Gui’s treatise 
on inquisition (1319–23). Gui referred to it in its prologue as a Tractatus de 
practica inquisitionis: a discursive treatise about the practice of inquisition 
rather than a ‘how-to-do-it’ pocket book.58 Gui was a man of few words but 
he made this text as long as he could. In the wake of the Council of Vienne 
(1311–12) Gui was protesting against its attempt to reform inquisition, 
providing in the Tractatus a general apologia for inquisition, its power 
and the necessity of its unfettered operation.59 He did this in part by a 
demonstration of the procedural orderliness of the customary working of 
inquisition in the Toulousain. This is the theme of the treatise’s first three 
parts. One hundred and thirty-one forms for 131 distinct inquisition actions 
provide its massive demonstration. On one of these forms, which is for 
appointing a new prison guard, the inquisitor refers to both himself and 
his successors; another form warns against anyone other than the seneschal 
staying in the house of inquisition (domus inquisitionis) while the inquisitor 
is away and dwells on its importance for the safe-keeping of inquisition 
records.60 The permanence and complexity of this organization are palpable. 
If this is an institution, can we say when it became one? Should we look 
at the earliest years? There is architectural continuity in Toulouse, where 
Peter Seila had given the Dominicans the building used for inquisition, it 
seems, from 1233;61 and the inquisition’s key-document, the deposition, had 
emerged by 1237. While these beginnings make us pause, the instantaneous 
materialization of an ‘institution’ in the early 1230s is an unrealistic idea. 
This author is reluctant to pick a point between the 1230s and Bernard Gui, 
preferring just to fall back on the words of Topsy in Uncle Tom’s Cabin: 
inquisition just ‘growed’. 
58 Bernard Gui, Practica inquisitionis heretice pravitatis, ed. C. Douais (Paris, 1885), p. 1.
59 Together with the inquisitor of Carcassonne, he also wrote a letter of complaint to John 
XXII; its wording suggests Gui was the principal author (BNF, MS. Collection Doat 30, fos. 
90–132v). 
60 Gui, Practica, pp. 61–2, 66–7.        
61 Feuchter, Ketzer, Konsuln und Büßer, p. 56.
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8. Robert of Courson’s systematic thinking about 
early thirteenth-century institutions∗
John Sabapathy
What went through the diseased mind of Robert of Courson on 6 February 
1219, ‘dying in the sands of Damietta before the river was crossed’,1 during 
the siege of the city by the epidemic-ridden crusading army? Englishman, 
master of theology at the university of Paris, canon of Noyon, cardinal priest 
of San Stefano in Monte Celio, sometime papal legate to northern France, 
ecclesiastical legislator, university reformer and, lastly and terminally, 
preacher to the fifth crusade, did Courson think of the enormous crush 
of the great council at the Lateran church and palace four years earlier; the 
stench of burning flesh and towns during the Albigensian crusade; the noise 
of his preaching campaigns; the haggling at the reforming councils he had 
co-ordinated in northern France; the days teaching and writing in Paris; 
his university reform of his shape-shifting alma mater; the tense diplomacy 
with hard men like King John and Philip Augustus; the friendships with 
the other bright young theologians in the circle of Peter the Chanter; his 
strained relations with Pope Honorius III; or his youth in England about 
which we know nothing?2 
* I am very grateful to the conference participants for comments on my original paper 
and – for numerous suggestions and corrections to the written version – especially to Emily 
Corran, David d’Avray and Antonia Fitzpatrick. 
1 For Courson at Damietta see Oliver of Paderborn, Historia damiatina, in Die Schriften 
des Kölner Domscholasters, späteren Bischofs von Paderborn und Kardinal-Bischofs von S. 
Sabina, Oliverus, ed. H. Hoogeweg (Tübingen, 1894), pp. 161–280, at p. 187 (quote); also 
Oliver’s Historia regum Terre Sancte, pp. 83–158 at p. 158; Register, at p. 287; and pp. xviii, xix, 
xxiv, lxxvii, clxv, clxxi, clxxxi; Lettres de Jacques de Vitry (1160/1170–1240), évêque de Saint-
Jean-d’Acre, ed. R. B. C. Huygens (Leiden, 1960), p. 116 (#5); M. Dickson and C. Dickson, 
‘Le cardinal Robert de Courson, sa vie’, Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen 
Âge, ix (1934), 53–142, at pp. 132–4. All translations are the author’s own unless otherwise 
stated.
2 For Courson’s biography, see Dickson and Dickson; J. W. Baldwin, Masters, Princes, 
and Merchants: the Social Views of Peter the Chanter and his Circle (2 vols, Princeton, N.J., 
1970), i. 19–25 and s.v. ‘Robert de Courson’; J. E. Sayers, ‘Courson, Robert de (d. 1219)’, 
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Courson’s life intersected with some of the major religious movements and 
contemporary concerns of his day. Many were ‘institutional’, taking that term 
to cover macro-organizational forms (the Church, the university of Paris); 
meso-level religious practices (ecclesiastical councils, anti-heresy campaigns, 
the fifth crusade); and micro-level ones (diet, sacraments). It is, therefore, 
particularly interesting to investigate the tenor of Courson’s attitude to 
institutions. His breadth of engagement was shared more widely with the 
‘biblical-moral tendency’ of Peter the Chanter which so struck John Baldwin, 
although Baldwin was more interested with respect to their particular ‘social 
policy’ positions (ordeals, usury, tithes, etc.).3 Commenting on their ‘social 
theory’ as a whole, Baldwin’s compliments were somewhat backhanded: 
The Parisian theologians discussed each occupation as a separate entity, making 
little effort to unify their ideas in coherent social theory. Since their chief task 
was to evaluate the concrete moral act, not to speculate about the nature of 
society, they produced little social theory which resembled the hierarchical 
systems … of the mid-thirteenth century under the influence of Aristotelian 
notions of justice. What their theories lacked in consistency and unity, was 
compensated by richness of detail. Although their particular views of society 
were fragmentary and unconnected, their writings provide a brilliant mosaic 
for the social life of their times.4
ODNB <https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/6956> [accessed 27 June 2018]. Courson figures 
importantly in J. L. Bird, ‘The construction of orthodoxy and the (de)construction of 
heretical attacks on the eucharist in pastoralia from Peter the Chanter’s circle in Paris’, 
in Trials and Treatises: Texts and the Repression of Medieval Heresy, ed. C. Bruschi and P. 
Biller (Woodbridge, 2003), pp. 45–61; J. L. Bird, ‘Paris masters and the justification of 
the Albigensian crusade’, Crusades, vi (2007) 117–55; J. L. Bird, ‘The wheat and the tares: 
Peter the Chanter’s circle and the fama-based inquest against heresy and criminal sins, 
c.1198–c.1235’, in Proceedings of the Twelfth International Congress of Medieval Canon Law: 
Washington, D.C. 1–7 August 2004, ed. U.-R. Blumenthal, K. Pennington and A. A. Larson 
(Monumenta iuris canonici, series C, Subsidia xiii, Vatican City, 2008), pp. 763–856; and E. 
Corran, Lying and Perjury in Medieval Practical Thought: a Study in the History of Casuistry 
(Oxford, 2018), passim with appendix. Courson’s thought on inquisitions and communities 
has been analysed in Sabapathy, ‘Some difficulties’, pp. 175–200.
3 This chapter cannot explore the precise relationship between the Chanter and Courson: 
their approach is very similar and Courson cites ‘the Chanter’ repeatedly. The phrase 
‘biblical-moral tendency’ was coined by M. Grabmann, Die Geschichte der scholastischen 
Methode (2 vols, Freiburg, 1909–11), ii. 476–501; for a critique, see M. J. Clark, The Making 
of the Historia scholastica, 1150–1200 (Toronto, 2015), pp. 16–22, 257–9. Clark’s account 
of Langton’s reception and refinement of his teacher Peter Comestor’s writings seems to 
parallel Courson’s relationship with the Chanter. See also M. J. Clark, ‘The biblical Gloss, 
the search for Peter Lombard’s glossed Bible, and the school of Paris’, Mediaeval Stud., lxxvi 
(2014), 57–113; M. J. Clark, ‘Peter Lombard, Stephen Langton, and the school of Paris: the 
making of the twelfth-century scholastic biblical tradition’, Traditio, lxxii (2017), 171–274.
4 Baldwin, Masters, Princes, i. 58–9.
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The criteria are arguably somewhat unfair ones with which to twit these 
thinkers. That consistency and unity are, first, required and, second, achieved 
through a particular route requires demonstration. Nor is coherence the 
same as consistency: indeed we can show for one of the Chanter’s circle – 
Innocent III – that it was not.5 There should be ways of judging the quality 
of this thought other than indexing it against texts it had not received. This 
chapter explores that quality through Courson’s ‘thought style’, to use Mary 
Douglas’s term: the thought beneath the thought which shapes the group.6 
It suggests that what seems striking about Courson’s thought is the way he 
approaches particular problems as products of social relations and the degree 
to which he responds to them as such, whatever the topic (diet, sex, abusive 
lords). The main source is Courson’s Summa (by mid 1212), which draws 
important inspiration from his master Peter the Chanter’s posthumously 
arranged questio collection, the Summa de sacramentis et animae consiliis.7 
Courson’s Summa first addresses fields which attract penitential concern 
(for example, excommunication, usury, rapine); then moves to a range 
of social bonds, effects and procedures (vows, scandal, due process); then 
discusses the sacraments and (in one manuscript) ends by considering the 
afterlife.8 It is these practices as social institutions on which this chapter 
focuses. Courson was ‘systematic’ but in a style distinct from that of later 
thinkers such as Aquinas. The systematization here lies less in the exhaustive 
order of topics in the Summa than in the fact that Courson treated given 
issues as widely connected to others, not narrowly compartmentalized from 
them – as, indeed, they might be experienced by parishioner or priest.9 
5 J. Sabapathy, ‘Thinking politically with Innocent III: prudence and providence’, 
Thirteenth Century England, xv (2015), 115–36, at pp. 133–6.
6 M. Douglas, Thought Styles: Critical Essays on Good Taste (Thousand Oaks, Calif., 1996). 
For a discussion of this style’s wider context, see Emily Corran’s article in this volume.
7 Specifically, Paris, BNF, MS. lat. 3477. Baldwin argues that Courson’s work was ‘a final 
product of the school of Peter the Chanter’ (Masters, Princes, i. 23, 24–5, esp. nn. 66, 76). 
The question of distinct approaches by associated thinkers cannot be properly addressed 
here but see n. 42 below.
8 For dating, see Sabapathy, ‘Some difficulties’, p. 181, n. 27. For the contents of the 
Summa, see V. L. Kennedy, ‘The contents of Courson’s Summa’, Mediaeval Stud., ix 
(1947), 81–107. BNF, MS. lat. 14524 and MS. lat. 3259 have been used. For editions and 
long quotations from Courson’s Summa see the works cited in n. 2 above; and G. Lefèvre, 
Le traité ‘De usura’ de Robert de Courçon (Travaux et Mémoires de l’Université de Lille, x. 
30, Lille, 1902); V. L. Kennedy, ‘Robert Courson on penance’, Mediaeval Stud., vii (1945), 
291–336, J. W. Baldwin, The Language of Sex: Five Voices from Northern France around 1200 
(Chicago, Ill., 1994), appendix 1, pp. 239–45; J. M. M. H. Thijssen, ‘Master Amalric and 
the Amalricians: inquisitorial procedure and the suppression of heresy at the University of 
Paris’, Speculum, lxxi (1996) 43–65, at pp. 61–5; Corran, Lying and Perjury, appendix.
9 This chapter draws very loosely on N. Luhmann, Social Systems, trans. J. Bednarz Jr. 
with D. Baecker (Stanford, Calif., 1995).
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There are different forms of ‘systematic’ scholastic thinking and this one 
emerged at an interesting moment: Courson was as much a member of an 
intellectual generation as of a school.10 This chapter, first, shows Courson’s 
recognition of the systemic way these institutions hung together socially. 
It demonstrates, second, how the constructions of groups could prove 
problematic; and looks at important considerations underlying Courson’s 
reasoning when evaluating such institutions. Finally, it contextualizes this 
by reflecting on Courson’s conciliar activity and ends by reconsidering the 
way in which Courson’s thought is systematic.
Systems, rules, traditions
The complexity of the social systems with which Courson engaged and 
their entangled nature can be illustrated by Courson’s sympathy for the 
perplexed (perplexi):
A most difficult question follows, also about those things necessary in the 
penitential field, arising from perplexity in relation to equal, greater and lesser 
crimes. Such perplexity can often be overwhelming, as Gregory shows in the 
Moralia [32.20.39 to Job XL: 12, ‘He setteth up his tail like a cedar, the sinews 
of his testicles are wrapped together [perplexi]’] that where a mind is caught 
between greater and lesser sins, the lesser should always be chosen, so that 
someone who is hemmed in on all sides by the ramparts of the walls should 
flee to where the wall seems shorter. By such perplexities do modern heretics 
[moderni heretici] say that they are confused – and they can be perplexed to 
such a degree that they cannot be saved, so that if they profess the perfection 
of their sect [perfectionem secte sue] and afterwards eat meat or contravene [the 
sect] in any way, or in their moment of death when they cannot take counsel 
with their consolers [consolidatoribus] they say that they cannot be saved, as 
happens in many cases when they say that they cannot avoid many established 
rules without incurring the damnation of death, but an infinity of authorities 
cry out against each other [in contrarium].11 
Even a heretic’s worldview is a woven whole which hangs together. It is 
the interconnection of things which indeed produces confusion and why 
unpicking them is complex (and, here, doomed). 
10 Though Baldwin was more interested in their social commentary, Masters, Princes 
necessarily treats them as a generation. For their successors, see S. M. Young, Scholarly 
Community at the Early University of Paris: Theologians, Education and Society, 1215–1248 
(Cambridge Studies in Medieval Life and Thought, Cambridge, 2014); and N. Gorochov, 
Naissance de l’université: les Écoles de Paris d’Innocent III à Thomas d’Aquin (v. 1200–v. 1245) 
(Paris, 2012). For complementary analyses of Courson as casuist on these themes, see 
Corran, Lying and Perjury, pp. 85–9, 97–8.
11 BNF, MS. lat. 14524, fo. 90rab (§ 26.2), corrected against BNF, MS. lat. 3259 fo. 113vab. 
The Latin is not quite right here. My thanks to Antonia Fitzpatrick for discussion.
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The underlying question of how rules should form coherent wholes for 
society and the need to disaggregate the good and bad also receive sustained 
attention in Peter the Chanter’s compendium of ethical problems, the 
Verbum adbreviatum. The Chanter took a strong position in relation to 
positive law within the Verbum: ‘Positive justice has nothing solid about 
it’ is one heading. This was the case because so much controversy followed 
the feeling and will of judges, producing additions to God’s ‘clear laws’ 
(certae leges).12 In his chapter ‘Against the burdensome multitude of human 
traditions [tradicionum humanarum]’ the Chanter set out three types of 
problematic tradition:
There are three types of tradition [tradicionum]: those which are illicit and the 
invention of the Devil rather than man and are completely contrary to God’s 
law; those which are licit and useful but seem to go contrary to divine precepts, 
as some monastic traditions and so are dubious; others do in fact go contrary 
to God’s law and harm by their sheer number and so should be rather avoided, 
for they make transgressors out of the disobedient.
The problem is in the right arrangement of a hierarchy of divine to human 
demands and the proper privileging of evangelical precepts. The Chanter’s 
general position seems a minimalist one legislatively: ‘[Traditions] should 
only be established sparingly and minimally for manifest reasons and utility, 
since they are an impediment to divine precepts and seem to set up barriers 
to them’.13
The problem of untangling this hierarchy of commitments can be illustrated 
by Courson’s handling of Jepthath’s vow (Judges XI: 29–40). The spirit of the 
Lord comes over Jepthath, who bargains with God, promising that if God 
will give the Ammonites over to him ‘then whoever comes out of the doors 
of my house to meet me, when I return victorious from the Ammonities, 
shall be the Lord’s, to be offered up by me as a burnt-offering’. It is Jepthath’s 
daughter who greets him on return, of course, and, after two month’s grace to 
bewail her lost life, she returns home willingly and is burnt.
12 Petrus Cantor, Petri cantoris parisiensis verbum adbreviatum, textus conflatus, ed. M. 
Boutry (CCCM, cxcvi, Turnhout, 2004), p. 337 on marriage laws (§  1.51) (henceforth, 
Chanter, Verbum). For the theologians’ complex position on law, see further P. Buc, 
L’ambiguïté du livre: prince, pouvoir, et peuple dans les commentaires de la Bible au Moyen Âge 
(Paris, 1994), pp. 239–70; K. Chambers, ‘“When we do nothing wrong, we are peers”: Peter 
the Chanter and twelfth-century political thought’, Speculum, lxxxviii (2013), 405–26, at p. 
424.
13 For this and the previous quotation, see Chanter, Verbum, p. 514 (§  1.77). Thomas 
of Chobham uses ‘institutum’ for practical human solutions to problems (e.g. covering 
the wine cup and altar and celebration of the eucharist indoors to avoid spiders and bird 
droppings in the wine (Thomas of Chobham, Summa confessorum, ed. F. Broomfield 
(Analecta mediaevalia namurcensia, xxv, Louvain, 1968), pp. 138–9 (A. 4 d. 2 q. 6.4)).
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Courson discusses this in the context of evaluating a given vow’s 
‘necessity’. Does a public vow to kill whatever comes through the door first 
trump an earlier or more necessary Christian vow to follow the Decalogue 
and gospels (Do not kill; love your neighbour)?14 Courson asks various 
questions. Was it Jepthath’s punishment because he had actually hoped his 
detested wife would come through the door? What if a dog had come out 
of the door first? 
Solution: We say that Jepthath’s vow was made indiscretely and against God. 
No vow expressed like this is binding, but in such cases a wrongful oath should 
be repented; the spirit of the Lord did not come into Jepthath to make the vow, 
because in this matter he simply was not led by the familiar counsel of the Holy 
Spirit, as with Samson and Abraham. If the Spirit came into him it was before 
he took the oath, namely to attack the enemy.15 
A means of differentiating the good from bad comes from the Chanter. 
This is the so-called ‘triple truth’ of life, doctrine and justice.16 The Chanter 
takes truth of life to be ‘not only that without which eternal life cannot be 
had, but also that which it cannot easily be had without’. Doctrinal truth 
is clear enough: I should create a scandal rather than obeying a bishop who 
has forbidden me from declaring that he has been covertly preaching heresy. 
Defending the truth of justice entails not only that the law’s precepts and 
judgements should be preserved per se, but also that one should ensure they 
are not despised since this will undermine them in the long run. Hence a 
prelate who has ‘noble horses and precious trappings from the Crucified’s 
patrimony’ may scandalize those who see him. Nevertheless, he should not 
discard them since ‘if I had vile clothing and appeared as one cast down and 
contemptible, and not like those who punish the delinquent, at once my 
14 Courson discusses the Chanter’s threefold structuring of the vow according to (1) what 
is fundamental to a Christian, e.g. baptism; (2) voluntary vows obligatory once taken, e.g. 
vows of continence, but some types of which may be dispensed with; (3) lesser third vows 
of necessity which can be dispensed with (BNF, MS. lat. 14524, fos. 79vb–80ra (§ 21.4)). See 
also Petrus Cantor, Summa de sacramentis et animae consiliis, ed. J.-A. Dugauquier (Analecta 
mediaevalia Namurcensia, iv, vii, xi, xvi, xxi, 3 vols in 5, Louvain, 1954–67), iii, pt 2a, pp. 
200–6 (§ 224) (henceforth, Chanter, Summa).
15 BNF, MS. lat. 14524, fo. 80rb–80va (§ 21.7).
16 BNF, MS. lat. 14524, fo. 87ra–b (§ 25.4) and Chanter, Summa, iii, pt. 2a, pp. 375–7 
(§ 319). Courson attributes the formulation to Jerome but this cannot be corroborated with 
the Patrologia latina database. For further discussion, see C. Nemo-Pekelman, ‘Scandale 
et vérité dans la doctrine canonique médiévale (XIIe– XIIIe siècles)’, Revue historique de 
droit français et étranger, lxxxv (2007), 491–504. Cf. its use by a subsequent generation of 
theologians in William of Auxerre, Summa aurea Magistri Guillelmi Altissiodorensis, ed. J. 
Ribaillier (Spicilegium Bonaventurianum, xvi–xx, 5 vols in 7, Paris, 1980–7), iii, pt 2, pp. 
1020, 1026, 1029, 1030, 1033 (§ 3.52 on scandal). See pp. 221, 232 below.
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subjects would become disobedient and do evil and thus I would be unable 
to exercise justice, and thus my subjects’ truth of life would be endangered 
since they would have the grounds to sin [because I was not enforcing the 
law]’.17 Such formulations both show the wide latitude created to safeguard 
Christian doxa but also the socially canny pragmatism applied by these 
activists to the systems in which they envisaged intervening.
Institutions and the problem of shared meaning
For Courson, then, the problem of institutional life is a holistic one, 
complicated by the fact that communities may construct institutional 
practices of which theologians disapprove –  be they local customs, legal 
procedures or dietary rules. He acknowledges quite plainly the socially 
constructed meanings and practices, but in his chapter on perplexity argues 
that real perplexities arise only from incompatibilities of experience (de 
facto), not from incompatibilities of law (de iuris): ‘Perplexity of law is said 
to be where superficially authorities and canons contradict one another, 
but which can be resolved into concord through the rule of the Old and 
New [Testament], and thus nothing legal can be perplexing because no 
one can be in such a state that the law cannot come to his aid, and that he 
cannot obtain the grace to repel all perplexity’.18 Reality, not law, produces 
perplexities. Those realities are secured by human convention and Courson 
recognizes that particular practices are the product of collective agreement 
and that one has to engage with this, whether one is opposed to or supportive 
of that agreement.19 
These social systems are strong and tricky to intervene in. They may have 
their own logic; and distinct versions of apparently shared practices can 
facilitate misapprehension across groups.20 Suppose you visit a monastery 
where the custom is to eat meat on the sabbath. There is a risk, if you 
decline, that you will be called a ‘Cathar or Papelard’ (that is, a heretic or 
an unorthodox extremist).21 Courson determines ultimately that the risk 
17 Chanter, Summa, iii, pt. 2a, pp. 377 (§  319). There is a striking contrast with 
contemporary mendicant attitudes here. See Emily Corran’s chapter in this volume for a 
parallel discussion of the triple truth at p. 221..
18 BNF, MS. lat. 14524, fo. 90rb (§ 26.3). Cf. the more technical approach to perplexity in 
the very slightly later William of Auxerre, Summa aurea (between 1215 and 1229, probably 
by 1218), v. 16 (dating discussion), iii, pt. 2, pp. 1044–54 (§ lv, ‘de perplexitate’). For William 
see Young, Scholarly Community, ch. 3 and appendix.
19 On institutions as human conventions, see the discussion of John Searle in the 
introduction at p. 428.
20 BNF, MS. lat. 14524, fos. 88va–90ra (§ 25.15–21).
21 BNF, MS. lat. 14524, fo. 88vb (§ 25.16).
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of being thought a Cathar does not outweigh the risk of scandal if you eat 
the meat (this example is analysed further below). The relevant point here 
is that being taken (incorrectly) for a heretic would again be a product of 
the social (mis-)construal of what such eating means. A similar case is that 
of a priest enjoined by the ‘king of the land, his bishop and the custom 
of the land’ to ‘bless the white-hot iron and water used in judgement’ 
when this was theologically problematic since it tempted God to intervene 
inappropriately (temptatur Deus). Here Courson answers, as he does in 
other cases, that one should follow the custom of the realm even when the 
practices are diabolical (diabolice inuentiones).22 
Another set of potential misunderstandings arises when there is 
disagreement about a shared conceptual definition: for instance, the idea of 
‘notoriety’, which Courson discusses in the context of fraternal correction.23 
He criticizes those ‘moderns’ (quidam modernorum) who think that 
something is not notorious unless ‘it has been made manifest by conviction 
or confession in law’.24 Courson’s preference is for a more ‘common-sensical’ 
approach, in which legal conviction or confession is not always necessary. 
Those are two of three ways someone can be condemned as notorious, but 
notoriety should also be sufficiently clear when ‘evidence of crime is so great 
that nothing can be hidden by subterfuge, as with the Corinthians’ [sexual] 
crime and the crime [in the Gospels] of selling doves in the church’.25 Nor 
is the problem simply definitional, since such disagreement leads (at least 
here) to argument about the structure of the social practice with which it is 
connected (fraternal correction).
The socially joined-up nature of these institutional practices is both a fact 
and a potential problem when groups have different versions of them. A 
number of external aspects seem important when Courson determines how 
such institutions should work. First, publicity may considerably alter how 
far an institution should be observed. Second, the status of given groups 
within a community may likewise inflect how practices should play out 
because of how the community will react subjectively, given that status. 
Third, this is at the same time an admission that the institutions with which 
one has to live are imperfect and sub-optimal. Let us look at some instances. 
First, publicity can be determinative. Against the idea that the strong 
internalization of a vow is key to its efficacy, it is the publicly affirmed 
vow which can be compelled because it has been externally affirmed: 
22 BNF, MS. lat. 14524, fos. 91vb–92ra (§ 26.8–9). 
23 BNF, MS. lat. 14524, fo. 78ra (§ 20.9).
24 BNF, MS. lat. 14524, fo. 78ra (§ 20.9) and fo. 79ra (§ 20.11) for the reference to moderns, 
also fo. 78rb–78va.
25 BNF, MS. lat. 14524, fo. 78va (§ 20.10).
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‘Thus if someone publicly avows continence orally, or that he will enter 
a cloister, the Church can compel him to fulfil such a vow, even if he had 
not firmly formed this in his mind, but rather the opposite’.26 The social 
solemnities of vows can enhance and strengthen their tightness because of 
the dependence of the solemnity of such vows on its wider reception: ‘We 
concede to this, saying that the solemnities in vows oblige those vowing to 
the vows’ fulfilment more since the solemnities intensify the effect of the 
vow and its nature more than a greater intention and make a vow-breaker 
more guilty’.27 This solemnity is inextricably connected to publicity and the 
establishment of the vow as a collective institution. Thus, vows to go on 
pilgrimage or crusade are taken ‘in the face of the Church before the altar 
or between the hands of a priest or abbot and such vows oblige more than 
private ones, as is proven by the contrary, that the transgression of such 
[vows] offends both God and the Church more than the transgression of 
a private vow. Therefore, we accept that a solemn vow obliges more than 
a private one’.28 The effect is a somewhat relativistic, or variable, position 
with respect to the institution (here vow-taking) in which publicity affects 
the standing of the vow.
Courson develops this by saying, second, that the standing of different 
groups affects institutions differentially: these are ad status institutions, so 
to speak. It is not quite that there are rules particular to specific status 
groups (though there are). It is rather that Courson thinks the way in 
which an institution should be expressed shifts in light of context-sensitive 
concerns about the status of the actors involved. The majority of these are 
clerical status groups, but there are other criteria or groups, especially those 
differentiated by intellect and power. These are nicely brought out when 
discussing liabilities to undertake fraternal correction:
Just as a man need not render his marital debt to his wife at all times nor 
conversely (because of many impediments which we might discuss elsewhere), 
so many reasonable factors may intervene because of which it is not necessary 
for a private person to be obligated to correct someone greater. Suppose 
someone is an imbecile, or a simple cloister monk, or a private person with no 
ability to approach a prince; if their life is infamous such that no one would 
receive them, if they are excommunicate, if they are held in prison, or prevented 
by innumerable other invincible reasons [then they could not]. However, if 
a learned person is in a cloister, and the subversion of the faith or Church 
threatens, then he is bound to break his obedience to the abbot because of his 
26 BNF, MS. lat. 14524, fo. 79va (§ 21.3). 
27 BNF, MS. lat. 14524, fo. 80vb (§ 21.9).
28 BNF, MS. lat. 14524, fo. 80vb (§  21.9). The emphases are quite different to those 
analysed by Sylvain Piron in his chapter in this volume. 
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obedience to a greater, namely God, and set himself to the wall against heresy 
and for the house of God.29
There is a strong interest here in the socially determined effectiveness of how 
correction works. A private person lacks the authority to gain access to a 
prince. A learned person can correct by virtue of greater apparent insight. 
Both licences are ultimately granted by their audiences. The practicalities of 
applying a collective practice – fraternal correction – cannot be understood 
or implemented outside that shared system. 
The institution or organization to which one belongs also has a role 
in determining what one should do – principally if that institution is the 
Church and, as a priest or prelate, one acts as a synecdoche for it. The 
exemplariness of one’s social status provides a feedback loop to affect how 
one should respond to a problem or apply a given rule in a specific situation. 
Suppose:
there is a custom in many churches that clerics and monks eat meat on the 
sabbath. You are learned and deemed a person of great authority among them. 
The whole city is scandalized to see so great a convent of clerics and monks 
eating meat on such a day when the common laity never eat meat on such a day. 
If you eat meat on such a day with the others great will be the scandal because 
of you, because you are of so high a standing among them that your eating 
really will increase the scandal. If you do not eat you will offend the abbot or 
your bishop and the whole convent of clerics and monks who will call you a 
Cathar or Papelard. What are you to do in such a case? [Further cases follow 
before Courson’s resolution.] … We say that the abbot with his convent and 
the prelate with his clerics sin gravely by scandalizing the neighbourhood by 
eating meat on the sabbath and thus are bound to abstain from such eating in 
order to avoid so grave a scandal. And if you are learned and a person of great 
standing among them you should not consent to your prelate in eating flesh 
with him on such a day to the people’s scandal, following the example of the 
apostle Paul, who said, ‘If my food scandalize my brother I will never eat meat’ 
[1 Corinthians VIII: 13].30
The thought experiment is nicely tailored.31 The protagonist has social 
standing but no official role (or, if it is assumed he is a priest, an inferior 
one). On this ecclesiastical axis his status is inferior to that of his host, 
29 BNF, MS. lat. 14524, fo. 76va (§ 20.3), corrected with BNF, MS. lat. 3259, fo. 95rb–va.
30 BNF, MS. lat. 14524, fos. 88vb and 89va (§ 25.16 and 21), corrected with BNF, MS. lat. 
3259 fos. 111rb–112v.
31 Such thought experiments seem distinct from modern ones. Modern thought 
experiments aim to reduce the question to essentials (e.g. Rawls’s veil of ignorance); these 
medieval ones aim to achieve a more textured set of plural complexities. 
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who is, furthermore, literally at home in the customary setting he has 
established. His learned status nevertheless gives him a different axis along 
which to offer resistance to the dominant rules of the game in this particular 
community.
Scandal is an obviously interesting area within which to think about 
how wrongdoing is constructed. By its nature it is perhaps an extreme case: 
scandal is an ‘ex post facto’ institution. Like a joke, only your audience can 
tell you whether scandal is present: ‘So it is accidental whether the actual sin 
is scandalous, since if it is done before many people who are consequently 
led to consent to sin then it is a scandal. But if it is done in secret with no 
one else knowing then it will not be a scandal’.32 Publicity again matters, 
but so, too, does perception. At one level this can seem arbitrary; at another 
it is simply pragmatic. There is, of course, a risk, however, that perceived 
scandal, treated as an absolute bad, enables communities to resist behaviour 
or regulation which they may disingenuously claim undermines their faith. 
It is in such circumstances that the triangulations of the ‘triple truth’ would 
prove useful.
Such an attitude asserts absolute (if ambiguous) lines beyond which social 
practices must submit to external rules. At the same time the rules concede 
the imperfection of the world in which – as a priest, prelate, confessor – one 
intervenes and which is irredeemably social. This seems a third sub-text of 
Courson’s diagnostic operating assumptions. On the question of fraternal 
correction there may be an ideal rule, but in practice it should be applied 
discriminately: ‘It seems to us as we learnt it from the Chanter of Paris. That 
irrespective of whether someone is greater or lesser, free or servant, they are 
bound to correct their brother so that he is corrected with the zeal of justice, 
but not at all times or places, since there is a time for being quiet and a time 
for speaking, as Solomon says [Ecclesiastes III: 7]’.33 General rules can be 
very heavily qualified (as with the simple cloister monk above).
The degree, then, to which actual institutions have to accommodate 
themselves to the undesirable social dynamics of actual groups is a powerful 
feature of Courson’s analysis. An example which shows the messy literal 
intermixture of multiple concerns is the ‘very difficult question which we 
have often seen in practice’ of what to do when a prince or pseudo-prelate 
takes money to market as a melted mass which has been obtained from 
usurers through tailles and exactions and which is there re-coined and put 
back into circulation as legal tender:34 ‘It is asked, therefore, whether it is 
32 BNF, MS. lat. 14524, fo. 87ra (§ 25.3). 
33 BNF, MS. lat. 14524, fo. 76rb (§ 20.2).
34 For the quotations, see BNF, MS. lat. 14524, fos. 55va– 56ra (§ 12.1). See also Baldwin, 
Masters, Princes, i. 242–3.
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permissible for you or others to enter into market agreements involving 
this money’. Here Courson’s answer hinges on the actors’ knowledge or 
ignorance of these facts. An example illustrating the deformities arising from 
inappropriate intra-ecclesiastical group relations concerns ‘what a parish 
priest should do wanting to accuse a subject according to the prescribed 
form before a bishop who does not want to hear his accusation’.35 The 
‘prescribed form’ is the admonition in Matthew XVIII: 15–17: first privately; 
second with witnesses; and – for the incorrigible – third before the Church. 
The problem here is:
if the bishop does not want to hear the proof but inclines to the accused’s side, 
stroking his vice or dissembling, either out of flattery or fear of the prince, or 
because of some temporal good which he hopes from him. It is asked here what 
that priest ought to do about the subject whose care he has, when he can see 
that he is a putrid member scandalizing his whole parish and making the whole 
neighbourhood return to the vomit of sin. If he gives up on him the whole 
parish will be corrupted by him. But if he excommunicates him on his own 
authority at once the other will appeal to the court of the bishop who connived 
in his sin, and if the priest goes against the bishop’s mandate in this or otherwise 
he will be excommunicated and thrown out of his position, yet if he goes with 
the opposing side of the bishop and the excommunicate all of his remaining 
flock will be scattered, meanwhile he has no recourse to the metropolitan or 
cardinal or pope, since they will better believe a bishop than a shabby priest 
[sacerdoti pannoso].
The admission of institutional fallibility is frank. Courson comes close, 
though, to acknowledging that his solution remains locked within the 
original problem. All he can suggest is, again, the threefold admonition 
of the bishop and then recourse to the metropolitan, legate or pope, 
notwithstanding his earlier scepticism: ‘for we are not investigating here 
what happens, but what ought to happen’.36
The sub-optimal world of which socio-religious institutions are a product 
is simply part of life. Sub-optimal, too, is the degree to which they can be 
tailored to that world. The art of such tailoring lies less, however, in the 
flat application of a rule and more in fitting it contextually and shaping 
it flexibly.37 Here internal disposition can matter. Thus, in general with 
35 BNF, MS. lat. 3259, fo. 96vb (§ 20.7). 
36 This and the previous quotation can be found at BNF, MS. lat. 14524, fo. 77va (§ 20.7), 
corrected with BNF, MS. lat. 3259, fo. 96vab. See also the case of the lord so powerful no one 
dare act against him and whose purgation would be popularly deemed a sham (Sabapathy, 
‘Some difficulties’, pp. 185–7 (on § 25.22)).
37 E.g. in the context of the poor foreigner seeking judgement from an individual (BNF, 
MS. lat. 14524, fo. 87va (§ 25.7)). See Sabapathy, ‘Some difficulties’, p. 195.
211
Robert of Courson’s systematic thinking about early thirteenth-century institutions
genuine cases of perplexity, ‘when someone runs into such perplexities in 
fact [de facto] he should do whatever he can in a way that is always full of 
saving love and always choose the less undesirable of alternatives’.38 Take a 
church threatened with arson when you are inside and risk death. Here the 
question, in relation to your potential resistance, is whether you are perfect 
or imperfect, given that a summary execution for the criminal will follow if 
you cry fire. However, ‘if in fact you are imperfect it is licit for you to repel 
force with force and to call the neighbourhood in defence of the ecclesia and 
res publica. And then you have to strive in every way you can so that the 
person is not corporally punished, through your demonstration that you do 
nothing out of spiteful vindictiveness but only zeal for justice’.39
One could say this is a sort of medieval rational-choice theory in 
which achieving an acceptable but not optimal outcome is the order of 
the day, given the impossibility of the latter in a fallen world. However, 
understanding the correct relative value which should be placed on different 
goods was the underlying judgement, one it was crucial to make correctly, 
a process complicated by their interaction with one another.40 The Chanter 
concluded his chapter in the Verbum adbreviatum against those who ‘out 
of learning or crass ignorance’ soften the rigour of scripture by invoking 
Jerome on the unfruitful vineyard in Isaiah V and those who call the evil 
good and the good evil:
As Jerome says, it is no small error to rank the lesser good before the greater 
and more useful good. For a change [mutatio] in the order of merits changes 
the substance [forma]. Similarly, woe to those who call the greater evil the less 
evil, or the less evil the greater evil. I do not say this absolutely [simpliciter] but 
comparatively [comparacione] and with respect to the greater evil.41 
Calibrating action in an imperfect world so as to choose the lesser over the 
greater sin is a non-trivial and continuously necessary matter.42 
38 BNF, MS. lat. 14524, fo. 90va (§ 26.4).
39 BNF, MS. lat. 14524, fo. 106ra (§  30.5). See also the case of the psychopath in the 
woods: should an individual defend himself and kill him/her; or love, and not murder, this 
‘neighbour’ (BNF, MS. lat. 14524, fo. 88va (§ 25.14))? 
40 Cf. F. Morenzoni, Des écoles aux paroisses: Thomas de Chobham et la promotion de la 
prédication au début du XIIIe siècle (Paris, 1995), p. 97. 
41 Chanter, Verbum, pp. 548–9 (§ 1.78). 
42 The Chanter and Courson seem neighbouring points on a spectrum which can only 
be sampled here. Robert of Flamborough’s Liber poenitentialis (between 1208 and 1215) 
acknowledges the importance of established custom (e.g. §  178), the role of publicity 
(§  67) and the need for credibility to audiences (§  108) but questions are treated more 
individualistically (e.g. on sexual relations with sisters § 65) (Robert of Flamborough, Liber 
poenitentialis: a Critical Edition, ed. J. J. F. Firth (Toronto, 1971)). Peter of Poitiers’s post-
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Counsel and councils
In the light of the complexity and social sensitivity underlying Courson’s 
penitential thinking it is instructive to set it alongside another major area of 
activity, his acts as a legate and legislator. It is harder to find a more apparent 
contrast than with his actions at Morlhon (between Cahors and Rodez) 
during the Albigensian crusade against Occitan heresy in April and May 
1214. As the eyewitness historian Pierre des Vaux de Cernay wrote: 
There was in our army Master Robert of Courson, legate of the apostolic see 
… who had very recently come from French lands. Soon after his arrival our 
men advanced towards Morlhon and began to attack their enemies violently. 
The men of the citadel, seeing that they could not resist any more, handed 
themselves over to the legate to follow his every wish. Our men, at the legate’s 
behest, completely destroyed the castle. Nor should it go unmentioned that 
here we found seven heretics of that sect which are called Waldensians, who, at 
once being led to the legate, confessed to their disbelief [incredulitatem] fully 
and plainly. Seizing them, our pilgrims [peregrini, i.e., crusaders] burnt them 
with great rejoicing.43 
Weeks later, on 25 June, Courson held a council at Bordeaux, where one 
of the canons revived the third Lateran Council’s 1179 legislation against 
heresy (cap. 27).44 Here Courson reiterated the penalty of excommunication 
against routiers, heretics and murderers as well as their receivers, supporters, 
teachers and defenders, in addition to sixty days of indulgence for those 
opposing them.45 As Baldwin noted, the tension between the nuanced 
1215 Compilatio praesens tends to be more definitional than exploratory, but addresses a 
wider social nexus at points (e.g. § xxviii on confessors who fear to absolve knights who 
retain tithes; also esp. § li) (Peter of Poitiers, Compilatio praesens, ed. J. Longère (CCCM, 
li, Turnhout, 1981). In his Liber poenitentialis (pre-1191–1203), the older Alain of Lille (b. 
c.1120/1130?) stresses a moderating, medicinal approach, arguably bridging older approaches 
and newer ones (Alain of Lille, Liber poenitentialis, ed. J. Longère (Analecta mediaevalia 
Namurcensia, xvii–xviii, 2 vols, Louvain, 1965)). See also Corran, Lying and Perjury, pp. 
88–90.
43 Petri Vallium Sarnaii Monachi Hystoria Albigensis, ed P. Guébin and E. Lyon (3 vols, 
Paris, 1926–39), ii. 207–8 (§ 513).
44 Conciliorum oecumenicorum generaliumque decreta. Editio critica, ii.i: The General 
Councils of Latin Christendom: From Constantinople IV to Pavia-Siena (869–1424), ed. A. 
García y García et al. (Turnhout, 2013), pp. 145–7. For such re-transmission as an active 
process by recipients, see D. Summerlin, ‘The reception and authority of conciliar canons 
in the later-twelfth century: Alexander III’s 1179 Lateran canons and their manuscript 
tradition’, Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte, Kanonistische Abteilung, c 
(2014), 112–31.
45 Foedera, conventiones, litteræ, et cujuscunque generis acta publica, ed. T. Rymer (4 vols in 
7, 1816–69), i, pt. 1, p. 122.
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discrimination of Courson’s counsel and the simple sharpness of conciliar 
precept could be striking.46 
More interesting implications lie behind the basic explanation (different 
fora with different purposes produce different guidance). The Chanter and 
his collaborators’ generation began to think concertedly about the sorts 
of practical problems produced by the theological agenda emerging at the 
end of the twelfth century.47 The 1179 and 1215 Lateran statutes wanted to 
regulate all Christendom (and the difference between the statutes shows 
the growing ambition). Their resurgent ambition to scale up such attention 
did not, however, entirely converge with their ability to do so. Courson’s 
mise-en-scène often concedes this: a marginalized, isolated priest, lacking 
reinforcements, deep in enemy territory, having to make complicated 
cost-benefit decisions, sometimes at risk to his life. This was typical of 
the period in many places before the coming of the friars and their mass 
preaching, as far as that went. It was two years after Courson’s death 
before there were Dominicans in his home country, five before there were 
any Franciscans.48 If Courson’s Summa illustrates the hair-fine attention 
theologians would have liked to give perplexed parishioners, his legislation 
indicates the broad brush needed when working at scale. At Bordeaux 
Courson regulated across a fragmented France, indeed, in English-held 
Guyenne.49 There was a gulf between the vistas of such statutes and the 
smaller-scale counselling of concrete communities and individuals which 
Courson’s Summa takes as its horizon. Courson sat at the crux of an 
interesting imbalance between ecclesiastical ambition and ability. The sheer 
monumentality of 1215 encourages a temptation to suppose it marks the full 
winding-up of ecclesiastical mechanisms which could then run themselves 
46 On judgements of blood at Lateran IV, see Baldwin, Masters, Princes, i. 190–1.
47 In terms of broad pastoral responsibility there is a longer continuity: see S. Hamilton, 
‘Penance in the age of Gregorian reform’, Studies in Church History, xl (2004), 47–73; W. H. 
Campbell, ‘Reconciliation in thirteenth-century England’, Studies in Church History, xl 
(2004), 84–94; W. H. Campbell, The Landscape of Pastoral Care in 13th-Century England 
(Cambridge, 2017); R. Springer, ‘Prelacy, pastoral care, and the instruction of subordinates 
in late twelfth-century England’, Studies in Church History, lv (2019), 114–28. In terms of 
theological concern with heresy, orthodoxy and thresholds of Christian literacy, the late 
12th century does seem to mark an ambitious turn: N. Bériou, L’avènement des maîtres de la 
Parole: La prédication à Paris au XIIIe siècle (2 vols, Paris, 1998), i. 15–21.
48 J. R. H. Moorman, Church Life in England in the Thirteenth Century (Cambridge, 
1955), pp. 368–70. For their novelty, see The Historia Occidentalis of Jacques de Vitry, ed. J. F. 
Hinnebusch (Fribourg, 1972), pp. 158–63 (§ 32).
49 O. Guyotjeannin, ‘L’intégration des grandes acquisitions territoriales de la royauté 
capétienne (XIIIe – début XIVe siècle)’, in Fragen der politischen Integration im mittelalterlichen 
Europa, ed. W. Maleczek (Vorträge und Forschungen, lxiii, Ostfildern, 2005), pp. 211–39.
214
Individuals and Institutions in Medieval Scholasticism
(out?).50 However, if Lateran IV set parameters, there are no grounds for 
thinking it magically flicked the ecclesiastical lights on across Europe, in 
France any more than elsewhere. It has been powerfully argued that c.1200 
marks the end of a long incremental process establishing the Church as the 
necessary physical space for European sacramental reification and religious 
orientation.51 Be this as it may, there remained much long, slow, repetitive 
work needed to bridge local practices and desires on the one hand and 
ecclesiastical expectations and aspirations on the other, none of which 
had foregone conclusions.52 The period may be better thought of not as a 
settlement terminating the Gregorian reforms but as a hinge, a time when 
many political actors were buttressing multiple and potentially conflicting 
modes of power with not-yet-clear consequences.53 
Is there, then, a real contrast between the absolutes of Morlhon and the 
more nuanced approach of Courson’s Summa? Three points may be made. 
First, power or coercion mattered in the operation of medieval pastoral 
care, just as in more obvious coercive forms of legislation or military action. 
There are plenty of absolutes in the Summa. These were different means to 
similar ends. Nevertheless, the pastoral mode required a more empathetic 
engagement with local concerns and norms, even when theologians like 
Courson might disagree with them. Thus, second, while there is a tension 
between the Morlhon-Courson and the Summa-Courson, there is not a 
paradox. (In Courson’s view the heretics of Morlhon clearly broke the truth 
of life and doctrine after all.) What makes this tension interesting was that 
Courson stressed the difficulty of generally elaborating rules as a means of 
resolving the particular, bizarre and ‘de facto’ problems of human life. It may 
appear ironic that someone who drafted reforming statutes for provincial 
50 E.g. R. I. Moore, The First European Revolution c.900–c.1215 (Oxford, 2000), pp. 180–1, 
but cf. p. 174. For different models for thinking about the Church institutionally, see I. 
Forrest, ‘Continuity and change in the institutional Church’, in The Oxford Handbook of 
Medieval Christianity, ed. J. H. Arnold (Oxford, 2014), pp. 185–200; and Forrest’s ‘social 
church’ model as developed in I. Forrest, Trustworthy Men: how Inequality and Faith Made 
the Medieval Church (Princeton, N.J., 2018), outlined at pp. 4–6.
51 D. Iogna-Prat, La Maison Dieu: un histoire monumentale de l’église au Moyen Âge (rev. 
edn, Paris, 2012), pp. 23, 401–2, 613–17.
52 For an explanation of how this worked in England, see Forrest, Trustworthy Men. His 
basic argument is that the practical gulf between the episcopal Church and its localities 
post–1200 was bridged by a series of accommodations and liaisons between ecclesiastical 
authorities and local parish elites, but that it was these elites, which the Church could deem 
trustworthy, which were fundamental. For a complementary argument published as this 
chapter was completed, see J. M. Wayno, ‘Rethinking the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215’, 
Speculum, xciii (2018), 611–37.
53 These issues are discussed in my forthcoming analysis of 13th-century Europe, The 
Cultivation of Christendom.
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Churches, which in turn influenced ecumenical councils, took the more 
general position that greater elaboration of rules did not automatically 
equal greater elucidation of the problems they were supposed to address. 
However, finally, in the particular circumstances of this transitional period 
there may well be grounds for thinking that in his later legislative acta 
Courson was merely taking his pragmatic satisficing of moral dilemmas 
onto a new level. If, in due course, counselling such as the Summa envisaged 
was needed generally, at least now, faute de mieux, Bordeaux-type legislation 
would do.54
Systematic and social thinking
Had Sir Richard Southern finished his great summa on scholastic humanism 
and the unification of Europe it seems likely he would have cast his thirteenth-
century narrative as one of ‘increasing difficulties encountered, especially 
from the middle of the thirteenth century onwards, by those who aimed 
to make the system complete in substance and operation’.55 In Southern’s 
account, central to these difficulties was scholars’ compulsion for both 
completeness and order, since ‘systematization requires selection, selection 
requires omission, and omission impairs completeness’.56 Historians of 
scholasticism need not agree with Southern’s chronology, nor with his 
suggestion that from 1200 (or even 1160) onwards developments in learning 
had only increasingly ‘marginal and often conspicuously deleterious effects 
on the conduct of government’ (though this certainly places Courson’s 
generation at an interesting juncture).57 
It is, nevertheless, very interesting to think about Southern’s stress on 
completion and system in light of the ‘Biblical-moral’ group. He said little 
specifically about them, grouping the Chanter with Hugh of St Victor, Peter 
Lombard and other ‘representatives of a scene of intellectual development 
over a century, diversified in their contributions, but consistently developing 
towards a final statement of systematic truth. They were the heralds of the 
54 For Innocent III’s attitude, cf. H. Grundmann, Religious Movements in the Middle 
Ages: the Historical Links Between Heresy, the Mendicant Orders, and the Women’s Religious 
Movement in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Century, with the Historical Foundations of German 
Mysticism, trans. S. Rowan (Notre Dame, Ind., 1995 [1961 edn.]), p. 50.
55 As described on the hardback cover of R. W. Southern, Scholastic Humanism and the 
Unification of Europe (2 vols, Oxford, 1995–2001), ii.
56 Southern, Scholastic Humanism, ii. 54. 
57 Southern, Scholastic Humanism, ii. 5. His argument was that the ambitions of 
government became too great, its literate elite’s pretensions unsustainable. Cf. R.W. 
Southern, Robert Grosseteste: the Growth of an English Mind in Medieval Europe (2nd edn, 
Oxford, 1992), pp. 270–81, 285–91. Southern seemed to indicate inconsistent chronologies 
of decline. See also Emily Corran’s comments about this style’s longevity in this volume.
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final consummation of all knowledge within the reach of human enquiry’.58 
Did Courson’s Summa seek completion in terms of giving a ‘final statement 
of systematic truth’? At one level that position can be defended: Courson 
did work systematically through a range of penitential problems, dynamics 
and sacraments.59 However, the systematic nature of Courson’s thought is 
different. The ‘completion’ he sought was not so much in exhaustiveness of 
treatment or resolution as in a holistic acknowledgment that pastoral care 
and reform needed to mesh with the actual social systems which themselves 
constructed how communities understood those penitential and sacramental 
phenomena. Beryl Smalley characterized this biblical-moral group as being 
focused on the ‘art of the possible’ and systematic pragmatists would be a 
good way of describing them.60
The thinking of this particular generation and group is, therefore, better 
evaluated for its attempt to engage with its particular milieux and less as 
an unfulfilled anticipation of later trends. The rich detail Baldwin implied 
was compensation for the lack of structure in this style of thought arguably 
becomes central to its diagnostic method. God was in the detailed – and 
interminable –  puta, esto, item through which Courson explored his 
precepts and problems. One of the striking, and engaging,  things about 
the so-called biblical-moral scholars of Paris is neither their biblicalism 
nor their moralism, but rather their engagement with experience – the de 
facto. That engagement arises from the mediation they sought between 
actual individuals and social practices, reflecting on and wrestling with the 
systemic complexity of what they thought being a Christian should mean 
in early thirteenth-century France.
58 Southern, Scholastic Humanism, i. 190.
59 Kennedy, ‘Contents of Courson’s Summa’.
60 B. Smalley, The Gospels in the Schools c.1100–c.1280 (London, 1985), p. 115.
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9. ‘Better to let scandal arise than to relinquish the 
truth’: the cases of conscience of the masters of Paris 
in the thirteenth century
Emily Corran
This volume addresses the ways in which institutions ‘did or did not 
constrain, enable and inflect the substantive thinking of individuals’ (see 
the introduction to this volume, p. 25). A number of the chapters explore 
this theme by identifying ways in which scholastic authors developed their 
own position within the boundaries imposed by institutional loyalties. 
Fitzpatrick’s and Linde’s chapters in this volume, for example, show how, 
at the turn of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, scholastic debate 
simultaneously pushed forward intellectual arguments and defined the 
parameters of disputes between Dominicans, Franciscans and the secular 
clergy. In contrast, quodlibets dealing with cases of conscience, the subject 
of this chapter, are something of an exceptional case in scholastic thought: 
moral quodlibets usually did not correspond directly to the syllabus organized 
around commentaries on the Sentences and they addressed questions which 
were not in the strictest sense theological, but which related to pastoral care. 
This chapter argues that responses to moral quodlibets should be understood 
neither as personal responses to a controversy, nor as attempts to carve out a 
position in a debate between rival ‘schools’. Rather, they are best explained 
as interventions within a separate genre of penitential thought and have a 
close relationship with manuals for confessors. In penitential manuals, the 
imperative on the author was less to devise appropriate responses to open 
questions and more to offer practical advice on how one should act. This 
was no less true of the moral quodlibets answered by theology masters. 
When masters gave responses within this genre, they found themselves 
constrained and enabled by institutions, but in a rather different way from 
when they answered questions in other kinds of theology. 
The practice of quodlibets first appeared in the 1230s and came to be 
a biannual event which took place in Advent and Lent and in which the 
audience, made up of students, masters and the general public, were invited 
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to pose any question they liked for debate. On the first day arguments were 
proposed for and against; and on the second occasion the regent master 
gave a resolution.1 Almost from the beginning practical moral problems 
were among the questions addressed in quodlibets;2 and especially from the 
1250s onwards moral dilemmas (‘cases of conscience’) became a frequent 
feature. These questions have been a fertile source for intellectual historians. 
Palémon Glorieux pointed out the importance of quodlibets for accurately 
tracking the progression of arguments over time: quodlibets tend not to 
represent a theologian’s most detailed treatment of a subject, but they are 
repetitive (we often have records of several quodlibets given by a master 
over several years) and can be precisely dated, thus allowing the historian 
to demonstrate the chronology of an argument.3 More specifically on moral 
questions, Elsa Marmursztejn and Ian Wei have argued that these quodlibets 
mark a transformation in the university masters’ authority.4 From the 1260s 
onwards theology masters answered questions on the ethical duties of a 
theology master, including questions on the morality of choosing university 
disputation over active pastoral care, the formation of future prelates and 
the proper lifestyle of a master. Their responses to these questions set out a 
vision of university masters as sources of moral authority and advice for the 
rest of the clergy, as well as possessors of what Alain Boureau has called ‘a 
vocation for judging all things’.5 Many moral quodlibets deliver penitential 
verdicts on commercial transactions, questions of Church and state, oaths, 
vows and war, to name but a few examples. On this basis, Marmursztejn goes 
so far as to speak of the theology masters in Paris as a new form of normative 
1 P. Glorieux, La Littérature quodlibétique de 1260 à 1320 (2 vols, Kain and Paris, 1925–35), 
i. 18–20; J. F. Wippel ‘Quodlibetal questions, chiefly in theology faculties’, in Les Questions 
disputées et les questions quodlibétiques dans les facultés de théologie, de droit et de médecine, 
ed. B. C. Bazàn et al. (Typologie des sources du Moyen Âge occidental, xliv–xlv, Turnhout, 
1985), pp. 153–222; a passage on procedure and format is at pp. 158–62; J. Hamesse, 
‘Theological quaestiones quodlibetales’, in Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages: the 
Thirteenth Century, ed. C. Schabel (Brill’s Companions to the Christian Tradition, Leiden, 
2006), pp. 17–48.
2 Guerric of Saint-Quentin answered a few questions on moral dilemma in his 5th and 6th 
quodlibets, which took place between 1233 and 1242 (Glorieux, La Littérature quodlibétique, 
ii. 109–11). 
3 Glorieux, La Littérature quodlibétique, i. 66, 70–5. 
4 I. P. Wei, Intellectual Culture in Medieval Paris: Theologians and the University, c.1100–
1330 (Cambridge, 2012), pp. 174–9; E. Marmursztejn, L’autorité des maîtres: Scolastique, 
normes et société au XIIIe siècle (Paris, 2007), pp. 21–82.
5 A. Boureau, ‘Intellectuals in the middle ages, 1957–95’, in The Work of Jacques le Goff 
and the Challenges of Medieval History, ed. M. Rubin (Woodbridge, 1997), pp. 145–55, at p. 
155. 
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power alongside the secular clergy and lay authorities.6 A larger argument 
about the masters of Paris during the turn of the thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries notes the increasing frequency with which the French monarchy 
and the papacy relied on Paris masters to deliver judgements on contested 
questions of doctrine and jurisdiction. One could cite William of Mâcon’s 
and Simon of Beaulieu’s use of arguments developed in the university of 
Paris during the secular-mendicant controversy in the 1280s, or Philip the 
Fair’s appeal to the university during the trial of the Templars. The rise in 
‘normative’ quodlibets coincided, then, with a wider acknowledgement of 
the Paris masters’ intellectual authority.7 
This chapter describes the influence of penitential thought on the 
masters’ moral quodlibets, with particular reference to questions involving 
the sin of scandal (of which more below). The debt to penitential writings 
in these university debates adds important nuance to our understanding of 
the masters’ authority, since the significant innovation in moral thought 
was going on in the pastoral writings of this period, rather than in the 
theology faculty. When Paris masters were asked moral questions, as often 
as not the same question had already been addressed in a confessors’ manual 
and the master would rarely answer a question in a different way from the 
penitential text. Even when the question posed was entirely specific to the 
university, the Paris masters would answer along lines similar to questions 
already treated in penitential literature. 
This has implications for understanding Parisian intellectual culture, but 
also for one branch of scholastic thought. In these quodlibets we can see 
part of a larger intellectual development, namely the creation of a discipline 
of scholarly moral advice which would eventually beget the casuistry of the 
seventeenth century. Casuistry – an academic discipline of moral questions 
for confessors – did not exist by that name or as a recognized genre in the 
thirteenth century. However, in quodlibets like these and in similar genres, 
including canon law and confessors’ manuals, we can see that there were 
common conventions for addressing moral problems which had the qualities 
of a distinct genre by this time. Hence moral quodlibets are important in the 
development of an institution, in the sense of a lasting common practice. 
Theology masters did not explicitly acknowledge they were participating in 
an institution of this kind when they responded to casuistical quodlibets, but 
they participated in a style of reasoning held in common among themselves 
and the authors of penitential thought more generally. 
6 Marmursztejn, L’autorité des maîtres, p. 265.
7 R. W. Southern, ‘The changing role of universities in medieval Europe’, Hist. Research, lx 
(1987), 133–46; A. Destemberg, L’honneur des universitaires au Moyen Âge. Étude d’imaginaire 
social (Paris, 2015). 
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Scandal
The medieval concept of scandal does not map directly onto the modern 
meaning. The word itself comes from the Greek for a ‘trap’ or ‘snare’ and 
its moral-theological meaning derived primarily from Gregory the Great’s 
sixth-century homily on Ezekiel which said that a person in authority should 
not lead others into sin, even if his words or actions are not inherently 
sinful.8 Scandal, as it came to be understood, was the fault of leading other 
people to sin through one’s own words or actions, or bringing disrepute 
to the Church.9 A famous medieval case of scandal taken from Gratian’s 
Decretum involved a priest who openly kept a concubine. As well as the 
sin of clerical marriage, he was guilty of scandal, because his actions would 
cause his parish to lose faith in the holiness of the clergy.10 The term scandal 
appears quite often in judicial judgements in ecclesiastical courts of the 
late middle ages.11 It was a way of determining whether a crime should be 
dealt with in a public court or was a private matter of conscience.12 If, for 
example, a priest has had an affair about which nobody knows, the canon-
law court would say that it would cause scandal if the crime became known: 
it would damage the souls of the people in the community, therefore 
the priest should do penance in private. On the other hand, if there is a 
notorious crime – for example, someone has punched a priest in public 
with many witnesses – then this has to be dealt with in a public procedure, 
because it will cause scandal to the many if it appeared that the crime had 
gone unpunished.13
As well as this legal definition, the concept of scandal was the subject 
of a theological and penitential debate about the relative importance of 
public harm and personal integrity in moral dilemmas. Gratian discussed 
8 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologia, in Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, iv–xii (Rome 
1886–1906), IIa–IIae, q. 43, a. 1; Hostiensis [Henry of Susa], Summa Aurea (5 vols, Venice, 
1574), i. col. 165 (Tit. De renunciatione, no. 9). On scandal see R. H. Helmholz, ‘Scandalum 
in the medieval canon law and in the English ecclesiastical courts’, Zeitschrift der Savigny-
Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte, Kanonistische Abteilung, xcvi (2010), 258–74; A. Fossier, ‘“Propter 
vitandum scandalum”: histoire d’une catégorie juridique (XIIe–XVe siècle)’, Mélanges de 
l’École française de Rome. Moyen Âge, cxxi (2009), 317–48; C. Nemo-Pekelman, ‘Scandale 
et vérité dans la doctrine canonique médiévale (xiie–xiiie siècles)’, Revue historique de droit 
français et étranger, lxxxv (2007), 491–504.
9 Nemo-Pekelman, ‘Scandale et vérité’, p. 492. 
10 Decretum Gratiani, dist. 33, c. 5. in E. Friedberg (ed.), Corpus Iuris Canonici (2 vols, 
Leipzig, 1879–81; repr. 1959), i. cols. 123–4; cf. Nemo-Pekelman, ‘Scandale et vérité’, p. 495. 
11 Helmholz, ‘Scandalum’, pp. 263–8.
12 A. Fossier, Le bureau des âmes. Écritures et pratiques administratives de la Pénitencerie 
apostolique (XIIIe–XIVe siècle) (Rome, 2018), ch. 8. 
13  Helmholz, ‘Scandalum’, pp. 264–7.
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these matters to a certain extent, but it was Peter the Chanter, a master of 
the Paris schools at the end of the twelfth century, who made the subject 
interesting. It is not surprising that Peter the Chanter was the first to 
deepen the discussion about scandal in his Summa de sacramentis et animae 
consiliis, since the point of this treatise, unlike his more popular preaching 
manual, the Verbum adbreviatum, was to move quickly through the obvious 
and well-known teaching on penitential matters in order to dwell on the 
more difficult problems. In the case of scandal, Peter the Chanter talks 
briefly about the canon law cases in which a priest commits crimes, such as 
simony and fornication, and causes scandal in the community, but moves 
quickly on to a subtler set of problems.14 These concern actions which are 
not inherently sinful but nevertheless cause suspicions among the general 
public which could lead them into scandal and sin. The formula he offers to 
solve these problems are the three truths: one should always avoid scandal, 
unless it endangers a truth of life, justice or doctrine.15
One such case is a woman who forms the pious intention not to marry, 
to avoid the company of men and to observe a fast. These actions are good 
in themselves, but if they cause her neighbours to think she is a Cathar, 
then that might lead to scandal. A woman who causes scandal in this way, 
says the Chanter, should either enter a convent or agree to marry (an action 
which is not in itself sinful). Marrying would not ruin a ‘truth of life’, 
which is to say, it would not be sinful; and so the woman should choose this 
course of action so that scandal can be avoided.16 In a second dilemma, the 
Chanter quotes the case of a prelate who keeps fine horses, wears precious 
ornaments and employs a number of lawyers and jurists in order to regulate 
his diocese. This causes scandal among his subjects because they see him 
spending money on this instead of helping the poor. However, in this case 
it is better to allow the people to be scandalized because if the prelate wore 
cheap clothes, or appeared lowly and contemptible, or had no one to punish 
wrongdoers in his diocese, this would prevent the truth of justice, by which 
the Chanter means he would be unable to exercise justice in his diocese.17 
Peter the Chanter’s teaching was influential on his immediate circle of 
students. For example, Robert of Courson also had cases on scandal in his 
Summa: should a preacher declare truths which will offend the audience and 
cause scandal? Should a judge give a verdict on a foreign poor man’s case 
14 Petrus Cantor, Summa de sacramentis et animae consiliis, ed. J.-A. Dugauquier (Analecta 
mediaevalia Namurcensia, iv, vii, xi, xvi, xxi, 3 vols in 5, Louvain, 1954–67), iii, pt. 2a, pp. 
372–81 (§ 318–21) (hereafter Chanter, Summa).
15 Chanter, Summa, iii. pt. 2a. pp. 376–7 (§ 319). See also pp. 204–5 above.
16 Chanter, Summa, iii. pt. 2a. p. 376 (§ 319).
17 Chanter, Summa, iii. pt. 2a. pp. 376–7 (§ 319). See also pp. 204–5 above.
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if he risks angering the local rich men, or should he instead find an excuse 
to delay the case to avoid scandal? If two men have been promised the 
same benefice, should the benefactor worry about causing one of the men 
scandal when he is inevitably disappointed?18 Peter the Chanter’s teaching 
was significant for its content – he was the first to introduce the idea of 
the three truths, as far as we know – but it was no less important because 
of its innovative methodology. His thought was unremittingly ordered 
towards practical courses of action, rather than theoretical completeness. 
These cases are as much about how to apply the rules in particular cases 
as they are about establishing ethical principles.19 This kind of reasoning 
about what a person should do is very unusual for a scholastic enquiry. 
Riccardo Quinto gave a definition of scholasticism as a specialized way of 
reading texts which strives to resolve logical contradictions in order to find 
the truth.20 This works in most cases but it was not Peter the Chanter’s 
method: when he answered these problems, he did not refer to an apparent 
contradiction between texts, but instead an apparent contradiction between 
moral imperatives in a practical situation. The Chanter’s methodology was, 
therefore, an exceptionally empirical pocket of scholastic thought. 
Scandal in penitential literature
Peter the Chanter’s and Robert of Courson’s distinctively practical approach 
had a fairly limited influence among the next generation of theologians; 
and within the university the case-of-conscience method appeared to be in 
danger of falling into disuse in the second quarter of the thirteenth century. 
The big names of the following generation – Stephen Langton, Geoffrey 
of Poitiers, William of Auvergne – focused their teaching on the more 
theoretical aspects of theology rather than the practical issues involved in 
moral dilemmas.21 Nevertheless, the Chanter’s legal-theological approach, 
the distinctively practical way of addressing problems, did also appear in 
confessors’ manuals and pastoral literature during these years. Significantly, 
penitential writing had a wider diffusion outside the university, such that 
it could claim to be a more influential kind of normative writing. This 
meant that when theology masters later answered questions on scandal 
in quodlibets, they were conscious of a popular precedent in the pastoral 
tradition, particularly confessors’ manuals such as Raymond of Peñafort’s 
18 Robert of Courson, Summa (Paris, BNF, MS. lat. 14524, fos. 87rb–88rb (§ 25.4, 7, 12)).
19 Cf. John Sabapathy’s chapter in this volume, which draws a distinction between 
coherent and consistent thinking.
20 R. Quinto, ‘Scholastica’: storia di un concetto (Padua, 2001), p. 416.
21 E. Corran, Lying and Perjury in Medieval Practical Thought: a Study in the History of 
Casuistry (Oxford, 2018), pp. 88–90.
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Summa de casibus (1225/1227, revised 1235–6) or John of Freiburg’s Summa 
confessorum (1297–8). 
Like the late twelfth-century theology masters, confessors’ manuals 
continued to use many aspects of case-based practical ethics. Raymond 
of Peñafort included a series of practical dilemmas in each chapter of his 
Summa de casibus with the intention they should demonstrate to a confessor 
how to deal with ambiguous sins. Raymond had a pragmatic, case-by-case 
approach: he quotes the rule about avoiding scandal except in cases of a 
truth of life, doctrine and justice. If a religious man finds himself the subject 
of suspicion, even though he has a clean conscience he is morally obliged to 
try to explain his intentions in order to prevent any chance of scandal. He 
should try to convince people of his good intentions; and only if they are 
determined to find fault with his behaviour should he stop trying to explain 
himself to them.22 If a multitude are in a state of sin – for example, a crowd 
persistently refusing to pay tithes or taking part in duels and tournaments – 
should the bishop excommunicate them all if they refuse to be corrected?23 
Raymond suggests that if the crowd know they are in the wrong but refuse 
to stop, the bishop should pass over the matter in silence in order to avoid 
a schism. Instead, he should send written threats and try to win back the 
wiser, more powerful sinners and so break down the resistance gently. If, 
on the other hand, they refuse to acknowledge they are sinning, then the 
bishop should treat them more severely.24 As in Peter the Chanter’s cases, 
the question is what to do in extraordinary circumstances and how to weigh 
principle against pragmatic effect. 
The inclusion of cases on scandal in the Summa de casibus meant that 
these ideas became widespread and accessible. Raymond of Peñafort’s 
manual was dispersed across Christendom and remained in use throughout 
the middle ages, which ensured that the subject remained in the clerical 
vocabulary. There was the beginning of a consensus about what scandal 
is and how a cleric in a position of responsibility should either avoid it or 
allow it to happen, something which would not have been the case if Peter 
the Chanter alone had been interested in the theological implications of 
scandal. All this is significant. There was a type of thought which was quite 
specialized and dedicated to solving a certain kind of moral problem. It 
appeared in areas of intellectual writing which were particularly concerned 
with confession and clerical duties and had influence beyond the university. 
22 Raymond of Peñafort, Summa de poenitentia et matrimonio cum glossis Ioannis de 
Friburgo (Rome, 1603; repr. Farnborough, 1967), p. 355 (iii.30.3).
23 Raymond of Peñafort, Summa de poenitentia et matrimonio, pp. 355–6 (iii.30.4), with 
details from William of Rennes’s Apparatus.
24 Raymond of Peñafort, Summa de poenitentia et matrimonio, pp. 355–6 (iii.30.4).
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The university of Paris and pastoral care
With this background in mind, we can turn to questions of scandal in 
quodlibets in Paris.25 We can see that the quodlibets approach moral 
problems in the same way as these earlier pastoral writings and writings 
in the circle of Peter the Chanter. They answer practical, moral dilemmas 
which are particularly relevant to responsible churchmen; and, like the 
confessors’ manuals, there was a preference for difficult circumstances. The 
debt to the earlier pastoral writings was so important that the theology 
master often simply restated or paraphrased teachings which had already 
been developed in confessors’ manuals.
The answers elicited by such questions appear problematic for an 
intellectual historian in that they often say very little which is really new. 
Quodlibets are often described in the secondary literature as sparring grounds: 
occasions when masters could work out their positions on controversial 
matters and position themselves against other schools of thought.26 This 
does not apply to moral problems. Many of the questions on practical, moral 
decisions in fact seem remarkably safe and do nothing to improve on the 
pastoral manuals they quote. For example, there is a collection of practical 
quodlibets containing the determinations by a number of different masters 
which was donated to the Sorbonne by Bishop Nicholas of Bar. One master 
determined on a question which appears in both Raymond’s Summa and 
Hostiensis’s chapter on penitence in the Summa aurea: a wife has a child in 
adultery and brings it up as her husband’s first son. Is she obliged to admit 
the deception to her husband? The quodlibet simply restates Raymond of 
Peñafort’s solution.27 The same collection includes standard questions on 
the duty to reveal the truth under oath and the morality of saving a life by 
lying, again with no real originality in the responses. 
It is not in itself surprising that some quodlibets were not innovative: 
the masters could not control the choice of questions and could not have 
provided a new answer on every possible topic. Yet, these moral quodlibets 
also had a function which was rather distinct from that of their more 
controversial metaphysical or ecclesiological counterparts. These were real-
life problems: what was required was simply good advice rather than novelty. 
A philosophical opinion ceases to be relevant once everyone has conceded 
it to be true; not so a moral opinion, since people can be repeatedly or 
25 The following section draws on arguments in Corran, Lying and Perjury, pp. 119–23.
26 Glorieux, La littérature quodlibétique, i. 63–6.
27 Iohannes de Murro, Quodlibet 1.4: ‘Queritur si constante matrimonio mulier ex 
adulterio suscipiat filium, vir suus credat esse suum et mulier in confessione dicat sacedoti 
sic esse, utrum sacerdos debeat ei dicere quod filium illum repellat a se et quod dicat talis 
non debet esse heres?’ (BNF, MS. lat. 15850, fo. 23va).
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continuously troubled by essentially the same dilemmas. Masters were being 
asked to provide reassurance as much as a contribution to a debate. This can 
be seen in a quodlibet by Berthaud of Saint Denis, who was asked whether it 
was sinful to dissimulate instead of carrying out fraternal correction because 
of scandal.28 The situation he had in mind was the following: a responsible 
superior knows he ought to correct a subordinate but is worried what the 
man’s reaction to correction will be. Berthaud gave advice similar to that of 
William of Rennes in his Apparatus: if a prelate and those below him fail to 
correct their brothers for reasons of negligence, they are culpable; but if they 
omit or hide the correction for justified prudential reasons, their actions 
are praiseworthy.29 However, with a well-chosen quotation from Augustine, 
Berthaud fleshes out the recommendation. He warns that a prelate might 
be afraid his reproaches will be met with anger; he may fear that the subject 
he corrects will either abuse him to his face or complain behind his back.30 
The prelate should dismiss all such fears: as Augustine says, it often happens 
that the person being corrected is initially upset and disputes the criticism 
but, when he considers the matter again quietly, realizes his own error and 
changes his actions.31
The answer is conventional in that it restates well-worn pastoral teaching. 
No one was going to disagree. It seems fair to conclude that Berthaud 
simply meant to strengthen the resolve of his audience, which certainly 
included people who would be called upon to make such decisions. The 
response is best seen in the context of the culture discussed above of 
consulting theologians, especially in the university of Paris, as experts in 
matters of spiritual jurisdiction and pastoral care.32 It is Berthaud’s wisdom 
and authority, rather than his dialectic prowess, which were sought. He 
took the question to refer not to hypothetical principles but to a concrete 
decision involving personalities and predictable reactions. This was the 
28 Berthaud of Saint Denis, Quodlibet 1.8 (BNF, MS. lat. 14726, fo. 174rb, edited in 
Corran, Lying and Perjury): ‘Utrum aliquis propter scandalum dissimulans a correptione 
fraterna peccet dissimulando?’ (pp. 172–7). 
29 ‘Credo autem quod peccant Episcopi, et inferiores praelati, ad quos pertinet huiusmodi 
admonitionem facere: (inferiores enim eam possunt facere, etiam si sint simpices sacerdotes, 
curati tamen; cum constitutio illa non specificet, quod ab episcopo sit facienda) si per 
negligentiam, aut alias corrupta intentione omittant eam facere; si autem ex iusta causa 
omittant, quia forte vident ibi multorum stragem iacere, vel aliud simile, non peccant’ 
(cf. William of Rennes’s Apparatus to Raymond of Peñafort, Summa de poenitentia et 
matrimonio, p. 360 (iii.30.9), at v. ‘Suspenditur’).
30 Berthaud of Saint Denis, Quodlibet 1.8, in Corran, Lying and Perjury, p. 174 [§ 5].
31 Berthaud of Saint Denis, Quodlibet 1.8, in Corran, Lying and Perjury, p. 174 [§ 6]. 
32 This was a culture the masters of Paris actively fostered themselves (Wei, Intellectual 
Culture in Medieval Paris, pp. 174–9; Marmursztejn, L’autorité des maîtres, pp. 21–82). 
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way in which masters habitually dealt with pastoral quodlibets: here they 
participated in a discipline devoted to procedure in practical decision-
making. The intellectual work involved was somewhat distinct from the 
theologian’s usual bread and butter. By the late thirteenth century, when 
these quodlibets took place, the answer to the various categories of dilemma, 
including scandal, had become fairly conventional and established.
A theology master’s duty to avoid scandal
The rest of this chapter concerns the quodlibets on scandal which touched 
particularly on a master’s duty to teach in the light of official bans on certain 
subjects. A number of moral quodlibets asked questions about whether a 
master should run the risk of causing scandal to his audience by teaching on 
doctrine which had been forbidden by a local bishop. By virtue of coming 
very close to the bone for the masters who answered these questions and 
of being bound up with some specific events, these are the questions on 
scandal which most closely affected the masters who commented on these 
problems. As such, they are a revealing final example of the form of moral 
teaching which masters offered in quodlibets. 
During the final quarter of the thirteenth century there was a growing 
fear among responsible ecclesiastics that disputation might not always lead 
smoothly to a clear solution. It had become apparent that contentious 
papal privileges had generated fruitless argument. A council of masters in 
Paris in December 1286 forbade masters from answering any ‘provocative 
question’ (quaestio litigiosa) and Godfrey of Fontaines ascribed the decision 
to a desire to stem the tide of argument about mendicant confession.33 Fear 
of theological error consequent on irresponsible use of philosophical texts 
motivated a number of condemnations of doctrine. Most notably, the bishop 
of Paris, Étienne Tempier, banned a series of philosophical propositions in 
1271 and more extensively in 1277, with automatic excommunication for 
those who taught them.34 There were condemnations in Oxford in 1277, 
1280 and 1282 to 1283; London in 1286; and Paris in 1314 and 1316–17.35 
These events had various practical and moral implications for the theology 
masters, depending on which side they found themselves in institutional and 
doctrinal disputes. Some masters were stung because they chose to continue 
discussing a matter they had been warned off: Jean de Pouilly’s teachings 
33 Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodlibet 4, q. 13, in Godfrey of Fontaines, Les quatre premiers 
quodlibets de Godefroid de Fontaines, ed. M. de Wulf and A. Pelzer (Louvain, 1904), p. 276. 
This quodlibet is the only source for this council. 
34 There is an extensive bibliography on this subject, the seminal study being R. Hissette, 
Enquête sur les 219 articles condamnés à Paris le 7 mars 1277 (Louvain, 1977). 
35 Southern, ‘Changing role of universities’, p. 139.
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on the mendicant privilege were condemned at Avignon in 1321; theology 
masters had been told to stop discussing the privilege in 1290 by the then 
papal legate Benedict Gaetani.36 Others, like John Peckham and Peter John 
Olivi, accused their rivals of deliberately using superfluous and misleading 
arguments in the face of authoritative pronouncements to the contrary. Still 
others were asked questions on condemned articles or forbidden legislation 
and so had to choose whether to perpetuate stale quarrels and to defy a 
prohibition.37 Henry of Ghent recounts a situation in which the papal 
legate positively told him to teach a contentious doctrine – the plurality 
of forms – without publicly condemning the opposing view (Henry was 
himself unsure about this doctrine).38 Luca Bianchi has described the 
hostile atmosphere of censure and self-censure which followed the 1277 
condemnations and in which many masters refused to answer sensitive 
questions.39 Given this range of experience and agendas, one might expect 
a number of different perspectives on the ethics of teaching a contentious 
doctrine and the question of disguising one’s true views. Quodlibets asked 
whether a master should respond to litigious questions, whether he was 
morally obliged to teach the whole truth, or whether he could refuse to 
teach a truth he knew to be beneficial.40 However, a detailed look at the 
cases shows that the masters were not tempted to advocate either widespread 
concealment or defiantly ‘free speech’. They universally applied the same 
moderate set of teachings taken from the casuistical tradition on scandal.
The consensus about the ethical duties of a theology master turned on 
weighing the possible benefit of a lesson against any likely harm it could 
36 On both of these cases, Southern, ‘Changing role of universities’, pp. 135–7.
37 See Henry of Ghent’s comments to questions on angels in P. Porro, ‘Doing theology 
(and philosophy) in the first person: Henry of Ghent’s Quodlibeta’, in Schabel, Theological 
Quodlibeta, pp. 171–231, at p. 194.
38 L. Hödl, ‘Neue Nachrichten über die Pariser Verurteilungen der tomasischen 
Formlehre’, Scholastik, xxxix (1964), 178–96, at pp. 183–5.
39 L. Bianchi, Il vescovo e i filosofi: La condanna parigina del 1277 e l’evoluzione 
dell’aristotelismo scolastico (Bergamo, 1990), pp. 31–5.
40 Quodlibets on this subject not discussed here include: Gerard of Abbeville, Quodlibet 
10, q. 3, ‘Utrum arguenda non arguere sit peccatum?’ (BNF, MS. lat. 16405, fo. 80ra–rb); 
Henry of Ghent, Opera omnia, ed. R. Macken et al. (multiple vols, Leuven, 1979– ), xvi. 
91–3 (Quodlibet 12, q. 16, xvi: ‘Utrum scholastice docens falsum ex sinistra affectione 
motus peccet mortaliter?’); Servais of Mont Saint Éloi, Quodlibet 1, q. 55, ‘Queritur de 
peccato magistri in theologia disputantis de quolibet, qui renuit accipere questionem sibi 
propositam quia tangit aliquos quos timet offendere, peccet in hoc mortaliter?’ (BNF, MS. 
lat. 15350, fo. 281rb); Hervaeus Natalis, Quodlibet 2, q. 16, ‘Utrum magister in theologia 
tractans questiones curiosas et dimittens utiles non peccat mortaliter?’ (Hervaeus Natalis, 
Quodlibeta (Venice, 1513; repr. Ridgewood, N.J., 1966), fo. 65v).
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cause. Richard of Mediavilla’s 1296 quodlibet was typical.41 He was asked 
whether a master must accept a question which will bring ill will on him, 
given that the question is a useful one to know. In his response Richard was 
studiously bland. A master was guilty of mortal sin if he refused to answer 
a question with a bearing on true faith and morals, especially if he thought 
he could avert scandal by answering the question. He only sinned venially if 
he refused a question which could be beneficial to his audience, but which 
had no bearing on faith. He acted well if he refused to answer a question 
which would cause no benefit to faith if he answered it, but probably would 
cause argument, scandal and bad judgements. Such a solution could offend 
no one. It affirmed the theology masters’ vocation for explaining unclear 
questions of faith yet conceded that it might be permissible to refuse a 
question on occasion. It admitted the social nature of the judgement: 
if teaching on a matter would only lead people into further sin, then it 
was permissible to suppress the truth. The answer thus allowed pragmatic 
obedience to condemnations and prohibitions on given articles. Which 
questions exactly should be refused was left diplomatically undetermined; 
it was up to the individual to judge which topics were more harmful than 
beneficial. 
This opinion was echoed on all sides of various disputes. Henry of 
Ghent, for example, had been vocally in favour of the theology masters’ 
right to dispute the mendicant privilege. He was one of the theologians 
who formulated the 219 condemned articles in 1277.42 When he was asked 
in 1286 whether a master sins mortally if in public he does not answer a 
question to which he knows the answer, he follows the same casuistical 
precedents.43 He prefaces his response with a restatement of the law of 
scandal: scandal should always be avoided unless a truth of life, justice or 
doctrine is endangered. He describes the moral character of a master in 
terms of a duty towards teaching the truth.44 A teacher must only assume 
his office in order to help the ignorant (propter imperitos).45 He describes 
in detail the sin which is involved in teaching falsehood, or in failing to 
41 Richard de Mediavilla, Quodlibet III, ed. and trans. A. Boureau (Paris, 2017) pp. 298–
303 (q. 23), commentary at p. lxxv. Glorieux gives the date 1286 (La littérature quodlibétique, 
i. 270–1).
42 Henry of Ghent, Opera omnia, vi. 67 (Quodlibet 2, q. 9).
43 Henry of Ghent, Opera omnia, xiv. 304–7 (Quodlibet 10, q. 16: ‘Utrum doctor sive 
magister determinans quaestiones vel exponens scripturas publice peccet mortaliter non 
explicando veritatem quam novit?’); discussion in Marmursztejn, L’Autorité des maîtres, p. 
60.
44 Henry of Ghent, Opera omnia, xiv. 306 (Quodlibet 10, q. 16, ll. 44–5).
45 Henry of Ghent, Opera omnia, xiv. 306 (Quodlibet 10, q. 16, ll. 42–4). 
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explain difficult matters of faith to the people.46 This would be equivalent 
to failing to point out a hidden precipice to an unsuspecting traveller who 
is in danger of falling to his death. However, when he came to the decision 
on whether to teach a truth which might harm those listening, he was no 
less pragmatic than Mediavilla: one must be willing to hide the truth in 
order to save a soul.47 
When Henry was later asked, either in Advent 1291 or Lent 1292, ‘whether 
the power of prelates should be disputed by masters’, the question was even 
more topical.48 The year before, Cardinal Benedict Gaetani had rebuked the 
Parisian masters for doing just this when the university masters had criticized 
Martin IV’s privilege allowing Franciscans to hear confession without 
seeking the permission of the local bishop. Gaetani responded astringently 
that masters had no right to criticize the privilege and denied them any 
role in deciding matters of doctrine or Church government.49 Henry of 
Ghent himself had been prominent among the masters who had wished to 
amend the legislation; it was his feathers which were ruffled by Gaetani’s 
rudeness. He is reported to have complained about the contradiction that 
masters who disputed the word of God should not be permitted to discuss 
the pope. Gaetani reportedly suspended Henry from teaching (although, 
clearly, he was teaching again the following year).50 This is the background 
to his quodlibetical question in 1291/2. It is a work of rhetoric meant as 
self-justification against his opponents. However, what is controversial in 
his answer lies in its implications, not what it overtly concludes about the 
moral dilemma. Once again he argues for a prudent, subtle approach to 
disputing difficult questions and concealing harmful truths.
Henry starts by establishing his own bona fides. Those who dispute 
the power of prelates with a view to diminishing their jurisdiction are 
completely in the wrong: they are like those philosophers who tried to 
reduce the power of God and Christ with their Averroistic arguments.51 The 
comparison is self-interested: Henry of Ghent had himself been among the 
group of theologians under Étienne Tempier who had drawn up the list 
of condemned Averroist doctrines in 1277. Henry is, therefore, reminding 
46 Henry of Ghent, Opera omnia, xiv. 306 (Quodlibet 10, q. 16, ll. 49–60). 
47 Henry of Ghent, Opera omnia, xiv. 306 (Quodlibet 10, q. 16, ll. 61–9).
48 Henry of Ghent, Opera omnia, xx. 147–54 (Quodlibet 15, q. 15: ‘Utrum licitum sit 
magistris disputare de potestate praelatorum?’; cf. Marmursztejn, L’autorité des maîtres, pp. 
71–3; Wei, Intellectual Culture in Medieval Paris, pp. 181–2).
49 Southern, ‘Changing role of universities’, p. 136.
50 H. Finke, Aus den Tagen Bonifaz VIII: Funde und Forschungen (Münster, 1902), Quellen, 
pp. iii–vii.
51 Henry of Ghent, Opera omnia, xx. 148–9 (Quodlibet 15, q. 15, ll. 26–53).
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those present that he has in the past been a defender of the bishop’s power 
over errant philosophers. No one could accuse him of arguing doctrine 
merely for the sake of pride or secular curiosity.
Disputing prelates’ power in order simply to know better what those 
powers are and in order to judge when it is right to obey them is, on the 
other hand, entirely licit and beneficial, according to Henry.52 He does not 
mean that matters agreed by universal councils should be dragged back into 
doubt. Rather, prelates should be happy for those matters to be disputed 
which need it, since they will then know exactly which powers they can 
exercise and which they should not. Subjects will know when they should 
obey their prelates and when they should, rather, disobey.53 Henry quotes 
Bernard of Clairvaux and St Matthew to show that subjects must judge 
when to obey their superiors.54 He concludes that if a prelate is seen to 
discourage disputation of any of his powers, the validity of that power will 
be held suspect: he compares such a prelate to Mohammed, who, aware 
of the shakiness of his own doctrine, banned his followers from disputing 
his law.55 All this contrives to make a prelate who denies masters’ right to 
dispute Church legislation (as Benedict Gaetani had seemed to do) look 
petty and insecure. 
Henry certainly criticizes prelates who try to control discussion of the 
truth; the response was an apology for the free intellectual activity of 
university masters. However, what Henry concretely says about the moral 
dilemma of whether always to reveal the truth does not venture into any 
unexpected territory. Boiled down, his argument is that a master should 
not dispute powers if his intentions are evil, but should do so if he means 
to serve the Church and foresees that his comments will be useful. Henry 
makes the conventional provisos: if a question has reached the point at 
which further disputation is unhelpful, masters should withhold their 
comments. This is the case for Nicholas III’s constitution on the Franciscan 
rule.56 There is no advantage to be gained from disputing a truth which no 
one doubts. The Talmud, for example, was only produced when Jewish law 
was placed in doubt through the influence of Christianity and philosophy.57 
It is not the moral teaching itself but its application in a particular case 
which is the source of controversy. Henry objected to Benedict Gaetani 
telling the masters what they should and should not dispute, but his view 
52 Henry of Ghent, Opera omnia, xx. 150 (Quodlibet 15, q. 15, ll. 87–90).
53 Henry of Ghent, Opera omnia, xx. 150–1 (Quodlibet 15, q. 15, ll. 91–109).
54 Henry of Ghent, Opera omnia, xx. 151–2 (Quodlibet 15, q. 15, ll. 110–23). 
55 Henry of Ghent, Opera omnia, xx. 152–3 (Quodlibet 15, q. 15, ll. 139–42). 
56 Henry of Ghent, Opera omnia, xx. 153 (Quodlibet 15, q. 15, ll. 144–51).
57 Henry of Ghent, Opera omnia, xx. 153–4 (Quodlibet 15, q. 15, ll. 151–66). 
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on dissimulation was nuanced: he neither argued for bringing out the truth 
at all costs, nor denied that dissimulation, even a prelate’s ban on disputing 
forbidden articles, could sometimes be advisable.
By contrast, Godfrey of Fontaines’ allegiances were different. He appears 
largely to have supported masters who gave opinions on the mendicant 
privilege. He praises those who chose to give an opinion in spite of the ruling 
by Paris masters against further disputation; those who refused to answer on 
the question, he says, ‘may be excused to some extent’.58 More significantly, 
he disapproved of the bishop of Paris’s condemnations of 1277. Later in life 
he would criticize them as an impediment to students’ progress, a cause 
of scandal among those studying and an obstruction of good doctrine.59 
In his seventh quodlibet, in 1290, Godfrey answers a question on whether 
a theology master should teach an article of doctrine which he believes 
to be true if the same article has been condemned by the local bishop.60 
More than Henry of Ghent or Richard of Mediavilla, Godfrey’s personal 
circumstances led him to consider defying authority more concretely and 
we can detect a current of disapproval against bishops. 
It is clear from the outset that Godfrey was talking exclusively about 
Étienne’s condemnations. He concedes initially that a master should avoid 
publicly affirming the condemned articles, but should remain silent about 
both the false doctrine approved by the bishop and the condemned true 
doctrine.61 However, when Godfrey went on to criticize the bishop who 
passed such legislation, his audience knew to whom he was referring. If a 
bishop publicly excommunicates anyone who professes a condemned 
opinion which is actually true, or which can be asserted as true by a probable 
opinion, his condemnation would be mistaken.62 It is not for an individual 
to disobey the condemnation – that would break the bond of obedience – 
but he must urge the prelate to revoke his decision.63 If the question is one 
necessary to salvation, on the other hand, and the master knows he is right 
58 ‘aliquo modo possunt excusari’ (Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodlibet 4, q. 13, in de Wulf 
and Pelzer, Quatre premiers quodlibets, p. 276).
59 Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodlibet 12, q. 5, in Les quodlibets onze-quatorze, ed. J. 
Hoffmans (Louvain, 1932), pp. 100–5.
60 Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodlibet 7, q. 18, in Les quodlibet cinq, six et sept, ed. M. de 
Wulf and J. Hoffmans (Louvain, 1914), pp. 402–5; cf. Marmursztejn, L’autorité des maîtres, 
pp. 69–71; Wei, Intellectual Culture in Medieval Paris, pp. 179–81.
61 Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodlibet 7, q. 18, in de Wulf and Hoffmans, Quodlibet cinq, six 
et sept, p. 403. 
62 Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodlibet 7, q. 18, in de Wulf and Hoffmans, Quodlibet cinq, six 
et sept, pp. 403–4.
63 Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodlibet 7, q. 18, in de Wulf and Hoffmans, Quodlibet cinq, six 
et sept, p. 404. 
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and the condemnation wrong, he must disobey the bishop openly. The sting 
in the tail is when Godfrey finally asserts that even if the master only believes 
himself to be right, but is actually mistaken, he must still teach what he thinks 
despite the excommunication.64 It is more important to follow one’s own 
conscience (even an erroneous one) than to hold back for fear of punishment. 
Despite the belligerent asides, however, the casuistical judgements 
remain the same. Godfrey concludes, like the others, that it is a question 
of balancing ultimate harm to those listening against the advantage of 
teaching. An inconsequent truth should not be endorsed at the expense 
of the order of the Church and a teaching necessary to salvation should be 
included whatever the consequences. These masters disagreed bitterly over 
theological doctrines to which the moral dilemma referred; they took up 
intransigent opposing stances on the mendicants’ privileges, the Franciscan 
vow and Thomistic propositions. Yet they were in accord when it came 
to the parameters of the moral dilemmas: they agreed it was a pragmatic 
decision and concurred on which circumstances were pertinent. They never 
deviated from the principles of scandal established in pastoral literature. In 
short, their use of casuistry was straightforward, even on occasions when 
the comments surrounding the practical advice were rather barbed. 
Moral arguments about scandal were a feature of several of the major 
controversies which would affect the Paris theology faculty in the late 
thirteenth century. Masters did not advocate dissimulation as a response 
to censures on philosophical positions, nor did they argue for telling the 
truth at all costs. On the contrary, these responses say remarkably little 
because of their emphasis on the necessity of making a personal judgement 
in the circumstances. The casuistry of scandal itself was not affected by the 
prohibitions or mutual blame. Some masters did defend their choice to 
conceal articles of philosophy, or to remain silent about legislation with 
which they did not agree, but they did not develop the casuistry for the 
purpose: they remained faithful to the principal of avoiding scandal except 
in cases of a truth of life, doctrine or justice. The moral reasoning was 
already well-established in its own right: it advised masters on how to make 
their decisions as individuals in remarkably neutral terms while the larger 
intellectual quarrels and institutional conflicts played out.
Conclusion
All this points to some conclusions about the conventions and expectations 
surrounding moral quodlibets in the thirteenth century. In the responses 
64 Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodlibet 7, q. 18, in de Wulf and Hoffmans, Quodlibet cinq, six 
et sept, pp. 404–5.
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discussed here, there is a clear distinction between the masters’ theological 
positions and their ethical reasoning. The former are, in each case, a personal 
set of judgements about doctrine: each theologian mentioned here had his 
own view on the big, controversial questions. At the same time they all 
took an interest in the procedure for deciding how a master should teach 
responsibly and agreed on all the important aspects: which considerations 
were pertinent to questions of scandal; to whom the teacher’s responsibilities 
were owed; when and on what subjects he should hold disputations. The 
masters who answered these questions were aware, in short, that a special 
kind of answer was required in questions of moral conscience. They 
were asked to engage with casuistical conventions in these cases, which 
foregrounded circumstantial deliberation and personal judgement. 
The term casuistry was not coined until the seventeenth century as a 
term of disparagement for Catholic – and particularly Jesuit – rules of 
confession. Nevertheless, the ‘thought style’ which came to be known as 
casuistry was fully in existence by the end of the thirteenth century. Thought 
about cases of conscience spread from one genre of scholarly discussion to 
another during the period: from theology masters and canon lawyers to 
penitential authors and back to theology masters. In terms of methodology, 
the late thirteenth-century masters’ approach to questions of scandal had 
more in common with penitential manuals than it did with their answers 
to the more abstract branches of theology. Considerable original thought 
about the resolution of moral thought had appeared in the work of authors 
such as Peter the Chanter and Raymond of Peñafort; when the theology 
masters came to address the same problems, they were more interested in 
applying this thought helpfully to their own problems than in developing 
new arguments. 
These conclusions nuance our understanding of the university masters’ 
authority. Marmursztejn talked about theology masters claiming an extra 
basis of authority and ‘intellectual jurisdiction’. The findings here suggest 
this was a more specific kind of jurisdiction than previously acknowledged. 
Masters engaged in an institution of counsel of conscience (consilium 
animae) when answering these questions. These were problems which 
constantly reappeared in life, but for which there was a standard means 
for arriving at an answer – and the masters simply restated this means and 
pointed out the possibilities for circumstantial variation. 
This discovery has implications for scholasticism as a discipline. 
Traditional definitions of scholasticism, particularly Riccardo Quinto’s, have 
emphasized factors such as scientific interest in knowledge for its own sake, 
the use of reason and in particular the analysis of texts for contradictions. 
Casuistry has some features of traditional scholastic method: it focuses 
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on contradictions; it is in a question-and-answer form. Yet, practical 
situations, not texts, are at its centre. Theology masters do cite relevant 
texts in their casuistic problems but their answers often lie in reconciling 
the circumstances of the case rather than the words of an authority. Cases of 
conscience permit us, therefore, to broaden the definition of scholasticism 
to include practical pastoral enquiry and to acknowledge that scholastic 
method could accommodate a degree of empirical thought. 
A final comment should be made about casuistry as an institution. In 
the late twelfth century, school masters like Peter the Chanter perceived 
the need for practical solutions to conflicts of duty involving the danger 
of scandal. He forged procedures on how to make moral decisions which, 
by the late thirteenth century, were second nature, thanks to a widely-
diffused penitential literature. University masters answering quodlibets 
on scandal dispensed their advice not primarily as great speculators but 
in their additional role as pastoral counsellors. It was characteristic of this 
style of reasoning that it was stable and explicit in stating a method for 
moral choice, but left it entirely to the individual to decide in a particular 
case, allowing room for personal adjustment. Because of this agreement in 
method across the genres, thirteenth-century casuistry, including the moral 
quodlibets of the theology masters, deserves recognition as an institution in 
its own right, in the sense of a lasting common practice. 
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10. Of parish priests and hermaphrodites: Robert 
Holcot’s discussion of Omnis utriusque sexus 
Cornelia Linde
The Dominican Robert Holcot (d. 1349) was one of the foremost theologians 
of his time. Witty, razor-sharp and challenging, his writings provide insight 
not just into the medieval lecture halls but also into modes of influence 
and interaction between individual and institutional thought. Holcot’s 
discussion of suitable confessors in his Super quattuor libros Sententiarum 
questiones, the focus of this chapter, provides an eloquent example of how 
an individual thinker introduced institutional thought, in this case that 
of the Dominican order, into a different institutional context, that is, the 
university’s, and thereby spread one institution’s ideas beyond its borders by 
propagating it through another institution.1
Robert Holcot spent his entire life in England. After joining the 
Dominican order, probably at Northampton, Holcot was sent to Oxford as 
a student around 1326, where he lectured on Peter Lombard’s Sentences in 
1331 to 1333.2 He was appointed regent master of theology at the university 
between 1336 and 1338.3 Between 1338 and 1340 Holcot, who was one of the 
‘classicizing friars’ studied by Beryl Smalley, established a close connection 
to the household of Richard Bury, bishop of Durham, through which he 
gained more access to classical literature.4 Holcot then lectured on the Book 
1 See also the introduction to this volume.
2 For Holcot’s life and works, see J. T. Slotemaker and J. C. Witt, Robert Holcot 
(Great Medieval Thinkers, Oxford, 2016), pp. 1–12. Slotemaker and Witt offer improved 
biographical information compared to that provided in the ground-breaking article by B. 
Smalley, ‘Robert Holcot O.P.’, Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum, xxvi (1956), 5–97, at pp. 
7–8.
3 Slotemaker and Witt, Robert Holcot, p. 2; F. Hoffmann, Die theologische Methode 
des Oxforder Dominikanerlehrers Robert Holcot (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie 
und Theologie des Mittelalters. Neue Folge, v, Münster, 1971), p. 1; and Smalley, ‘Robert 
Holcot’, p. 8, date his inceptio to 1334 and 1332, respectively.
4 Slotemaker and Witt, Robert Holcot, pp. 2–3. On Holcot’s use of the classics, see B. 
Smalley, English Friars and Antiquity in the Early Fourteenth Century (Oxford, 1960), pp. 
133–202.
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of Wisdom for two years, possibly as regent master at Cambridge, between 
1340 and 1343. His commentary on Wisdom made Holcot hugely famous 
and survives in over 100 manuscripts and several early printed editions.5 In 
1343 he returned to Northampton and over the next five years was regularly 
granted licences to hear confessions. He is said to have died of the Black 
Death while caring for the sick in 1349.6 
His commentary on the Sentences was Holcot’s earliest work, composed 
in the years 1331 to 1333 and re-worked a few years later during his regency.7 
In keeping with the fashion at Oxford at the time, Holcot commented 
not on the entire text of the Sentences but instead tackled select issues 
derived from the text by formulating and answering specific questions 
(quaestiones).8 Question 5 in book 4 addressed a problem close to the heart 
of the Dominican order: ‘Whether a penitent who has confessed his sins 
to a priest who has a general licence to hear confessions but who is not 
his own priest has to confess the same sins again to his own priest [proprio 
sacerdoti]’.9 The issue raised by Holcot had its origins in two interconnected 
developments dating back more than 100 years to the early thirteenth 
century: the Fourth Lateran Council’s call for annual confession and the 
rise of the mendicant orders. Holcot’s discussion in his quaestio revolves 
entirely around the interpretation of canon 21 issued by the Fourth Lateran 
Council in 1215, better known under its incipit, Omnis utriusque sexus: 
‘Every one of the faithful of both sexes [Omnis utriusque sexus fidelis] after 
reaching the age of discretion should at least once a year faithfully confess 
alone all their sins to their own priest [proprio sacerdoti]’.10 The crucial words 
5 Slotemaker and Witt noted that the evidence for Holcot’s regency at Cambridge stands 
on shaky ground (Robert Holcot, pp. 3–4); cf. Smalley, ‘Robert Holcot’, pp. 20–1. For the 
immediate success of Holcot’s Wisdom commentary, see J. C. Wey, ‘The Sermo finalis of 
Robert Holcot’, Mediaeval Stud., xi (1949), 219–24, at p. 219. Wey observed correctly that 
rather than lacking seriousness, the Sermo finalis is a sign of ‘the lighter side of university life 
which is both traditional and natural to students of all ages who are sane enough to possess 
a sense of humour’ (p. 219). See Slotemaker and Witt for the large number of manuscripts 
and incunabula (Robert Holcot, p. 10).
6 Smalley concluded her article on Holcot with the remark that upon Holcot’s death, ‘the 
future of theology in England lay with grimmer, narrower men’ (Smalley, ‘Robert Holcot’, 
p. 97).
7 Slotemaker and Witt, Robert Holcot, p. 3. Smalley dated the reworking to 1336 (‘Robert 
Holcot’, p. 7).
8 For this format, see Slotemaker and Witt, Robert Holcot, pp. 5–6.
9 R. Holcot, Super quattuor libros Sententiarum questiones (Lyons, 1497; used: London, 
British Library, IB.41933), sig. a ir–o vr, at sig. n iiivb. For a very brief discussion of this 
quaestio, and an outline of Holcot’s views on confession in general, see Slotemaker and Witt, 
Robert Holcot, pp. 111–18.
10 Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, ed. N. P. Tanner S.J. (2 vols, Washington, 1990), i. 
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in the Latin text are the final two, proprio sacerdoti, as it is on these two 
words and their interpretation that most debates about Omnis utriusque 
sexus hinge. A common – but by no means unchallenged – interpretation, 
both in the middle ages and also in modern scholarly literature, is that 
one’s own (proprius) priest is one’s parish priest. Such a definition would 
imply that each believer had to confess to his or her parish priest once a 
year. Since a parish priest can never be a mendicant, this interpretation 
of proprius sacerdos threatened to deprive the mendicants of substantial 
income and influence as well as sense of purpose. Up until Holcot’s time, 
however, the definition of what role mendicants were allowed to play in the 
framework of pastoral care, which the Dominicans in particular regarded as 
part of their order’s raison d’être, changed with almost every pope and was 
debated ever more hotly by seculars and mendicants.11 Unsurprisingly, then, 
Holcot’s discussion revolved around the correct interpretation of the phrase 
‘proprius sacerdos’.
The phrasing itself of the quaestio promises a powerful contribution to 
the continuing debate over the status of licensed mendicants as confessors, 
for it alludes to the key question of whether licensed mendicants can be 
truly suitable and acceptable confessors, or whether confession is only fully 
valid when made to one’s parish priest. For Holcot, the fact that there was 
even a discussion about whether or not one has to confess to one’s parish 
priest once a year rested upon a misguided interpretation of the canon.12 
Nicaea I to Lateran V, pp. 245–245*. Translation slightly adapted from M. C. Mansfield, The 
Humiliation of Sinners: Public Penance in Thirteenth-Century France (Ithaca, N.Y., 1995), p. 
66. The text of Omnis utriusque sexus, only the beginning of which is quoted here, spread 
widely and rapidly after its publication. It was integrated into synodal statutes and was 
commented on and discussed by canonists and theologians alike (N. Bériou, ‘Autour de 
Latran IV (1215): la naissance de la confession moderne et sa diffusion’, in Pratiques de la 
confession. Des Pères du désert à Vatican II. Quinze études d’histoire (Paris, 1983), pp. 73–93, 
at p. 80).
11 See Bériou, ‘Autour de Latran IV’. Bériou particularly stressed the role of Odo of Sully 
and Stephen Langton in implementing regular confession and promoting greater attention 
to the sacraments (p. 75). Peter Biller pointed out ‘that this great text, Omnis utriusque sexus, 
was not legislating in a vacuum. Rather, it was making something uniform out of the norms 
and practices of various regions, and universalising this for the Church as a whole’ (P. Biller, 
‘Confession in the middle ages: introduction’, in Handling Sin: Confession in the Middle 
Ages, ed. P. Biller and A. J. Minnis (York Studies in Medieval Theology, ii, Woodbridge, 
1998), pp. 1–33, at p. 8). For the non-innovative character of Omnis utriusque sexus, see also 
Bériou, ‘Autour de Latran IV’, p. 80. For a broad study of the history of penance, see T. N. 
Tentler, Sin and Confession on the Eve of the Reformation (Princeton, N. J., 1977).
12 Holcot, Super quattuor libros Sententiarum questiones, sig. n ivra: ‘In ista questione 
oritur tota difficultas pro maiori parte de illo capitulo de penitentia et remissionibus Omnis 
utriusque sexus’.
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Holcot, predictably, rejected the interpretation of proprius sacerdos in Omnis 
utriusque sexus as referring to one’s parish priest. Instead, by arguing for a 
more nuanced interpretation of proprius sacerdos, he defended the legitimacy 
of licensed mendicants as fully acceptable confessors.
At the beginning of his quaestio Holcot acknowledges that, according 
to Omnis utriusque sexus, once a year each member of the Church has to 
confess to his or her priest. Since it could be argued that a friar preacher 
or a friar minor is not one’s own priest, proprius sacerdos, one would 
technically have to confess the same sins again to one’s parish priest even 
if one had previously confessed to a licensed mendicant.13 However, this, 
in Holcot’s view, would be interpreting the relevant passage too narrowly; 
and he provides six reasons to show why Omnis utriusque sexus was never 
intended in this way. These six reasons refer directly to the trial against the 
secular cleric John of Pouilly, which took place only a decade before Holcot 
composed his commentary on the Sentences.
The trial against John of Pouilly, a master of theology at Paris, had its 
roots in the ever-changing papal legislation on hearing confession. Already 
in 1254 Innocent IV had drastically curtailed the friars’ right to hear 
confession in the bull Etsi animarum. Innocent died later the same year 
and was succeeded by Alexander IV, the former cardinal protector of the 
Franciscan order. Not entirely impartial in his attitude, Alexander rescinded 
Etsi animarum the following year. A major milestone was the bull Ad fructus 
uberes issued by Pope Martin IV on 13 December 1281. In it he granted 
the mendicants the right to hear confessions independent of the wishes 
or consent of local priests or bishops. As this had harsh consequences for 
parish priests, the secular clergy soon demanded that those who confessed 
their sins to mendicants should then have to confess once more to their 
parish priest, thus calling for double confession. The seculars also argued 
that Ad fructus uberes, like other pro-mendicant bulls concerning this topic, 
disrupted the order of the Church.14
The mendicant privilege of hearing confession was again restricted in 
1300, when Boniface VIII published Super cathedram, which revised the 
13 Holcot, Super quattuor libros Sententiarum questiones, sig. n iiivb: ‘Sed talis audiens ex 
commissione, sicut sunt predicatores et minores ab antiquo, non est proprius sacerdos, ergo 
non obstante confessione facta tali tenetur eadem peccata numero iterum confiteri proprio 
sacerdoti’.
14 J. Dunbabin, A Hound of God: Pierre de la Palud and the Fourteenth-Century Church 
(Oxford, 1991), p. 57. The bulls have been published in H. Denzinger, Enchiridion Symbolorum 
definitionum et declarationum de rebus fidei et morum. Kompendium der Glaubensbekenntnisse 
und kirchlichen Lehrentscheidungen. Lateinisch – Deutsch, ed. P. Hünermann (44th edn, 
Freiburg, 2014).
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existing legislation in favour of the seculars. While the seculars applauded 
this bull, it aroused the ire of the mendicants, as it restricted their earlier 
rights to preach in parish churches and hear confession. Now only friars 
who had been granted a special licence by the local bishop were allowed to 
hear confession and only in the narrowly defined region for which they had 
obtained the licence. In addition, they had to share their income from, for 
instance, performing funerals with the local parish priests.15 The mendicants 
were thus put on a tight leash by Boniface. 
Boniface, however, died in 1303 and was succeeded in office by Niccolò 
Boccasini, the former master general of the Dominican order, who took the 
papal name of Benedict XI. In 1304 Benedict XI revoked Super cathedram 
and issued the bull Inter cunctas, in which he gave even greater rights to the 
mendicants than they had held before. In addition to legitimizing confessions 
made to any mendicant without the need of consent from the local bishop 
or parish priest, the bull also addressed the question of double confession 
and explicitly spelt out that re-confessing to one’s parish priest was not 
necessary after previous confession to a mendicant. Nevertheless, despite 
denying the necessity of double confession, Benedict still recommended a 
repeat confession to the parish priest.16 
Unsurprisingly, the seculars were now outraged and alarmed. Yet 
Benedict’s papacy was short-lived, lasting not even ten months. His 
successor was Clement V, who convened the Council of Vienne where, 
under pressure from prelates, he called for the revocation of Inter cunctas 
and the reinstatement of Super cathedram, a demand he articulated in 
the decree Dudum on 6 May 1312.17 Clement’s death in April 1314, before 
Dudum had been debated by the council, proved to be a cruel twist of fate 
as this meant that its legal status remained debatable. It was not until late in 
1317 that Clement’s successor, John XXII, who was elected after more than 
two years of sede vacante, officially promulgated the council’s decrees.18
It was probably unavoidable that in these three years, from 1314 to 1317, 
seculars would draw on Dudum in an attempt to assert their position. Most 
15 J. Koch, ‘Der Prozeß gegen den Magister Johannes de Polliaco und seine Vorgeschichte 
(1312–1321)’, in J. Koch, Kleine Schriften (2 vols, Rome, 1973), ii. 387–422, at p. 388; 
Dunbabin, Hound of God, pp. 57–8.
16 A. Migliavacca, La ‘Confessione frequente di devozione’. Studio teologico-giuridico sul 
periodo fra i Codici del 1917 e del 1983 (Rome, 1997), p. 231; Dunbabin, Hound of God, p. 58.
17 Dunbabin, Hound of God, p. 58; Koch, ‘Prozeß gegen den Magister Johannes de 
Polliaco’, pp. 388–9; S. Menache, Clement V (Cambridge, 1998), p. 291. For an edition of 
Dudum, see Tanner, Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, i. 365–9.
18 Dunbabin, Hound of God, p. 58. For the question of the validity of Dudum before 
its promulgation by John XXII, see also Koch, ‘Prozeß gegen den Magister Johannes de 
Polliaco’, p. 389.
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prominent among them was John of Pouilly, who in his quodlibetal questions 
actively propagated the validity of Dudum and thus the reinstatement 
of Super cathedram. Furthermore, John did not limit his activities to the 
university world, but even managed to convince a local synod to return 
officially to the rules laid out in Super cathedram. Unsurprisingly, John’s 
activities stirred both Franciscans and Dominicans into action: they fiercely 
attacked the secular party, and especially John of Pouilly, for several years 
to come.19
The criticism levelled by John against the mendicants became so extreme 
that in 1318 he was finally summoned to appear at the papal court in Avignon 
before Pope John XXII. The trial lasted for three years and ended with his 
condemnation on 24 June 1321, when three of his propositions regarding 
confession were condemned in the bull Vas electionis.20 The condemned 
propositions were: first, that those who have confessed to friars with a 
licence to hear confession have to re-confess their sins to their own priest; 
second, that while Omnis utriusque sexus is in force, neither the pope nor, 
for that matter, God can decide that parishioners do not have to confess to 
their own priests, that is their parish priests, once a year; third, neither the 
pope nor God can assign power to hear confession, so that somebody who 
has confessed to someone with a licence to hear confession has to re-confess 
to their parish priest.21 After his condemnation in 1321, a remorseful John 
19 Dunbabin, Hound of God, pp. 58–9; Koch, ‘Prozeß gegen den Magister Johannes de 
Polliaco’, p. 389. The main protagonist on the Dominican side and John of Pouilly’s main 
opponent was the Paris master Peter de Palude (Dunbabin, Hound of God, p. 59). For a 
study of the controversy between John of Pouilly and the Dominican Peter de Palude on 
the topic, see J. G. Sikes, ‘John de Pouilli and Peter de la Palu’, Eng. Hist. Rev., xlix (1934), 
219–40.
20 R. Zeyen, Die theologische Disputation des Johannes de Polliaco zur kirchlichen Verfassung 
(Frankfurt am Main, 1976), p. 33. 
21 The text of the bull is published in Chartularium universitatis Parisiensis, ed. H. Denifle 
and E. Chatelain (4 vols, Paris, 1889–99), ii. 243–4 (#798): ‘Primo: Confessi fratribus 
habentibus licentiam generalem audiendi confessiones tenentur eadem peccata que confessi 
fuerant iterum confiteri proprio sacerdoti. Secundo, quod stante statuto Omnis utriusque 
sexus, edito in Concilio generali Romano, pontifex non potest facere quod parrochiani 
non teneantur confiteri omnia peccata sua semel in anno proprio sacerdoti quem dicit 
esse parrochialem curatum, immo nec Deus posset hoc facere, quia, ut dicebat, implicat 
contradictionem. Tertio, quod papa non potest dare generalem potestatem audiendi 
confessiones, immo nec Deus quin confessus habenti generalem licentiam teneatur eadem 
iterum confiteri suo proprio sacerdoti, quem dicit esse, ut premittitur, parrochialem 
curatum’. Koch pointed out that the three condemned propositions were taken from John 
of Pouilly’s Responsiones (Koch, ‘Prozeß gegen den Magister Johannes de Polliaco’, p. 409). 
For the uncertainty about the legal situation after the issuing of Vas electionis, see K. Walsh, 
‘Archbishop Fitzralph and the friars at the papal court in Avignon, 1357–60’, Traditio, xxxi 
(1975), 223–45, at p. 236.
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of Pouilly recanted his views in a lecture hall before 300 people.22 Andrew 
Larsen has argued that despite this public revocation, John’s ideas remained 
popular among those who opposed the mendicants.23 Yet the memory 
of his condemnation was also kept alive by the mendicants themselves: 
even the title of Holcot’s quaestio echoes in large part the first proposition 
condemned in Vas electionis.
Ten years after the condemnation, Holcot drew on John of Pouilly’s defeat 
to support his order’s institutional standpoint. As a Dominican, Holcot 
gloated over the secular cleric’s failure to curtail the role of the friars in 
hearing confession.24 In his account of the proceedings against John, Holcot 
claims that the secular master had presented his teachings before the pope 
and cardinals with the explicit request that they be judged.25 According to 
Holcot, John, who had strongly opposed any encroachment upon what he 
saw as the parish priests’ prerogatives with regard to hearing confession, had 
thus had the audacity to approach the pope himself, but had rightly been 
put in his place by the papal court. John of Pouilly’s alleged request to be 
judged, however, seems to have been an invention by Holcot, as there is no 
evidence for this boldness in Vas electionis.26 In all likelihood, then, Holcot 
embellished the story to make his case even more strongly, by ridiculing 
what he perceived to be the absurdity of John’s position.
Holcot summarizes the papal decision propagated in Vas electionis: the 
pope, he writes, had decreed that the very opposite of John’s condemned 
propositions was true; namely first, that nobody had to confess to his parish 
priest if they had confessed to a friar who held a licence to hear confession; 
second, that even with Omnis utriusque sexus in force, the pope can decree 
that annual confession to one’s priest is not obligatory; and, third, that the 
pope can assign general licences to hear confessions and that those who 
22 Zeyen, Theologische Disputation, p. 33.
23 A. E. Larsen, The School of Heretics: Academic Condemnation at the University of Oxford, 
1277–1409 (Education and Society in the Middle Ages and Renaissance, xl, Leiden, 2011), p. 95.
24 Holcot quotes the condemned propositions from Vas electionis: ‘Unum sciendum 
est quod anno domini MCCCXXVI [sic] magister quidam Parisiensis dictus Johannes de 
Poliaco sacre theologie professor errores tres qui subscribuntur et docuit et tenuit in scolis 
sicut in sacra institutione domini Johannis XXII que sic incipit “Vas electionis et cetera” 
etiam plenius continetur’ (Holcot, Super quattuor libros Sententiarum questiones, sig. n iiiir).
25 ‘Hic tamen magister licet predictos articulos defendisset et publice docuisset et sic 
posse defendere diceret, quando apparuit coram papa et cardinalibus, asseruit se velle in 
premissis quod sedes apostolica diffiniret. Unde multis sibi disputationibus assignatis tam 
in consistorio quam seorsum illos articulos publice reuocauit dicens rationibus factis in 
contrarium se respondere non scire’ (Holcot, Super quattuor libros Sententiarum questiones, 
sig. n ivr).
26 Nor is it mentioned by scholars who have written about the trial, such as Koch.
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have confessed to someone with such a licence do not need to re-confess 
to their parish priest.27 All these decisions by John XXII were, of course, 
very much in favour of the mendicants, strengthening their role within 
the Church. By referring to the case of John of Pouilly and the resulting 
papal decision, Holcot makes it clear that the view that licensed mendicants 
could be fully acceptable confessors was not just correct, but had also only 
recently been confirmed by the (current) pope, hence putting this position 
beyond question.28 He rebuts John of Pouilly’s standpoint that the parish 
priests’ right to hear confessions comes directly from God rather than 
from the papacy. A prerogative, Holcot notes, can only be taken away if 
it existed in the first place. In this instance, however, parish priests had 
held no prerogative. Also, higher-ranking prelates can commission others 
to provide the cure of souls for the believers under their jurisdiction. For 
instance, if the pope sends a legate who represents him to England, this 
legate should rank above parish priests as he is sent by the pope himself 
– who, after all, is the proprius sacerdos of all Christianity. Consequently, 
certain proprii sacerdotes, for instance the pope and bishops, can rightfully 
pass this status on to others.29 The argument that not exclusively parish 
priests, but also priests further up in the hierarchy were proprii sacerdotes 
is crucial and goes back to a time before Holcot. It denies ultimate power 
and control to the parish priests and reassigns it to persons such as bishops, 
who hold the authority to delegate the right to hear confessions to other 
27 ‘Nam in constitutione papa determinauit quod iste tres propositiones sunt vere. Primo 
quod nullus confessus fratribus habentibus generalem licentiam audiendi confessionem 
tenetur iterum eadem pecccata confiteri proprio sacerdoti plus quam si alias fuisset sacerdoti 
proprio eadem peccata confessus teneretur iterum. Secundo quod stante constitutione 
Omnis Utriusque Sexus et cetera Romanus pontifex potest facere quod parochianus non 
tenetur omnia sua peccata semel in anno confiteri proprio sacerdoti. Tertio quod papa potest 
dare generalem licentiam audiendi confessionem et quod confessus habenti huiusmodi 
licentiam non tenetur eadem peccata confiteri proprio sacerdoti’ (Holcot, Super quattuor 
libros Sententiarum questiones, sig. n ivr).
28 John XXII died in Dec. 1334, so after Holcot had finished his lectures on the Sentences. 
References to John XXII in this section of his commentary give no indication that he is 
deceased, so Holcot may well not have updated this part of the text during his regency a few 
years later.
29 ‘Dicunt doctores quod sibi non sit preiudicium quia nunquam sit preiudicium alicui 
nisi ei substrahantur quod sibi est in favore, indultum sed potestas iurisdictionis non 
est curato indulta in favore persone sed in utilitatem plebis et honorem Dei. Et ideo si 
superioribus prelatis videtur expedire ad salutem plebis et honorem Dei possunt post 
modum committere aliis a prelatis inferioribus iurisdictionem in subditos eorum et sine 
preiudicio eorundem, ut si papa faceret unum simplicem sacerdotem legatum in Anglia 
in nullo preiudicaret episcopis nec inferioribus prelatis’ (Holcot, Super quattuor libros 
Sententiarum questiones, sig. n vr). For more on the status of proprius sacerdos, see below.
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priests and thus to mendicants. This notion, and especially the aspect that 
the pope as head of the Catholic hierarchy is by office proprius sacerdos to all 
Catholics and can therefore rightfully distribute the power of absolution, 
came to be repeated again and again by mendicant interpreters of Omnis 
utriusque sexus.30
Holcot’s six arguments against the narrow interpretation of the proprius 
sacerdos of Omnis utriusque sexus as parish priest are as follows.31 First, such 
an interpretation implies that even someone who had confessed to the 
pope or his confessor would then still have to confess again to his parish 
priest, which as far as Holcot is concerned is plain silly (fatuum) and wrong. 
Second, contrary to what is claimed by John of Pouilly, there is no way the 
pope could possibly lose his jurisdiction over and ability to absolve others as 
he is the representative of Christ on earth. Third, if one wanted to confess 
to a priest who is not one’s own priest, one’s own priest, according to a later 
passage in Omnis utriusque sexus, has to give his consent. That the consent 
has to be granted by the parish priest, however, is not specified and thus the 
proprii sacerdotes could also be priests other than parish priests. If, however, 
the term proprius sacerdos in this passage was supposed to refer exclusively 
to parish priests, this would entail that only they, and thus not even the 
pope, could commission other priests to hear confession, which would be 
absurd.32
Fourth, Holcot insists, it is possible wantonly to misinterpret the 
text, which is precisely what happens if the meaning of proprius sacerdos 
is limited to ‘parish priest’. If one interpreted the first three words of 
the canon, Omnis utriusque sexus, similarly narrowly, it could be argued 
that this decree refers exclusively to hermaphrodites,33 which, while 
conceivable, would be a frivolous interpretation. Taking the literal 
understanding to the other extreme, the canon’s opening words could be 
understood as referring to absolutely everybody. In this case, each and 
every human being, including the pope, bishops, as well as their legates, 
would have to confess to a lowly parish priest, which, once again, would 
30 The idea goes back to the time of the Fourth Lateran Council (Sikes, ‘John de Pouilli 
and Peter de la Palu’, p. 219).
31 Holcot, Super quattuor libros Sententiarum questiones, sig. n ivrb–vb.
32 On this point, see Slotemaker and Witt, Robert Holcot, p. 117.
33 W. A. Pantin noted the incident of the Dominican Richard Helmslay, who when 
preaching at Newcastle in 1379/1380 put forward the same over-interpretation of ‘omnis 
utriusque sexus’ as referring to hermaphrodites as part of an attack on the secular clergy. The 
incident was reported to the papacy and Helmslay, who became known as Frater Ricardus 
utriusque sexus, recanted. It stands to reason that Helmslay had derived this interpretation 
from Holcot (W. A. Pantin, The English Church in the Fourteenth Century (Cambridge, 
1955), pp. 164–5).
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be absurd. Hence, the canon must not be interpreted literally but has to 
be approached with flexibility.
The fifth argument against an exclusive understanding of proprius sacerdos 
as parish priest is based on the ever-potent argument of consuetudo (custom). 
Holcot points out that it is a long-established practice that people other 
than parish priests hear confession: bishops appoint confessors who can 
absolve everyone in their diocese. Similarly, the pope appoints the head of 
the apostolic penitentiary for the absolution of sins. These well-established 
alternative confessors would, however, be irreconcilable with John of 
Pouilly’s misguided views. The importance of consuetudo also crops up 
elsewhere in the quaestio. It is customary, Holcot notes, that in all kingdoms 
both clerics and lay people confess to those who have been commissioned 
with the power to absolve – that is, not just parish priests – without then 
confessing the same sins again. Kings, bishops and noblemen are in the 
habit of confessing their sins to friars minor and friars preacher who have 
received licence from the pope or bishops and, therefore, surely their right 
to hear confessions must not be questioned. Finally, Holcot concludes, it is 
noteworthy that the wording of Omnis utriusque sexus explicitly speaks of 
the proprius sacerdos and not the presbyter parochialis (parish priest). Had the 
intention been to codify the necessity of confession to one’s parish priest, 
that could have easily been achieved by simply specifying it in the canon. 
The fact that this was not done means there was never an intention to refer 
only to parish priests.
Having thus dismissed John of Pouilly’s interpretation of Omnis utriusque 
sexus, Holcot then expounds what he regards as the correct interpretation of 
proprius sacerdos. To start with, the pope is by default the proprius sacerdos 
of every Catholic, just as a bishop is the proprius sacerdos of everybody in 
his diocese.34 Consequently, annual confession to the pope or one’s bishop 
fulfils the demand of Omnis utriusque sexus and does not require additional 
confession to a parish priest. In addition, those who receive permission to 
hear confession either from the pope or from a bishop, as is the case for 
licensed friars preacher and friars minor, also count as proprii sacerdotes: their 
commission automatically removes any status of their being alieni [aliens] 
and instead they become communes [common to the local community], so 
part of the local community, and thus proprii sacerdotes.35 With this broader 
34 ‘Primo modo papa est proprius sacerdos cuiuslibet catholici, et episcopus cuiuslibet 
catholici existentis in eius episcopatu’ (Holcot, Super quattuor libros Sententiarum questiones, 
sig. n ivvb).
35 ‘Illi vero qui habent commissionem a papa immediate vel ab episcopis localibus sicut 
modo est de fratribus predicatoribus et minoribus sunt proprii sacerdotes primo modo quia 
non alieni sed communes’ (Holcot, Super quattuor libros Sententiarum questiones, sig. n ivvb).
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definition of proprius sacerdos, Holcot removes any doubt that confessing to 
a licensed mendicant might not satisfy canon 21 of Lateran IV.
The history of the Dominican interpretation of Omnis utriusque sexus 
remains to be written, for Robert Holcot was by no means the first 
Dominican to dwell at length on the question of what confessing to one’s 
proprius sacerdos means. A century earlier Albert the Great, who is quoted 
by Holcot,36 had addressed the same problem. In his early De sacramentis, 
probably composed before he was sent to Paris, Albert remarks that there are 
different routes towards becoming a proprius sacerdos, including by means 
of being granted the privilege of hearing confession.37 Albert addressed the 
same problem again in his Super Sententias, composed at Paris between 1241 
and 1245. There he discussed whether a believer has to confess to his or her 
own priest, or whether confession to any priest – and thus also to a priest 
who is not one’s parish priest – is valid. In his discussion, Albert stressed the 
concept, later repeated by Holcot, that the pope is at the top of the Catholic 
hierarchy and can therefore grant the power of absolution.38
Changes in the Dominican approaches to and interpretations of Omnis 
utriusque sexus can already be found in these two works by Albert the Great: 
his later commentary on the Sentences is far more polemical, outspoken 
and detailed than his earlier De sacramentis. This is quite probably due to 
the radical change in intellectual sphere which came with his move from 
Germany to Paris. In his later work he attacks the alleged failings of secular 
clergymen, pointing out that many parish priests know nothing or next 
to nothing about the cure of souls, while others are so rotten that they 
36 See, e.g., Holcot, Super quattuor libros Sententiarum questiones, sig. n vva: ‘Albertus 
distinguit de proprio sacerdote id est presbytero parochiali quia vel est pastor sicut rector 
perpetuus vel vicarius vel est tantum sacerdos conductus’.
37 Albertus Magnus, De sacramentis, ed. A. Ohlmeyer, in Albertus Magnus, Opera omnia 
(31 vols to date, Münster, 1951–), xxvi. 1–170, at pp. 106–7 (Tract. VI, De paenitentia, pars 2, 
q. 2, a. 15). For Albert’s departure to Paris around 1240, see I. M. Resnick, ‘Albert the Great: 
biographical introduction’, in A Companion to Albert the Great: Theology, Philosophy, and the 
Sciences, ed. I. M. Resnick (Brill’s Companions to the Christian Tradition, Leiden, 2013), 
pp. 1–11, at p. 6. For a summary of Albert’s view on the sacrament of penance, see H. Lauer, 
Die Moraltheologie Alberts des Großen mit besonderer Berücksichtigung ihrer Beziehungen zur 
Lehre des hl. Thomas (Freiburg i. Br., 1911), pp. 308–31. C. Rigo argues that De sacramentis 
was composed between the late 1130s and 1141, while Albert was still in Germany (C. Rigo, 
‘Zur Redaktionsfrage der Frühschriften des Albertus Magnus’, in Albertus Magnus und 
die Anfänge der Aristoteles-Rezeption im lateinischen Mittelalter/Albertus Magnus and the 
Beginnings of the Medieval Reception of Aristotle in the Latin West, ed. L. Honnefelder et al. 
(Münster, 2005), pp. 325–74, at p. 360).
38 Albert the Great, Commentarii in quartum librum Sententiarum (Dist. I–XXII), in 
Albertus Magnus, Opera omnia, ed. E. C. A. Borgnet (38 vols, Paris, 1890–9), xxix. 724 
(IV.17.40). For Holcot see above.
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themselves pose a threat to their flock. Others again simply cannot be 
bothered to hear confession or are constantly absent from their parishes. 
While a believer would, in these cases, still have the option of confessing 
to his bishop or even the pope as his own priest, these options, Albert 
notes, were simply not accessible to most people. Things were thus not 
looking bright for the average sinner’s soul. Luckily, however, as Albert 
points out, the negligence of pastors was counterbalanced by specially 
appointed preachers and confessors. The populace could thus, after all, 
not merely confess, but confess to a worthy priest. Albert here brings into 
the discussion a point raised in Omnis utriusque sexus, namely that the 
sacrament of penance can be administered by another priest if the proprius 
sacerdos has given his permission.39 These specially appointed preachers and 
confessors were obviously understood to be mendicants, although this is 
not spelt out by Albert.
Still, Albert insists that confessing to one’s proprius sacerdos is preferable 
to confessing to a specially appointed priest; and that one’s own priest 
should be the person to turn to even when a legitimate alternative would 
be available. Should a penitent nevertheless turn to an alternative confessor, 
this confessor may administer the sacrament, yet should still encourage 
that confession to the parish priest follow as quickly as possible. In fact, 
the licensed confessors should exhort the faithful to confess to their parish 
priests in the first place. Thus, despite all his criticism of the secular clergy, 
Albert regards confession to one’s own priest – be it one’s parish priest, one’s 
bishop, or the pope – as preferable to confessing to a licensed mendicant. 
This insistence might seem odd for a mendicant, yet Albert explains his 
stance with the comment that this approach is necessary to uphold the order 
of the Church.40 For him, confession to one’s own priest constitutes the 
proper implementation of Omnis utriusque sexus. Confession to someone 
else, and hence to a commissioned mendicant, is only legitimate in very 
special circumstances and by no means to be encouraged.
This, of course, is contrary to Holcot’s later standpoint, yet Holcot 
finds a neat solution to this apparent Dominican dilemma in John XXII’s 
Extravagantes: in Holcot’s opinion, the pope had advanced the view that 
licensed confessors should encourage the faithful to re-confess to their 
39 For this paragraph, cf. Lauer, Die Moraltheologie Alberts des Großen, pp. 325–6; 
Albertus Magnus, Opera omnia, ed. Borgnet, xxix. 724 (Commentarii in quartum librum 
Sententiarum, IV.17.40, 42, 44). The relevant passage from Omnis utriusque sexus reads: ‘Si 
quis autem alieno sacerdoti voluerit iusta de causa sua confiteri peccata, licentiam prius 
postulet et obtineat a proprio sacerdote, cum aliter ille ipsum non possit absolvere vel ligare’ 
(Tanner, Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, i. 245).
40 For this paragraph cf. Lauer, Die Moraltheologie Alberts des Großen, pp. 326–8.
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priest, not for the sake of the validity of the sacrament but for the sake of 
obligation, because the sinner had confessed to somebody to whom he was 
not bound.41 Re-confession to one’s parish priest was thus not a matter of 
salvation, but more a question of appropriate behaviour.
The other Dominican quoted by Holcot is, unsurprisingly, Thomas 
Aquinas. Thomas, whose writings became official Dominican teaching not 
long after his death in 1274, started his lectures on the Sentences at Paris 
in September 1252.42 In his commentary on the Lombard’s work, Aquinas 
concludes that for the sacrament of penance it is essential that the priest 
serving as confessor hold jurisdiction over the believer. Whether one’s own 
priest is a suitable confessor is not up to the believer to decide. Instead, this 
decision lies with the superior prelate.43 By definition, every parishioner has 
more than one proprius sacerdos: his parish priest, his bishop and the pope, 
all of whom may rightfully commission additional confessors for the faithful 
under their jurisdiction. Those commissioned by the bishop or the pope 
rank higher in the hierarchy than the parish priest. While it is sufficient to 
confess to someone who has been commissioned as a confessor, Aquinas, 
like Albert and unlike Holcot, nevertheless advises that the penitent should 
re-confess to his own priest and that his confessor should urge him to do 
so. Still, even if the penitent refuses to do so, he should be absolved from 
his sins.44 Thus, while Aquinas regards commissioned confessors, who 
included commissioned mendicants, as suitable, he nevertheless insists on 
the importance of confession to one’s proprius sacerdos – be it the parish 
priest, the local bishop or the pope – even though re-confession was not 
necessary for salvation.
Holcot repeats Aquinas’s conclusion that any commissioned priest, by 
power of his rank, can absolve from sin.45 Aquinas had also raised another 
41 ‘Sed contra predicta videntur esse quedam que ponit Iohannes monachus [i.e., 
John XXII] … Movet dubitationem an confessus fratri teneatur confiteri iterum proprio 
sacerdoti, et respondet innuitive quod sic. Hoc tamen “non est ex necessitate sacramenti 
sed ex obligatione” tantummodo. Loquitur in secunda persona ad confirmationem, “qui 
voluntarie ad fratrem accessisti”, et vult dicere quod licet talis parochianus confessus 
fuerit fratri, tamen non liberatur a dicta constitutione Omnis utriusque sexus, quia “relicto 
patre spirituali cui fuit astrictus” voluntarie ivit ad illum cui non fuit astrictus. Et ad hanc 
conclusionem quod scilicet confessus fratri remitti debeat ad curatum et similiter iterato 
confiteri arguit multipliciter’ (Holcot, Super quattuor libros Sententiarum questiones, sig. n 
vva).
42 J.-P. Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas, trans. R. Royal, i. The Person and His Work (rev. edn, 
Washington, D.C., 2005), p. 37.
43 Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum super Sententiis, IV.17.3.3.4 <http://www.corpusthomisticum.
org/snp4016.html> [accessed 20 July 2018].
44 Aquinas, Scriptum super Sententiis, IV.17.3.3.5.
45 ‘Hic dicit [sc. Thomas] duas conclusiones. Prima est quod quilibet sacerdos potestate 
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point adopted by Holcot: namely, that certain people, such as bishops, do 
not have a proprius sacerdos to whom to confess. In this matter Holcot gives 
an even broader definition than Aquinas by arguing that the meaning of 
proprius sacerdos must be expanded to include other legitimate confessors, 
such as licensed mendicants, penitentiaries and legates.46
Judging from the three examples of Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas 
and Robert Holcot, the Dominican interpretation of proprius sacerdos in 
Omnis utriusque sexus underwent considerable change in the course of one 
century. It shifted to an increasingly wide understanding of the phrase, 
comprising a range of possible confessors; and re-confession to one’s parish 
priest, while initially encouraged, was no longer regarded as necessary 
by Holcot. Similarly, the references to friars, both implicit and explicit, 
increase significantly. Initially, Albert does not mention friars explicitly in 
this context and even covert references are rare, even though he must, of 
course, have had the position of mendicants in mind in his discussion. 
This lack of explicit comment may well be due to the fact that Albert first 
commented on the Sentences in Germany around 1240, before the well-
known secular-mendicant clashes and before the friars were widely regarded 
as serious competition by parish priests. Holcot, on the other hand, refers 
to mendicants explicitly and repeatedly.
Certainly, by the time Holcot was writing circumstances had changed 
considerably from the situation faced by Albert when he composed De 
sacramentis, when there was apparently neither strong competition nor 
serious conflict regarding the hearing of confession; and even from the 
more inflamed situation Aquinas encountered at Paris when he gave his 
lectures on the Sentences. Yet neither Albert nor Aquinas was as polemical 
and outspoken about the role of licensed mendicants as confessors as Holcot 
was to be less than a century later.
The reception and interpretation of Omnis utriusque sexus and the 
subsequent history of confession are still in need of further exploration. It 
is, of course, not possible to make valid pronouncements about intellectual 
developments and traditions on the basis of just three Dominican 
ordinis regulariter potest a quolibet peccato absolvere. Secunda est quod licet omnis 
sacerdos habeat potestatem ordinis non tamen habet potestatem iurisdictionis exercitii nisi 
in subditos’ (Holcot, Super quattuor libros Sententiarum questiones, sig. n vvb).
46 ‘Sic ergo videtur dicendum quod quicunque subditus presbytero parochiali potest 
licite confiteri istis subscriptis: Domino pape in quo est plenitudo iurisdictionis in omnes 
catholicos; eius penitentiario generali; item eius penitentiariis generalibus; item episcopo 
dyocesano; item cuilibet habenti commissionem a sedem apostolicam vel a dyocesano vel a 
presbytero quia quilibet istorum potest dare licentiam super subditos parochialis presbyteri, 
videlicet papa, episcopus, et curatus’ (Holcot, Super quattuor libros Sententiarum questiones, 
sig. n vra).
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commentators on the Sentences. Whether the view of any of the three authors 
can be regarded as representative for their order as a whole in their respective 
eras can, for now, only be speculated. It is worth noting, however, that the 
Franciscans seemed considerably less preoccupied with the interpretational 
intricacies of Omnis utriusque sexus. Bonaventure discusses the question 
of whether believers may confess to somebody more discreet than their 
own priest and whether they then still have to confess to their own priest. 
William of Ockham, however, whose works Holcot knew, did not devote a 
quaestio to this matter in his commentary on the Sentences.47 Similarly, the 
subject is not raised in the commentary on the Sentences by the Franciscan 
Walter Chatton, written sometime between 1321 and 1323 (that is, just at 
the time of John of Pouilly’s condemnation in Vas electionis).48 This, too, is 
a tiny sample, so it might turn out that Franciscans devoted just as much 
attention to the question as Dominicans. However, on first inspection it 
would seem that the topic of confession, in particular with regard to the 
role of mendicants and the question of the correct interpretation of Omnis 
utriusque sexus, was more of a concern to Dominicans than to Franciscans.
When Holcot was writing in the early 1330s, the question of the legitimacy 
of mendicant confessors had seemingly been put to rest over a decade earlier. 
Yet if it had been resolved by the papacy and was at that time no longer a 
hot topic, why did he lecture his students on this subject for so long and 
with so much verve and detail? Holcot’s account, at times polemical and 
even melodramatic, may have been influenced by, or even had its origin in, 
particular sets of circumstances. The most likely cause for his involvement 
with the issue is that papal legislation on the topic had been constantly 
changing since the mid thirteenth century, almost from one pope to the 
next. The Dominicans must thus have been well aware that the situation 
as it was under John XXII would not necessarily remain unchanged. In 
fact, the numerous bulls issued and controversies conducted on the topic 
in the course of the previous decades strongly suggested the matter was 
not permanently settled. By issuing a strong argument for the legitimacy 
of licensed mendicant confessors, Holcot defends his order’s necessity and 
legitimacy. Additionally, Holcot’s interest in the question may be hinting 
at a problem or dispute specific to England, or even more locally to the 
47 Bonaventure, Opera omnia (10 vols, Ad Claras Aquas, 1882–1902), iv. 452–55 
(Commentaria in quatuor libros Sententiarum, IV.17.3.1.2: ‘Utrum contra voluntatem proprii 
sacerdotis liceat poenitenti confiteri alii discretiori, an teneatur confiteri proprio sacerdoti’); 
William of Ockham, Quaestiones et decisiones in IV libros Sententiarum, cum centilogio 
theologico (Lyons, 1495). 
48 W. Chatton, Reportatio super Sententias, ed. J. C. Wey and G. J. Etzkorn (4 vols, 
Toronto, 2002–5).
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Lincoln diocese or Oxford, concerning the validity of licensed mendicants 
as confessors. Slotemaker and Witt have shown that the question of who 
makes an acceptable confessor in England was relevant well past the middle 
of the fourteenth century; the registers of John Grandisson (bishop of Exeter, 
d. 1369) record numerous clashes with unlicensed mendicant confessors.49 It 
has, however, not proved possible to find any traces of debate or controversy 
with regard to licensed mendicant confessors.50
What promised to be another potential explanation similarly turned out 
to be a dead-end. At the same time as Holcot was lecturing on the Sentences, 
another important theologian-in-the-making was teaching at Oxford: 
Richard FitzRalph, famous for his hostile attacks on the mendicants in the 
1350s, was regent master in theology in 1331/32,51 exactly the same period 
as Holcot’s lectures on the Sentences. Yet while his later clashes with the 
mendicants are well known, his anti-mendicant streak cannot be traced 
back to the 1330s. In fact, FitzRalph was rather well-disposed towards the 
mendicants earlier in his life.52 
It appears we must conclude, then, that the discussion, or rather the 
fierce defence, of the legitimacy of licensed mendicants as confessors within 
the Church was an intra-institutional topic especially close to the heart 
of the Dominican order, the urgency of which was driven by the fear and 
suspicion that, through pressure by seculars, papal legislation could change 
49 Slotemaker and Witt, Robert Holcot, p. 115. While these clashes were not about 
mendicants with a licence to hear confession, which according to Holcot would make them 
proprii sacerdotes, but about unlicensed mendicants, they nevertheless illustrate the ongoing 
concerns surrounding the topic of confession. Slotemaker and Witt pointed out that in 
the next question debated in his Sentences commentary, Holcot insisted on the necessity of 
commission for mendicants. In his view, unlicensed mendicants did not count as proprii 
sacerdotes (Robert Holcot, p. 116).
50 Several Dominicans received licence to hear confession in the Lincoln diocese in the 
decade preceding the composition of Holcot’s commentary on the Sentences: on 10 July 
1321 Simon de London was granted licence to hear confession; on 27 Feb. 1332 Richard de 
Farle was licensed to hear confession in the archdeaconry of Oxford; in 1332 Holcot himself 
received licence to hear confession in the diocese of Lincoln. A few years later, on 5 March 
1337, Philip Lavenham was licensed to hear confession in Bedford and Buckingham.
51 K. Walsh, A Fourteenth-Century Scholar and Primate: Richard FitzRalph in Oxford, 
Avignon and Armagh (Oxford, 1981), p. 36. For a brief summary of FitzRalph’s engagement 
with mendicants in the 1350s, see Larsen, School of Heretics, pp. 96–8.
52 Walsh has pointed out that Holcot engages intensively with FitzRalph’s commentary on 
the Sentences (A Fourteenth-Century Scholar, p. 37). Yet, in all likelihood it did not contribute 
to Holcot’s discussion of Omnis utriusque sexus: FitzRalph devoted only one or perhaps 
two questions to bk. IV; the surviving question deals with the eucharist (M. W. Dunne, 
‘Accidents without a subject: Richard FitzRalph’s question on the eucharist from his Lectura 
on the Sentences’, in Richard FitzRalph. His Life, Times and Thought, ed. M. W. Dunne and 
S. Nolan (Dublin, 2013), pp. 11–29, at p. 11).
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once again to the detriment of the mendicants. It may have been for this 
reason that Holcot expounded on the subject in detail in his lectures on the 
Sentences.53
Joseph Goering has argued that the most important development for the 
history of penitential thought in the later middle ages was the creation of 
schools and universities.54 Goering also insists that ‘it would be a mistake 
… to think of these scholastic jurists and theologians as being primarily 
concerned with settling arguments about dogma or with determining 
fine points of doctrine’. Instead, he emphasizes their role as teachers who 
introduced their students to the tradition of theology they represented.55 
From a twenty-first century perspective, it is easy to lose sight of this 
original function of many medieval commentaries. Holcot’s text originated 
in the classroom and was primarily intended to teach the next generation 
of theologians, not just Dominicans but other mendicants and seculars, 
too. Like many medieval theologians, he frequently wove references and 
discussions of contemporary events into his commentaries.56 In the case 
discussed in this chapter he took the opportunity not just to provide 
mendicant students with concrete arguments which defended the role of 
licensed mendicants as valid confessors, but also to expose secular students 
to the Dominican reasoning concerning this topic.
While Holcot’s commentary on the Sentences may have been of far 
less importance than his biblical commentaries,57 it nevertheless contains 
strong, well-argued views which he sought to impart to his students as well 
as his readers.58 The vast problems arising from Omnis utriusque sexus in 
53 This is confirmed by Holcot himself: ‘Sacrosancta romana ecclesia ius et auctoritatem 
canonibus impartitur sed non eis alligatur’ (Super quattuor libros Sententiarum questiones, 
sig. n vira). 
54 J. Goering, ‘The scholastic turn (1100–1500): penitential theology and law in the 
schools’, in A New History of Penance, ed. A. Firey (Brill’s Companions to the Christian 
Tradition, xiv, Leiden, 2008), pp. 219–37, at p. 219.
55 Goering, ‘The scholastic turn’, p. 219.
56 E.g., in his commentary on Wisdom, Holcot comments on the controversy on 
the Beatific Vision under John XXII; and in his commentary on Amos he ridicules the 
Carmelites and Austin Friars (Smalley, ‘Robert Holcot’, pp. 19–20 and 85–7).
57 See Walsh, A Fourteenth-Century Scholar, p. 35; for a critical view of Holcot’s 
commentary on the Sentences, see A. Maier, ‘Diskussionen über das aktuell Unendliche 
in der ersten Hälfte des 14. Jahrhunderts’, in A. Maier, Ausgehendes Mittelalter. Gesammelte 
Aufsätze zur Geistesgeschichte des 14. Jahrhunderts (3 vols, Rome, 1964–77), i. 41–86, at pp. 
81–2.
58 In addition, Holcot refers frequently to aspects of canon law rather than questions 
concerning strictly theology, which reflect the more practical bent to his work. This tendency 
supports Goering’s view that there was a close co-operation between the two faculties of law 
and theology throughout the middle ages (Goering, ‘The scholastic turn’, pp. 228–9).
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intellectual circles were due to a phrase, proprio sacerdoti, which proved to 
be open to numerous interpretations.59 To defend the friars’ position, and 
to influence his audience, Holcot used the institutional and intellectual 
framework provided by the Dominican order and its connection to the 
university of Oxford. He exploited his lectures on the Sentences, which 
were compulsory for anyone pursuing a degree in theology, to disseminate 
distinctly Dominican ideas to a wider audience, composed not just of friars 
preacher or mendicants.60 In the schools, he thus disseminated his order’s 
viewpoints on an issue which was relevant to the entire Church and of 
great importance to the friars preacher. Holcot did so with a decidedly 
pro-mendicant bent, thereby spreading his order’s position beyond its 
institutional borders. As an individual thinker and theologian, he thus 
instrumentalized his affiliation with one institution – namely the university 
– to uphold and propagate the privileges of another institution – that is, 
the Dominican order.
59 See also Dunbabin, Hound of God, p. 57.
60 For the popularity of the mendicant schools, see I. W. Frank, Hausstudium und 
Universitätsstudium der Wiener Dominikaner bis 1500 (Archiv für österreichische Geschichte, 
cxxvii, Vienna, 1968), p. 57, where he quotes Roger Bacon, Compendium studii philosophie, 
in Roger Bacon, Opera quaedam hactenus inedita, i, ed. J. S. Brewer (London, 1859), p. 428.
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11. The cult of the marriage of Joseph and Mary: 
the shaping of doctrinal novelty in Jean Gerson’s 
Josephina (1414–17)
Isabel Iribarren
On 8 September 1416 Jean Gerson, then chancellor of Paris university, 
preached a sermon at the Council of Constance for the feast of the nativity 
of Mary, with the main objective of promoting the cult of her marriage with 
Joseph. Gerson was well aware of the undesirability of multiplying feast 
days – a subject of debate during the council – but insisted on the relevance 
of his proposition on ecclesiological grounds: ‘Why promote another feast? 
So that, through the merits of Mary and the intercession of the great and 
commanding influence of Joseph on his spouse, from whom Jesus the Christ 
is born, the Church be brought back to her unique and truthful spouse, 
the Supreme Pontiff, vicar of Christ’.1 However, the novelty was not only 
liturgical: it was also doctrinal. Intent as he was on inciting popular devotion 
to St Joseph, Gerson advanced a series of doctrinal statements which would 
not earn a favourable reaction from the conciliar assembly. Indeed, the 
latter represented the very ‘institution’ the chancellor’s statements could 
seem to threaten: an established doctrinal tradition, as well as a set of 
existing liturgical practices which the Church promoted as normative and 
considered necessary for social order. Seeking to optimize the acceptability 
1 ‘apud ecclesiasticos et de ecclesiasticis talia loquimur dum de celebritate virginalis 
conjugii Joseph cum Maria vel de ipsius felici transitu fieri solemnitatem exoptamus. Ad quid 
ita? Sane quatenus meritis, et intercessione tanti tamque potentis et imperiosi quodammodo 
patroni apud sponsam suam, de qua natus est Jesus qui vocatur Christus, reddatur Ecclesia 
unico viro vero et certo, Summo Pontifici sponso suo vice Christi’ (J. Gerson, ‘Jacob autem 
genuit’, in Oeuvres complètes de Jean Gerson, ed. P. Glorieux (10 vols, Paris, 1960–73), v. 
344–62, at pp. 362, 365). The sermon is articulated around four subjects: ‘Collegamus 
tamen ex his principiis laudes utriusque, Joseph scilicet et Mariae … et hoc sub quadruplici 
consideratione fiat. Agetur in prima de nobilitatis origine Mariae et Joseph; agetur in altera 
de sanctificatione utriusque; agetur in tertia de fomitis repressione in utroque; agetur in 
quarta de multiplici nativitate Christi respectu Joseph et Mariae’ (v. 345). All translations are 
the author’s own unless otherwise stated.
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of his position, in the sermon Gerson adopts a threefold strategy, which is 
examined in what follows: he claims affinities with established doctrinal 
tradition; grafts the new cult onto existing liturgical practices; and argues 
for the possibility of a historical development of doctrinal truths which 
allows for the introduction of probabilistic arguments. All three approaches 
are finely intertwined in the Josephina, an epic poem of some 3,000 Latin 
hexameters composed by the chancellor between 1414 and 1417 during the 
Council of Constance.2 This poem constitutes a prime example of how an 
individual’s intellectual project sought to earn acceptability through the 
instrumentalization of an established tradition and its doctrinal patrimony.
Before examining the relevant passages of the Josephina, let us dwell 
a little longer on the Constance sermon cited above, since it brings out 
the institutional setting in which the poem was composed. Deliberating 
on the privileges of Joseph and Mary, the chancellor raises the question 
of their royal lineage as descendants of the house of David. The question 
itself was not surprising. The evangelical text presents such genealogical 
records (Matthew I: 1–16; Luke III: 23–38) as a way to establish Jesus’ noble 
descent.3 Citing the opinion of Richard FitzRalph, however, Gerson raises 
the specific issue of royal succession through the female line in a way which 
seems to justify English claims to the French crown:
A rather recent doctor, the archbishop of Armagh [Richard FitzRalph], had 
inquired [in De pauperitate Salvatoris (1350–8)] on the nobility of Joseph and 
Mary, asking whether it came from David by rightful genealogical law, such 
that Mary and Joseph themselves should be exalted as lawfully belonging by 
hereditary line to the temporal kingdom of David. And [he also asked] whether 
Jesus, the blessed fruit of Mary’s womb, should rightfully occupy David’s royal 
seat and throne as a temporal king and particularly of the Jews. Whereby he 
consequently asked whether a female, considered as unsuitable, as regard to 
males, for the rightful inheritance of royal succession, should be regarded as 
befitting kingship according to divine law, invariably and imprescriptibly. This 
2 For a critical edition of the poem with a French translation, see Josephina. L’épopée de 
saint Joseph, ed. G. Matteo Roccati, trans. with introduction, notes and comments by I. 
Iribarren (2 vols, Paris, 2019). This chapter will refer to this edition.
3 See also the commentaries on these verses by Bernard of Clairvaux, Homiliae super 
‘Missus est’ (In laudibus Virginis Matris), hom. 2, 16, in Sancti Bernardi opera (8 vols, Rome, 
1957–77), iv. ed. J. Leclercq and H.–M. Rochais (Rome, 1966), p. 33, col. 70B; Thomas 
Aquinas, Summa theologiae Tertia pars, ed. P. Caramello (Turin, 1962), iii, q. 28, a. 1, ad 2; 
q. 31, a. 2, ad 1; Matthew of Acquasparta, De Annuntiat. B.V.M., in Matthaei ab Aquasparta, 
Sermones de B.M. Virgine, ed. C. Piana (Quaracchi, 1962), p. 52 (sermon 1); Peter John Olivi, 
Lectura super Mattheum, MS. Vat. lat. 1001, fo. 8c–d (ch. 1, quaestio praeliminaris), cited by 
A. Emmen, ‘Pierre de Jean Olivi, sa doctrine et son influence’, Cahiers de Joséphologie, xiv 
(1966), 209–70, at p. 251.
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caused a rather significant dispute between the two most renowned Christian 
kingdoms, France and England, creating and fostering controversy.4
In September 1416, as he was preaching his sermon, Gerson seemed to 
underestimate the impact such statements would have at a politically 
delicate time: French defeat at Agincourt was still fresh in people’s minds and 
civil war raged in the royal capital. The question of St Joseph’s promotion 
was thereby precipitated into the centre of the Anglo-French conflict. 
Pre-empting probable critics, Gerson hastened to add that the royalty in 
question was not a temporal, but a spiritual one. Indeed, Joseph and Mary’s 
nobility lay in their moral qualities and religious piety.5 By preaching the 
magnanimity of the holy couple, the chancellor was hoping to encourage 
its imitation by the Parisian aristocracy at a time of internecine war. From 
this perspective he had, a few years earlier in November 1413, addressed 
a letter to Jean de Berry, uncle of Charles VI, seeking the duke’s support 
for the instauration of a solemn feast in honour of the marriage of Joseph 
4 ‘Et an Jesus benedictus fructus ventris Mariae fuerit jure ponendus super sedem David 
et thronum ejus tamquam rex temporalis et specialis Judaeorum. Unde consequenter 
inquiritur ab aliquis si mulieri sexui, deficiente masculino apud reges jus successionis 
ad regnum debeat etiam jure divino et invariabili vel imprescriptibili competere. Quae 
disceptatio non parvam inter duo regna christianorum clarissima, Franciae et Anglia, vel fecit 
vel fovit controversiam, sicut ex opusculis hinc inde confectis sciri potest; quorum sententias 
omittere decrevimus pro praesenti’ (Gerson, Jacob autem genuit, v. 347). The chancellor 
was only repeating here what he had already stated in a previous treatise, Considérations 
sur saint Joseph, written in middle French around 1414 (Oeuvres complètes, vii, pt. 1, pp. 
69–72, at p. 70). In his translation, with commentary, of Aristotle’s Politics, Nicole Oresme 
advanced the same argument, according to which it is illegitimate to invoke the genealogy 
of Jesus to justify the transmission of royalty through the female line, since His kingdom is 
not of this world (N. Oresme, Le livre de Politiques d’Aristote. Published from the Text of the 
Avranches Manuscript 223. With a Critical Introduction and Notes by Albert Douglas Menut 
(Philadelphia, Pa., 1970), p. 156. I wish to thank Serge Lusignan for bringing this source to 
my attention.
5 Gerson, Considérations sur saint Joseph, pp. 70–7; also Oeuvres complètes, ix. 479, § 12 
(De nobilitate): ‘Nobilitas humana respiciens principaliter animam vel hominem ut homo 
est, magis attenditur a philosophis juxta illud: nobilitas sola est animum quae moribus 
ornat’. Cf. Ludolph of Saxony: ‘nihil de nostris vilitatibus erubescens; per ita proculdubio 
docens ut nos quoque nunquam de vitiis erubescamus parentum, sed unum illud queramus 
semper nobilitari propriarum honore virtutum. Non est omnino, non est nec de virtute nec 
de vitio parentum, aut laudandus aliquis aut culpandus; nemo inde vere aut obscurus, aut 
clarus est. Immo ut considerantius aliquid dicamus nescio quo magis ille respondet, qui ex 
parentibus a virtute prorsus alienus existens, ipse tamen fuerit de virtute mirabilis; nullus 
igitur in superbiam de gloria elevetur parentum, sed considerans progenitores Domini 
omnem evacuet et comprimat mentis tumorem et de solis virtutibus glorietur’ (Ludolphe 
Le Chartreux, Vita Jesu Christi ex Evangelio et approbatis ab ecclesia …, ed. L.-M. Rigollot (4 
vols, Paris, 1870), i. 69).
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and Mary. Of Orleanist allegiance like Gerson, the duke of Berry had also 
endured Burgundian violence during the Cabochien revolt in the aftermath 
of Louis of Orléans’s murder in 1407 by agents of John the Fearless. In 
his letter the chancellor claims that the fall of the Cabochiens was due to 
a miracle worked by St Joseph, whom he had promoted to the status of 
protector of the city of Paris alongside St Geneviève and St Denis in an 
earlier speech addressed to the king.6 A symbol of the union of God and 
his Church, the cult of the virginal marriage of Joseph and Mary was also 
intended to promote peace and unity within the kingdom.7
Gerson’s letter to Jean de Berry is not an isolated example. From a series 
of other letters written around the same period we know he committed 
himself thereafter to the double task of instituting a solemn feast in honour 
of the marriage of Joseph and Mary and of employing – in vain – his oratorial 
talents to condemn Jean Petit’s justification of tyrannicide and reopen the 
case against the duke of Burgundy.8 Not surprisingly, the Burgundian 
faction present at Constance looked for an opportunity to discredit the 
chancellor. Retaliations came without delay. A record (schedula) based on 
notes taken during Gerson’s sermon on behalf of Martin Porée, bishop of 
Arras and principal ambassador to John the Fearless, accused the chancellor 
of justifying royal succession through the female line in order to attract 
English favour.9 Other doctrinal blunders incriminating Gerson included 
the claim that Joseph, like John the Baptist, had been sanctified in utero. The 
chancellor was well aware of the unprecedented nature of such statements, 
as the sermon’s initial caveat testifies:
6 See Gerson, Rex in sempiternum vive! (4 Sept. 1413), in Oeuvres complètes, vii, pt. 2. pp. 
1005–30.
7 Gerson, letter to the duke of Berry, 23 Nov. 1413, in Oeuvres complètes, ii. 155–7. See 
M. Lieberman, ‘La lettre de Gerson au duc de Berry’, Cahiers de Joséphologie, ix (1961), 
199–265. For Joseph as protector of the city, see Rex in sempiternum vive!, p. 1030. For 
other documents testifying to Gerson’s efforts to promote the new cult, see the letter to the 
universal Church (‘Office pour la fête de saint Joseph’) of Aug. 1413, in Oeuvres complètes, 
vii, pt. 1, pp. 55–60; and Bonne exhortation generale pour la feste de la Desponsacion de Nostre 
Dame (26 Sept. 1413), in Oeuvres complètes, vii, pt.1, pp. 11–15. 
8 E.g., Veniat pax (1408), in Oeuvres complètes, vii, pt. 2, pp. 1100–23. In his Tractatus 
de nuptiis Christi et Ecclesiae (Nuptiae factae sunt), of 17–27 Jan. 1417 Gerson establishes a 
significant parallel between the errors of Jan Hus, harmful to clerics, and those of Jean Petit, 
harmful to secular princes (Oeuvres complètes, vi. 190–210, at pp. 208–10).
9 Martin Porée’s schedula is published in Ioannis Gersonii opera omnia, novo ordine digesta, 
et in V. tomos distribute, ed. E. du Pin (Anvers, 1706), v. 663B–D. Note, however, that in 
Oct. 1416, at Calais, John the Fearless recognized Henry V as legitimate heir to the crown of 
France. It was only in April 1417 that the incriminating schedula against Gerson was made 
public!
257
The shaping of doctrinal novelty in Jean Gerson’s Josephina (1414–17)
In what follows, I shall imitate the method of the holy doctors who have said 
many things about the saints and the holy persons in order to incite devotion 
among the good souls. We are led to believe these things on the grounds of 
probable or conjectural reasoning, without thereby being obliged to accept 
them as necessary by faith. That is how I would like my statements to be 
understood: not that things happened de facto the way I pretend they did, but 
as we can piously believe that they could have happened, without temerity or 
prejudice towards other opinions.10
The choice of terms used in this programmatic passage will be commented 
on later. Other arguments advanced by Gerson to mitigate the effects of his 
doctrinal statements appeal to their ancestry: the idea that Joseph had been 
sanctified in utero appears already in an officio Jerosolymitano, a liturgical 
office probably in use among Carmelites in the thirteenth century.11 He 
adds that such a belief is desirable on devotional grounds, for it encourages 
hope and devotion among parents of unborn children – even if ‘it has not 
been confirmed by any revelation’ and cannot be directly deduced from the 
scriptures. More revealingly, Gerson makes a doctrinal link between Mary’s 
privileges through her immaculate conception and the spiritual promotion 
of her husband.12 Indeed, the cult of their virginal marriage, which he was so 
10 ‘Erit autem deductio nostra imitatrix sanctorum ac devotissimorum patrum qui ad 
commovendam piarum mentium devotionem dixerunt multa de sanctis et divinis quae 
et qualia, magis ex conjecturali quadam probabilitate quam ex fidei necessitate, tenenda 
sciebant. Sic eorum quae dicentur plurima volo posterius intelligi ita ut non tam quae facta 
sunt quam quae fieri potuisse pia quadam religiositate credi possunt, absque ulla assertionis 
temeritate et sine praejudicio sententiae sanioris referantur’ (Gerson, Jacob autem genuit, pp. 
345–6) (my emphasis).
11 On this subject, see M. Lieberman, ‘Les sources joséphologiques de Gerson et l’ “Office 
des Carmes”’, Cahiers de Joséphologie, x (1962), 17–57, 189–249 (with an edition of the office 
from the Tours MS. at pp. 198–220); ‘Pierre d’Ailly, Jean Gerson et le culte de saint Joseph 
I–III’, Cahiers de Joséphologie, xiii (1965), 227–72; xiv (1966), 273–314; xv (1967), 5–113; 
‘Chronologie Gersonienne. IV: Gerson poète’, Romania, lxxvi (1955), 289–333; ‘La lettre de 
Gerson au duc de Berry’, Cahiers de Joséphologie, ix (1961), 199–265. See also I. N. Maegawa, 
‘La doctrine de Jean Gerson sur saint Joseph’, Cahiers de Joséphologie, vii (1959), 181–94. 
For the officio Jerosolymitano mentioned by Gerson, see Oeuvres complètes, v. 349 (Jacob 
autem genuit, secunda consideratio); and the letter addressed to Dominique Petit, chanter 
of Chartres, on 7 Sept. 1416, in Oeuvres complètes, ii. 169. See also J. Dusserre, ‘Les origines 
de la dévotion à saint Joseph’, Cahiers de Joséphologie, i (1953), 1–60 and i.2 (1954), 61–86; B. 
P. McGuire, ‘When Jesus did the dishes: the transformation of late medieval spirituality’, 
in The Making of Christian Communities in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages, ed. M. F. 
Williams (London, 2005), pp. 131–52.
12 ‘Maria de qua natus est Jesus sicut fuit in utero sanctificata priusquam nasceretur, ita de 
Joseph virginali viro suo pia probabilitate credi potest quamvis forte non omnino similiter. 
Potest forsan haec dissimilitudo notari in hoc quod Joseph post originale contractum 
sanctificatus est in utero baptismo flaminis sicut Joannes Baptista et aliorum plurimi. Sic 
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keen to encourage, depended on the doctrinal rehabilitation of the much-
neglected figure of Joseph.
Gerson’s arguments in favour of Joseph’s sanctification in utero are 
somewhat reminiscent of St Bernard of Clairvaux’s famous remonstrance 
to the canons of Lyons on the subject of the immaculate conception of 
Mary. In order to promote the new feast day, the canons had appealed 
to the authority of a certain revelation in which, supposedly, the Virgin 
recommended the introduction of the new feast as a way to commemorate 
her parents, as prescribed by the fourth commandment (‘Honour thy father 
and thy mother’ (Exodus XX: 12)). Bernard had discarded such devotional 
claims, along with unproven revelations, as a possible justification for 
instituting a new feast day. Such arguments, he maintained, had not been 
proved by reason or attested by any ancient tradition (novam inducendo 
celebritatem, quam ritus Ecclesiae nescit, non probat ratio, non commendat 
antiqua traditio).13 In this light, Gerson’s own arguments read as an 
attempt to outwit Bernard’s critique. In an earlier sermon, preached in 
Saint-Germain l’Auxerrois on 8 December 1401, Gerson refers explicitly 
to the Cistercian’s reluctance concerning the instauration of the feast of 
the immaculate conception. Constructed on the famous verse from Daniel 
X11: 4 – ‘Many shall run to and fro, and knowledge shall be increased’ – 
Gerson’s riposte is instructive with regard to his understanding of doctrinal 
development:
Sometimes the Holy Spirit reveals to the Church and to the most recent doctors 
certain truths or expositions of the sacred scriptures which had not been revealed 
to their predecessors. That is what Gregory means by citing Pertransibunt 
plurimi et multiplex erit sciencia Domini (Daniel XII [4]).14 Moses knows more 
enim in officio Jerosolymitano de Joseph composito continetur et ex praemisso quadruplici 
principio sequi videtur’ (Gerson, Jacob autem genuit, pp. 349–50).
13 ‘Sed profertur scriptum supernae, ut aiunt, revelationis, quasi et quivis non queat 
scriptum aeque producere, in quo Virgo videatur idipsum mandare et de parentibus suis, 
iuxta Domini mandatum dicentis: ‘Honora patrem tuum et matrem tuam’ [Ex 20, 12]. Ipse 
mihi facile persuadeo scriptis talibus non moveri, quibus nec ratio suppeditare, nec certa 
invenitur favere auctoritas’ (Bernard of Clairvaux, Epistola 174 ad canonicos lugdunenses, de 
conceptione Mariae, in Sancti Bernardi opera omnia, ed. J. Leclercq, C. H. Talbot and H. M. 
Rochais (8 vols, Rome, 1974), vii. 391). On the subject of the immaculate conception, see 
M. Lamy, L’immaculée conception: étapes et enjeux d’une controverse au Moyen-Age (XIIe–XVe 
siècles) (Paris, 2000), pp. 52–3; also A. Wilmart, Auteurs, spirituels et textes dévots du Moyen 
Âge latin (Paris, 1932), pp. 202–4.
14 ‘Fallor si haec ipsa scriptura non loquitur: pertransibunt plurimi, et multiplex erit 
scientia. Sed haec eadem quae de abraham, moyse, prophetis et apostolis diximus, ex 
eiusdem scripturae uerbis, si possumus, ostendamus. Quis enim nesciat quia abraham cum 
deo locutus est? Et tamen ad moysen dominus dicit: ego sum deus abraham, et deus isaac, 
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than Abraham; the prophets know more than Moses; the apostles know more 
than the prophets; and the doctors in their turn have added to what the apostles 
already knew. We can thus affirm that this truth, according to which Our Lady 
was not conceived in original sin, is one of the truths which have been recently 
revealed or declared. ... For this reason St Bernard reprimands the canons of 
Lyons in his letter, for they wanted to celebrate the feast of this conception too 
soon, just as if someone today wanted to celebrate the feast of a saint not yet 
canonized or consecrated by the tradition and authority of the Roman Church. 
However, things now are no longer as they were in Bernard’s time, for truth 
has become clearer, such that we celebrate this solemn feast almost universally 
within the Roman Church. That is why we run fewer risks of incurring error by 
presuming to celebrate this feast, than not wanting to celebrate it.15
The allusion to Bernard’s conservatism – which Gerson otherwise shared to 
a large extent – reveals the real issue underlying the chancellor’s doctrinal 
innovations in the Constance sermon of 1416, for the central point of 
contention was not the use of Gerson’s propositions by his adversaries for 
et deus iacob, et nomen meum adonai non indicaui eis? Ecce plus moysi quam abrahae 
innotuerat, qui illud de se moysi indicat quod se abrahae non indicasse narrabat. Sed 
uideamus si prophetae plus quam moyses diuinam scientiam apprehendere potuerunt. Certe 
psalmista dicit: quomodo dilexi legem tuam, domine? Tota die meditatio mea est. Atque 
subiungit: super omnes docentes me intellexi; quia testimonia tua meditatio mea est. Et 
iterum: super seniores intellexi’ (Gregorius Magnus, Homiliae in Hiezechihelem prophetam, 
ed. M. Adriaen (CCSL, cxlii, Turnhout, 1971), II, hom. 4, ll. 344–57).
15 ‘Le Saint Esperit revele aucunes foys a l’Eglise et aux docteurs darreniers aucunes veritez 
ou exposicions de la saincte Escripture lesquelles il n’a pas revelé a leurs predécesseurs. 
Ainsy le dit saint Gregoire super illo: Pertransibunt plurimi et multiplex erit sciencia Domini, 
Daniel XII [4]. Moyse sceut plus que Abraham, les prophetes que Moyse, les apostres que 
les prophetes. Et les docteurs ont adjousté oultre les apostres. Si pouons dire que ceste verité 
que nostre Dame ne fut point conceue en pechié originel est de celles qui sont nouvellement 
revelees ou declairees, tant par miracles qui se lisent comme par plus grant partie de saincte 
Eglise qui ainsy le tient’ (Gerson, sermon Tota pulchra es [Song of Songs IV: 7], in Oeuvres 
complètes, vii, pt. 2, pp. 1057–80, at p. 1076); and ‘Pour ce saint Bernart en l’espitre que 
il feist aux chanoines de Lyon [Epist. 174] les reprent, car trop hastivement ilz vouloyent 
celebrer la feste de ceste concepcion comme on devroit faire maintenant qui vouldroit faire 
la feste d’un saint non canonisé ou non acoustumé sans aucune autorité de l’Eglise romaine. 
Pour tant saint Bernart s’en raporte en la fin a ce que l’Eglise en vouldra ordonner. Mais 
maintenant autre chose est que du temps saint Bernart car a verité est plus esclaircie et se 
celebre la solennité presque universelement par toute l’Eglise rommaine et autre; par quoy 
il n’y a point de peril de conscience et de erreur coulpable ou de presumpcion celebrer ceste 
solennité mais trop plus a la non celebrer’ (Gerson, Tota pulchra es, p. 1077). The same 
verses of the Book of Daniel are also quoted in the same sense by Vincent de Beauvais in 
the Libellus totius operis apologeticus, prologue to the Speculum maius, edited as Préface au 
Speculum maius de Vincent de Beauvais: réfraction et diffraction, ed. S. Lusignan (Cahiers 
d’études médiévales, v, Montréal and Paris, 1979), p. 116.
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political ends,16 but the acceptability of new religious beliefs and, more 
profoundly, the degree of latitude to be accorded to revealed truth. On 
what criteria of truth can the Church judge the acceptability of new objects 
of devotion? Is belief in them necessary for salvation in a way which would 
require the believer’s unwavering assent?17 In answer to these questions 
Gerson announced the composition of a brief treatise devoted to the 
normative classification of doctrinal discourse according to degrees of truth. 
A few months later, by the end of 1416, the Declaratio compendiosa quae 
veritates sint de necessitate salutis credendae laid down what could be rightly 
seen as the epistemological foundations and moral justification of doctrinal 
novelty according to Gerson.1819
The treatise establishes six degrees (gradus) of truth following a descending 
order of epistemic assent. The first three correspond respectively to orthodox 
doctrine as it is explicitly contained in the scriptures; as it is conveyed by the 
apostolic tradition; and the revelations received by certain individuals insofar 
as they have been confirmed by the scriptures or the Church. These truths, 
directly revealed by God, constitute the articles of faith and are therefore 
necessary for salvation. The following three degrees are logically deduced 
from the first and have only a probable status. The lowest of the three 
corresponds to truths which ‘nourish the feeling of charity and devotion of 
the pious heart’. Such truths result from an exercise of ‘estimation or pious 
belief ’ (existimatio vel pia credulitas) and escape the principle of bivalence of 
classical Aristotelian logic.1920 Thus understood, pious truths are not required 
16 They did not result, however, in any formal condemnation. For Gerson’s assertions 
regarding Mary’s queenship, see Jacob autem genuit, pp. 346–9; and Considérations sur saint 
Joseph, p. 70. See also Lieberman, ‘Pierre d’Ailly, Jean Gerson et le culte de saint Joseph, III’, 
esp. pp. 39–47.
17 ‘Est igitur quaestio si de necessitate fidei tenenda est veritas nostra consideratione 
secundae. Et hoc est investigare sub generali regula quae veritas est certa fide et de necessitate 
salutis, quae de sola probabilitate, quae de pietate fidei et quae sit impertinens’ (Gerson, 
Jacob autem genuit, p. 350). 
18 J. Gerson, Declaratio compendiosa quae veritates sint de necessitate salutis credendae, in 
Oeuvres complètes, vi. 181–9.
19 See also Gerson, De vita spirituali animae (1402): ‘Distinxerunt itaque in simili doctores 
ante nos quod veritas aliqua est pure de fide, aliqua solum pertinens ad fidem quae dici 
potest de pietate fidei, aliqua impertinens quae dici potest apocrypha’ (Oeuvres complètes, iii. 
137); Collectorium super Magnificat, tract. ix: ‘Probabilia sunt insuper plurima de et super hac 
beata beatarum, quae sunt potius accipienda de pietate devotionis quam de fidei necessitate 
vel temeritate assertionis, ubi non suppetit auctoritas Scripturae cogens aut ratio convincens’ 
(Oeuvres complètes, viii. 380); De examinatione doctrinarum: ‘Nihilominus attendendum 
est multiplicem esse doctrinarum per Ecclesiam seu Concilium vice sua, approbationem. 
Quaedam enim approbantur, ut certitudinaliter, vere, necessarioque credendae; quaedam, 
ut utiles ad moralem religiosamque doctrinam, sine mictione falsitatis noxiae; non tamen 
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for salvation, but merely allowed by the Church.20 Gerson’s argument is 
founded on an Aristotelian principle formulated in the Topics: ‘[N]othing 
prevents certain false things from being more probable than true ones, for 
if two contradictory statements cannot be simultaneously true, they can 
nevertheless be simultaneously probable’.21 Gerson concludes from this that 
‘nothing prevents us from piously believing something false’ as long as we do 
not hold it with pertinacity. In other words, as Daniel Hobbins admirably 
put it, a pious belief is true if it is not entirely improbable: probability 
sunt sic ut credantur obligatorie; sed dicuntur sive nominantur de pietate fidei’ (Oeuvres 
complètes, ix. 459). See also Josephina, dist. II, vv. 747–50: ‘Sed nec te Virgo beata/Septenni 
toto cum vicinis siluisse | Crediderim, sed eas de lege sacra docuisse | Quae ventura forent 
et quae credenda tenerent’; dist. III, vv. 875–6: ‘Ex fas fuerit paucis deducere multa | Qualia 
non credi sed nec reprobare necesse’.
20 ‘in sexto gradu … collocantur veritates illae quae tantummodo faciunt ad nutriendam vel 
fovendam devotionis religiosam pietatem, quae scilicet magis inducuntur ad inflammandum 
affectum quam ad instruendum intellectum, ubi pietas devota magis inspicitur quam veritas 
certa, ubi hoc unum reprobatur si adesset assertionis temeritas priusquam elucidaretur alio 
modo vel rationem certam ipsa veritas … Cadit existimatio vel pia credulitas non super 
veritate vel falsitate sed tantummodo super probabilitate vel apparentia … de talibus 
eligibilius est pie dubitare quam temere definire’ (Gerson, Declaratio compendiosa, pp. 
184–5). Cf. also Religioso et bono viro, the letter addressed by Gerson to Jean Morel on the 
subject of the Vie d’Ermine de Reims (Paris, 1408?), in Oeuvres complètes, ii. 94–5; and De vita 
spirituali animae, pp. 137–41.
21 ‘Unde, sicut dicit Aristoteles, nihil refert quaedam falsa probabiliora esse quibusdam 
veris, ita nihil refert quaedam falsa pie credi … Sicut stat quodlibet contradictorium 
esse probabile et unum stat cum altero, non in veritate sed in probabilitate, sic diversis 
respectibus utrumque contradictorium credi potest cum fidei pietate dum tamen sit animus 
a pertinaci assertione alienus’ (Gerson, Declaratio compendiosa, p. 184); also ‘Didicisti quod 
duo contradictoria in veritate simul non stant, sed in probabilitate’ (Gerson, Collectorium 
super Magnificat, p. 480); and ‘Numquid non insania est concedere quod duo contradictoria 
sunt simul vera pro eodem instanti temporis licet non naturae’ (Ignem veni mittere, letter 
addressed by Gerson to a Franciscan (Lyons, 1426), in Oeuvres complètes ii. 277–8). For 
Aristotle, see Topics VI, in Hamesse, ‘Auctoritates Aristotelis’, p.  331; also Metaphysics IV, 
in Hamesse, ‘Auctoritates Aristotelis’, p. 124. The same principle was later incorporated by 
Gerson in his treatise in favour of Joan of Arc, composed on 18 May 1429, a few days after 
the lifting of the siege of Orleans and shortly before Gerson’s death. Intending to justify 
the pious belief in a politically controversial figure, the former chancellor claims that the 
probable nature of the reasons which lead us to believe in her are not contradicted either by 
evidence (apparentiae) or by the plausible conjectures (apparentiae seu verisimiles coniecturae) 
of the opposite party. The treatise is edited: D. Hobbins, ‘Jean Gerson’s authentic tract 
on Joan of Arc: Super facto puellae et credulitate sibi praestanda (14 May 1429)’, Mediaeval 
Stud., lxvii (2005), 99–155, at p.  146: ‘Praeseupponendum est in primis quod multa falsa 
sunt probabilia. Immo secundum Philosophum non refert quaedam falsa probabiliora esse 
quibusdam veris, usque adeo quod duo contradictoria simul stant in probabilitate licet non 
in veritate’.
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governs truth, thus leading Gerson to the notion of ‘probable truth’.22 In 
such cases the chancellor calls for the greatest prudence: if the doctrine in 
question is uncertain, it is advisable to doubt piously rather than to advance 
hasty conclusions.23
The same principle governs Gerson’s attitude towards other cases of 
popular devotion, as can be seen in a famous letter he addressed in September 
1426 to Jean Bassandi, provincial of the Celestines in Lyons. Bassandi had 
asked for the theologian’s expert opinion on the Arbor vitae crucifixae 
Iesu of the Franciscan Ubertino de Casale, a work which had presumably 
caused interest mixed with mistrust on the part of monks otherwise fond of 
devotional literature.24 The chancellor, then in exile in Lyons, developed a 
detailed critique against certain Christological tenets contained in the work 
of the Franciscan. He accused Ubertino of temerity, which he attributed to 
a lack of discernment between truths which are necessary for salvation and 
consequently require firm assent by faith; and truths which hold a merely 
probable status and therefore proscribe bold assertions. Without logically 
resulting from the scriptures, such ‘pious propositions’ (propositiones de 
pietate fidei) serve to edify charity and devotion insofar as they do not 
contradict the sacred text. Together with hagiographical legends and the 
opinions of the doctors of the Church, ‘pious truths’ include:
devout meditations on what the gospel conveys regarding the acts of Christ and 
His mother, considering many things implicit in the way in which they could 
have acted; or what Jesus would have done with Joseph and Mary from His 
birth to the death of Joseph, as told in the epic poem the Josephina.25
22 Hobbins, ‘Jean Gerson’s authentic tract on Joan of Arc’, p. 116.
23 ‘Cadit existimatio vel pia credulitas non super veritate vel falsitate sed tantummodo 
super probabilitate vel apparentia … de talibus eligibilius est pie dubitare quam temere 
definire’ (Gerson, Declaratio compendiosa, p. 185). See also the letter dated 1408 to Jean 
Morel, regarding the visions of Ermine de Reims (Oeuvres complètes, ii. 93–6, at p. 94). 
24 For an analysis of this letter, see I. Iribarren, ‘Jean Gerson, spiritual adviser to the 
Celestines’, in Autorität und Wahrheit. Kirchliche Vorstellungen, Normen und Verfahren (XIII. 
– XV. Jahrhundert), ed. G. L. Potestà (Schriften des Historischen Kollegs, lxxxiv, München, 
2012), pp. 159–78.
25 ‘Ceterum de opinione non temeraria sed probabili vel de pia credulitate, latius dici 
potest prout alibi [in Declaratio compendiosa] notavimus. Et hoc unum placet hic repetere 
quid sit pium credere aut quae propositiones de pietate fidei sunt censandae: omnes illae 
scilicet quae nec evidenter sequuntur ex contentis in sacra Scriptura, nec etiam patenter 
repugnant, et aedificant caritatem vel devotionem pii cordis temerarie nihil asserentis; 
tales sunt narrationes sanctorum Patrum, tales devotae recogitationes circa totum evangelii 
decursum erga Christum et matrem suam, considerando multa non explicita quemadmodum 
fieri potuerint, vel quid egerit Jesus cum Joseph et Maria ab initio usque ad mortem Joseph, 
qualiter processum est in Josephina carmine heroico’ (J. Gerson, De susceptione humanitatis 
Christi, in Oeuvres complètes, ii. 269). In the Collectorium super Magnificat, tract. xii, Gerson 
lends to Mary a similar description of the Josephina (Oeuvres complètes, viii. 528).
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As this passage reveals, the hierarchy of truths developed earlier in the 
Declaratio compendiosa underlies both Gerson’s criticism against Ubertino’s 
devotional audacity and his poetical composition of the Josephina. The 
connection between the two is not without importance. The growing 
interest in the character of St Joseph during the thirteenth century reached 
a climax in the fourteenth within Franciscan circles, in particular among 
the spirituals Peter John Olivi and Ubertino de Casale. Seeking to stress 
the importance of Christ’s earthly life, these theologians had enhanced 
by extension the role played by his earthly father – not without betraying 
a certain Joachimite tendency which did not further the reception of 
their writings among ecclesiastical authorities. Although Gerson was no 
exception, his attitude towards popular devotion was not unequivocal. 
Indeed, the Josephina borrows extensively from the Franciscan tradition of 
devotional literature, notably the pseudo-Bonaventuran Meditationes vitae 
Christi. Like the latter, it seeks to guide the believer through the reading of 
the Bible and its various meanings; convey its message concerning Christian 
life and moral conduct; and provide spiritual consolation through devout 
mediation on concrete representations of Christ’s childhood and passion.26 
From this perspective the Josephina could be read as an attempt to retrieve 
Franciscan devotion to St Joseph and channel it in favour of Church reform 
and political stability.
However, in attempting to reconstruct the story of the Holy Family 
through an exercise in biblical amplificatio, Gerson was skating on thin ice. 
A few verses of the Josephina testify to this:
Our meditation … does not advance any bold statements 
on what remains unknown, but moderately recurs  
to conjectures by means of topical arguments. 
Based on what is written, the spirit is capable, 
through a pious effort, of inferring what is unwritten. 
That is how a firm faith reveals what remains uncertain, 
what actually happened and what could have happened.27
26 E.g., Josephina, dist. VII, vv. 1894–6: ‘Deficit hic sensus, ratio stupet omneque mentis | 
Caligat lumen, dum te, vir, cernere tali | Conor in obsequio quid dicam nescio’. I. Fabre states 
that, ‘un principe popularisé par la devotio moderna consiste à s’imaginer présent à la scène 
méditée, car c’est en partant de scènes imaginées que l’on s’élève plus facilement au-delà même 
de la méditation, de telles images étant tenues d’emblée pour contingentes et provisoires. 
Le rôle de l’imagination chez Gerson repose sur l’idée d’une dynamique exemplaire censée 
accoutumer l’âme contemplative à saisir la présence du mystère à travers un tissu symbolique’ 
(I. Fabre, La doctrine du chant du cœur de Jean Gerson. Edition critique, traduction et commentaire 
du ‘Tractatus de canticis’ et du ‘Canticordum au pèlerin’ (Geneva, 2005), pp. 106–7).
27 ‘Nil super ignotis igitur meditatio nostra | Affirmet temere, sola suffecerit uti | 
Coniecturarum thopica ratione modeste. | Ex scriptis inferre potest non scripta pio mens | 
Cum studio, sic certa fides incerta revelat | Qualia sunt acta vel que fieri potuere’ (Josephina, 
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Echoing Gerson’s caveat in the Constance sermon, these verses contain 
the main features of the chancellor’s ‘grammar of assent’ as stated in 
the Declaratio compendiosa: of merely probable status, the devotional 
amplificatio of the scriptural text is the result of conjectural arguments to 
which a minimum level of epistemic assent corresponds. Its principal aim 
is to foster the believer’s affection, thereby precluding doctrinal temerity 
and hasty assertions. The concept of poetry as a narrative founded on what 
might have happened rather than on what actually happened comes from 
Aristotle’s Poetics: ‘[T]he poet’s task is not to tell how things really happened 
but rather to tell what could have happened’. That is why, Aristotle proceeds, 
poetry is ‘more philosophical and of a loftier character than history, because 
poetry tends to give general truths while history tells particular facts. By 
general truth I mean the sort of thing that a certain type of man will do 
or say either probably or necessarily’.28 The term ‘philosophical’ employed 
by Aristotle to qualify poetry takes us back to the principle stated in his 
Topics, cited by Gerson in his Declaratio compendiosa, as we saw above: 
‘[I]f two contradictory statements cannot be simultaneously true, they 
can nevertheless be simultaneously probable’. ‘If we deny this principle’ – 
Aristotle adds – ‘philosophy becomes impossible’.29 Philosophy and poetics 
thus converge on the terrain of topical or conjectural reasoning as a mode of 
argumentation seeking credibility rather than certainty and as such eluding 
the scientific standards of evidence.
In this context conjectural reasoning represents a minimal criterion of 
certainty, serving to guarantee the acceptability of beliefs which, without 
contradicting the sacred texts, cannot be logically deduced from them. 
Conjecture thus becomes a truth-seeking tool when a superior level of 
certainty fails. Cicero’s definition of divination is not dissimilar: ‘[I]t is 
the art of those who, having learned old things by observation, seek new 
things by conjecture’.30 Conjecture proceeds by correlations between 
unusual phenomena and analogous ones already known: in order to 
dist. III, vv. 855–60). See also the programmatic verses at the end of the Prologue: ‘favete | 
Nostraque sit, facite pietas accepta Camene, | Ancillans fidei, nulli preiudica vero, | Multa 
probabiliter suadens, temeraria nusquam, | Apta peregrinum cor sursum attollere celis’ 
(vv. 91–5).
28 Aristotle, De arte poetica, ed. L. Minio-Paluello (Aristoteles Latinus, xxxiii, Brussels, 
1968), ch. 9, 1451a36–10; also 1447a18–1448a27, 1448b4–23.
29 Aristotle, Metaphysics IV, in Hamesse, ‘Auctoritates Aristoteli’, p. 124; quoted by Gerson 
in Declaratio compendiosa, pp. 184–5.
30 ‘Est enim ars in eis qui novas res coniectura persequuntur, veteres observatione 
didicerunt’ (Cicero, De divinatione, ed. T. E. Page, E. Capps and W. H. D. Rouse, with 
English trans. by W. A. Falconer (Cambridge, Mass. and London, 1927), p. 262 (I. xviii. 
34)).
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clarify the meaning of an unusual event, the interpreter relies on similar 
ones already attested in oral or written memory.31 Similarly, the Josephina 
intends to elaborate a plausible narrative from what is implicitly contained 
in the scriptures, with reference to recorded traditions of biblical history or 
hagiographical models. An emblematic example of this kind of extrapolation 
from biblical narrative is the episode of the flight to Egypt, in which 
Gerson the poet imagines that, upon arrival, Joseph would prudently have 
attempted to conceal the identity of his wife. He draws his inspiration from 
a passage in Genesis in which the same behaviour is attributed to Abraham 
during his stay in Egypt.32 These narrative mechanisms are not unusual in 
hagiographical literature, in which the deeds or features of one saint are 
often attributed to other saints. In the case of the Constance sermon, the 
doctrine that Joseph was sanctified in utero results from an extrapolation 
from the privilege granted to John the Baptist and traditionally accepted 
by the Church.
In an earlier treatise devoted to the spiritual promotion of St Joseph, the 
Considérations sur saint Joseph (1414), Gerson had defined the conjectural 
reasoning underlying devotional truths by the middle-French term religieuse 
estimation.33 The choice of term is not arbitrary and takes us back to the 
Arab tradition of commentaries on the Aristotelian Organon. This tradition 
conceived rhetoric and poetics as part of logic, understood not as an ars 
sermocinalis (leading with language) but as an ars ratiocinativa (focusing 
on cognitive acts).34 The result was a raising of the scientific standards of 
31 K. Park, ‘Observation in the margins, 500–1500’, in Histories of Scientific Observation, 
ed. L. Daston and E. Lunbeck (Chicago, Ill., 2011), pp. 15–44, at p. 18.
32 Josephina, dist. II, vv. 411–24. Cf. Genesis XII: 11–13.
33 ‘Nous estudions prendre aucunes considerations particulieres selon probables raisons 
ou arguments, morals et topiques, comme appartient a tele matiere, et comme elle les peut 
souffrir et recevoir sans temeraire ou fole assertion; car en ce faisant, on edifie l’affection 
devote qui s’esmeut plus en considerations particulieres que universeles; et c’est ce que nous 
appelons en latin pietas fidei; nous le povons dire en francois: religieuse estimation … Et ceste 
consideration proffite a merveille pour entendre et concevoir … comment saincte Église 
use de leurs dis [des sains docteurs] en ses legendes et en ses chans’ (Gerson, Considérations 
sur saint Joseph, p. 65). Cf. Jacob autem genuit: ‘religiosa studiositas plurima conquirere 
de castissima et sanctissima conversatione Joseph cum Maria, de confabulationibus suis 
divinissimis in loco peregrinationis suae super mysteriis nostrae redemptionis, super canticis 
ipsius Mariae, Zachariae et Simeonis; super his praeterea omnibus quae dicebantur de 
puero Jesu et quae videbantur in eo et quae revelabantur ab angelo; immo et quae felici 
experimento tu Maria didiceras’ (Jacob autem genuit, p. 353) (my emphasis).
34 E.g., al-Fārābī, De scientiis, Al-Farabi über die Wissenschaften, ed. F. Schupp (Hamburg, 
2005), ch. 5; also Aristotle, Rhetoric, ed. B. Schneider (Aristoteles Latinus, xxxi, pts 1–2, 
Turnhout, 1978), I.1, 1355a14–18; Boethius, De differentiis topicis, trans. and notes E. Stump 
(Ithaca, N.Y. and London, 1978), bk. IV. On this subject, see, among a vast literature: La 
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evidence, thus opening the way to the notion of a moral kind of argument 
distinct from demonstrative syllogism. In this context the use of the term 
aestimatio (estimation) to describe the type of cognitive act characteristic of 
poetry is recurrent in Latin commentaries of the Organon in the thirteenth 
and fourteenth centuries. Based on a descending hierarchy of degrees of 
assent, Latin theologians ascribe necessary judgement to demonstrative 
reasoning; to opinion or belief (opinio or fides), in which one of the 
terms of the contradiction outweighs the other; to dialectics; to suspicio 
(suspicion) of the conclusion to rhetoric; and, finally, to aestimatio, to the 
poetical construction of a plausible literary universe seeking to influence 
the behaviour of the audience.35 Gerson’s use of the term aestimatio in the 
context of his promotion of St Joseph is indebted to this tradition and 
confirms the connection made previously between the principles governing 
his attitude towards lay devotion and his conception of religious poetry.
This analysis concludes with one last example of Gerson’s strategy to 
justify devotional novelty by grafting it onto an existing tradition through 
probable arguments. In its doctrinal reconstruction of Joseph, the Josephina 
insists on the providential importance of Joseph’s youthfulness. In order to 
exclude all suspicion of adultery by his pregnant wife (indeed, conception 
from an elderly man seemed improbable), a young Joseph was all the more 
rhétorique d’Aristote: traditions et commentaires de l’Antiquité au XVIIe siècle, ed. G. Dahan 
and I. Rosier-Catach (Paris, 1998); J. Franklin, The Science of Conjecture: Evidence and 
Probability before Pascal (Baltimore, Md., 2001); K. Fredborg, ‘The scholastic teaching of 
rhetoric in the middle ages’, Cahiers l’Institut du moyen âge grec et latin, lv (1978), 85–105; P. 
O. Lewry, ‘Rhetoric at Paris and Oxford in the mid-thirteenth century’, Rhetorica, i (1983), 
45–63; G. Dahan, ‘Les classifications du savoir aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles’, L’Enseignement 
philosophique, xl.4 (1990), 5–27; G. Dahan, ‘Notes et textes sur la poétique au moyen âge’, 
Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge, xlvii (1980), 171–247; J. J. Murphy, 
Rhetoric in the Middle Ages: a History of Rhetorical Theory from Saint Augustine to the 
Renaissance (Berkeley, Calif., 1974); Medieval Eloquence: Studies in the Theory and Practice 
of Medieval Rhetoric, ed. J. J. Murphy (Berkeley, Calif., 1978); K. Eden, ‘The rhetorical 
tradition and Augustinian hermeneutics in the De doctrina Christiana’, Rhetorica, viii (1990), 
45–63; D. Black, ‘Traditions and transformations in the medieval approach to rhetoric and 
related linguistic arts’, in L’enseignement de la philosophie au XIIIe siècle: autour du ‘Guide de 
l’étudiant’ du ms. Ripoll 109, ed. C. Lafleur and J. Carrier (Turnhout, 1997), pp. 233–54; W. 
F. Boggess, ‘Aristotle’s “Poetics” in the fourteenth century’, in Stud. in Philology, lxvii (1970), 
278–94; R. Copeland, ‘Pathos and pastoralism: Aristotle’s Rhetoric in medieval England’, 
Speculum, lxxxix (2014), 96–127, esp. at pp. 96–100. I am very grateful to Mary Carruthers 
for her valuable comments and references on this subject.
35 E.g., Thomas Aquinas, Expositio libri posteriorium, in Sancti Thomae de Aquino opera 
omnia, ed. Leonine (multiple vols, Rome and Paris 1882–; 1989), i. 2. (I, 1); Albert the Great, 
Super Ethica, in Natürliche Moral und philosophische Ethik bei Albertus Magnus, ed. J. Müller 
(Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, Neue Folge, lix, 
Münster, 2001), pp. 325–58, at pp. 341–2 (I, 3).
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likely to guarantee Jesus’ legitimate birth (dist. V, vv. 1524–5; and dist. IV, 
vv. 1300–4). Following an idea which harks back to Augustine and is rather 
present in medieval religious imagination, Gerson considers that Joseph’s 
role was crucial to deceiving the devil and thereby safeguarding the mystery 
of the incarnation.36 In this respect he regrets the lasting influence of 
apocryphal accounts on iconographical representations of an old, slightly 
awkward Joseph, overshadowed by the imposing figures of Mary and the 
Child. According to the Paris chancellor, this tendency can only be explained 
by the fact that at that point in history the doctrine of Joseph’s own virginity 
was not sufficiently established in the minds of the faithful. Indeed, the 
apocryphal literature had conveyed the image of Joseph as an old widower 
at the time he married Mary as a way of dispelling suspicion of any carnal 
knowledge between the two spouses.37 As Gerson sees it, then, apocryphal 
accounts correspond to an embryonic stage in the development of doctrine, 
just like Bernard’s position, alluded to earlier, regarding the immaculate 
conception of Mary. Governed by grace, the normative character of the new 
law requires gradual unfolding and adaptation in time, without thereby 
diminishing its perfect and definite character:38 non subito totam se monstrat 
gratia mondo [the whole of grace does not manifest itself in a sudden way 
to the world] (dist. V, v. 1535). Convinced as they are now of the virginal 
nature of the union of Joseph and Mary – Gerson claims – the faithful 
are ready to embrace the new cult and see in Joseph the physically young, 
spiritually privileged spouse who corresponds to Mary’s sinless conception. 
A passage from the Considérations sur saint Joseph offers, as it were, Gerson’s 
final manifesto on doctrinal development:
If someone argues that it would be introducing novelty in the Church, which 
would seem a danger and a temerity, for – they could add – our predecessors, 
who were so holy and wise, would have established such a solemn feast at 
their time had they considered it convenient: to this we could answer that 
God’s providence accomplishes things by wise disposition, one after the other, 
even though he could have made them all at the same time. And we see this, 
36 ‘Altera ratio [quod Joseph fuisse juvenem], fuit ad conservandam Mariae famam apud 
perfidos Judaeos et ad Incarnationis mysterium celandum demonibus; quae ratio cessasset 
prorsus si Joseph senex, frigidus et quasi maleficiatus palam apparuisset’ (Gerson, Jacob autem 
genuit, p. 353). For Augustine, see sermon 263, De ascensione Domini: muscipula diaboli, crux 
Domini , in Sancti Augustini Sermones post Maurinos reperti, Miscellanea Agostiniana, ed. G. 
Morin (2 vols, Rome, 1930), i. 508.
37 ‘Vel ideo pingebatur senex ab initio nascentis Ecclesiae dum Mariae perpetua virginitas 
nondum ut modo radices fixerat in cordibus fidelium, ne suspicaretur carnale aliquid de 
Joseph et Maria’ (Gerson, Jacob autem genuit, p. 353).
38 On this subject, see E. Marmursztejn, L’autorité des maîtres. Scolastique, normes et société 
au XIIIe siècle (Paris, 2007), esp. pp. 85–7.
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more to our purpose, as feast days have been successively instituted and the 
truths of faith successively preached. The feast of the Nativity of Our Lady 
was thus instituted a long time after the feast of her Assumption; and the feast 
for her Conception was recently established, and lately the feast of the Blessed 
Sacrament was instituted, as well as that of St Anne, and similarly for a number 
of other cases. For God wants our devotion to be turned first to one thing 
and then to another, as long as it is according to truth and following a good 
intention, since a holy novelty can be agreeable to him without reprehension.39
An epic reconstruction of St Joseph’s gesta, the Josephina can also be seen 
in the light of the above analysis as a timely justification of new religious 
cults and, indeed, a far-reaching illustration of doctrinal boldness in the 
promotion of new institutional religious cults and beliefs.
39 ‘Et s’aucun dit que ce seroit introduire nouvelté en l’Eglise, qui sembleroit peril ou 
temerité, car c’est bien a savoir, dira aucun, que nos predecesseurs qui furent tant saints 
et saiges eussent pièca de leur temps ordonnee tele solennité se ce eust esté bien et 
convenablement fait, nous pouvons respondre que la providence de Dieu fait ses choses par 
saige ordonnance, l’une apres l’autre combien qu’elle les pourroit tout faire ensemble et nous 
le veons a nostre propos que les festes des sains et sainctes ont este successivement ordonnés 
et les verités de la foy successivement prachees. La feste de la Nativite Noster Dame fu faicte 
moult longtemps apres celle de son Assumption; puis on a fait nouvellement la feste de sa 
Conception et n’aguerez que la feste du saint sacrement fu instituee, et celel de sainte Anne, 
et ainsi de plusieurs telz cas; car Dieu veult bien que nostre devocion se torne puis en une 
chose puis en l’autre, mais que ce soit selond verité et bonne entencion, car sainte nouvelleté 
peut bien plaire sans reprehension’ (Gerson, Considerations sur saint Joseph, p. 71).
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Afterword
David d’Avray
The Franciscan university master and minister general Bonaventure (c.1217–
74) once gave a talk about the ‘order’ of university study which, like this 
book, is an interpretative history of scholasticism.1 He writes that there 
are four kinds of writing which are the object of study: first, the books of 
holy scriptures; second, the ‘original [Patristic] texts’ (libri originalium);2 
the Summae of the [university] masters (Summae magistrorum) are the 
third kind of writing; and the fourth are the writings of worldly teachings 
(doctrina mundialium) (Collationes, pp. 214–5). With the scriptures one 
must start with the literal sense, then go on to the ‘spiritual’ (symbolic/
allegorical) sense. One must master the Bible as a whole (oportet totum 
textum sacrae Scripturae habere in promptu). To understand the literal sense 
of the scriptures properly, one must turn to the ‘Fathers’, who have had help 
from the holy spirit. Their writings too are difficult to understand, however; 
and some people studying them on their own have fallen into very many 
errors and heresies. Hence one needs to have recourse to the Summae of the 
masters, in which those difficulties are elucidated. Because these writings 
of the masters make much use of texts from the (pagan) philosophers 
(verba Philosophorum), it is necessary for the student of sacred scripture 
to hear lectures on and study the latter (Collationes, p. 216). Each kind of 
study has its danger. The Summae can mislead because the masters do not 
always understand the Fathers: for example, Peter Lombard (c.1100–60), 
though a great man, did not understand Augustine (354–430) in certain 
places (Collationes, p. 216). Moreover, (pagan) philosophy is full of dangers. 
It ought to be a preparatory study (in scriptis Philosophorum transeundo 
studendum est) (Collationes, p. 217). It does not work like that, however, 
‘because those who teach it [professores], even if not openly, nonetheless 
1 Bonaventure, Collationes in Hexaemeron, ed. F. Delorme (Bibliotheca Franciscana 
Scholastica Medii Aevi, viii, Ad Claras Aquas, 1934), pp. 212–22 (visio III, Collatio VII). 
Henceforth references will be given in the text.
2 Later Bonaventure uses the phrase ‘Sanctorum originalia’ (Collationes, p. 216). All 
translations are my own.
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secretly read, copy and hide booklets [quaternos] of the philosophers like 
idols’ (Collationes, p. 218).
This is meant to be a sort of syllabus but stands up well as a short 
history. Scholastic theology started with questions about the Bible and the 
‘Fathers’ of the Church, who themselves seldom strayed far from biblical 
exegesis. Both sources of authority generated problems for anyone who 
read them in a spirit of intellectual enquiry, as did Peter Abelard, whose 
Sic et non juxtaposed authoritative texts which appeared to refute one 
another. ‘Gratian’s’ Decretum (a theological as well as legal synthesis from 
the 1130s–50s; the inverted commas indicate scholars’ uncertainty about 
the author or possibly the two authors) did the same.3 The Decretum was 
itself a Summa, theological as well as legal; and the theological Summa 
of Peter Lombard, his Sentences, resolved the naked tensions emphasized 
by Abelard to make students think and set the parameters for a whole 
series of subsequent Summae in what would, by the early thirteenth 
century, become the university system as we still know it today. Logic and 
philosophical linguistics were at first the main problem-solving tools, but 
with the translation into Latin of the substantive philosophical works of 
Aristotle, Avicenna and Averroes, Bonaventure’s ‘philosophers’ with their 
‘worldly teachings’, the relation of these to theological data became a central 
preoccupation. 
Bible, Fathers, Summae and pagan philosophy: Bonaventure’s summary 
does considerable justice in a small compass to the intellectual movement 
with which this book is concerned. Dufal’s chapter is all about the relation 
of the masters to the Fathers; and Kempshall focuses on the influence 
exercised by the greatest Latin Father, Augustine, on the historical writing 
of Nicholas Trevet, who chose the ‘deliberate restatement of Augustinian 
restraint’ over alternative approaches of which he was well aware. The 
Summae of the masters are at the centre of other analyses: Sabapathy’s of 
Robert of Courson; Corran’s of Peter the Chanter and Raymond of Peñafort 
and Linde’s on Robert Holcot’s commentary on the Sentences. Piron writes 
important pages on ideas from Peter John Olivi’s rather loosely articulated 
Summa. Rolando of Cremona, the centre of Biller’s chapter, also wrote a 
Summa (though it is only one of a range of sources used). Philosophy – 
non-Christian – is at the core of the contributions by Fitzpatrick (the ideas 
of Aristotle and Averroes were hugely important in the debate she studies) 
and Marenbon, writing about the celebrity arts professor Pomponazzi. 
Even in Iribarren’s chapter on a poem about Mary and Joseph, in which 
one would not expect arts-faculty thinking or pagan philosophy, it is argued 
3 On ‘Gratian’ see the editors’ note in their introduction.
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that conjectural reasoning is used to justify devotional truths described in 
language which goes back to the Arab tradition of commentaries on the 
Aristotelian Organon. 
Only the chapter by Melville resists easy insertion into Bonaventure’s 
schema. It is true that it dovetails with the book as a whole because of its 
affinities with Piron’s contribution. Both explore the same paradox: belief 
in institutions by misfits in the institutions of their time who felt inspired 
by God. Piron finds in Spiritual Franciscans a ‘tendency to attribute a 
strong historical meaning to the Franciscan institution itself ’ which ‘would 
develop especially among a minority group; and that this use would grow 
stronger the more they were marginalized and “de-institutionalized”’. 
Melville illustrates from the history of religious orders the paradox that 
charismatic leaders subversive of institutions had to institutionalize their 
movements. Peter John Olivi (c.1248–98), the man at the centre of Piron’s 
article, had a conventional, ‘scholastic’ university training, even if from 
wholly Franciscan institutions; and can be counted among the writers of 
Summae, something which brings him into line with most of the thinkers 
discussed in the volume. However, Melville’s contribution to the history of 
canon law and religious orders forces us to think about where we draw the 
boundaries around ‘scholasticism’.
‘Gratian’ is Melville’s starting point and, as already noted, there is a strong 
affinity between ‘Gratian’s’ modus operandi and the technique of ‘contrasting 
authorities’ associated with academic theology from Abelard onwards. The 
excellent ideal-type of scholasticism which the editors borrow from the late 
Riccardo Quinto (1961–2014) fits academic canon law as well as academic 
theology, especially if one can understand ‘truth value’ to include truth 
about the state of the law:
(1) an ‘objective’ engagement with texts ‘independent of the subjective 
conditions of the commentator’ i.e. not primarily concerned with a 
‘subjective’ personal, spiritual engagement – as in monastic texts; 
(2) texts are subject to an analytical reading, with ‘individual statements’ 
compatibility established though dialectical means’; 
(3) the text’s value comes wholly from its truth-value and not from its ‘own’ 
interest or purpose –  to that degree it produces knowledge (scientia), ‘an 
ensemble of propositions guaranteed by their conformity to an authoritative 
text, integrated yet in a new ensemble in which their legitimacy and 
reciprocal connection shines in an even clearer way.4 
4 R. Quinto, Scholastica. Storia di un concetto (Subsidia Mediaevalia Patavina, ii, Padua, 
2001), pp. 416–7. See also the editors’ discussion of the topic in their introduction and the 
comments by Emily Corran in her chapter at pp. 5, 222, 234. 
272
Individuals and Institutions in Medieval Scholasticism
That raises a question, however, for by no means all the texts studied in 
this volume fit that definition. Nor do they all fit other definitions of 
scholasticism which might plausibly be proposed (and which overlap a 
good deal with Quinto’s): one could for instance define scholasticism as 
the systematic use of quaestiones to resolve problems and contradictions 
in authoritative tradition; or one could adopt Martin Grabmann’s classic 
definition: the application of reason to revelation.5 There is thus a surface 
contradiction between the contents of the volume and the definition of its 
subject endorsed by its editors. The editors themselves provide the conceptual 
tools to resolve the contradiction; and also to think in new ways about the 
relationship between ‘ideas’ and ‘society’, about which the introduction 
proposes some seminal ideas, going far beyond the conceptual frameworks 
for intellectual history which survive from the twentieth century.
What is the legacy of the twentieth century as far as frameworks for 
intellectual history are concerned? For the middle ages, a key role was assigned 
to ‘the rise of towns and trade’ by scholars far beyond the narrow circle of 
Marxisant historians: a diluted version of the ‘socio-economic substructure/
ideological superstructure’ schema. Its typical Annales form was to point to 
homologies rather than a one-directional causal relationship. Out of the 
same tradition came the Jacques Le Goff (1924–2014) school of ‘historical 
anthropology’; then ‘scholastic anthropology’ (the school of Alain Boureau 
which helped to form Piron and Dufal), working scholastic thought into its 
social setting in life. It focused on the penetration, into the actual content 
of high-level academic thought, of ideas underlying the social and political 
practice of their time; and perhaps also on scholastic thought which still 
seems relevant to understanding humanity. Also emanating from Paris were 
the theories of Michel Foucault (1926–84) of a dominant discourse in each 
age. From Cambridge came an emphasis on the immediate context of ideas 
as opposed to their long-term life. Meanwhile, most historians of scholastic 
texts have been primarily engaged in editions and high-quality description 
of content. None of this will provide an answer to the question of how 
to find a concept of ‘scholasticism’ which includes the rich variety in this 
volume without being impossibly vague. To this may be added the questions 
of how to integrate the intellectual and social aspects of scholasticism; and 
of where the field should go next. 
5  M. Grabmann, Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode (2 vols, Freiburg, 1909–11), 
i. 36: ‘Die scholastische Methode will durch Anwendung der Vernunft, der Philosophie 
auf die Offenbarungswahrheiten möglichste Einsicht in den Glaubensinhalt gewinnen’ (the 
definition goes on to include bringing supernatural truth nearer to the thinking human 




The introduction suggests solutions by drawing attention to Niklas 
Luhmann’s brand of systems theory as a way to think about scholasticism; 
and offers an excellent short summary of his thought which need not be 
repeated. One way in which Luhmann (1927–98) differs from most previous 
anthropologists and sociologists is that he does not think in terms of ‘the 
social system’ so much as a myriad of systems and subsystems: any sequence 
of communications with boundaries is a social system. Scholasticism as 
defined by Quinto is a feature shared by a range of (but not all of ) the 
subsystems within a loose, overarching system, something one might define 
grosso modo as the academic world of the central and late middle ages: 
universities and the institutions modelled on them (mendicant studia). The 
tradition of teaching the Sentences and writing Summa is a subsystem, as is 
the tradition of commenting on the works of Aristotle in texts and in the 
classroom. One could call scholasticism as defined by Quinto the scholastic 
method; and the over-arching system the world of scholasticism.
If social systems are sequences of communications within boundaries, we 
move beyond the world of texts. Textual arguments about excommunication, 
usury, rapine, vows, scandal and due process (Sabapathy); perfection 
(Piron); casuistical questions (Corran); or Holcot’s interpretation of Omnis 
utriusque sexus (Linde) are just the – to us – most visible parts of ways of 
religious life, confessional conversations and tense disputes between friars 
and bishops. This volume is about a series of subsystems consisting not only 
of writings but also of oral teaching and debate and of ideas in action.
Even debates which are much more tightly defined can be re-conceived 
as social systems. Fitzpatrick’s chapter on the ‘unicity of substantial 
forms’ makes this clear. She shows Franciscans and Dominicans locked 
in conflict over this apparently technical issue. (Actually, it was rather 
fundamental, as it involved questions about the continuity between an 
individual’s body in life and after the resurrection.) Luhmann argues 
that conflicts can be highly integrated social systems.6 Furthermore, the 
subject of the debate was more protean than its technical name might 
suggest. Dominican intellectuals who claimed to represent the position 
of Thomas Aquinas (1225–74) actually had different views.7 It was the 
conflict as much as the content which makes this an identifiable subject of 
research. Furthermore, the conflict continued into the fifteenth century. 
It evolved into a debate about the status of Christ’s blood and became 
relevant to popular devotion. The orders attacked each other vehemently 
6 N. Luhmann, Soziale Systeme. Grundriß einer allgemeinen Theorie (Frankfurt, 1984), pp. 
532–5.
7 A. Fitzpatrick, Thomas Aquinas on Bodily Identity (Oxford, 2017), pp. 175–82, ‘Epilogue’.
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and in public.8 It was truly a ‘conflict system’ which had taken on a life of 
its own and moved into a new, popular arena.
A striking parallel is the argument about the immaculate conception of 
the Virgin: was she born free from original sin? As with the argument about 
bodily continuity before and after the resurrection, the conflict was about 
institutional identities and rivalries as well as belief. Broadly speaking, 
the doctrine of the immaculate conception was rejected by Dominicans 
and adopted by the Franciscan order, together with the Jesuits in the early 
modern period. The debate was fought out with scholastic intellectual 
weapons but also by mobilizing public opinion.9
This suggests a route for future research: the long-term history not 
of ideas as such, but of what might be called ‘conversational threads’: 
sequences of communication starting from the discussion of a specific 
problem or text, although evolving – as conversations (and arguments) do. 
The communication consists of oral teaching limited by tacit expectations 
as well as quaestiones in written Summae. The longer the sequence the better: 
these conversational threads can certainly be studied up to the Reformation, 
if not beyond. 
This is different from the ‘unit-idea’ approach10 because the conversations 
may shift their focus and change their character and even their content 
over time; and are not necessarily about one idea. For instance, ‘ethics’ 
in classical Greece, its boundaries marking it off from the religion of the 
Olympians with all their goings-on, can be seen as a conversation started 
by Sophists and continued by Socrates (469–399 bc) and Plato (c.429–347 
bc). It embraced new themes with stoicism; slid into a Christian framework 
without losing the boundaries which marked off natural virtues from other 
religious duties; then started to part company with politics in Machiavelli’s 
thought (1469–1527); and so on. This ‘conversational-thread’ approach 
would also be different from the study of the reception of an individual text 
or thinker. The sequence of communications could, in principle, consist 
only of authors replying to authors, but normally it will be more ‘embodied’.
Take Augustine’s idea of predestination. It takes off through controversy 
involving not just books but a council and popes. Opposition to it comes 
from John Cassian (c.360–after 430), working in a monastic social setting 
8 A. Fitzpatrick, ‘Mendicant order politics and the status of Christ’s shed blood’, Hist. 
Research, lxxxv (2011), 210–27.
9 The authoritative study is B. Gaspar, ‘The immaculate conception 1100–1700: para-
magisterial powers and their politics’ (unpublished University College London PhD thesis, 
2012).
10 Usually represented, in polemics against it, by A. O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being: 
a Study of the History of an Idea (Cambridge, Mass., 1936).
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in which man did not seem so hopelessly sinful, as long as he thought 
about scripture enough. Ninth-century intellectuals revive the argument 
(Gottschalk, Hincmar of Reims). With John Wyclif (c.1330–84) the idea 
evolves into a union with his notion of an eternal Bible in the mind of 
God. From then onwards the debate spilled into the public sphere, where 
it had begun, with Martin Luther (1483–1546); John Calvin (1509–64); the 
Council of Trent (1545–63); Jansenism; Jacobus Arminius (1560–1609), 
etc. Between Gottschalk and Hincmar, and within the larger conversation 
about predestination, there is a more specifically scholastic conversational 
thread which one can trace through commentaries on Peter Lombard’s 
Sentences. Research on the debate about predestination in commentaries on 
book 1, distinctions 40 and 41 can serve as a model for other investigations. 
Russell Friedman traces the debate up to 1320, distinctions 40–41 providing 
a thread to follow.11 The subsequent exchanges have been more sketchily 
surveyed.12 In the nature of the case, one would expect each to be responding 
to previous commentaries as well as to the original text. 
Many other new questions could be asked about medieval scholasticism. 
A promising method, successfully applied to Duns Scotus by Michael 
Sylwanowicz, is to uncover deep presuppositions far below the surface of a 
master’s work.13 According to Sylwanowicz, Scotus had a much fierier, more 
dynamic idea of being than did Aquinas and a more generous notion of 
God. The approach could be applied to other thinkers. Again, one could 
11 R. L. Friedman, ‘The Sentence commentary, 1250–1320. General trends, the impact of 
the religious orders, and the test case of predestination’, in Medieval Commentaries on the 
Sentences of Peter Lombard, ed. G. R. Evans and P. Rosemann (3 vols, Leiden, 2002–15), i. 
41–148, especially pp. 84–115. 
12 Research into this or other ‘conversational threads’ through Sentence commentaries is 
facilitated also by Rosemann’s 2nd and 3rd volumes of Medieval Commentaries on the Sentences 
and F. Stegmüller, Repertorium Commentariorum in Sententias Petri Lombardi (Würzburg, 
1947). Random examples are Hugolini de Urbe Veteri, OESA, Commentarius in Quattuor 
Libros Sententiarum, ii, ed. W. Eckermann (Würzburg, 1984), pp. 381–402 (he lectured in 
1348–49: see Evans and Rosemann, Medieval Commentaries on the Sentences, i. 431); and 
Heinrich von Gorichem [= Henry of Gorkum], In quatuor libros sententiarum (Basel, 1498, 
repr. Frankfurt, 1967), Lib. 1, Di. XL and XLI (no page numbers). On Henry of Gorkum, 
whose commentary was produced at Cologne in the early 14th century, see J. T. Slotemaker, 
‘Henry of Gorkum’s Conclusiones super IV libros Sententiarum: studying the Lombard in the 
first decades of the fifteenth century’, in Evans and Rosemann, Medieval Commentaries on 
the Sentences, iii. 145–73. For traditional doctrinal history of the predestination doctrine, see 
W. Pannenberg, Die Prädestinationslehre des Duns Scotus im Zusammenhang der scholastischen 
Lehrentwicklung (Göttingen, 1954). My thanks to Michael Sylwanowicz for this reference. 
Pannenberg concentrated on Duns Scotus and his predecessors but provided a short 
‘Ausblick’ on subsequent developments up to Luther (pp. 140–9).
13 M. E. R. Sylwanowicz, Contingent Causality and the Foundations of Duns Scotus’ 
Metaphysics (Leiden, 1996).
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investigate the significant absences from the range of topics scholasticism 
characteristically covered in its initial phase and its thirteenth- and early 
fourteenth-century flowering. Negative facts matter. The whole theme of 
ecclesiology is left on the margins of scholasticism, for instance, though it 
was on the minds of theologians in the later middle ages. Canon lawyers 
thought about it systematically much earlier. 
These two types of university intellectual and their respective paradigms 
should be studied together. The respective origins and methods of lawyers and 
theologians were similar: notably disputations and syntheses. Sociologically 
speaking, they were increasingly separate, however, and the same can be 
said of most of the scholars who study them today. To reconstruct the 
intellectual barriers of the middle ages some modern barriers need to come 
down. 
The relationship of scholastic theology to preaching also needs systematic 
attention. The whole problem has been obscured by a tendency to characterize 
the preaching method of the mid thirteenth century on as ‘scholastic’. That 
seems natural since these sermons were full of distinctions and authorities; 
but whereas scholastic theology proper used distinctions to resolve apparent 
contradictions between authorities, thirteenth-century sermons used them 
to unpack a topic – just as French students and scholars do in essays and 
lectures today (les trois points etc.) – and subsumed authorities under the 
parts thus divided, without any particular interest in contradictions between 
them. Furthermore, there are hardly any quaestiones in thirteenth-century 
sermons. Gradually, starting with a few exceptional cases in the thirteenth 
century and then, after that, less exceptionally, we meet quaestiones and 
genuine philosophical reasoning in sermons.14 The stages of this and many 
other developments have still to be mapped, but no user of the present 
volume is likely to feel pessimistic about the future of the field. 
14 For unsystematic preliminary findings, see D. L. d’Avray, ‘Philosophy in preaching: 
the case of a Franciscan based in thirteenth-century Florence (Servasanto da Faenza)’, in 
Literature and Religion in the Later Middle Ages: Philological Studies in Honor of Siegfried 
Wenzel, ed. R. G. Newhauser and J. A. Alford (Binghampton, N.Y., 1993) pp. 263–73.
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